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 7 Preface
Preface
My time, the rank I attain, my outward appearance — all of these are secondary. For a 
runner like me, what’s really important is reaching the goal I set for myself, under my 
own power. I give everything I have, endure what needs enduring, and am able, in my 
own way, to be satisfied. 
Haruki Murakami, 2009, p. 1731
Running a marathon and doing a PhD
In November 2011, I ran the New York City Marathon in 4 hours and 47 minutes. In 
2016, I hope to defend my PhD dissertation, after roughly ten years of contemplating, 
interviewing, analysing, writing, omitting, and editing. The similarity between the two 
events is that in both instances it took me quite some time to finish the job. Maybe 
this is an awkward way to start a preface to a PhD, but there are many parallels to draw 
between running a marathon and doing a PhD—parallels that I want to use to reflect on 
my academic ‘journey’ that has resulted in this thesis. 
Finishing a marathon can be seen as a symbol of perseverance, but it can also be a 
symbol of needless suffering. You do need to be a bit crazy to run a marathon, and the 
same goes for writing a PhD thesis, especially when you do it—like I did—in part-time, 
parallel to work, family, and the countless other things that constitute life.
Crossing bridges
The New York City Marathon is known for its millions of exuberant spectators, and 
2011 was no exception. In many places, spectators lined the streets in large numbers 
yelling “looking good!” and “almost there!”—regardless of the distance to the finish 
line. Less well-known are the quiet stretches along the route with very few spectators. 
The bridges connecting the New York boroughs are especially infamous. These artificial 
‘hills’ can suck the life out of you. My PhD had several ‘bridge’ moments, periods of 
desperation when I made little progress and my research seemed to be ‘walking in 
circles’, and moments when finding a healthy balance between study, work, and family 
seemed utterly hopeless.
1 Murakami, H. (2009). What I talk about when I talk about running. London: Vintage Books
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Meeting inspiring people
Running a marathon is like a series of super-short speed-dates with fellow-runners and 
people along the route.  Likewise, I have met many interesting people during my PhD 
research, too many to mention actually.  At the peril of omitting people, I do want to 
name a few individuals who inspired me by their commitment to improve the quality of 
living in vulnerable neighbourhoods. 
I want to express my gratitude to housing association De Huismeesters in Groningen, 
especially to Stein van Berkel, Peter Hillenga and Henk Zaagman. I want to thank the 
Groningen municipality officers Kees van der Helm, Chris Niemeijer and Liesbeth 
van de Wetering; community representatives in De Hoogte Evert Bosscher and Alex 
Spanjer and community support officers Hennie van Beek and Carina de Witte. I also 
want to thank the programme managers involved in developing and implementing 
the regeneration plans for De Hoogte: Ron Jeukens and Henk Boldewijn, and former 
Groningen local authority officers René de Jong and Gerard Tollner.
In Birmingham my appreciation goes to housing association Midland Heart, and 
especially to Jo Burrill, Mary Jane Gunn, Martin Hall, Baggi Mattu, Tom Murtha, Ashok 
Patel and Gail Walters; to the Birmingham City Council officers Deborah Burke, Mark 
English, and the Lozells neighbourhood managers Kate Foley and Gillian Loyd. A special 
word of thanks to the following members of the Lozells community: Saaed Saidul 
Haque, Sister Helen Ryan and Birmingham City Councillor Waseem Zaffar. 
Receiving support
Writing this thesis was not just ‘a marathon’ for me; very probably, it was also a rather 
long-winded endeavour for my daily PhD supervisor Marja Elsinga and supervisors 
Peter Boelhouwer and David Mullins. I want to thank them for their support, for sharing 
their knowledge and insights, for their inspiring and critical remarks, and last but 
not least, for their patience. Shortly after starting my PhD, Marja Elsinga gave me the 
opportunity to start as a housing researcher at TU Delft. This combined the best of two 
worlds for me: the relevance of working in the social housing sector, and the reflection 
provided by my work as a housing researcher. Thank you Marja!
A special word of thanks to my lovely wife and lifelong partner (Neeltje) who supported 
my quest to complete this PhD with unwavering confidence that I could—and would—
finish the job. She is now looking forward to the oceans of time her husband will have 
(probably not), and is grateful for providing her with an ironclad reason to buy a new 
outfit for the PhD defence ceremony. My thoughts also go to my son Gideon (17) 
and my daughter Emma (15); they have known their father longer with than without 
‘his PhD’. I also want to thank my mother-in-law, Lidi Reijnders, who meticulously 
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proofread my Dutch language summary and checked if all the jargon words I used 
actually appeared in the Van Dale dictionary—luckily, most of them did. 
While doing my PhD, I also found support in the example of others: individuals that 
made a difference by supporting vulnerable people and places. I have honoured some 
of these inspiring individuals -my ‘housing heroes’- by including one of their quotes on 
the pages that separate the different parts of this thesis.
Crossing fault lines
Bridges, real or metaphorical, are not only difficult to conquer in marathons and PhDs; 
they are also formidable obstacles between organisations and people. Sometimes even 
the ‘bridges’ are missing. My 25 years in social housing—as a practitioner, consultant, 
researcher, lecturer, supervisory board member, and performance auditor—have 
strengthened my conviction that housing associations can contribute to the quality 
of life in vulnerable neighbourhoods. They can do so by helping cross the fault lines 
between organisations and local communities. Housing associations can make the 
difference—if they want to.  I hope that this thesis will make a modest contribution 
towards achieving that aim. 
Metaphors only go so far, and this is where the parallel between marathons and PhDs 
ends: I will certainly not do another PhD, but another marathon? Maybe.
Gerard van Bortel 
January 2016
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PART 1 INTRODUCTION
HOUSING HERO 1:
Is this policy, or is it logically considered?
Jan Schaefer (1940-1994), Dutch Labour (PvdA) politician. 
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1 Introduction
§  1.1 Background
Neighbourhood regeneration partners
The inspiration and motivation for this doctoral study can be found in the growing 
complexity in decision-making in housing and neighbourhood regeneration. Working 
for one of the housing associations in the city of Groningen between 1997 and 2004, 
I became accustomed to the robust collaborative relations between the Groningen 
local authority and local social landlords. In 2006, I was asked, no longer working 
for a housing association but as an external strategy consultant, to help solve stalled 
negotiations on a new housing and neighbourhood regeneration covenant. I was utterly 
amazed. How could decision-making have become so problematic and deadlocked 
among parties that had been collaborating for years? What could have been the role of 
housing associations in the development of this situation?
This chapter starts by introducing the decision-making deadlock that fuelled my 
motivation to start this PhD. The chapter continues with the introduction of two key 
concepts that played a central role in this study: first, the role and position of housing 
associations in neighbourhood regeneration, and second, the complex decision-
making processes between interdependent actors. These concepts are introduced 
briefly in the following sections and further developed in subsequent chapters. 
Integrated neighbourhood regeneration
The Groningen1 local authority and the local housing associations have been closely 
collaborating in neighbourhood regeneration since the mid-1990s. These actors have 
shared a strong commitment to improving the quality of life in the city, especially in 
vulnerable neighbourhoods. Around 2005, the nature of the collaboration changed. 
The introduction of new challenges, that neighbourhood regeneration was expected 
1  Groningen is a university town of 200 000 residents in the North of the Netherlands. 
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to address, markedly increased decision-making complexity. The renewal of deprived 
areas no longer predominantly focussed on ‘bricks and mortar’, on creating a better and 
more mixed housing stock, but also on improving the lives of residents and the social 
cohesion of local communities. Housing associations were expected to contribute (in 
kind and financially) to social and economic initiatives to improve the quality of life in 
deprived neighbourhoods.
Two interrelated developments led to this broader focus on neighbourhood 
regeneration and the more active involvement of housing associations: first, reports 
of growing social tensions in deprived neighbourhoods, and, second, the growing 
indignation among the public and policy makers that Dutch housing associations did 
not make full use of their organisational and investment capacities to improve the 
quality of life in vulnerable areas. These developments came together in the influential 
2005 Trust in the Neighbourhood report by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR, 2005). That report included a direct call to housing associations to focus 
more on social investment in communities:
The current lack of commitment of many housing associations to fulfil their social obligations is too 
large. In the ‘social recapture’ of neighbourhoods, they must act as prime contractor, with social care 
providers as subcontractors (WRR, 2005, p. 13).
Decision-making deadlock
The Trust in the Neighbourhood report acted as a transformative catalyst that led to a 
broader and more active role of the Groningen housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration. Notwithstanding this commitment and the well-developed collaborative 
relationship between housing associations and the Groningen local authority, it proved 
particularly difficult in 2006 to renew agreements on physical and social investments 
in neighbourhoods. Decision-making reached a stalemate, and the actors did not see 
a clear way out of the impasse due to the sheer complexity of the issues and number of 
actors that were part of the decision-making process. 
The deadlock was so severe, that the leadership of the Groningen local authority 
and housing associations decided to retreat to the idyllic but remote country estate 
Ekenstein near Appingedam2 in the autumn of 2006 for a two-day conference.  
2 The Ekensteijn conference is elaborated in chapter 6 Network Governance in Action: the case of Groningen
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Participants, including me, pledged not to leave the Ekenstein estate before the main 
issues were resolved. After two days of intense discussions, the main issues were 
resolved and the groundwork for a New Local Covenant (‘Nieuw Lokaal Akkoord’) 
was established, specifying housing and neighbourhood renewal objectives and 
investments for the coming years (Groningen Local Authority, 2007). 
Around the same time, a research commission for Delft University of Technology 
on neighbourhood regeneration networks in The Hague introduced me to network 
governance approaches [see chapter 5] and made it clear to me that our understanding 
of complex decision-making processes is still limited, especially with regard to the role 
played by non-state actors such as housing associations. 
This issue is not limited to the Netherlands; England also has a large social housing sector 
with third-sector housing associations involved in delivering housing and improving 
the quality of life in challenged neighbourhoods. English housing associations work 
in a markedly different context, prompting the question: to what extent, and why, the 
role played by English housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration decision-
making differs from that of their Dutch counterparts? Could comparing and contrasting 
developments in both countries generate new insights, improve the role of housing 
associations in neighbourhood regeneration decision-making, and ensure that vulnerable 
neighbourhoods get the support they need? The outline of a PhD-study was born. 
This research is analytical, exploratory, and —in some domains—normative in nature. 
This normative stance flows from my years working in housing and regeneration, 
which strengthened my conviction that housing associations have a role to play 
in neighbourhoods, and that this role should pay careful attention to the needs, 
capabilities, and wishes of local communities. Hence, this research pays attention to 
the democratic anchorage of decision-making, the inclusion of residents and local 
community organisations in decision-making, and the accountability of housing 
associations and other network actors to the outcomes delivered. 
An academic journey marked by complexity, crises, networks, and fault lines
At the beginning of my ‘academic journey’ in 2005, I could not have foreseen how 
much the nature of neighbourhood regeneration, and the role of housing associations, 
would change in the years to come. The global financial crisis, a severe housing market 
downturn, and a conservative twist in Dutch and English government policies, profoundly 
changed the working environment of housing associations. This turbulence made my 
scholarly journey an unforgettable experience, but it also demonstrated how strongly 
contextual developments can affect decision-making. This research highlighted the 
strong network relationships between housing associations and local authorities, but also 
revealed the often troublesome interactions between housing associations and residents. 
The title of this thesis: “Networks and Fault lines” is intended to reflect this.  
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§  1.2 Research objective, framework and questions
§  1.2.1 Research objective
This study aims to increase our understanding of the role of housing associations in 
neighbourhood regeneration governance networks in the Netherlands and England, to 
explore how that role is influenced by the respective societal contexts, and formulate 
recommendations to improve their involvement in vulnerable neighbourhoods.
§  1.2.2 Conceptual framework 
To achieve the research objective, a conceptual framework has been constructed 
[see Figure 1.1]. The governance network perspective, elaborated in chapter 2, 
underpins this framework. This perspective acknowledges that actors are increasingly 
interdependent in solving problems, but accommodates for the existence of a wide 
variety of coordination mechanisms: market, state, network, and hybrid forms of 
coordination. This conceptuel framework has five components, each one elaborated 
within a research question:
 – the contextual issues that influence policy problems and processes;
 – the actors and their various perspectives on the problems to be solved and the 
objectives to be achieved; 
 – the policy processes including the decision-making arenas, actions and interactions of 
actors over time, the deadlocks and breakthroughs, and the substantive outcomes that 
follow from these interactions;
 – the network of relationships between actors arising from interdependencies and 
previous interactions; 
 – the outcomes of decision-making interactions produced by the neighbourhood 
regeneration network.
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FIGURE 1.1 Conceptual framework
§  1.2.3 Research questions 
Question 1: Context: How have contextual factors such as economic, social, and 
political developments affected the role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration decision-making processes?  
Question 2 Networks: What are the characteristics (actors, dependencies, connections, 
and coordination mechanisms) of the neighbourhood regeneration networks that 
housing associations participate in? 
Question 3 Actors: What are the perceptions and objectives of housing associations 
and other key actors concerning neighbourhood regeneration investments and 
activities?
Question 4 Process: How do decision-making interactions involving housing 
associations develop in neighbourhood regeneration networks? Which interaction 
strategies do housing associations use, and how do other actors view and respond to 
these strategies? 
Question 5 Outcomes: How has the network, and the role of housing associations in 
particular, contributed to neighbourhood regeneration decision-making outcomes? 
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§  1.3 Research methodology
§  1.3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 presents the two key theoretical components underpinning this study: 
1) housing associations as hybrid organisations and their role in neighbourhood 
regeneration, and 2) network governance as an analytical framework. This section 
will elaborate the methodological implications of the chosen theoretical network 
governance perspective by discussing the following topics:
1 Research strategy
2 Research methods
3 Research quality
4 Case study and case selection
§  1.3.2 Research strategy 
In order to answer the research questions, a qualitative, comparative, longitudinal 
exploration based on case studies was conducted. The following section will discuss the 
various components of the research strategy.
Qualitative 
Understanding the role of housing associations in a complex context—such as 
neighbourhood regeneration—demands in-depth insights into actor-based 
perspectives. Only rich qualitative data can provide these insights. This study explored 
the interactions between actors involved in neighbourhood regeneration decision-
making. In decision-making there is no such a thing as an objective truth independent 
from the perspectives of individual people (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Johnson & 
Duberley, 2000). This research therefore adopts Teisman’s (1998) premises that 
actors construct their surroundings in interaction with others, and base their actions 
on these constructs. Through these strategic interactions, actors create arenas and 
decision-making processes as the unintended results. This research recognizes the 
socially constructed nature of knowledge and institutions, and does so based on the 
premise of a shared empirical reality. Consequently, within the academic debate 
between proponents of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of social constructionism in housing 
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research, this study clearly aligns with the latter (Somerville & Bengtsson, 2002, 
Clapham, 1997, 2009; Jacobs & Manzi, 2000; Jacobs, Kemeny, & Manzi, 2004; 
Lawson, 2006). 
Comparative 
In housing studies, there is a long tradition of cross-national analysis that is 
predominantly universalistic in nature and is focused on the macro level of national 
housing policies. Comparative case study investigations below the national level are 
rare (Steinführer, 2005).  Housing associations adapt to, and are influenced by, their 
respective contexts. Therefore, two carefully selected cases in very divergent contexts 
will be compared. In comparative research, a spectrum between two approaches can be 
identified: universalistic and particularistic research (Haffner, Hoekstra, Oxley & Van 
der Heijden, 2010). The universalistic approach assumes that similar concepts apply 
in all locations. The particularistic approach (also see Hantrais’s (2009) culturalistic 
approach) emphasises that phenomena being explored are bound to specific cultures 
and acquire their meaning in a specific institutional and historical context. This study 
takes a middle-way approach, based on the premise that there is much to be gained 
from microscale studies focusing on specific actors and neighbourhoods, and the belief 
that much can be learned about any given ‘whole’ by studying a single part and putting 
the part into context (Oxley, 2001, p. 103). 
Longitudinal 
The qualitative, comparative exploration sets out to examine social phenomena in their 
real-life contexts and should therefore not be restricted to a snapshot taken at a single 
point in time. A longitudinal view is especially relevant to studying neighbourhood 
regeneration decision-making because these processes can take many years and 
involve several iterations that may change the outcomes of previous decision-making 
rounds. In housing studies, longitudinal qualitative research studies that seek to 
document, record, and understand the temporal process of change over time are still 
rare. Although there is an established tradition of tracing change through quantitative 
methods, qualitative studies have tended to approach these questions retrospectively. 
What distinguishes longitudinal qualitative research is the deliberate way in which 
temporality is designed into the research process, making change a central focus of 
analytic attention (Thomson, Plumridge, & Holland, 2003). This longitudinal element 
is essential for this research because changes in goals and actor perspectives and 
opinions are very hard to reconstruct in retrospect. The timing of the study made 
the research period particularly valuable. The amount of system change was an 
unanticipated bonus.
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Case Study and case selection 
My experience as a housing practitioner and researcher made me keenly aware of 
the urgency to acquire a better understanding of how housing associations operate 
in regeneration networks. It also convinced me that the only feasible avenue to 
increase our understanding was to study decision-making interactions as ‘up close 
and personal’ as possible. This had an important impact on my decision to use a 
longitudinal case study strategy.
Case studies are the most appropriate approach to capture and analyse decision-
making in all its richness and depth. According to Swanborn (2010), a case study 
approach is the most suitable strategy if one wants to intensively study social 
phenomena, explore events, and follow developments over time. Collective decision-
making is explicitly mentioned by Swanborn as a subject often investigated using case 
studies. By using case studies, the researcher has multiple primary and secondary 
sources of evidence, and can add data through direct observation and interviewing (Yin, 
1984). 
To ensure that comparable cases were explored, a similar kind of policy output was 
selected: a neighbourhood regeneration plans as starting points for the study. In order 
to longitudinally monitor developments, decision-making had to be happening at an 
early stage. In addition, the access to documents, events, and informants involved in 
decision-making was an important selection criterion. Based on these criteria, the 
neighbourhoods of Lozells in North/West Birmingham (England) and De Hoogte in 
Groningen (the Netherlands) have been selected as case studies areas.  At the start of 
the fieldwork for this research, in 2007, housing associations were closely involved in 
developing regeneration plans to improve the quality of life in these areas: a Master 
Plan for Lozells and a Neighbourhood Action Plan (‘Wijkactieplan’) for De Hoogte.
Table 1.1 below provides a summary of case study characteristics, highlighting 
similarities and differences. The national level items in this table are discussed in 
chapter 2.
TOC
 31 Introduction
NATIONAL LEVEL ENGLAND THE NETHERLANDS
Political Economy
Hal and Soskice (2001)
Liberal market economy (LME) Coordinated market economy 
(CME)
Welfare state regime
Esping-Andersen (1990); Hoekstra, 
(2003)
Liberal (Modern) corporatist
Rental market
Kemeny (1995, 2006)
Dualist legacy Unitary legacy
Municipal level Birmingham Groningen
City Birmingham (1.2 million inhab-
itants)
Groningen (200 000 inhabitants)
Neighbourhood level Lozells De Hoogte
Focal actor Housing association Midland Heart 
(32 000 units)
Housing association De Huis-
meesters (7 000 units)
Role focal actor Midland Heart led partnership to 
develop Masterplan
De Huismeesters participated in 
partnership to develop Neighbour-
hood Action Plan
Position of focal actor Largest housing association in the 
area (market share around 30%)
Largest housing association in the 
area (market share around 80%)
Trigger of decision-making Development of Masterplan 
North-Lozells
Development of Neighbourhood 
Action Plan
Number of residents Lozells (4 000 households) De Hoogte (2 000 households) 
Status neighbourhood Priority area within Urban Living, 
Housing Market Renewal Path-
finder
Priority area within Empowered 
Neighbourhoods Programme
Issues Both neighbourhoods encounter problems with out-of-date housing 
stock, high levels of crime, unemployment, anti-social behaviour, and a 
concentration of vulnerable households.
Differences Focus on housing deconversions, 
transforming multiple occupation 
rental homes into family proper-
ties for home ownership
Focus on housing refurbishment 
and new housing construction
Very high ethnic minority popula-
tion (95%)
Moderately high ethnic minority 
population (20%)
TABLE 1.1 Summary of case study differences and similarities 
Sources: National level: summary of various sources in this chapter. Municipal and Neighbourhood level: 
Neighbourhood Action Plan De Hoogte, Lozells Masterplan, Annual reports of housing associations.
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FIGURE 1.2 Homes waiting for refurbishment in 
Lozells, Birmingham. Source: author
FIGURE 1.3 Refurbished homes in De Hoogte, 
Groningen. Source: author
§  1.3.3 Research quality 
This research used several criteria to ensure adequate research quality. These criteria—
veracity, objectivity and perspicacity—are derived from ethnographic research. Table 
1.2 briefly summarises these criteria. Following Stewart (1998), strategies have been 
developed and applied for each of these research quality criteria. The methodological 
reflection in the concluding chapter [§ 9.7.3], and Appendix E discuss the actions taken 
to assure maximum compliance with these research quality criteria.
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RESEARCH QUALITY CRITERIA EXPLANATION
Veracity Veracity focuses on the question whether we have 
observed in empirical reality what our descriptions 
claim we have.
Objectivity Objectivity entails the mitigation of bias, and the 
specification of research circumstances that could 
influence bias.
Perspicacity Perspicacity aspires to produce applicable insights, 
yielding research results that can be applied in more 
contexts than only that of the fieldwork.
TABLE 1.2 Research quality criteria
§  1.3.4 Research methods
In addition to written reports, personal accounts by individuals have been an important 
data source for this study. In the Groningen and Birmingham case studies, 70 
interviews with 45 different actors were conducted between 2007 and 20143. The 
average interview took around one hour. This amounted to approximately 60 hours of 
transcribed interviews4. The research started with a scoping phase to identify relevant 
actors. Key informants working for housing associations formed the starting point of 
the exploration. These individuals were identified through contacts in the author’s 
network for the Dutch case and, for the English case, through research partners at the 
University of Birmingham. ‘Snow-balling’ techniques were used to identify additional 
interviewees. Key informants were interviewed several times during the fieldwork 
period to capture newly unfolding developments [see Table 1.3 and Appendix C]. 
They were interviewed multiple times to keep the distance between events and the 
interviews as short as possible. Most interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
analysed using Atlas TI. All transcribed interviews are traceable, while allowing for 
anonymity of the informants. Individual, loosely structured interviews with individual 
actors were complemented by some group interviews, (participant) observation of 
public meetings, and desk research. 
3 This does not include the 25 interviews, non-transcribed interviews, conducted for the case study in The Hague 
(Chapter 5).
4 Some interviews were not transcribed because of technical problems with the audio recordings. Authors’ notes 
were used to summarize and analyze these interviews.  
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LOZELLS
BIRMINGHAM
DE HOOGTE
GRONINGEN
TOTAL
 Actors # Interviews # Different 
persons
# Interviews # Different 
persons
# Interviews # Different 
persons
Housing association 17 9 14 7 31 16
Local Authority 6 4 13 9 19 13
Residents, Neighbourhood 
organisations and Resident 
supporters 
4 3 8 6 12 9
Others (researchers, advisors) 6 5 2 2 8 7
Total 33 21 37 24 70 45
Observed and participated 
events & meetings
6  4  10  
TABLE 1.3 Number of interviews and number of different actors interviewed in Birmingham and Groningen
A full overview of interviewees from the Birmingham and Groningen case studies can 
be found in the appendixes. An overview of interviews that informed Chapter 5 on the 
neighbourhood renewal network in The Hague can be found in the original report (Van 
Bortel & Elsinga, 2005). 
§  1.4 Contribution to science and society
§  1.4.1 Scientific relevance
Previous studies have often focused on the role of governmental actors and their 
options for maintaining control over decision-making processes in a complex 
environment (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 1991; Koffijberg, 2005). We still have only a 
limited understanding of the role played by third sector actors such as social landlords 
(but see Kendall & Knapp, 2000).  Policy outcomes cannot be understood in full when 
perceptions and actions of other actors are not explicitly taken into consideration. 
Therefore, this study will contribute to the body of knowledge on the role of housing 
associations in neighbourhood renewal decision-making. 
Analysing neighbourhood regeneration decision-making from an actor-based 
perspective offers a generous supply of cooperative efforts, negotiations, and insights 
into the allocation of power in decision-making and the role of systems of governance. 
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However, these studies still have a modest position in housing research (Bengtsson, 
2009). In particular, research into the role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration governance is still scarce (but see Van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007 and Haffner 
& Elsinga, 2009). This is certainly the case for longitudinal comparative research. This 
research intends to contribute to the field of housing studies by applying and refining 
network governance theories and methodologies.
Research on policy processes in housing and neighbourhood renewal is often 
undertaken by retrospectively reconstructing the interactions and perspectives of the 
actors involved. The results are thus often affected by hindsight. This research has 
longitudinally explored emerging decision-making events during a period of eight years 
(between 2007 and 2014).
§  1.4.2 Societal relevance
This research is based on my conviction, based on almost 25 years of experience in 
the social housing sector, that social landlords can play an important role in improving 
the quality of life in neighbourhoods, and in the regeneration of deprived areas. An 
increased understanding of the role played by these actors in neighbourhood renewal 
can enhance the performance and outcomes of governance networks by improving 
the effectiveness and quality of decision-making processes. Therefore, it is important 
to gain scientifically sound insights into the way decision-making in neighbourhood 
renewal develops, and into how networks of state, market, third sector, and community 
actors develop and deliver results efficiently and effectively in a way that is transparent, 
inclusive, and democratic. 
§  1.5 Reading guide
§  1.5.1 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts [see Figure 1.4 below]. Part One introduces the key 
components needed to understand the role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration governance [Chapter 2], and presents different critical perspectives on 
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network approaches in neighbourhood regeneration, community, involvement and 
integration [Chapter 3]. The thesis continues in Part Two with several case studies 
presenting empirical findings that contribute to achieving the research objective and 
to answering the research questions [Chapters 4 – 7]. The theoretical sections in these 
case studies chapters further elaborate the analytical framework outlined in Part I. Part 
Three of the thesis is more reflective in nature. The chapters in this part discuss several 
patterns that emerged in this investigation. Chapter 8 returns to the sociological base 
underpinning the governance network approach and explores how lifeworld and system 
actors are involved in the co-production of solutions for societal problems. The third 
part ends with summarizing the answers to the research questions [Chapter 9]. The 
thesis concludes with Appendices, in Part Four, that contain lists of tables and figures, 
overviews of actors and interviewees,  actions taken to ensure research quality, a topics 
lists for the interviews, and updated data on liveability. 
A more elaborate introduction to the various chapters, and their connection to the 
conceptual framework, can be found in the following paragraph [§ 1.5.2]. 
FIGURE 1.4 Thesis structure
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§  1.5.2 Introduction to the chapters
General
This thesis is the result of a rather organic explorative process, and that is visible in 
the structure of this thesis. It consists of five published and one submitted article, an 
introductory, and a concluding chapter. The chapters are ordered in such a way as to 
build a logical narrative. Table 1.4 aims to draw all the chapters together into a cohesive 
set of texts. For each chapter the key contribution to the thesis is elaborated.
CHAPTERS Key contribution of the chapter to the thesis Context Networks Actors Processes Outcomes
1 & 2 Introduces key concepts and components of the 
conceptual framework needed to understand the 
role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration decision-making.
++ ++ ++ ++ ++
3 Critically reflects on network governance perspec-
tives, especially the incompatibility or comple-
mentarity of network governance approaches and 
democracy. Discusses the role of the state (steering 
in the shadow of hierarchy) and locally elected 
politicians in decision-making.
++ ++
4 Highlights the organizational diversity of housing 
associations. Demonstrates the impact of internal 
and external drivers on the behaviour of housing 
associations. Explores the far from straightforward 
relationship between size of housing associations 
and their performance. 
++ ++
5 Explores the explanatory potential of the gover-
nance network perspective: what insights does the 
network governance perspective generate when 
applied to the Dutch social housing sector in gener-
al and the neighbourhood regeneration network in 
the Hague in specific?
++ ++
6 Increases our understanding of the complexities 
and uncertainties in neighbourhood regeneration 
in Groningen by applying a network governance 
framework on decision-making processes between 
1995 and 2007. Includes a more in-depth analysis 
of policy games in 2005 to 2007 concerning 
decision-making on the integration of physical and 
social/economic regeneration initiatives.
++ ++
>>>
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CHAPTERS Key contribution of the chapter to the thesis Context Networks Actors Processes Outcomes
7 Explores and compares the added value of network 
governance and place leadership paradigms to 
increase our understanding of decision-making 
processes in neighbourhood regeneration and the 
potential to provide better outcomes for vulnerable 
neighbourhoods.
++ ++
8 Combines a network governance perspective with 
a system/lifeworld paradigm in order to increase 
our understanding of the collaboration between 
regeneration professionals and local communities 
in a context of government retrenchment
++ ++
9 Synthesises research findings for each of the com-
ponents of the theoretical framework. Highlights 
the theoretical, methodological, and societal rel-
evance of the research, and formulates conditions 
for which research findings are ‘portable’ to other 
contexts.
++ ++ ++ ++ ++
TABLE 1.4 Connection between thesis chapters and conceptual framework elements (Figure 2)  
++ = Strongest connection 
Note: Chapter 3 focuses on the outcomes of mergers in the social housing sector, not the outcomes of governance networks.
While the focus of this thesis is on the Groningen and Birmingham case study areas, 
the thesis also contains a chapter on neighbourhood regeneration governance in The 
Hague [Chapter 5]. The case study research underpinning that chapter was my first 
introduction to network governance approaches as an analytical perspective to increase 
our understanding of neighbourhood regeneration decision-making. That led to a 
taste for more. At the same time, there was some unease about the use of governance 
networks as a normative descriptive model of how complex decision-making processes 
should evolve and should be managed. My discomfort was shared by several fellow 
researchers and led, among other publications, to a special issue of the Journal of 
Housing and the Built Environment, with critical perspectives on network governance 
in urban regeneration, community involvement, and integration. Chapter 3 presents 
a critical review and analysis of the articles in that special issue. Because housing 
associations are the focal actors in this research. In chapter 4, the connection between 
the organisational characteristics (i.e. scale and merger activities) and the performance 
of housing associations is explored. No clear relation was found. However, we did find 
indications that internal and external drivers, organisational cultures, and ‘economies 
of scope’ can have a significant impact on organisational behaviour and performance. 
We use these results to formulate some ‘portability’ conditions [in chapter 9] for our 
research findings to contexts beyond the investigated cases. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present case study data from Groningen and Birmingham and have 
a strong focus on understanding the interactions in local neighbourhood regeneration 
governance networks. .
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Chapter 8 connects my research with Big Society/Participation Society policy 
paradigms that emerged during my fieldwork periode. At the start of my study in 
2007, both concepts were still unknown. They emerged from political discourse, the 
economic crisis, government austerity measures, and changed perspectives on the 
role of the state and the public sector. These agendas emphasise the need to more 
closely involve citizens in co-producing welfare services that previously were seen as 
directly delivered by the state, including improving the quality of life in vulnerable 
neighbourhoods. 
During my fieldwork, actors mentioned the difficulties they encountered in the 
interactions between organisations—such as housing associations—and local 
residents. These tensions appeared to be related to fundamental differences in 
language, logics, and values between actors. I found that the network governance 
approach did not offer me adequate insight. Habermas’s concept of lifeworld and 
system (Habermas, 1987) offered me a theoretical framework that provided additional 
insights in the interactions between system agencies and the lifeworld of local 
communities [also see § 2.3.5].
 Part I Introduction
Together with this first chapter, chapter 2 lays the groundwork for this thesis. Chapter 
2 introduces the key theoretical components of this study. Chapter 3 presents critical 
reflections on recent governance network studies and contributes to the theoretical 
framework. Chapter 4 explores recent organisational developments of housing 
associations —the focal actors of this research.
 Chapter 3 Critical perspectives on network governance in urban regeneration, community, 
involvement and integration.  
Journal Housing and the Built Environment, 2009, 24, 203–219. Special issue review article. 
Co-author: David Mullins
Chapter 3 provides a critical review of publications on the merit of network governance 
in urban regeneration, with a special focus on the democratic anchorage of governance 
networks. The article is part of a special issue on ‘second generation’ network 
governance research in housing and urban studies. This chapter tackles key questions 
relating to the sources of governance network failure and success, and explores these 
questions in the context of urban regeneration, community involvement, and the 
integration of minority groups in the Netherlands, Sweden, and England. 
TOC
 40 Networks and Fault Lines
 Chapter 4 ‘Change for the Better?’ — making sense of housing association mergers in the 
Netherlands and England.  
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 2010, 25, 353–374.  
Co-authors: David Mullins and Vincent Gruis
Chapter 4 explores the characteristics and behaviour of housing associations in the 
UK and the Netherlands —the focal actors of this thesis. The chapter particularly 
investigates the increasing scale of social landlords through the process of mergers 
and connects this development to the wider political and business environment, to 
managerial motives, to strategic choices, and to the process and the outcomes of 
mergers in relation to competing definitions of goals and success criteria. 
 Part II Case Studies
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide case study findings on the role of housing associations in 
neighbourhood renewal. Each chapter includes a theoretical paragraph related to the 
overarching network governance framework. 
 Chapter 5 A network perspective on the organisation of social housing in the Netherlands:  
the case of urban renewal in The Hague.  
Housing, Theory and Society, 2007, (24)1, 32-48.  
Co-author: Marja Elsinga
Chapter 5 describes the transformation of Dutch housing associations from strictly 
regulated and heavily subsidized organisations in the early 1990s into financially and 
administratively independent enterprises. From a governance network perspective 
this chapter presents research findings on two levels. On a national level, the chapter 
addresses the role of the government in regulating social housing and influencing 
the performance of housing associations. On a local level, this chapter examines the 
steering instruments available to the government and explores their efficacy in a case 
study in The Hague.
 Chapter 6 Network governance in action:  
the case of Groningen complex decision-making in urban regeneration.  
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 2009, (24)2, 167-183.
Chapter 6 uses the network governance approach as an analytical framework to 
present case study findings on urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen. The 
chapter describes the complexity of urban regeneration decision-making in an already 
well-established governance network and identifies strategies used by local actors to 
successfully deal with complexities and uncertainties in networks.
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 Chapter 7 Neighbourhood regeneration and place leadership:  
lessons from Groningen and Birmingham.  
Policy Studies, 2010, 31(4), 413-428. 
Co-author: David Mullins
Chapter 7 explores the concept of ‘place leadership’, a new and relatively under-
theorised concept in England, and a concept not explicitly formulated in the 
Netherlands. In this chapter, we relate the concept of place leadership to partnerships 
and network governance in neighbourhood regeneration and social housing. The 
chapter identifies a set of themes that are then used to explore research evidence on 
neighbourhood regeneration and the role played by housing associations in two cities: 
Groningen in the north of the Netherlands and Birmingham in the English Midlands. 
 Part III Conclusions and Reflections
Chapters 8 and 9 conclude this thesis, and supplement the previous chapters—
published between 2007 and 2010—with updated material over the 2010-2014 
period.
 Chapter 8 Will the Participation Society Succeed?  
Lessons from Neighbourhood Regeneration Programs in England and the Netherlands  
(Submitted to the Voluntas International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations) 
Compared to previous chapters in this thesis, the role of housing associations is less 
prominent in Chapter 8. This chapter is inspired by the changing political context 
during the 2007-2014 fieldwork period for this research. Departing from a top-
down, government-led approach to neighbourhood regeneration and welfare services 
provision, English and Dutch governments introduced agendas—Big Society and 
Participation Society—that emphasized more localised approaches and a more 
important role for citizens. This chapter explores how data from the neighbourhood 
regeneration case studies—including the role of housing associations—can tell us 
more about the challenges of implementing the Participation Society agenda.  A 
theoretical framework that connects Governance Network Theory with Habermas’s 
system and lifeworld concept guides this exploration. The chapter concludes with 
theoretical implication to strengthen governance network approaches.  
The thesis ends with a concluding chapter [Chapter 9] that synthesizes the answers to 
the research questions, reflects on the scientific and social relevance of this study, and 
presents directions for future research.  
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2 Key theoretical components: 
housing associations and 
complex decision-making
§  2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the two key theoretical components underpinning this 
research. Each component consists of various sub-components [see Table 2.1]. 
COMPONENT 1 COMPONENT 2
Housing associations and their role  
in neighbourhood regeneration
Understanding complex decision-making
The divergent contexts of housing associations: The rise of the network society
• Political economy Transformation from hierarchies and markets to 
hybrid coordination
• Welfare state regime Network governance as an analytical framework
• Rental market typology Different types of networks
Housing associations as hybrid social enterprises Different rules and logics in the system world of 
agencies and the lifeworld of residents
The role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration
Decision-making: garbage cans, policy streams, and 
arenas
TABLE 2.1 Key Theoretical components
§  2.2 Key component 1: The role of housing associations 
in neighbourhood regeneration 
To understand the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration we 
first have to understand their position within their respective welfare and housing 
systems. This section therefore first provides an overview of the welfare regimes and 
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housing systems in England and the Netherlands [§ 2.2.1]. This section continues 
by elaborating the characteristics of housing associations in both countries and 
highlighting their hybridity, combining state, market, and civil society values [§ 2.2.2]. 
A discussion of the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration 
concludes this section.
§  2.2.1 The divergent contexts of housing associations in England and the Netherlands
Housing associations in England and the Netherlands have largely similar tasks and 
housing management processes. However, they operate in very dissimilar societies. 
These contextual factors influence the resources and regulatory frameworks of 
social landlords and can affect decision-making processes. Frequently, ideal-type 
categories are used to compare and contrast countries. This section presents some of 
these typologies, but uses them as ‘can openers’ to start the exploration, rather than 
definitive descriptors of differences and similarities.  
To start our exploration we have used Kemp and Kofner’s (2010) framework that made 
the distinction between three levels of interrelated regimes and systems: the political 
economy, welfare regimes, and rental market housing systems [see Table 2.2 below]. In 
this section, we will introduce these tegimes and systems. 
REGIME TYPE THE NETHERLANDS ENGLAND REFERENCES
Political economy Co-ordinated market 
economy (CME)
Liberal market economy 
(LME)
Hall and Soskice (2001)
Welfare state regime Modern-
Corporatist
Liberal Esping-Andersen (1990, 
1999); Hoekstra (2010)
Rental market typology Unitary Dualist Kemeny (2006)
TABLE 2.2 Regime types in political economy, welfare and housing 
Based on table in Kemp and Kofner, 2010, p: 380 
1 Political economies 
In their influential work Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), Hall & Soskice (2001) distinguish 
between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). 
Economies in Britain and most other Anglo-Saxon countries are classified as ‘liberal’, 
while the Netherlands is categorized as ‘coordinated’. Coordination in LMEs takes place 
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through market competition rather than being mediated by collaboration between 
market firms and government agencies (also see Williamson, 1975; Kemp & Kofner, 
2010). CMEs depend on non-competitive networked and collaborative relationships to 
coordinate their endeavours. It does not suffice to focus only on the formal institutional 
characteristics to understand the dynamics and outcomes of political economies. 
Understanding of multi-player interactions between participants and the formal and 
informal rules guiding these interactions is also essential (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
2 Welfare state regimes
Political economies shape social policies that underpin welfare state regimes. Virtually 
all LMEs are accompanied by ‘liberal’ welfare states, whose emphasis is on means-
tested and low levels of benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Not only is there a strong 
entanglement between political economies and welfare state regimes, there are 
also strong but complex relations between welfare regimes and housing systems 
(Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992; Van der Heijden, 2002; Kemeny, 1992, 2006). 
Housing is often referred to as the “wobbly pillar” of the welfare state (Torgersen, 1987, 
pp. 116-118; Malpass, 2005), because it is simultaneously seen as an individual 
market commodity needing healthy competition as well as a public good demanding 
state involvement (Bengtsson, 2001; Van der Schaar, 1987; Helderman, 2007; 
Lundqvist, 1992; Harloe, 1995; Kleinman, 1996). Because of its status as an economic 
and a social good, housing provision has an ambiguous position between state and 
market. 
According to Esping-Andersen, one of the crucial dimensions in which modern welfare 
states differ from each other is the way in which state activities are linked to the role 
of the market and the family in the provision of welfare services.The other dimensions 
are ‘decommodification’, the extent to which a welfare regime promotes an acceptable 
standard of living independent of the market value of individuals, and ‘stratification’, 
the differences between groups of citizens which are supported by the welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The complex relations between housing and government policies do not align very well 
with Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory. Housing hardly features in his study 
‘The Three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (1990). This starkly contrasts with the active 
role of many governments in the provision of housing (Boelhouwer, 2003b). Hoekstra 
(2003) further developed Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes typology and tailored it 
to better fit the characteristics of housing systems. He classified the United Kingdom 
as a liberal welfare state, characterised by a dominant position of market parties. The 
Netherlands was labelled a ‘modern-corporatist’ welfare regime combining social-
democratic and corporatist traits, wherein market and state actors have a prominent 
position in the provision of welfare services. 
TOC
 46 Networks and Fault Lines
In both liberal and modern-corporatist welfare regimes, services are mainly provided 
based on individual means-tested needs. These regimes differ markedly from each 
other with regard to the perceived need for welfare services. Welfare services are 
provided by a wide array of state and market actors, and the role of the family is 
relatively limited. Not all institutions neatly fit within one of the three sectors (market, 
state, family); in virtually every country, institutions exist that combine market, state, 
and family characteristics. 
A distinct characteristic of modern-corporatist welfare regimes is the more indirect style 
of governance (Hoekstra, 2010), adopting policy frameworks that allow local authorities 
and non-state providers of welfare services, such as housing associations, to operate with a 
certain degree of freedom. In this style of governance, central government, local authorities, 
and private actors develop policy jointly. Modern-corporatism resembles concepts such 
as ‘third way politics’ (Giddens, 1998), ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes, 2001) and 
‘network governance’ (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Hoekstra (2010, p. 166) placed ‘modern 
corporatism’ in the middle of an axis with liberalism, entailing few corporatist structures 
and little state interference, on one end. ‘Labour-led corporatism’ was positioned on the 
other end of the spectrum with much and direct state involvement. 
Recent developments suggest that the characteristics of the social housing models 
in the Netherlands and England are converging. Since 2008, the role of the state in 
the English social housing sector is moving away from direct state involvement, and, 
using Hoekstra’ terminology, transforming from labour-led corporatism towards a 
modern corporatist model with more moderate and indirect state involvement. This 
development is underpinned by the 2008 Housing and Regeneration Act and driven 
by the establishment of the Homes and Communities Agency as a new regulator that 
same year, as well as the coming into power of a Conservative-led national coalition 
government in 2010. The abolition of social landlord inspections by the government’s 
Audit Commission illustrates this development. These inspections have been replaced 
by a more co-regulatory approach that makes social housing organisations accountable 
for developing, monitoring, and reporting on housing quality standards (Mullins, 
2010). 
In the Netherlands, the social housing model, characterized by moderate and indirect 
state involvement, has moved somewhat in the direction of Hoekstra’s ‘labour-led 
corporatism’. Following reports of fraud and mismanagement in the social housing 
sector, and an enquiry by Parliament, the Dutch government introduced a strongly 
revised Housing Act in 2015. This act restricts the mandate of housing associations 
and strengthens the regulatory powers of the national government, as well as the 
influence of local authorities and tenant organisations on the strategies and actions 
of housing associations. Self-regulation remains an important element of the Dutch 
social housing sector.
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3 Rental housing systems
Housing systems are composed of many subsystems and interacting parts, such as 
housing providers, consumers, and regulators, which may display complex system 
behaviour (Bourne, 1981; Priemus, 1983). Housing systems are affected by, and 
interact with, their context (Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992). The distinctions 
among housing systems and political economies and welfare regimes is therefore more 
conceptual than empirical.
Within housing systems, Kemeny (1995) identified two distinct rental typologies: 
‘dualist’ and ‘unitary’. He classified the English rental housing system as dualist, and 
the Dutch system as unitary. Dualist systems combine two distinct rental housing 
segments: an overall profit oriented housing market, and a cost-rental sector that is 
restricted to low-income households. The cost-rental sector in unitary systems, by 
contrast, is not reserved solely for low-income households. Kemeny suggests that 
both typologies have very distinct coordination mechanisms. Unitary systems aim 
for competition between commercial and social rental housing tenures, while the 
government tries to balance economic and social principles to mitigate the possible 
negative effects of free market forces, without distorting competition (Kemeny, 
1995; Kemeny, Kersloot, & Thalmann, 2005). The dualist model has two distinct 
coordination mechanisms: free market competition in the profit-sector, and a 
hierarchical command-and-control government involvement in the cost rental sector. 
The contextual political economy and welfare regime characteristics of the English 
housing system indicate a strong focus on market relations with—in theory—an 
important role for competition. However, recent research found very limited 
competition between various segments of the English rental market (Lennartz, 2013; 
also see Elsinga, Haffner, &  Van der Heijden, 2009). In contrast, the context of housing 
associations in the Netherlands has more corporatist characteristics with a strong role 
for networked and collaborative relationships. These differences are demonstrated, for 
example, in the allocation of housing development grants. In England, competition 
is used to allocate affordable housing development grants to a limited number of 
actors that deliver the highest value for money (Housing Corporation, 2007; Mullins, 
2010; HCA 2011b, 2011a, 2014). Funding mechanisms are also used to enforce 
the government’s influence on the activities of housing associations. In a 2004 
‘Investment Partnering’ reform, the Housing Corporation concentrated development 
funding on around 70 housing associations (of the 1.500 or so registered social 
landlords) that complied best with government expectations (Mullins & Pawson, 
2010).
In the Netherlands, subsidies for affordable housing (and neighbourhood regeneration) 
have rarely been allocated based on competition. In the mid-1990s, the net value of all 
outstanding subsidies were paid out to housing associations as part of a ‘grossing and 
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balancing operation’ (in Dutch the ‘Brutering’), cancelling out all government loans against 
current subsidy obligations. This operation strengthened the financial and operational 
autonomy of housing associations but at the same time increased the need for more 
collaborative relationships between social landlords and local and national governments. 
Consequently, the national government largely lost its ability to steer housing associations 
through investment subsidies. Local governments also saw their influence on the activities 
of housing associations largely diminished (Boelhouwer, 2002; Priemus and Dieleman, 
1997; Van der Schaar, 2006). From an international perspective, this created a unique 
system. Nowhere else do the government, tenants, and other stakeholders have so little 
direct influence on housing associations. Nowhere else is the social rented sector so 
financially independent from the government (Dutch Parliament, 2014). 
This autonomy to allocate resources can be regarded as a fundamental contrast 
between the Dutch and the English housing regimes. In the Netherlands, the 
government does not have this level of control. However, findings in chapter 5 suggest 
that financial supervision by the government-related Central Housing Fund is one of 
the few instruments to have any—but still moderate—influence on the behaviour of 
Dutch housing associations. The strong role of the government as housing regulator 
over the past decades has been a distinctive feature of the English housing associations 
that aligns with Kemeny’s dualist rental system typology. The role of the governement 
changed considerably when regulation became more focused and less well-resourced 
following the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review.
Recent developments show a more nuanced picture, with stronger market mechanisms 
in the English social rental sector and more government regulation in the Netherlands 
(also see Czischke, 2014). The English social housing sector has become more market-
oriented. Following the 2008 Housing and Regeneration Act, for-profit registered 
providers of social housing emerged. Private sector housing providers were already able 
to compete for social housing grants in a 2006 pilot set-up by the Housing Corporation 
(Mullins & Walker, 2009). The private sector is still a very small part of the affordable 
housing grant programme, and its involvement is dwindling. In 2014 private sector 
actors gave affordable rental housing development grants back to the government after 
investments in houses for sale became more profitable5. 
After the introduction of the Affordable Homes Programme in 2011 (HCA, 2011a), 
rent levels for low-income housing were set at up to 80% of market rents. In addition, 
developing landlords were expected to raise some of the existing rent to this level to cross-
subsidize new developments and thereby reduce government capital funding per dwelling. 
This indicates a shift from a dualist social rented sector with strong direct government 
involvement towards a unitary system with less government funding and regulation. 
5  Article ‘Private developers return cash for 2,600 affordable homes.’ The Guardian, 28 August 2014.
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In contrast, the Netherlands, traditionally labelled as a unitary housing system, is 
developing dualist characteristics with stricter regulation of social landlord activities 
and the introduction of means-tested access to social housing in 2010 (Priemus & 
Gruis, 2011). Social housing in the Netherlands is becoming less unitary and more 
targeted at low-income households. This is a clear break from the hitherto broad 
mission and wide target group of Dutch housing associations. This could be related to a 
more profound development in the political economy of the country. The Netherlands 
appears to be moving towards a more liberal market economy and liberal welfare state 
regime, with stronger market mechanisms in the provision of welfare services such as 
health care, social care, and social housing. These crossovers of development paths 
in the Netherlands and England, on several dimensions and in a short time period, 
suggest that the added-value of typologies for political economies, welfare regimes, 
and rental housing systems is limited to a helpful conceptual reference point for a more 
in-depth exploration of developments; a more fine-grained exploration is necessary to 
capture similarities and differences. 
Housing associations as hybrid social enterprises
Although there are significant differences between English and Dutch housing 
associations with respect to the timing, intensity, and direction of welfare state 
developments, many parallels can be drawn between the social origins of housing 
associations in the two countries (Mullins, 2000; Mullins & Murie, 2006; Mullins 
& Riseborough, 2000; Boelhouwer, 2002, 2007; Beekers, 2012; Gulliver, 2006; 
Priemus & Dieleman, 1997; Van der Schaar, 1987). In both countries, the first housing 
associations emerged in the nineteenth century as private initiatives undertaken by 
philanthropists, enlightened entrepreneurs, and other elite groups. The state only 
took a more prominent position in the aftermath of World War I, in order to reduce 
the housing shortage caused by lack of supplies, and after World War II to address 
the considerable war damage and to meet increasing demand for new housing due to 
the post-war baby boom. In the 1980s and 1990s, a more liberal approach took hold, 
whereby governments retreated from direct involvement in social housing provision. 
Due to this shared development pattern, English and Dutch housing associations 
have inherited a hybrid mix of public sector, market, and civil society values, 
structures, purposes, and governance mechanisms (Czischke, Gruis, & Mullins, 2012; 
Mullins, Czischke, & Van Bortel, 2012; Czischke, 2014; Mullins & Pawson, 2010). 
Brandsen, Van de Donk, and Putter (2005) developed a framework to explore the 
hybrid position of organisations operating between state, market, and community. 
Housing associations act as third-sector organisations in the field bordering, and 
sometimes overlapping, the state, market, and community domains [see blue patch 
in Figure 2.1]. This third sector is hybrid and fuzzy, but so are the other sectors. Very 
few organisations in the market, state, and community sectors are close to their ideal 
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types. Many other organisations cannot be pin-pointed that easily due to problems of 
fragmentation, unclear boundaries, dynamics, and mixed-coordination mechanisms. 
Hybrid arrangements, such as New Public Management approaches (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992) and quasi-markets (Helderman, 2007), attempt to combine elements 
of market, state, and non-profit domains.
FIGURE 2.1 Hybridity in the third sector  
Adapted by author from Brandsen et al. 2005, p: 752 (the blue mark in the centre represents the fuzzy working 
terrain of third sector organisations). 
Not only is hybridity a clear trait in the development path of housing associations; it is 
also evidenced by the associations’ broad and continuously evolving array of services. 
These activities are often on the edge of state, market, or community sectors. Housing 
associations adapt themselves to, and are influenced by, their context. They can be 
chameleon-like in their ability to present themselves as belonging to the private, the 
public, or the community sector (Brandsen, Van de Donk & Putters, 2005; Blessing, 
2012). They can present themselves as private sector actors for funding purposes6, or 
as community organisations for contacts with residents. When accountability is at stake 
or when they provide non-housing services aimed at increasing the social or financial 
6 For example the AEDEX/IPD Netherlands Annual Social Housing Property Index (‘AEDEX/IPD Corporatie 
Vastgoedindex’), used by Dutch housing associations, employs the vocabulary, methods, and standards used 
by private real estate companies to measure and benchmark the performance and risk of (social) real estate 
portfolios. 
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inclusion of their residents, they may present themselves as public sector actors (Mullins 
& Murie, 2006). Some organisations have embraced a social enterprise discourse 
to highlight their position between markets and communities. These organisations 
distance their activities from those of the government (Teasdale, 2012). In housing, this 
positioning has to a degree been promoted by governments who have embraced the 
opportunity to shift state expenditures for social housing off the public sector accounts 
and towards a stronger role for the private sector (Pawson & Mullins, 2010).
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS:  
SIZE, SCALE AND CHARACTERISTICS
With a share of 32% of the total national housing stock, the Dutch social housing sector is the largest 
in Europe. England takes second position, with 20% of the stock. In most European countries, the 
social rented sector accounts for less than 10% of all housing (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). Council 
housing used to dominate the English rental market with a share of 29% of the total housing stock 
in 1981. This was before the Thatcher government introduced the ‘Right to Buy’, stock transfers to 
housing associations and restrictions of new housing construction by local governments. At that time, 
housing associations accounted for only 2% of the housing stock (Pawson & Mullins, 2010, p.31). 
Not only was social housing the largest section of the rental market, it also provided housing for a wide 
section of the population, including middle-class households. 
In the Netherlands, almost all (2.2 million) social housing properties are managed by one single type 
of organisation, namely housing associations (Finance Ideas, 2014, p.11). Municipal housing, which 
historically played an important role in the Dutch social housing sector, has almost completely been 
absorbed by housing associations (Beekers, 2012; Van der Schaar, 1987). By comparison, England 
has a much wider array of public, private, third-sector, and community-led social housing providers. 
Roughly, the management of the social rental portfolio (4 million homes) in England can be split 
into four almost equal shares: local authority council housing; semi-independent Arms Length 
Management Organisations (ALMOs7), managing homes for local authorities; traditional housing 
associations; and stock transfer housing associations8 (Pawson & Mullins, 2010). 
7 Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs) are social landlords created as a result of stock transfers from 
council housing to an organisation that manages the stock on behalf of local authority owners.
8 Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) is a process that has seen 50% of council housing transfer to housing 
associations since 1988 (Pawson & Mullins, 2010).
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As illustrated in the text box above there are large differences between the providers 
of social housing in England and the Netherlands. Decision-making processes 
between organisations can be hybrid, but so can the processes within organisations 
(March & Simon, 1958/1993). Organisational structures have become more flexible 
and permeable (Agranoff, 2007). Organisational boundaries can be blurred, and 
coordination mechanisms within organisations can be mixed. Many organisations 
are characterised by hybridity because of their need to balance social and economic 
objectives (Billis, 2010). This creates hybrid intra-organisational decision-making 
processes on top of the inter-organisational coordination mechanisms. The social 
housing sectors in both countries have strived to manage the diversity and intra-
organisational hybridity by introducing codes of governance to provide guidance for 
decision-making and governance processes, and oversight of the conduct of CEOs 
and board members (Aedes/VTW, 2015; NHF, 2015). The umbrella organisation for 
English housing associations, the National Housing Federation (NHF), published its 
first edition of the Code of Governance. Around the same time, the predecessors of 
Aedes, the trade body for Dutch housing associations, presented their Business Code 
Housing Associations (Nationale Woningraad, 1996). These self-regulatory frameworks 
define common values and standards of practice and also contain mechanisms to 
ensure compliance. To accommodate for changing expectations and the shifting 
balances of power, codes of governance for housing associations are frequently 
updated.
The core characteristics of housing associations are summarised in Table 2.3 below.
GOAL Housing associations provide housing to target groups that cannot afford 
full market rents, while balancing social and economic objectives. Profit is 
not an aim; social impact is.
STEERING Housing associations are self-governing organisations, operating within 
a framework of government regulation, but without direct government 
control. 
STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY Beyond the core of a shared goal and steering concept, housing associa-
tions vary considerably in organisational structure, strategy, and the scope 
of the activities they undertake complementary to providing affordable 
rental housing.  
TABLE 2.3 Core characteristics of housing associations
TOC
 53 Key theoretical components: housing associations and complex decision-making
§  2.2.2 The role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration
Neighbourhood regeneration: from clearance to improvement
Neighbourhood regeneration entails a programme-based approach to reduce 
deprivation in areas characterised by decline (Carter, 2012). In many countries, 
neighbourhood regeneration originated after WWII, manifesting as the clearance and 
redevelopment of inner city areas to provide opportunities for new urban developments 
(Priemus & Metselaar, 1993). New neighbourhoods were built in green field areas to 
provide housing for the displaced inhabitants of the city centre. In many Northern and 
Western European countries these new properties were social housing for working 
class households (Wassenberg, 2010, p. 16). Housing associations and council 
housing departments played a prominent role in the development of these new 
neighbourhoods (Pawson & Mullins, 2010).
In the early 1970s, Dutch housing associations constituted an already large and mature 
sector, managing 41% of the total housing stock in 1975 (Boelhouwer, 1999). In 
England, social housing was still dominated by municipal council housing. Housing 
associations comprised a small sector, owning less than 1.6% of the housing stock in 
1975 (Murie, 2008). The revival of English housing associations was strongly related 
to neighbourhood regeneration. The 1974 Housing Act envisaged a larger role for 
housing associations in housing construction and the improvement and conversion of 
older properties in challenged areas (Murie, 2008). Housing Action Areas (HAAs) were 
set up through the 1974 Housing Act as a response to top-down gentrification and 
clearance. New approaches embraced more bottom-up methods to tackle inner city 
decline. Selected areas attracted generous improvement grants aimed at encouraging 
residents to stay. Tenants’ rights were guaranteed and, where private landlords failed 
to improve, councils could compulsorily purchase and renovate (Powers & Mumford, 
1999). Through these initiatives, housing associations became more closely involved in 
urban regeneration partnerships with local authorities (Pawson & Mullins, 2010). The 
involvement of housing associations in small-scale neighbourhood renewal activities, as 
well as housing for special needs groups, complemented rather than competed with local 
authority housing provision, such as urban renewal activities (Mullins & Murie, 2006).
During the 1970s and 1980s, urban renewal in the Netherlands was mainly focused on 
pre-WW II districts. During the 1990s, the focus shifted from pre-WW II to post-war urban 
areas built between 1950 and 1970. The new priority areas often had large concentrations 
of housing owned by housing associations (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2007). The creation of 
mixed-tenure neighbourhoods by replacing part of the social housing stock with owner-
occupied housing and up-market rental dwellings in order to retain moderate-income 
households became the prominent policy paradigm (Priemus, 1997, 2004; VROM, 1997).
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The emergence of integrated area-based approaches 
During the clearance and redevelopment in the 1950s and 1960s, regeneration 
was primarily a top-down process with a strong emphasis on the physical elements 
of renewal and a prominent position for national and local governments. The social 
dimension of neighbourhood renewal remained underdeveloped, ambiguous, 
and implicit (Van der Schaar, 2006). Particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, the 
neighbourhood clearance and redevelopment approach came under pressure due to 
the growing focus on preservation and repair. A new focus on popular demand and 
social needs, including affordable housing, emerged (Priemus & Metselaar, 1993; 
Turkington, Van Kempen & Wassenberg, 2004; Vermeijden, 1996, 2001). 
Although the improvement of the pre-WWII stock was mainly triggered by poor 
housing quality, the improvement of post-WWII housing was also driven by the 
ambition of addressing social and housing market problems. This strengthened the 
understanding, in the Netherlands, England, and other Western European countries, 
that sustained area-based and integrated interventions were needed, with involvement 
of public and market actors, to address the multiple forms of deprivation concentrated 
in some neighbourhoods (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Dabinett, Lawless, Rhodes, & Tyler, 
2001; Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008; Mullins & Van Bortel, 2010; Priemus 2006; 
Rhodes, Tyler, & Brennan, 2003; Uitermark, 2003; VROM-Raad, 2006).
The role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration became increasingly 
prominent in the 1990s. The Dutch government considered its involvement in urban 
renewal as a temporary operation to catch up on neglected housing maintenance and 
neighbourhood deprivation. It assumed that local actors would be able to mobilise the 
necessary resources for future regeneration initiatives (VROM, 1992). This coincided 
with a major deregulation operation (the ’Brutering’) that provided Dutch housing 
associations with more operational and financial autonomy, as explained earlier in 
this chapter (Boelhouwer, 2003a). Housing associations were expected to fund the 
renewal of post-war neighbourhoods from their own resources, such as rental income 
and housing sales revenues (Ouwehand, 1997). The co-responsibility of housing 
associations for the quality of life in neighbourhoods was anchored through the 
inclusion of ‘liveability’ as a compulsory performance field in the 1997 revision of the 
Social Housing Management Order (Gruis, Nieboer, & Thomas, 2004). 
Especially since New Labour came to power, in 1997, housing and neighbourhood 
regeneration policies in England have emphasised the importance of social inclusion, 
stakeholder consultation,  “joined-up” government, and collaboration (Mullins 
& Murie, 2006, p. 135) in the delivery of housing policy and neighbourhood 
regeneration. In 2001 a National Strategy Action Plan for neighbourhood renewal 
(Cabinet Office, 2001) brought some coherence into the vast array of regeneration 
programmes. The strategy included the ambition that within 10 to 20 years no one 
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should be disadvantaged by where they lived. The Labour Government created two new 
government units: the Social Inclusion Unit and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. 
These units worked across national government departments, but also at the regional 
level through its neighbourhood renewal teams. At the local level, the emphasis 
was very much on harnessing all sectors, focussing existing services and resources 
explicitly on deprived areas, and giving local residents and community groups a 
central role in making better neighbourhoods (Pierson & Worley, 2005). Embedded 
in New Labour neighbourhood renewal policy was the assumption that local people 
and local organisations could and should mobilise their own resources to support 
neighbourhood renewal. 
The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit introduced two flagship programs: the New Deal 
for Communities (NDC) and Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders (NMP). The 
NDC programme was launched in 1999 and ran through 2008 (CLG, 2010a, 2010b). 
In addition to these programs, a Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative was 
created that ran from 2002 until 2011. The origin of the HMR initiative is unusual 
when compared to many other area-based initiatives in the UK. These programs were 
often designed by the central government and passed on to local authorities and/
or partnerships for local negotiation and delivery. Contrastingly, the HMR was the 
result of lobby activities by consortia of local authorities and housing associations in 
the Midlands and the North. Housing organisations commissioned research into the 
nature of changing housing demand and housing abandonment in order to make 
recommendations for regeneration (Nevin, Lee, Goodson, Murie, & Phillimore, 2001a, 
2001b). This body of research provided a basis for the lobby activities that led to the 
HMR program (Murie, 2008). 
The New Labour government’s 2003 Sustainable Communities Action Program was 
also a key policy reference point. The plan dedicated substantial resources to address 
serious housing shortages in London and the South East, and the impact of housing 
abandonment in places in the North and Midlands (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2003).
Housing associations as community investors 
In both the Netherlands and England there were strong drivers for housing associations 
to take a leading role in improving the quality of life in vulnerable neighbourhoods. In 
the UK there was a growing public prejudice against social housing tenants, a declining 
satisfaction among residents, and a persistent perception that housing associations 
were competitive and complaining (Scase & Scales, 2003). This led to the launch 
of the national ‘In Business for Neighbourhoods’ alliance in 2003 by the National 
Housing Federation (NHF), the representative body for English housing associations 
(National Housing Federation, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2005). The need for a stronger 
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focus on vulnerable neighbourhoods was also the result of a growing concern with 
unemployment among social housing tenants leading up to the 2007 Hills Report 
(Hills, 2007). In Business for Neighbourhoods was primarily a rebranding exercise, 
but English housing associations did invest considerable resources of their own and 
leveraged more from partners into community investment activities, as confirmed by 
two neighbourhood audits (National Housing Federation, 2008; 2012).  
Several years later, in 2007, Dutch housing associations also began to respond to 
external pressures to make better use of their asset-based equity and to deliver 
more socially relevant outcomes (SER, 2005; VROM-Raad, 2007). In a 2006 letter to 
parliament, the then Housing Minister Winsemius stated that housing associations 
“have a responsibility to the whole neighbourhood”9. In 2007 the government stated 
in its Coalition Agreement that a substantial financial contribution was expected from 
housing associations to fund the national neighbourhood regeneration program. That 
same year the minister responsible for housing and neighbourhoods presented the 
‘Empowered Neighbourhoods Program’ (WWI, 2007). The focus of that program was 
mainly on addressing social and economic deprivation in vulnerable neighbourhoods. 
Housing associations had been active in physical restructuring and urban renewal for 
many decades, but the need to contribute to social activities and objectives of urban 
policies was rather new (Van Gent, Musterd, & Ostendorf, 2009; Boelhouwer, 2007). 
In 2007, umbrella organisation Aedes revised its industry governance code to signpost 
the neighbourhood-focused mission of housing associations (Aedes, 2007; Aedes, 
2011). That same year Aedes presented its ‘Answer to Society’ manifesto (Aedes, 
2007a), expressing the social housing sector’s ambitions to channel substantial 
investments towards deprived neighbourhoods.  
Community investments by housing associations refer to neighbourhood-focused 
physical and social activities complementary to investments in housing construction 
and refurbishment. Because of divergent definitions of community investments, 
inconsistent accounting practises, and large differences between the policies of 
individual housing organisations, it is hard to formulate generic conclusions on the 
nature of community investments10. However, based on available information, some 
tentative observations can be made on the differences between the community 
activities in the Netherlands and England.
9 Letter to Parliament, TK 2006-2007, 30128, No 12
10 UK literature often uses the term ‘community investments’ where ‘community expenses’ would be more appro-
priate.
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The National Housing Federation published two audits (National Housing Federation, 
2008; 2012) to provide a clearer picture of the neighbourhood activities of English 
housing associations. The 2008 audit found that 40% of community investments by 
housing associations was paid for by other resources, such as local governments and 
charitable, voluntary, and faith organisations. In the 2012 audit, covering a period 
after the global financial crisis, this investment had dropped to 30%. Community 
investments comprised initiatives on a wide range of terrains, such as jobs, training, 
education, skills, well-being, community safety, cohesion, poverty, social exclusion, 
and environment. In addition to out-of-pocket expenses reported in the audits, 
English housing associations also delivered in-kind contributions to neighbourhoods 
in the form of administrative, managerial, and technical support and advice as well as 
facilities such as free accommodation, transport, and supplies. 
Social landlords in the Netherlands hardly ever use resources from other organisations to 
fund their community investments. Their activities have traditionally been more focussed 
on physical activities, such as improving the quality, upkeep, and safety of semi-public 
areas, burglary and fire prevention, and maintenance of neighbourhood facilities (Centraal 
Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2007, 2013). While English housing associations demonstrate a 
stronger focus on people-related social investments, their Dutch counterparts undertake 
fewer activities focussed on jobs, training, education, and skills directly themselves. When 
they undertake social activities, there is a stronger connection with basic landlord services, 
such as preventing evictions, rent-arrears, and anti-social behaviour. Dutch housing 
associations also provide ‘social real estate’ and facilities management for partners that 
deliver health services, social care, and other services.
§  2.3 Key component 2: Understanding decision-
making in the public domain 
§  2.3.1 The rise of the network society 
Societal developments, especially the emergence of the ‘network society’ have 
profoundly altered the state’s role in decision-making in the public domain. Information 
and communication technologies have fragmented social, economic, and political 
infrastructures into a network of interdependent decentralised ‘nodes’. Consequently, 
decision-making has shifted from vertical bureaucratic to horizontal cooperation, and from 
government to governance (Van Dijk, 1999; Castells, 1996; Frissen, 2002; Rhodes, 1997).
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The network society has increased the complexity of societal challenges, including 
the ‘wicked’ problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) of interrelated social, economic, 
and physical deprivation that neighbourhood regeneration is expected to address. 
Public and private actors addressing these problems are increasingly interdependent 
due to the fragmentation of resources such as funding, expertise, land, democratic 
legitimation, and links with local communities (Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009). 
The resulting complexity involving multiple actors and issues frequently leads to 
deadlock, low-quality outcomes, and ambiguous democratic anchorage of decision-
making processes (Simon, 1955; Lindblom, 1959, 1965; Rhodes & MacKechnie, 
2003; Rhodes, 2006, Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). These 
developments have consequences for the ways in which decisions are both made and 
studied (Teisman, 2005). This section briefly discusses the following elements that are 
needed to explore and understand neighbourhood regeneration decision-making:
1 transformation from state hierarchies and markets to hybrid coordination 
mechanisms;
2 network governance as an analytical framework; 
3 decision-making in networks: ‘garbage can’ decision-making, policy streams, and 
decision-making arenas; 
4 different types of networks;
5 different rules and logics in system world of agencies and the lifeworld of residents.
Each of these elements will be discussed more elaborately in other chapters in this 
thesis.
§  2.3.2 Transformation from hierarchies and markets to hybrid coordination 
With the emergence of the network society, the delivery of housing policies and 
neighbourhood renewal was transformed. Bureaucratic procedures were replaced by 
multi-actor decision-making ‘games’ in collaborative governance networks where 
the government no longer was the dominant actor (Swyngedouw, 2005). These new 
modes of decision-making and public service delivery involve interdependent state, 
private, non-profit, and community actors (Bengtsson, 2001; Priemus, 2004). There 
is, however, disagreement among scholars about the power distribution and resulting 
coordination mechanisms in these networks (see Davis, 2011).
Are markets, hierarchies, and network mechanisms mutually exclusive [see Table 2.4 
below], or can these forms of coordination be combined or blended into hybrids forms of 
decision-making? Williamson saw distinct boundaries between market mechanisms and 
government hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). Powell argued that the dichotomy between 
markets and hierarchies blinds us to the role played by reciprocity and collaboration 
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as alternative governance mechanisms (Powell, 1991). He advocated a continuum of 
coordination mechanisms. Others contend that hierarchies, markets, and networks can 
be separated conceptually, but that in reality these mechanisms are found in various 
interwoven forms and combinations (Swyngedouw, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Bradach & Eccles, 
1989). In a similar vein, Brandsen et al. (2005) state that in a network society, borders 
between market, state, civil society, and community actors are blurred; within hierarchical 
structures, one can see forms of network coordination or market competition (Buitelaar, 
Mertens, Needham, & De Kam, 2006; Koffijberg, 2005). Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
contended that interdependent networks are replacing other forms of coordination. 
THE HIERARCHICAL 
MODEL
THE MARKET MODEL THE NETWORK MODEL
Focus Central ruler Multi-actor setting Interactions among 
actors
Characterization of 
relations
Hierarchical Autonomous Interdependent
Policy Process Neutral implementation 
of ex-ante formulated 
policy
Self-governance on basis 
of discrete decisions and 
mutual adjustment
Interactive process in 
which information, 
goals, and resources are 
exchanged
Successful governance Attainment of public 
goals as part of formal 
policy
Attainment of individual 
goals by actors
Attainment of mutual 
goals by collective action
Causes of failure Ambiguous goals, lack of 
information and control
Rigid policies, lack of 
discretionary freedom 
and resources
Lack of incentives for 
collective action, existing 
blockades
Recommendations for 
governance
Coordination and central-
ization
Deregulation, decentrali-
sation, privatization
Management of policy 
networks: improving 
conditions under which 
actors interact
TABLE 2.4 State, market and network coordination mechanisms 
Source: Klijn and Koppenjan (2007, p. 172). Adopted from Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997, p. 10)
These shifts in governance do not necessarily lead to a reduction of state power, but 
could indicate a shift from formal to informal techniques of government steering (De 
Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1991; Swyngedouw, 2005), such as steering in the “shadow 
of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1993, pp. 145-147; Koffijberg, 2005). This notion is closely 
related to Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, i.e. the techniques and strategies 
by which a society is made governable (Foucault, 1980; Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009). 
Rhodes claims that interdependent networks of state and non-state actors weaken 
the hierarchical powers of the government in urban regeneration processes (Rhodes, 
1997). Davies, on the other hand, insists that the state is still dominant because these 
networks have asymmetrical power relations that still favour the state (Davies, 2002, 
2011). Similarly, Jones and Evans (2006) conclude that many fail to see the state-
centeredness in many network arrangements. 
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These actors mainly comment on developments in the 1990s and early 2000s from 
a UK perspective, with a strong role of the state in funding and regulating social 
housing and neighbourhood renewal. However, Koffijberg (2005) also found a strong 
role for the Dutch national government in shaping housing policies by using network 
steering instruments. Koffijberg found that the department responsible for housing 
used a variety of strategic actions to influence policy developments and the behaviour 
of actors. Some actions had a classic hierarchical character, but network steering 
instruments were numerically in the majority. Chapter 5 discusses these steering 
instruments in more detail.
Market competition and state hierarchies are features of liberal and coordinated 
market economies, but Hall and Soskice (2001) stress the variation found in the 
character of corporate structures and government hierarchies across different types 
of economies and the presence of coordination problems even within hierarchical 
settings.
Considering market, state, and society as separate domains is not very realistic or 
productive. To the extent that these coordination mechanisms already can be identified 
in empirical reality as distinct separate domains, they are each other’s precondition: 
modern societies are not able to flourish without a market, no market operates without 
government, and no government can exercise authority without societal involvement 
and support (WRR, 2012). 
This research intended to explore and understand how decision-making processes in 
neighbourhood regeneration work in practice, not how they should evolve. The research 
perspective used should therefore be able to accommodate for the existence of market, 
state, network and mixed coordination mechanisms in decision-making processes, and 
the possibility of either centralised hierarchical power or more distributed networked 
power. 
§  2.3.3 Network governance as an analytical framework 
Theorists in political science, public management, economics, and organisational 
sociology have developed a still-growing body of network theory to increase our 
understanding of organisational and institutional dynamics. There is a growing critique 
of traditional decision-making approaches, assuming that actors make rational choices 
based on perfect information. Simon’s (1955) ideas about ‘bounded rationality’ 
and ‘satisficing’-oriented processes of policy development and Lindblom’s (1959) 
proposition of a science of ‘muddling through’ have made it clear that traditional 
rational approaches to policy-making are unrealistic and at odds with day-to-day 
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decision-making practices (Klijn, 2008). Contrastingly, the network approach connects 
with real-life decision-making processes by taking account of the complexity and 
uncertainties involved in contemporary governance (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Since the 1990s, considerable research efforts have been made to conceptualize 
complex systems and network governance (Rhodes, 1997; Scharpf, 1993, 1997; De 
Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 1991, 2000; Blackman, 2001; Chapman, 2002; Kickert, Klijn, 
& Koppenjan, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Teisman, 1998, 2005; Rhodes, 2006; 
Sørenson & Torfing, 2007, 2009). There is a growing body of knowledge applying 
network governance theory to the domain of social housing and neighbourhood 
regeneration, in the form of research reports (e.g. Van Bortel & Elsinga, M. (2005), 
Haffner, & Elsinga (2007, 2009), PhD dissertations, (e.g. Klijn, 1996; Koffijberg, 
2005), special issues in academic journals (Mullins & Rhodes 2007, Van Bortel, 
Mullins & Rhodes, 2009), and conference papers (e.g. Van Bortel, Van Bueren, Van 
Eeten, Elsinga & Kerpershoek, 2007). Building on this, governance network approaches 
will be used to construct the analytical framework for this research [see section 1.2 
Conceptual framework and research questions]. The characteristics of governance 
networks are discussed in more detail in chapters 3, 5 and 6).
§  2.3.4 Different types of networks
The previous sections discussed the rise of networks in modern society. Actors in these 
networks can have divergent goals and resources. To increase our understanding of 
decision-making in these networks, we need to know more about the different types 
of networks that exist, and the different types and strengths of relationships that 
are required to make these arrangements work. Brown and Keast (2003) and Keast, 
Mandell, and Brown (2007) identified three main network typologies, i.e. cooperative, 
coordinative, and collaborative networks, ranging from loose to strong relational 
connections [see Table 2.5]. The different network types represent different purposes 
and different structural characteristics, and require different levels of trust and time to 
develop. 
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COOPERATIVE1 COORDINATIVE COLLABORATIVE
LOW TRUST — UNSTABLE RELA-
TIONS
MEDIUM TRUST — BASED ON 
PRIOR RELATIONS
HIGH TRUST — STABLE RELA-
TIONS
Infrequent communication flows Structured communication flows Thick communication flows
Known information sharing ‘Project’ related and directed 
information sharing
Tactical information sharing
Adjusting actions Joint projects, joint funding, joint 
policy
Systems change
Independent/autonomous goals Semi-independent goals Dense interdependent relations 
and goals
Power remains with organisation Power remains with organisations Shared power
Resources — remain own Shared resources around project Pooled, collective resources
Commitment and accountability to 
own agency
Commitment and accountability to 
own agency and also to project
Commitment and accountability to 
the network first
Relational time frame requirement 
— short term
Relational time frame medium 
term — often based on prior 
projects
Relational time frame requirement 
— long term 3-5 years
TABLE 2.5 Network typologies 
Source: Brown & Keast 2003; Keast et al., 2007 
1 The term ‘cooperative’ is used by Brown and Keast. Feedback from native English speakers highlighted that 
‘cooperative’ can be understood as a stronger form of collaboration than is intended here.
Cooperative networks are primarily focused on short-term activities and mutual 
adjustment to ensure that the goals of individual organisations are met. There is 
relatively little trust between actors, and their relationships are often unstable. 
Decision-making power remains within the individual organisations and does not 
extend to mutual decision-making. In coordinative networks, the relationship between 
actors is more mature and structural. Previous interactions have strengthened the level 
of trust between actors.  Interactions take place in joint projects with pooled resources 
and shared goals. As in cooperative networks, decision-making power remains within 
the respective organisations. Individuals have a shared commitment, partly to their 
own organisation, and partly to the projects they carry out together with others. 
Relations between actors in collaborative networks are even more long lasting and 
built on trust between actors. A distinctive feature of collaborative networks is ‘systems 
change’, and organisational boundaries become more opaque due to semi-permanent 
collaborative organisation structures. The goals of the organisations become more 
intertwined, as do their financial resources and their decision-making powers. Also, the 
commitments and allegiances of individuals become more ambiguous —shifting more 
towards the network rather than their own organisation.
Housing associations in the Netherlands have more resources and regulatory 
autonomy than their English counterparts. The Dutch political economy is based on 
non-competitive collaborative relations (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and its welfare regime 
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has strong corporatist traits. Therefore, it is likely that one can find more collaborative 
characteristics in Dutch neighbourhood regeneration networks. In contrast, more 
cooperative/coordinative characteristics are expected in English regeneration networks 
because of the more competitive arrangements in that country, as well as the stronger 
dependence of English housing associations on government resources. In other 
words, housing associations in the Dutch local regeneration networks already have 
most of their required resources and adequate regulatory freedom, yet need strong 
collaborative relations with other actors to allocate these resources, while their English 
counterparts (i.e. housing associations and local authorities) need to cooperate in order 
to acquire the financial resources from their national government in the first place. 
These partnerships can be regarded as ‘externally mandated’ (Rees et al, 2012). The 
national government still has important hierarchical power over these partnerships, 
and this may reduce the ability of partnership members to determine activities and 
outcomes. (Muir & Mullins, 2015). 
§  2.3.5 Different rules and logics in the system world of 
agencies and the lifeworld of residents
During the fieldwork period of this research, national governments in the Netherlands 
and the UK introduced new policy paradigms that have influenced the role of the 
government and citizens in the provision of welfare services and neighbourhood 
regeneration. In 2009, David Cameron introduced the ‘Big Society’ agenda. Several 
years later, in 2013, the Dutch government presented its ‘Participation Society’ agenda 
(‘Participatiesamenleving’). Although the aim of both initiatives is very similar, namely 
reducing the role of the government and increasing the role of citizens, the approach 
towards achieving these aims is very different (Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2013). These 
differences are discussed in more detail in chapter 8. The introduction of these new 
policy paradigms led to a greater emphasis on the collaborative co-production of 
public services and neighbourhood regeneration initiatives between citizens and 
neighbourhood regeneration professionals. 
The network governance perspective used to analyse fieldwork data provided sufficient 
insight into the causes of the rather cumbersome interactions between residents and 
local community representatives on the one hand, and the housing associations and 
local authorities, on the other. The publication by Van den Brink, Van Hulst, De Graaf, 
& Van der Pennen (2012) on the role of exemplary practitioners in neighbourhood 
regeneration introduced me to Habermas’s concepts of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ (1987). 
The system is the formal and rational dimension covering organisational forms, 
rules, laws, procedures, and hierarchies. It can arise in many societal domains such 
as economics, politics, education, housing, science, government, healthcare, welfare, 
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and justice. In contrast, the lifeworld is the domain of personal relations between 
family members, friends, neighbours, and members of local, faith, or other informal 
communities. The lifeworld is a world of informal communications, storytelling, 
personal values, experiences and emotions, but also a domain of social inequalities 
and conflicts. Habermas’s concept helped me to better understand the interactions 
between organisations and residents. This concept is further elaborated and applied in 
chapter 8 (also see Van der Pennen & Van Bortel, 2015).
§  2.3.6 Decision-making: garbage cans, policy streams, and arenas 
Decision-making processes rarely evolve chronologically, nor do they have an 
established logic (Simon, 1955). In networks, where there is no set hierarchy of 
objectives and values, problem solving is often characterized by ‘organised anarchy’ 
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). In these situations, problem formulation, solution 
design, and decision-making develop independently from each other. Cohen et al. 
describe these processes as streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice-
moments. They label these choice-moments as ‘garbage cans’ in which participants 
‘drop’ often unrelated problems and solutions.  Garbage can decision-making often 
does not solve the problems at hand, but the ambiguous situations in which decision-
making occurs in practice cannot easily be eliminated.  Acknowledging the existence 
of the garbage can phenomenon helps us to understand this core characteristic of 
decision-making, and can inform the design of processes to accommodate for its 
existence and, to some extent, manage it (Cohen et al., 1972).
Whilst Cohen et al. (1972) focused on university decision-making, Kingdon (1984) 
applied the stream model to public decision-making processes. He distinguished three 
streams: problems, solutions, and political events. For decision-making to take place, 
the streams need to be coupled in order to create a ‘policy window’ and an opportunity 
for decision-making. The coupling of these streams does not come about naturally. 
Actors, in search of solutions for their problems or support for their solutions, must 
create these couplings themselves. Kingdon called these actors ‘policy entrepreneurs’.
Decision-making in housing systems has many of the characteristics of an open 
‘garbage can’ (Helderman, 2007, viii). According to Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,), the 
garbage can may be regarded as a policy arena. The policy arena consists of activated 
parts of governance networks that include multiple interdependent actors that interact 
while pursuing their own objectives and applying their own logics in a particular 
instance of time and space. 
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Interactions between actors in these arenas are guided by formal and informal rules.  
The rules describe, among others, what actors are permitted to do and which actors 
can participate in which games. While formal rules deal with the authority of actors 
and the legal institutional characteristics of interactions, informal rules address social 
practices and values (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). According to Giddens (1984), rules 
are formed, sustained, and modified by human interactions. The basis of Giddens’ 
concept of duality lies in the relationship between agency and structure. All human 
interaction (agency) is performed within the context of a pre-existing social structure, 
which is governed by a set of rules. Consequently, all human action is at least partly 
predetermined based on the varying contextual rules under which it occurs. 
§  2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced two key components to help us understand 
the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration, and the complex 
and networked nature of decision-making.  It can be concluded from the literature 
presented in the first component that housing associations have played an increasingly 
important role in neighbourhood regeneration. Housing associations in England 
and the Netherlands share many organisational characteristics and largely similar 
hybrid third-sector values. They have similar business processes, but work in different 
contexts, with relations to state, market, and community that are constantly evolving. 
Because of its place-based nature, neighbourhood regeneration takes place in rather 
exceptional governance networks. Actors are more or less locked into the regeneration 
network. They are compelled to collaborate in order to solve housing and other 
area-based problems. The second component presented the elements needed to 
understand decision-making process: it discussed the transformation from hierarchies 
and markets to hybrid coordination mechanisms in the context of an emerging network 
society. Different components of network governance as an analytical framework 
were presented, such as various types of networks, different rules and logics in the 
system world of agencies and the lifeworld of residents, and finally concepts to unravel 
decision-making processes such as garbage can decision-making, policy streams, and 
arenas .
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Abstract 
Significant claims have been made about the benefits of network governance and 
management in securing community involvement and assisting social integration in 
complex urban regeneration programmes. The move from vertical to horizontal forms 
of coordination, and the assumption of a more equal power distribution between 
participants, have been combined with an emphasis on mutuality and trust to present 
networks as a promising mechanism for pluriform involvement and collective decision-
making. Often this promise runs ahead of the evidence of how network governance 
functions in practice, the opportunities for different actors to influence the process 
and the often disappointing outcomes of joint decision-making. This special issue 
contributes to the ‘second generation of research on governance networks’ by tackling 
key questions relating to the sources of governance network failure and success. 
Building on the articles in this special issue, we explore these questions in relation to 
urban regeneration, community involvement and the integration of minority groups 
in The Netherlands, Sweden and England. This article reviews the articles in this 
special issue from the perspective of Klijn and Skelcher’s (2007) four conjectures 
on democracy and governance networks and Sørensen and Torfing’s (2007) four 
conditions for democratic anchorage. It also suggests ways in which the research 
agenda on networks in urban regeneration, community involvement and integration 
might be developed.
Keywords:
network governance, urban regeneration, community involvement, social integration.
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§  3.1 Introduction
As a result of reforms in public management and governance during the 1980s 
and 1990s the nature of social housing systems in Europe is changing, replacing 
hierarchical relationships among actors with market and/or network relations (Mullins 
& Rhodes, 2007, p.1; Hood, 1991; Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). The renewal of deprived 
neighbourhoods and low-quality housing stock is an important challenge in social 
housing throughout Europe and network governance is gaining precedence as mode 
of decision-making to harness the involvement of relevant actors in these processes. 
Advocates of network governance highlight the necessity of networked forms of decision-
making to manage uncertainty, resolve societal problems, access expertise and enable 
citizen engagement in a complex society with dispersed power and resources (Koppenjan 
& Klijn 2004). Significant claims have been made about the benefits and efficiency of 
network governance in securing community involvement and assisting social integration 
in complex urban regeneration programs (McLaverty 2002; Van Bortel, Van Bueren, Van 
Eeten, Elsinga, & Kerpershoek, 2007).
The move from vertical to horizontal forms of co-ordination, and the assumption of 
more equal power distribution between participants has combined with an emphasis 
on mutuality and trust to present networks as a promising mechanism for pluriform 
involvement and collective decision-making. Often this promise runs ahead of the 
evidence of how network governance functions in practice, the opportunities for 
different actors to influence the process and the, often disappointing, outcomes of 
joint decisions. Moreover, there are tensions between network forms of governance 
and democracy, with the potential for incompatibility, complementarity, transition or 
instrumentality (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). The concept of ‘democratic anchorage’ refers 
to the relationship between governance networks and democracy and the potential for 
either loose or close coupling.
There is currently a significant stream of research in progress on network governance 
in fields such as housing, regeneration and social integration in what has been termed 
a ‘second generation of research on governance networks’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, 
2007). It is anticipated that this research will produce more critical and nuanced 
perspectives on the efficacy of different types of network governance in different 
contexts. We attempted to access some of this research in progress in the fields of 
housing, regeneration and integration by convening a workshop at the European 
Network for Housing Research Conference in Rotterdam in 2007 and by working with 
authors of papers on urban regeneration, community involvement and the integration 
of minority groups in The Netherlands, Sweden and England to tease out some of 
the determinants of network success and failure and to develop some more critical 
perspectives on the analysis of network governance. Secondary analysis of these papers 
is used to inform our argument in this paper.
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We will start by introducing network governance and its relationship to democracy in 
Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we consider some critiques of network modes of decision-
making. Section 3.4 introduces Klijn and Skelcher’s (2007) four conjectures on 
the relationship between democracy and network governance and the framework 
developed by Sørensen and Torfing (2007) to explore the notion of democratic 
anchorage. Section 3.5 introduces the case studies from the housing regeneration and 
integration fields and assesses their findings in relation to the competing conjectures 
and democratic anchorage conditions. Our conclusion (Section 3.6) draws out the main 
points of comparison and proposes some directions for further research on networks in 
urban regeneration, community involvement and integration in Northern Europe.
§  3.2 Network governance in urban renewal
The concept of network governance11 is increasing in prominence. Since the 
hierarchical power of government is waning in many parts of society, the terms 
‘governance’ and ‘networks’ are used to describe emerging modes of decision-making. 
Sørensen and Torfing refer to governance networks as a particular type of network and a 
particular type of governance (2005, p. 9). They define the following key elements:
1 a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors;
2 actors interact through negotiations;
3 negotiations take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary 
framework;
4 the framework is self-regulatory within limits set by external agencies;
5 the framework contributes to the production of public purpose.
Since the 1990s a considerable body of literature on decision-making in networks has 
been published (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 1991; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn 1997; 
Koffijberg, 2005; Rhodes, 1997; Scharpf, 1993, 1997; Teisman, 1998). Among others, 
Klijn (1997), Van Bortel and Elsinga (2007), and Mullins and Rhodes (2007) have 
begun to explore the growing role played by networks in systems concerning housing 
and urban renewal policies and programmes.
11 In this paper we use both ‘network governance’ and ‘governance networks’. In our opinion the meaning of these 
terms is almost identical, but ‘network governance’ places slightly greater emphasis on the decision- making 
aspect, while ‘governance networks’ emphasises the institutional aspect.
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Some of these researchers claim that markets and hierarchies are replaced by 
network modes of decision-making due to the complexity of societies and the wicked 
nature of problems making network governance the only viable option (Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004). Others contend that actors have more freedom to use different 
coordination mechanisms or even combinations of hierarchy, networks and markets. 
This is sometimes described as mixed-economy coordination (Bradach & Eccles, 
1989). These authors argue that each coordination mechanism has its advantages 
and disadvantages and the viability of a coordination mechanism depends on the 
characteristics of the actors involved, the issues at stake and context of decision-
making (Entwistle et al., 2007).
§  3.3 Governance networks: ambiguity and critique
Several related critiques are now beginning to emerge of network governance 
highlighting its ambiguity and problematic relationship with democracy. First there 
is the view that in many cases the appearance of interdependent networks masks a 
reality of continued state dominance and steering. Second is the related critique that 
inequalities of power within networks can lead to quite hierarchical relationships 
focused on one or more dominant actors. Third is the more subtle observation that the 
appropriateness and acceptability of network governance depends on the institutional 
and political context in which the decision-making takes place. All of this suggests 
potential conflicts between efficient network governance and accountability and 
democracy.
Besides the failures of coordination mechanisms and the possible mix of market, 
networks and hierarchies (Entwistle et al., 2007), there is also discussion on the 
ambiguous nature of decision-making in governance networks. Rhodes (1997) claims 
that urban regeneration in the UK is characterised by an interdependent network of 
state and non-state actors that is undermining the power of the state. Davies (2002) 
insists that the state is still dominant, even if in a highly mediated form, arguing that 
‘networks’ can better be described as ‘partnerships’, with asymmetrical power relations 
still favouring the state. Jones and Evans (2006, p. 1494) see a widespread appeal in 
different political contexts for the emergence of networks between public and private 
actors, but conclude that in many cases these partnership arrangements are strongly 
steered by the state.
Swyngedouw (2005) contends that the emphasis on more participatory governance 
arrangements is decidedly ‘‘Janus faced’’ since networks often favour strong actors 
over the weaker ones. This is particularly apparent in regeneration and integration 
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partnerships where community partners often enjoy substantially fewer resources 
than state or private sector partners and are dependent on the willingness of other 
network members to hear and respond to their agendas. Mullins and Jones (2007) for 
example explore the extent to which the enormous differences of power and interests 
between Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs), housing associations and other 
partners affect the ability to deliver joint outcomes, even within networks specifically 
constructed to enable power to be shared.
Discussions on the appropriateness of governance networks versus hierarchical 
steering are influenced by the context in which decision-making takes place. 
This can be illustrated by the urban renewal approach taken in Naples, Italy. Bull 
and Jones (2006) contend that urban regeneration in Naples was not aimed at 
creating an inclusive governance network based on community involvement, but on 
strengthening legality and accountability of conventional representative democracy 
(Bull & Jones, 2006, p. 768). Traditional governance networks in Naples’ urban 
renewal neighbourhoods were of a very particularistic and non-transparent nature. 
The municipal efforts to replace this with more hierarchical steering and ‘command 
and control’ received large public support due to the widely felt revulsion in Italy at 
clientelism, corruption and organised crime in Naples (Bull & Jones, 2006).
Academic discussions on coordinating mechanisms illustrate that the shift from 
government to governance is an ambiguous phenomenon. Decision-making in 
networks of interdependent actors is not always seen as a benign form transcending 
conflict and power relations, but as an element that can lead to exclusionary and 
sometimes very particularistic social networks (Mullins & Rhodes 2007). These 
networks can be efficient, but at the same time profoundly undemocratic and lacking 
transparency and accountability.
§  3.4 Bringing democratic anchorage back into governance networks
Network theorists contend that governance networks are a way of responding to 
complex and wicked societal problems and may be the only viable way of decision-
making in a situation with fragmented resources and many interdependent actors 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Though maybe an efficient mode of decision-making, 
governance network are criticised for their lack of attention to the democratic 
implications of these networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). Klijn and Skelcher (2007) 
open up the question of the relationship between network governance and democracy 
by identifying four distinct conjectures, each with different implications for analysis 
and practice.
TOC
 78 Networks and Fault Lines
Their first incompatibility conjecture assumes that governance networks conflict 
with democracy because they are predicated on a different set of institutional rules. 
Sørensen (2002) identifies four ways in which implicit rules of governance networks 
may conflict with those of representative democracy: first through a sharing of 
sovereignty between different levels; second through changing the nature of political 
representation; third through a more active role for public administrators vis-a`-vis 
elected representatives; and fourth by blurring the separation between the political 
system and society. In this view governance networks undermine liberal democracy 
because they often bypass representative democratic institutions.
Klijn and Skelcher’s second complementarity conjecture is more optimistic, seeing 
governance networks as complementing traditional institutions of liberal democracy, 
contributing to the development of new forms of democracy, and adapting to 
greater complexity in the nature of decisions and societal fractures by opening 
up new opportunities and arenas for citizen engagement around the edges of the 
representative systems. In this view certain managerial issues may be delegated 
to networks, whilst elected politicians preserve a ‘high policy role’ and democratic 
oversight. Thus rather than undermining democracy, networks may enable wider 
democratic anchorage, involving more groups at different stages of decision processes 
from agenda setting to implementation, and thereby building social capital (McLaverty, 
2002).
Klijn and Skelcher’s third transitional conjecture suggests that we may be seeing a 
gradual displacement of representative government by network governance. There are 
interesting implications here depending on whether the shift is a product of external 
drivers such as globalisation or internal momentum, whereby once power is delegated 
to networks, elected politicians have great difficulty reclaiming it. If the latter is the case 
then the reaction of elected politicians is important. Should they resist an inevitable 
process in which political values and judgements will be more widely shaped? Or 
should they seek to adapt their own role to an active process management one in which 
‘‘democracy is a design task to be implemented in the real life practice of governance 
networks’’ (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007, p. 18).
Klijn and Skelcher’s final instrumental conjecture sees networks as instruments used 
by dominant actors to reinforce and realise their interests rather than as a process of 
negotiation with other actors. We have already referred to Davies (2002) in support for 
the conjecture that the state remains the dominant actor in regeneration policy and 
that horizontal influence is relatively limited in practice. Skelcher et al. (2005) provide 
a helpful depiction of different types of sub-national governance networks—‘clubs’ are 
characterised by strong horizontal influences and mutuality; ‘polity networks’ involve 
the creation of new political communities (e.g. election of residents to regeneration 
boards); meanwhile ‘agency networks’ come closest to those described by Davies 
in which the network is shaped by national government and autonomy is limited by 
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being integrated into vertical performance management systems that dictate and 
regulate outcomes to meet national targets. Case studies of regeneration partnerships 
in England by Skelcher et al. (2005) found that over half were closest to the ‘agency 
network’ type.
A new generation of post-liberal theorists on democracy support the complementarity 
conjecture that governance networks might contribute to the democratisation of 
societal governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, p. 200). But governance networks can 
only have a positive effect on the democratic functioning of society if these networks 
are themselves democratic. Sørensen and Torfing (2005, pp. 201–213) suggest 
measuring the democratic performance of governance networks in terms of democratic 
anchorage. Their criteria for network governance to complement democracy and 
maintain democratic anchorage are that governance networks should:
1 be subject to control by democratically elected politicians through network design, 
framing and participation;
2 represent the membership basis of the participating groups and organisations;
3 be accountable to the territorially defined citizenry; and
4 follow the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar or conduct.
§  3.4.1 Anchorage in democratically elected politicians
The basic rationale of the anchorage of governance networks in democratically elected 
politicians is to make sure that the outcomes in these networks are in line with the 
popular will expressed by the political majority in elected assemblies. To do this one 
needs to rethink the notion of political control. Unconstrained overruling of decisions 
made in governance networks is not compatible with one of the main characteristics 
of governance networks: their capacity for self-regulation. Therefore political control 
has been redefined as the concept of meta-governance. Meta-governance can be 
described as the attempts of politicians, administrators or other governance networks 
to construct, structure and influence the game-like interaction within governance 
networks. Meta-governance facilitates and constrains the decision-making processes 
in self-regulation networks without using hierarchical control. However, network 
governance always takes place in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ because meta-governance 
is in last instance sustained by the underlying threat of government interventions. 
Based on Kickert and Koppenjan (1997, p. 53) Sørensen and Torfing (2005, pp. 
203–204) distinguish three different forms of meta-governance: (1) network design, 
(2) network framing and (3) network participation.
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Network design involves attempts to influence which actors participate in specific 
governance networks and to selectively empower some actors by giving them important 
resources that turn them into key players in the network. Network framing involves 
the formulation of goals and objectives pursued by governance networks. Network 
framing can include the allocation of resources and the legal framework to guide the 
interactions within the governance network. Network participation involves direct 
participation of elected politicians in order to get first-hand knowledge of the network 
process and exert their political authority.
§  3.4.2 Anchorage in the membership basis of participating groups and organisations
In order to obtain democratic legitimacy, groups and organisations participating 
in governance networks should constitute a fair representation of directly affected 
people. Based on Pitkin (1967) and Laclau (1993), Sørensen and Torfing (2005, p. 
205) contend that the classical notion of representation (an unbiased one-to-one 
representation of a pre-given interest or preference in network-based decision-making) 
is problematic and theoretically flawed. There will always be discrepancies between the 
way opinions are articulated by those who are represented and the way representation 
is constructed in the governance network: the performative act of representation. The 
crucial question is whether those whom the representatives claim to represent identify 
with the discursive form of representation. Sørensen and Torfing (2005, p. 207) divide 
the democratic anchorage of representation in three aspects: (1) the ability of members 
of a group to select and instruct their representatives, (2) the ability of members to 
form an informed opinion about their representatives’ performance in the governance 
network and (3) to express different opinions and criticise the representatives’ 
performance in the governance network. The main challenge is to balance the pre-
given mandate of representatives with the freedom to negotiate in the decision-
making process. If representatives are tied ‘by hands and feet’ it is almost impossible to 
participate in the give and take forms of decision- making in networks.
§  3.4.3 Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry
Governance networks must not only include representatives of all the people directly 
affected by decisions, they must also be accountable to a wider citizenry, which is 
affected indirectly. In the example of urban renewal networks territorially defined 
citizens and communities should be able to hold the governance network accountable 
for its policy output and outcomes. The classical notion of public accountability is 
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difficult. Network actors cannot be expelled at the next election because they are not 
elected but (self-) appointed, and since there might not be anybody to replace them. 
For instance a housing association mismanaging an urban renewal project cannot be 
removed because they often own significant assets within the neighbourhood. Often 
the problem is not so much the removal of such interests, but their activation to get 
involved within these territorially based networks by attracting their attention from 
other networks and policy games that they may be involved in.
Sørensen and Torfing argue that these difficulties should not prevent one from seeking 
solutions to facilitate public contestation of decisions made by governance networks. 
Public contestation basically involves a public account by the governance network of 
why, how and with what result they did what they did. Furthermore, they must engage 
in public dialogue with critical citizens. If participation of citizens remains wanting, 
critical opponents can also be found in mass media, scientific and professional 
organisations, interest organisations, social movements and other governance 
networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007, pp. 209–210). Public contestation can only 
succeed if three crucial requirements are met: (1) transparency by the governance 
network in presenting decisions and results in a comprehensive, informative and for 
lay people accessible format, (2) access of citizens or other stakeholders to a public 
dialogue with the governance network and (3) responsive- ness on the part of the 
governance network without scorn, ridicule or other dismissive attitudes towards 
critical opponents.
§  3.4.4 Anchorage in democratic rules and norms
Internal processes and interactions within governance networks should live up to 
commonly accepted democratic standards, rules and norms. Sørensen and Torfing 
(2005, p.212) point out that these rules are subject to endless contestation. 
Furthermore they contend that rules are structurally ambiguous and can only be 
followed through re-articulation and re-enactment. So any list of rules and norms 
is by definition incomplete. Sørensen and Torfing mention three kinds of normative 
regulations that relate to the formation, functioning and output of governance networks: 
(1) inclusion of all relevant and affected actors and the construction of an open-ended 
policy discourse, (2) democratic deliberation based on voice and exit, respect for 
other people’s opinions, commitment to reach a ‘rough’ consensus (which includes 
the possibility to ‘agree to disagree’), transparency about the terms of the debate, (3) 
government networks must improve the future system of governance by enhancing 
social and political justice, empower participating actors and stimulate an active search 
for new forms of democracy to improve public decision-making processes.
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§  3.5 Democratic anchorage in housing, regeneration 
and integration networks
§  3.5.1 Introducing the cases
Governance networks and the network approach to analyse decision-making in 
governance networks are getting more prominent in housing studies, especially in 
complex decision- making processes like urban regeneration and social integration. 
The focus in these studies is still very much on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policies, decision-making processes and their outcomes. The management of 
governance networks has only recently become an important theme in this research 
(see Mullins & Rhodes, 2007). Even fewer studies have yet begun to explore the 
democratic anchorage of governance networks, but this would be an important 
development in this research field. We will use Klijn and Skelcher’s four conjectures 
and Sørensen and Torfing’s four democratic anchorage points to critically assess the 
level of democratic anchorage in five case studies derived from the articles in this 
special issue [see Table 3.1 below].
TITLE AUTHORS
Papers on urban renewal and community involvement
Steering local housing production: evaluation of the performance of gover-
nance structures [§ 3.5.2]
Buitelaar, E and De Kam, G.
Deadlocks and breakthroughs in urban renewal: a network analysis in 
Amsterdam [§ 3.5.3]
Haffner, M. and Elsinga, M.
Network governance in action: the case of Groningen. Complex deci-
sion-making in urban renewal [§ 3.5.4]
Van Bortel, G.
Papers and refugee integration
Refugee integration and access to housing, a network management per-
spective [§ 3.5.5]
Mullins, D. and Jones P.
Neighbourhood network governance, ethnic organization, and the pros-
pects for political integration [§ 3.5.6]
Hertting, N.
TABLE 3.1 Overview of papers used for the secondary analysis (Drafts of these articles were presented at the 
2007 conference of the European Network of Housing Research in Rotterdam
All papers discuss decision-making processes in housing systems, some explicitly use 
network governance frameworks to analyse decision-making. Additionally almost all 
papers have in common that relatively weak actors were part of the decision-making 
process, or their position in urban renewal governance networks was an issue.  
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Four papers contain research results on urban renewal including community 
involvement. Two papers focus on social integration issues relating to refugee 
communities and urban renewal.
§  3.5.2 Urban renewal, Arnhem
In the urban renewal project described by Buitelaar and De Kam (2007) the local 
authority and a private investor developed plans for a specific brown field location in 
the city of Arnhem in The Netherlands. The municipality and the private developer had 
deliberately chosen not to include residents in the first stages of the planning process 
and wanted to adapt a ‘design-announce-defend’ approach because they wanted to 
check the feasibility of the plan before going public. The local authority assumed that 
the neighbouring residents would be content with the planning outcomes because the 
plan included the replacement of a supermarket (removing all the nuisances attached 
with these kinds of facilities) with housing.
Strong opposition from neighbouring residents emerged after public presentation 
of the plans. The alderman responsible for this project nevertheless decided to start 
the formal planning procedure to enable the execution of the plan. However, the city 
council’s planning committee (consisting of elected local politicians) refused to submit 
the plans for formal approval due to the opposition of residents. Consequently the 
planning had to start all over again in a more participatory way with adapted municipal 
goals. Buitelaar and De Kam’s reconstruction of decision-making in Arnhem creates 
the impression that including residents in the planning process was not intended to 
give residents’ objectives full attention. The city assumed that resident participation 
would result in a better supported plan that would pass formal planning procedures 
more quickly and would lead to lesser claims for planning damage compensation. 
Adaptations of the plan originating from residents are described as ‘a price to be paid’ 
and ‘buying consent’ and not as natural outcomes of a democratically anchored policy 
process.
This case provides an example of an initial perception of incompatibility between 
democracy and network governance. It traces a gradual transition from one to the 
other as elected politicians responded to opposition. They did so by invoking meta-
governance tools. These were used to influence network design through giving 
residents a stronger position and by using their hierarchical power not to start formal 
approval procedures until the objections of residents were properly addressed. This led 
to a different network framing because the municipal goals for the redevelopment area 
were modified to accommodate the residents’ objectives.
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§  3.5.3 Urban renewal, Amsterdam
The paper by Haffner and Elsinga (2007) describes the deadlocks and breakthroughs 
in the urban renewal of two neighbourhoods in Amsterdam North. Policy development 
became bogged-down because residents and the housing associations were not able 
to reach an agreement on the urban renewal interventions. The closedness of actors 
to each other’s arguments and objectives prevented a fruitful dialogue. Each actor 
commissioned their own report from external experts to prove that the other actors 
were wrong. The project also had a difficult start because residents were initially 
not involved in the planning decisions and had to contest the plans developed by 
the housing association from outside the governance network. This contrasts with 
Sørensen and Torfing’s democratic anchorage criterion that groups and organisations 
participating in governance networks should constitute a fair representation of 
directly affected people. The difficulties in reaching an agreement on urban renewal 
interventions in Amsterdam North are perhaps surprising considering that the authors 
describe the ‘culture of compromise’ as a typical Dutch phenomenon.
To escape the impasse in the governance network and on initiative of elected politicians 
of the district council of Amsterdam North, a special negotiation team was formed with 
independent chairs and representatives from all parties involved (local authority, residents 
and housing associations). An explicit set of rules was agreed upon to facilitate decision- 
making but also to increase the level of democratic anchorage. To make sure tenants could 
fully participate in decision-making professional actors (e.g. housing associations and 
local authority) agreed not to use technical jargon and to be open and forthcoming about 
the pros and cons of proposals. Actors had to commit themselves to working towards 
consensus and to respect and try to understand the viewpoints of other actors.
This case could also be interpreted as a shift from a hierarchical to a network 
governance perspective by powerful actors and the adoption of meta-governance tools. 
Perhaps for instrumental reasons to maintain their own interests, elected politicians 
decided to redesign part of the network (by introducing the negotiation team and 
making tenant representatives part of the network); they also emphasised democratic 
norms of negotiation.
§  3.5.4 Urban renewal charter, Groningen
The paper by Van Bortel (2007) analysed decision-making on urban renewal policy in 
the city of Groningen in the North of The Netherlands. The paper focused on the recent 
renewal of an urban regeneration charter between the local authority and housing 
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associations. Collaboration between these parties on urban renewal issues goes back 
more than a decade but lately became, according to Van Bortel, more complicated due 
to an expanding number of policy issues that are included in urban renewal policy. 
From a very ‘bricks-and-mortar’ approach urban renewal now also includes more social 
(e.g. social cohesion, health issues, crime prevention) and economic objectives (e.g. 
tackling long- term unemployment). The increasing number of policy issues and actors 
involved in the decision-making led to conflicts and stagnation of decision-making. To 
overcome this decision-making impasse a number of meta-governance interventions 
were taken targeting network design, network framing and network participation. 
Interventions were aimed at organising a special 2-day policy conference in 2006 to 
bring all relevant actors together from the local authority administration and housing 
associations to discuss hot issues that blocked the renewal of the urban regeneration 
charter. This form of network design was specifically envisaged to include officials from 
different hierarchical levels and participating organisations to facilitate more lateral 
interactions. So not only the chief executives of housing associations and top level civil 
servants from municipal departments, but also officials from secondary hierarchical 
levels in the organisations attended the policy conference. Citizens from Groningen did 
not participate in this round of decision-making, but it was clear from the outset that 
citizens would be consulted on the outcomes of the policy conference and the text of 
the new urban renewal charter.
In this case there was from the start an expectation that network governance would 
complement democracy, but the emergence of blockages between the network actors 
led to meta-governance interventions in which elected politicians (the three aldermen 
responsible for the policy fields that were involved in the new urban renewal charter) 
had an important role in the design (e.g. the structure of the policy conference and 
its participants) and the framing (e.g. the aims) of the policy conference. In addition 
the aldermen also participated in the decision-making at crucial moments during the 
policy conference.
§  3.5.5 Accommodate programme, refugee integration, England
Mullins and Jones’ (2007) paper on the Accommodate project contains several 
examples of initiatives to increase democratic anchorage in five local partnerships by 
improving housing and support options for refugees, empowering RCOs, and changing 
housing policies. The Housing Associations Charitable Trust (hact) partly funded the 
local partnerships and was a central actor in the governance network. Hact is described 
in the paper as an ‘‘ace networker’’ that undertook several meta-governance initiatives 
based on the belief that real benefits could be achieved by building partnerships 
between newly formed RCOs and Housing Associations at the local level in five cities. 
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The project aimed at increasing refugee groups’ capacity to engage in partnerships 
and local decision-making processes and create a sustainable leadership for these 
organisations.
The accommodate project connects well to several points of democratic anchorage as 
described by Sørensen and Torfing. Hact was very active in meta-governance activities by 
deciding on the aims of the Accommodate project (network framing) and the actors that 
could participate (network design). These meta-governance interventions by hact were 
only loosely coupled with local democratic structures in the five cities and failed to engage 
directly with private landlords, who are the largest providers of housing for asylum seekers 
and refugees. However, they contributed to democratic anchorage by empowering RCOs 
to engage productively with much stronger Housing Associations. The local Accommodate 
partnerships also promoted another (post-liberal) democratic norm: accountability. 
Actors were not only accountable to hact as funder, but also to their local partners. Hact 
was active in emphasising democratic norms, creating a common vision and negotiating 
rather than imposing operating procedures on the five local partnerships.
Steering in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ clearly played a part in the Accommodate 
project. Mullins and Jones contend that part of the reason for the programme was 
a perceived failure of the democratic process to manage the relationship between 
refugee integration and housing policies. The dominant position of Hact was not based 
on democratic legitimised power but on its value stance as a relationship funder. The 
goals of the Accommodate project were influenced by hact’s national policy but also 
by its own dependence on grant givers such as the Big Lottery, Caloust Gulbenkian 
Foundation and the European Refugee Fund with whom a priori goals are agreed.
In this case there was a strong emphasis on the compatibility of network governance 
with democracy and on stimulating democratic practice within the network. Hact is the 
dominant actor in the Accommodate governance network and uses network instruments 
(like focusing on common interest, reciprocity and horizontal forms of collaboration) not 
because it is forced to do so due to interdependencies, but as part of its values and ethos.
§  3.5.6 Prospects for political integration of ethnic organisations in Sweden
Hertting (2007a) takes a closer look at ethnic organisations and their capacity to 
increase their political influence in neighbourhood governance networks. This subject 
is closely connected with Sørensen and Torfing’s fourth democratic anchorage point: 
democratic rules and norms. Hertting presents two different mechanisms for political 
integration through ethnic organisations: (1) the collective articulation mechanism 
and (2) the individual development mechanism.
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Hertting begins by describing well-established structures of network modes of 
decision- making in urban regeneration and integration policy in Sweden. He illustrates 
this with examples from Botkyrka, a suburban city near Stockholm. Additional—clearly 
post-liberal—network modes of democratic participation have been introduced in this 
city. Elected politicians from the local council are developing neighbourhood dialogue 
forums for residents. This initiative is a clear example of meta-governance where 
elected politicians both shape and participate in governance networks.
Hertting contends that participation of ethnic minority groups in urban renewal can 
induce a more professional and centralised organisation within ethnic associations 
themselves. In order to perform their role, association leaders must be able to take part 
in sometimes very complex negotiations with full-time officials from local authorities 
and social landlords. Network negotiators from ethnic minority organisations need 
strategic skills and discretionary power in order to successfully negotiate in networks. 
This can lead to a split between these representatives/negotiators and the members 
they represent thereby weakening the democratic anchorage in the membership basis 
of participating groups and organisations. Somewhat paradoxically it seems that 
efficient network governance both enhances and is enhanced by hierarchical structures 
within the networking organisations (see Hertting, 2003, p. 9512). There appears 
to be a trade-off between the networking power of an ethnic minority organisation, 
requiring a degree of centralisation, and the democratic participation of members of 
the association.
Ethnic minority organisations participating in governance networks can work as a ‘school 
of democracy’ and form an arena for promoting political skills, political efficacy, self-
confidence, contact networks and trust in other individuals and in collective decision- 
making in general and thereby strengthen democratic norms and values. Hertting 
contends that the development of these skills and values is heavily dependent on the 
mode of interaction within the ethic minority organisations. Ethnic associations that 
encourage participation of their members produce political development skills, but to 
be successful in network negotiations, these organisations require centralisation and 
professionalism that could restrict the possibilities to practise skills of members in real 
decision-making. Hertting identified a more indirect form of transfer of political and 
democratic skills, based on sub-elite integration (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993) According to this 
line of argument, political efficacy, trust and skills developed among representatives in 
governance networks will spread downwards within the represented groups.
12 The original article contains a reference to Hertting’s (2003) PhD-thesis, in Swedish. More accessible En-
glish-language references on Hertting’s work on policy games in neighbourhood regeneration networks are: 
Hertting (2007b), and Bengtsson & Hertting (2014).
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Hertting concludes that there are both potentials and problems attached to the 
participation of ethnic minority groups in neighbourhood governance networks. He 
notes that participation of these groups can increase collective and individual political 
and democratic skills and values and thereby increase democratic anchorage. This 
suggests that while network governance can be seen as compatible with democracy, 
there are subtle ways in which instrumental forces begin to transform the nature of 
the agents involved in governance networks that can work to undermine their own 
democratic practices.
§  3.6 Conclusions
We have used the four conjectures put forward by Klijn and Skelcher (2007) and the 
four criteria for democratic anchorage as described by Sørensen and Torfing (2005) 
to assess the policy development in the articles. The outcomes of this assessment 
are mixed and necessarily limited by the evidence available from secondary research 
papers based on a variety of theoretical positions and methodologies. However, we 
believe that this analysis provides a useful way of exploring and synthesising existing 
work on the topic of network governance in housing, regeneration and integration in 
Northern Europe.
Taking the four conjectures first [see Table 3.2] we may distinguish between the 
starting point of the key actors involved in the case studies and the changes that 
emerged as these case studies developed.
Key actors in some case studies started from a clear perception of complementarity 
between democracy and network governance (notably the Groningen regeneration 
case study in The Netherlands, the regeneration and integration policy case study in 
Botkyrka, Sweden and the Accommodate refugee partnership model in England). In 
other cases there appears to have been an initial reluctance by powerful state and 
non-profit actors to engage with network forms of organisation, perhaps because of a 
perceived incompatibility with democracy (in Arnhem and in Amsterdam). It appears 
that such network organisation as existed operated in the shadow of hierarchy.
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1 2 3 4
Cases Authors Incompatibility 
conjecture
Complementary 
conjecture
Transitional con-
jecture
Instrumentality 
conjecture
Urban Renewal, 
Arnhem
Buitelaar, E and  
De Kam, G.
+ Initially Over time Over time Meta-governance 
interventions rein-
force democratic 
influence
Urban Renewal, 
Amsterdam
Haffner, M. and 
Elsinga, M.
+ Initially Over time Over time Meta-governance 
interventions rein-
force democratic 
influence
Urban Renewal, 
Groningen
Van Bortel, G. - ++ Throughout Meta-governance 
interventions to 
resolve blockaged
-
Accommodate 
project, England
Mullins, D. & 
Jones, P.
- ++ Throughout 
process
Over time Successful network 
interventions aim 
to overcome demo-
cratic failure
Political Integra-
tion, Sweden
Hertting, N. ++ Throughout 
process
Over time Successful network 
integration chang-
es nature of ethnic 
organisation
TABLE 3.2 Conjectures on democracy and network governance: positioning the case studies
However, the case studies indicate that such relationships do not remain static, but 
can be subject to change. Evidence of transition over time towards more network-
based approaches was found in several of the case studies. In both Arnhem and 
Amsterdam this took the form of intervention by elected members to activate resident 
interests in decision-making using meta-governance network management tools. 
In Groningen too elected politicians became involved in meta-governance but in 
this case to overcome blockages that had arisen within a complementary model of 
network governance and democracy. While such interventions are consistent with the 
complementarity conjecture, there is a suspicion that in some cases (e.g. Amsterdam) 
there was a more instrumental interest by politicians in restoring their own dominance 
in decision processes rather than in oiling the wheels of collaborative networks. The 
Swedish case study provides a further example of transition to network governance and 
instrumentalism, but in this case the very success of engagement between democracy 
and integration networks had produced a change in the nature of the minority ethnic 
organisations engaging in these networks. In order to engage in conformance with 
external democratic and network processes, minority ethnic organisations were being 
transformed internally into more hierarchical and less democratic organisations.
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Overall, the case studies appear to indicate a degree of complementarity between 
network governance and democracy. Meta-governance approaches by elected 
authorities and in one case by an external agency (hact) emerged to manage transitions 
from democratic to network forms of organisation and to overcome blockages that 
had arisen in the absence of strong hierarchical steering. If this evidence for the 
complementarity conjecture holds true, then it is relevant and important to go on to 
explore conformance with Sørensen and Torfing’s criteria for democratic anchorage 
of governance networks [see Table 3.3]. We agree with Sørensen and Torfing (2005, 
p. 214) that demanding a perfect and uncompromising compliance with all rules and 
norms at all times might seriously damage the efficiency of decision-making. So it is 
important to find a pragmatic balance between efficiency and democracy.
1 2 3 4
Cases Authors Anchorage in dem-
ocratically elected 
politicians
Anchorage in 
membership basis 
of participation 
groups and organi-
sations
Anchorage in a 
territorially defined 
citizenry
Anchorage in 
democratic rules 
and norms
Urban Renewal, 
Arnhem
Buitelaar, E and De 
Kam, G.
++ n/a n/a -
Urban Renewal, 
Amsterdam
Haffner, M. and 
Elsinga, M.
++ + + ++
Urban Renewal, 
Groningen
Van Bortel, G. + + + n/a
Accommodate 
project, England
Mullins, D. & 
Jones, P.
- + + ++
Political Integra-
tion, Sweden
Hertting, N. ++ + + ++
TABLE 3.3 Democratic anchorage assessment of case studies 
Note that not all cases covered the four democratic anchorage points. In these cases we have used the qualification non-available 
(n/a)
The two papers on refugee and ethnic minority participation (in England and Sweden) 
focused on improving capabilities of marginalised groups to participate in governance 
networks. In both cases network design initiatives were used to strengthen the 
position of minority groups within the governance network. In Botkyrka alignment with 
external democratic structures had interesting implications for democratic practice 
within minority community organisations as discussed above. In contrast with the 
Swedish case, the English Accommodate project meta-governance initiatives did not 
originate from elected politicians but from a relationship with a funding organisation, 
hact, operating at national level but aiming to facilitate local political integration. The 
democratic mandate of hact is not clear; however, Mullins and Jones suggest that it was 
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in ‘the right place at the right time’ to bridge the gap between refugee dispersal and 
housing policy that had emerged in the English political system where there appeared 
to have been a ‘failure of political will’ to make these links. Moreover, hact enjoyed 
strong legitimacy with both the refugee community and housing sectors as a result of 
45 years of work with both sectors and its commitment to ‘‘pioneer housing solutions 
for people on the margins’’.
The Arnhem case presents a more liberal democratic viewpoint on the role of 
elected politicians. City administration officials in this case initially undertook the 
redevelopment of the infill site in collaboration with a project developer. Elected 
politicians from the city council used formal planning procedures to include residents 
in the governance network. It appears that professional actors found the inclusion of 
residents in the governance network more of a burden than a blessing. Adaptations to 
the plan originating from resident involvement were described as ‘a price to be paid’ 
and as ‘buying consent’, not as natural outcomes of a democratically anchored policy 
process.
In Amsterdam there was a clearer commitment to meta-governance interventions 
to promote engagement with residents by agreeing more inclusive rules such as 
consensus working and plain speaking by officials.
The Groningen case showed a clear commitment to territorially based anchorage in 
each of the priority neighbourhoods. A prior commitment to network governance led 
to a democratic intervention to overcome blockages between professional actors prior 
to further engagement with the citizens. However, because the case study focused on 
this stage of the process there was little evidence of anchorage in democratic rules and 
norms. It was anticipated that this would follow through consultation on the text of a 
new urban renewal charter.
There is an emerging research agenda which it is important to build on to develop more 
sophisticated and nuanced accounts of network governance and the relationship with 
democracy. We believe that the following learning points need to be taken into account 
by researchers in the field of housing, regeneration and integration. First, accounts 
should identify the extent to which network governance operates in practice and the 
extent to which networks operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ as appeared to be the 
case in at least two of the case studies explored here. Second, we need to explore the 
extent to which network governance is seen by the actors involved as incompatible or 
complementary to democracy and how these views change over time. It is important to 
identify the a priori assumptions and to distinguish these from patterns that emerge 
as policy games develop within governance networks. Third, it is important to gather 
evidence of the ways in which networks are linked to democracy both in terms of 
system linkages and organisational practices.
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Inevitably our attempt to apply these principles to analysis of studies that had 
been conducted with rather different goals and methods raises possibilities of 
misinterpretation. We are also conscious of the rather narrow empirical base of these 
secondary accounts covering just three Northern European states. However, we hope 
that further work will now be undertaken in a wider range of contexts to develop critical 
second generation of research on network governance within the field of housing, 
regeneration and integration.
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Abstract 
Mergers among housing associations have become a frequent phenomenon in both 
the Netherlands and England. The general literature on mergers highlights the need 
for research to consider the wider political and business environment, managerial 
motives and strategic choices, to adopt a process perspective and to evaluate outcomes 
in relation to competing definitions of goals and success criteria. This article applies 
these perspectives to consider drivers for and experience of housing association 
mergers in the Netherlands and England, competing motivations such as efficiency 
savings in relation to borrowing and procurement costs, improved professionalism and 
organisational capacity and external influence. We discuss the pace and motivations 
of mergers, the expected positive and negative effects, and actual outcomes. We 
focus on the impact of mergers on stakeholder satisfaction, housing production and 
operational costs. Based on our findings we discuss the implications for policies and 
practice in both countries. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between the 
size of housing associations and their performance is not straightforward. This is partly 
because large and small associations are generally trying to do different things in 
different ways and have contrasting strengths and weaknesses; thus judgements about 
whether mergers and concentration of ownership in third sector housing is a change 
for the better are dependent upon considerations of underlying purposes and success 
criteria.
Keywords
housing associations, mergers, motives, process, outcomes.
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§  4.1 Introduction
Mergers have become a key feature of the restructuring of third sector housing in both 
the Netherlands and England. In the Netherlands the number of housing associations 
declined by more than 50% and the average number of dwellings per organisation 
increased from around 3 000 in 1997 to 5 600 in 2008. In England the average size 
of housing associations doubled in the past 10 years. In both countries there has been 
a process of concentration of ownership, which in some ways resembles the merger 
process in the private sector. However, a key difference from the private sector is that 
third sector organisations are not subject to ‘hostile takeovers’ since their shares are 
not traded on the market. Third sector organisations have no shareholders that could 
coerce their management into a merger.
A similarity between the housing associations and the private sector is that mergers 
frequently fail to deliver the promised results. Organisations often do not operate in 
a more efficient, effective or more customer-focused manner after a merger. Still the 
process of mergers in third sector housing is ongoing. So lacking shareholders and 
hostile take-overs that could drive this concentration in the not-for-profit housing 
sector, what are the forces underpinning this development and what are the impacts?
In this paper we want to explore the drivers and motivations for mergers among 
housing associations and the impact of mergers and organisational scale on their 
performance. We do this by presenting a preliminary analysis of the trends, patterns 
and implications of housing associations mergers based on work that has been 
conducted in parallel so far by researchers of third sector housing in England and the 
Netherlands. In Section 4.2 we discuss some key themes in the research literature on 
mergers in general to consider the position of mergers in third sector housing. Section 
4.3 draws on research on the drivers, motives and anticipated effects of mergers in the 
two countries. Then it reviews in some detail existing and new evidence on outcomes of 
mergers in third sector housing, i.e. the impact on service delivery, operating costs and 
housing production [Section 4.4]. In Section 4.5 we discuss possible explanations for 
unsuccessful mergers. In our conclusions [Section 4.6] we reflect on the implications of 
our findings for policy in different contexts, contrasting the high levels of policy steering 
in England with the much less regulated context in the Netherlands. We then suggest 
a potential research agenda that might enable comparative research to stimulate 
organisational and policy learning and promote change for the better in both countries.
Methodological considerations
This is a first attempt to bring together evidence on a complex process of organisational 
and sectoral change in two different housing systems with distinct legal and 
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institutional contexts; although there has been earlier comparative work on related 
topics such as performance measurement (Walker and Van der Zon 2000). In the 
light of these differences, the findings are tentative and would benefit from further 
refinement in a comparative research study with a common methodology. However, 
institutional variations and problems associated with differing administrative datasets 
and definitions would still constrain comparison. Furthermore, since we are reliant 
mainly on interpreting findings from earlier studies in each country, as is often the case 
with such systematic evidence reviews, differences in findings may simply indicate the 
different research questions and methodologies adopted in the source studies. One 
small example of this is the emphasis in some of the English literature on the process 
of merger and the implications of choices made at an early stage in relation to strategic 
and cultural fit for long-term success (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Cowin & Moore 1996; 
Mullins 2000). This emphasis seems less prevalent in the Dutch literature and it 
is therefore difficult to make direct comparisons without comparable case study 
research. Nevertheless, it is apparent that similar questions are being asked about the 
drivers, outcomes and policy implications of merger activity (Audit Commission and 
Housing Corporation, 2001; Davies et al., 2006; Van Veghel, 1999; Cebeon, 2006). It 
is useful to review these prior to making some recommendations for a future agenda 
to accelerate learning through comparative research. In addition to published studies 
on mergers cited in this paper, our research base includes an analysis of previously 
unpublished performance data13 interviews from a number of more general research 
projects14 and engagement with senior managers15
§  4.2 Mergers in third sector housing; learning 
from the wider research literature
Mergers are nothing new, neither among commercial enterprises nor within the 
third sector. There is an extensive literature on the motives, process and outcomes of 
mergers in the private sector (Hubbard, 1999; Jemison & Sitkin 1986), a key message 
of which is the high proportion of mergers that fail to increase shareholder value, 
13 KWH—results of quality measurements gathered over several years, based on quality labels developed by KWH 
to assess landlord services, tenant and wider stakeholder involvement.
14 Delphi Panel study of English Housing Associations 1997–2004 (see Mullins 2006a for details, David Mullins’ 
interviews with 20 Dutch HA directors 2007 (unpublished).
15 e.g. Mergers Masterclass at University of Birmingham December 2006, and work with National Housing Federa-
tion members 2004/2005.
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partly as a result of the limited consideration given to post-merger implementation 
planning. Recent attention has been extended to mergers in the public and third 
sectors (Cornforth, 1994; Cowin & Moore 1996) and similar stories of variable success 
and focus apply. Mullins (1999, 2000) has identified some relevant features of this 
literature for studying mergers in third sector housing. 
Four main features may be summarised here. The first is the need to consider the wider 
business and political environment in creating the climate for merger (Hubbard 1999). 
Private sector mergers tend to occur in waves reflecting disturbances or changes in the 
external environment usually related to the economic cycle. Analysis later in this paper 
shows similar patterns in the English housing association sector where policy and 
regulatory influences are strong drivers. The second is the need to consider managerial 
motives and strategic choices that influence how organisations respond to changes in 
the operating environment. For example, Singh (1971) argues that managers may be 
less interested in profits than in growth since size of firm can have a major influence 
on their own rewards. The consideration of managerial motives (Trautwein, 1990) 
requires a critical approach to the proposals that housing associations produce for 
mergers16 and a broad perspective on organisational strategies including choices 
between different options (such as mergers, alliances and groups; see next paragraph). 
The third is the process perspective (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) which relates merger 
outcomes to decisions made at various stages of the process, particularly at an early 
stage, on strategic and cultural ‘fit’; an over-emphasis on the former often leads to 
poorly planned integration processes and sub-optimal outcomes. Finally, there is a 
need to evaluate outcomes of mergers through close attention to the process and to the 
definitions of key success criteria (Cowin & Moore, 1996) emerging from organisations 
themselves and from their operating environment. Thus our research on Dutch and 
English housing associations recognised that associations were often trying to do 
different things in different ways, whereby simple distinctions between success and 
failure are hard to make.
16 Since 2005 English associations applying to the regulator for approval of mergers have been required to produce 
a business case setting out how the new structure will improve services, generate savings and how these savings 
will be monitored (Housing Corporation Chair’s letter to HA board Chairs May 24, 2005)
TOC
 99 ‘Change for the Better?’ making sense of housing association mergers in the Netherlands and England
§  4.2.1 A continuum of choices
Returning to the question of strategic choice, Figure 4.1 below indicates that merger is 
just one on a continuum of options, including partnerships, alliances, group structures 
and full mergers. These options can all increase the scale of operations, but each has 
different implications for control, independence and transaction costs. Partnerships 
and alliances preserve the highest levels of independence for partner organisations but 
are difficult to control, resulting in high transaction costs and continuing instability 
(since partners may pull out at any time). Group structures are constitutional 
partnerships based on legal agreements but were at one time thought to preserve 
significant opportunities for independence while sharing central services and joint 
procurement. Mergers involve greater sacrifices of independence and the possibility 
of enhanced control to deliver greater efficiencies (e.g. through fuller functional 
integration and collapse of subsidiary governance) (Mullins & Craig, 2005). The 
recent story of sector restructuring in England has largely been one of amalgamation 
through the group structure route, followed by fuller merger through ‘streamlining’ of 
governance and services delivery to create more integrated and unitary organisations 
(Pawson, 2006; Mullins & Pawson, 2010).
An important development in both countries is the creation through a series of ‘mega- 
mergers’ of a new set of third sector organisations operating on a much larger scale 
than ever before. In both countries the largest associations now own and manage in 
excess of 50 000 homes. It has been suggested that ‘there is a real difference between 
managing an organisation of 30 000 and one of 50 000 homes’, and that such 
organisations need new ‘structures, methods, technology and mindsets’ to operate 
effectively (London and Quadrant 2006). The emphasis on scale is somewhat ironic 
because housing associations in both England and the Netherlands started in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as small-scale and locally based organisations 
(Malpass, 2000; Ouwehand & Van Daalen, 2002). Well into the twentieth century 
English housing associations were seen to provide a smaller scale, an alternative 
associated with ‘the rejection of mass models’ (Kendall, 2003, p. 138).
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FIGURE 4.1 Mergers and alliance options
The role of housing associations in England and the Netherlands has considerable 
similarities. Both are now the main providers of social housing and often combine 
traditional landlord activities with social investments and community development. 
Dutch housing associations are financially more affluent, less regulated and 
more hybrid by combining third sector with commercial activities. Dutch housing 
associations are monopolists in the social housing sector, while in England social 
housing is also provided by local authorities which have much more of a ‘mixed 
economy’ of provision. In 2009 management of social housing in England was split 
into four almost equal shares: local authorities direct management (24%), Arms 
Length Management Organisations managing homes for local authorities (23%), 
traditional housing associations (27%), and stock transfer housing associations (26%) 
(Pawson & Mullins, 2010).
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§  4.2.2 Change for the better?
One key policy question has featured prominently in both countries: do large 
organisations perform any better than smaller ones and if so in what ways? This 
question has often been reduced to technical considerations of efficiency and cost, with 
sophisticated analyses attempting to compare costs of larger and smaller associations 
(Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2005; Indepen, 2008). However, it is sometimes 
recognised that larger and smaller associations may be trying to do different things, 
and that their performance may therefore be very difficult to compare in a meaningful 
way. Lupton and Davies (2005) have suggested that rather than considering economies 
of scale we might consider economies of scope. Economies of scope consider the 
different scales at which activities (in contrast to the scale of the organisation) such as 
housing management, development and back office services are ideally undertaken 
(Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH), 2005). Moreover, Mullins (2006a) has suggested 
that organisational logics associated with increasing scale for efficiency reasons may 
conflict with logics concerned with promoting local accountability. Encouragingly large 
housing associations in both countries appear to be taking this conflict seriously and 
have been developing structural, cultural and governance solutions to the challenge 
to ‘think globally but act locally’. For example, several larger Dutch associations have 
adopted structures with locally accountable management units of around 5 000 
homes. In England the imperative to invest efficiency savings in service improvements 
has been stimulated by regulatory requirements for merger proposals, by concepts of 
corporate social responsibility and social return (Mullins and Nieboer 2008; Mullins 
and Sacranie 2009) and by increasing emphasis by the social housing regulator (until 
2008 the Housing Corporation, now the Tenant Services Authority, TSA) on measuring 
social performance.
The pace of merger activity has been a highly visible and much discussed feature of 
both the Dutch and English housing association sectors over recent years. Long-term 
trend data for the two sectors indicates a similar direction of change, with high volumes 
of merger activity and a resulting increasing average size of housing associations in 
both countries [see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3].
The different context for mergers in the two sectors is apparent from the available data. 
For example, the number of registered housing associations in England has remained 
fairly constant since the sector has continued to grow through stock transfer. In direct 
contrast the number of Dutch housing associations has decreased by nearly 50% over 
the past 10 years. While the average size for all Dutch associations is more than 5 000 
homes and the average
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FIGURE 4.2 Decrease in numbers and increase in average size of Dutch housing associations 1997–2006
 
FIGURE 4.3 Merger activity in England 1976-2005
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Figure 4.3 plots the time series of merger activity in England between 1976 and 2005. 
It shows a continuous flow of ‘transfers of engagements’ (i.e. mergers) averaging 
about 1% of the sector each year (Mullins, 2000). Two peaks in activity reflected 
adjustments to legislative and funding changes: namely the introduction of public 
funding post-1974–1976; and the inauguration of the ‘mixed finance’ regime 
post-1988. In the later 1990s there was a shift in the form of restructuring with the 
emergence of group structures of associations and other charitable and non-charitable 
subsidiaries controlled by parent bodies. Initially stimulated by corporation tax 
changes, establishment of group structures was subsequently also motivated by other 
considerations including ring-fencing risky or specialist activities and accommodating 
local stock transfer subsidiaries (Audit Commission and Housing Corporation, 2001). A 
further and more intense process of sector restructuring was triggered by 2004 reforms 
which concentrated development funding on the 70 or so ‘best developing associations 
under the Housing Corporation’s Investment Partnering procurement initiative’ 
(Mullins, 2006b, p. 9).
In the eight years to 2009, stock holdings of the typical English housing association 
grew by 50% (from 800 to 1 420 dwellings), while the proportion of national housing 
association stock in the ownership of the 20 largest providers grew from 26 to 29% 
(Pawson & Sosenko, 2008). In England stock transfers from local authorities to 
housing associations have had an important impact on the institutional landscape. 
Over 200 transfer associations have been established, with stock holdings now 
exceeding those of the traditional housing association sector. Moreover, 40% of those 
set up as independent, stock transfer associations have subsequently established 
or joined together with others to form group structure arrangements. By 2007, over 
half of the transfer HAs operating as subsidiaries (over a quarter of all transfer HAs) 
were members of groups which also involved traditional (non-transfer) associations. 
(Pawson & Sosenko, 2008). As a result, over 75% of the stock managed by the largest 
50 English associations is now managed by groups including associations with origins 
in stock transfer from local authorities (Pawson & Mullins, 2010). To a lesser extent 
stock transfer is also a feature of restructuring in the Netherlands where a White Paper 
in the early 1980s aimed to eliminate all municipal housing companies by 1996. In 
practice there were still 213 in 1990, falling to 23 by 2000 (Ouwehand & Van Daalen, 
2002). Almost all Dutch municipal housing companies have now been privatised 
into new independent housing associations or merged into existing social landlords. 
Some of the largest associations such as Ymere, with a housing stock of 80 000 in the 
Amsterdam region, originated from the municipal sector.
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§  4.2.3 Differences in policy context
There are significant differences in the policy context in which this restructuring activity 
has been occurring in the two countries. Before the 1990s, Dutch housing associations 
were largely controlled by the government through regulations and financial 
arrangements. In the 1990s, however, the government diminished its direct financial 
support and replaced the prescriptive regulations by the principle of retrospective 
accountability. This new regulatory framework allowed the associations’ a lot more 
administrative freedom, but it also meant a significant increase in their financial 
business risks (e.g. Gruis & Nieboer, 2006). Consequently, housing associations have 
begun to adopt businesslike approaches in their management (e.g. Gruis & Nieboer, 
2004; Gruis, 2008). Mergers among housing associations can be seen as part of this 
development and also as part of a wider trend of increased cooperation in various 
kinds of networks. Since the 1990s housing associations have set up several types of 
cooperation aimed at, for example, joint product development, treasury, finance and 
project development (including setting up project development companies jointly 
owned by two or more housing associations).
English housing associations have also been subject to a degree of marketisation 
and competition (Walker, 2000). In particular, this has occurred through significant 
levels of private borrowing and reductions in the proportion of scheme costs funded 
by government, through cross-subsidies of rental housing from shared ownership 
and outright sales and a resulting emphasis on businesslike behaviour and strategic 
management (Mullins & Riseborough, 2000; Mullins, 2006a). However, English 
associations remain subject to strong regulation. Two of the most important drivers of 
merger activity in the sector have been regulatory intervention and a reduction in the 
number of investment partner associations directly funded by government (Mullins & 
Craig, 2005). In England regulatory intervention has been the main driver for enforced 
mergers, there being no market mechanism for hostile take-overs. Enforced merger 
has long been the ultimate regulatory sanction in the case of failing associations. The 
increasing regulatory burden has also been a factor cited for merger, particularly by 
smaller associations (Mullins & Craig, 2005). As in the Netherlands, there have been 
alliances and network co-operation in areas such as procurement and housing market 
renewal. Sacranie’s concept of multi-layered merging captures the parallel processes 
of sectoral changes arising from blurring of state, market and third sector identities 
alongside organisational mergers to create new kinds of organisational cultures and 
governance models (Mullins & Sacranie, 2008).
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§  4.3 Merger drivers, motives and anticipated benefits
Researchers in both countries have attempted to establish why the trend towards 
increasing merger activity has occurred. We have reviewed the extent to which these 
accounts emphasise three main dimensions: external drivers inducing mergers as an 
organisational response; internal motives such as growth and succession planning; and 
anticipated benefits such as increasing professional expertise and ability to manage 
the regulatory burden. A fourth consideration, varying in the attention given to it, is 
the need to appraise varying options for achieving these anticipated benefits (e.g. the 
choice between alliance, group structures and mergers and the level of integration 
desired within the merger option) (Mullins & Craig, 2005). Often such analyses 
combine these dimensions in a single set of factors.
In 1998, Van Veghel conducted a survey among Dutch housing associations to inquire 
about their motives for mergers [see Table 4.1]. The three most frequent reasons for 
mergers stated in that survey are achieving a better market position because of the 
larger size, professionalisation and improving service delivery (Van Veghel, 1999).
More recently, Cebeon (2006) conducted an in-depth analysis of the effects of mergers 
among 15 housing associations that had merged before 1 January 2002. As part 
of this analysis Cebeon asked what the objectives of the mergers were and whether 
the associations think the objectives have been achieved. In Table 4.2 we see that 
professionalisation and market position due to the increased size are still the most 
frequently mentioned objectives. Furthermore, these 15 housing associations seem to 
relate mergers more explicitly to their (re)development tasks and risks. In contrast to 
English associations, increasing efficiency is not a commonly stated motive for Dutch 
housing association mergers.
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MOTIVES N %
Better market position due to larger size 32 76%
Professionalisation 31 73%
Improving service delivery 28 67%
Improving financial continuity 18 41%
Better market position due to increased differentiation 
in housing stock
18 43%
A more efficient back office 17 40%
Matching investment tasks and means 10 23%
Efficiency in restructuring neighbourhoods 10 24%
Spreading risks of larger investment tasks 6 14%
Other reasons 3 8%
Total 42
TABLE 4.1 Motives for mergers mentioned by Dutch housing associations 
Source: Van Veghel (1998)
OBJECTIVES STATED AS OBJECTIVE ACHIEVED AS RESULT
Increasing size to become a stronger player in the (local) 
housing area   
13 14
Make further professionalisation possible 12 15
Being able to conduct a large task (restructuring, new 
housing development)
11 13
Increasing size to be able to handle larger risks 11 11
Better local or regional co-ordination because of con-
centration of ownership 
9 11
Expansion of activities (new competences within the 
organisation)
9 10
Efficiency gains 9 5
Matching tasks and means (of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ housing 
associations)
6 7
Other objectives 2 4
TABLE 4.2 Objectives and achieved results of mergers according to 15 Dutch housing associations 
Source: Cebeon (2006)
In England a similar survey was undertaken by Mullins and Craig (2005) to inform 
responses of the National Housing Federation to an apparent acceleration in the 
pace and scale of merger activity in the English housing association sector. This study 
identified a continuum of merger and alliance options involving different trade-offs 
between independence and scale with different levels of transaction costs involved 
[Figure 4.1].
In the 1990s Group Structures had become the most popular method to increase 
organisational scale. Group structures may be defined as formal associations of 
independent organisations in which one organisation, the parent, has ultimate legal 
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control over the other ‘subsidiary’ organisations (Audit Commission and Housing 
Corporation, 2001). One of the factors favouring groups was the ability to preserve 
apparently independent subsidiaries whilst benefiting from increased scale. After 
2000 it became clear that independence was limited by regulatory requirements for 
parents to have control (Housing Corporation, 2004) and later still increased emphasis 
on efficiency led to a move back to mergers with simpler streamlined structures as the 
preferred model
Mullins and Craig (2005) also made a distinction between external drivers and internal 
management motives and between the drivers for different types of partnership. 
Overall, there was remarkable consistency of view that a Government-led efficiency 
agenda and Investment Partnering had been the main drivers accounting for an 
increase in activity on all areas of the continuum over the past two years. For individual 
associations, people issues, especially the retirement of chief executives, was the main 
internal driver. Table 4.3 shows the most frequently mentioned drivers for each form of 
partnership.
MERGERS 
Value for money and efficiency agendas
Creating economies of scale and a more powerful entity with a greater ability to survive in a fast-paced sector 
Retirement of the chief executive 
Expansion and growth—merger gives development potential 
Investment partnering is now a driver for mergers 
Audit Commission inspections—if an association is struggling they are pushed in the direction of merger for 
improvement/survival 
GROUP STRUCTURES 
Efficiency agenda 
Mitigating risk: developing separate branches of specialism 
Smaller associations feeling that they can’t keep up with the pace of change—ability to deliver part of the 
package of joining a larger group. 
Retirement of a chief executive
Regulatory intervention—‘the Corporation continues to see Groups as the best place for turning around  
failing associations’
OTHER ALLIANCE/PARTNERSHIP 
Investment partnering has been a major stimulus to alliances to secure continued access to development 
funding 
Efficiency and cheaper procurement were growing in importance as drivers for alliances and there had been a 
‘big push in repairs and maintenance partnerships’ 
Other alliances and partnerships are seen as the ‘third option’ for associations who don’t want to merge or 
join a group structure 
TABLE 4.3 Main drivers and motives for different forms of mergers and alliances: England 2005
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§  4.4 Outcomes
§  4.4.1 Impacts of mergers
Assessments of the outcomes of mergers in the housing association sector have 
generally been rather inconclusive to date. This is partly because different types of 
questions have been asked, with a general tendency to seek evidence on financial 
benefits and cost savings rather than on a rounded assessment of impacts on financial 
and social performance. It also reflects a relative paucity of studies comparing the 
performance of different types and sizes of housing organisations though see for 
example Walker and Murie (2004). In this section we review existing evidence, but 
focus on new and emerging evidence highlighting the use of benchmarking data in the 
Dutch context.
In England, an early study of group structures (Audit Commission and Housing 
Corporation, 2001) was unable to find conclusive evidence of cost savings apart from 
those associated with corporation tax or procurement. However, it did express concerns 
that residents were being excluded from representation on the parent boards of the 
emerging groups. Later work by Lupton and Davies (2005) found that no general 
conclusions could be drawn about the correlation between scale and performance. 
They suggested instead that a focus on the desired social and other effects and on 
effective management is more important than the excessive emphasis currently placed 
on scale and structures. Most importantly they suggested that there is no such thing as 
‘one size fits all’ for housing associations because different housing functions work best 
at different scales. This interesting finding is discussed further in our conclusion.
Later work by Davies et al. (2006) was critical of the ambition of associations when 
setting cost savings targets in their merger proposals (these were generally 1–2% of 
turnover or 1.5–3% of operating costs). In the view of Davies et al., more ambitious 
targets would have been appropriate and achievable. However, unpublished 
discussions by the present authors with experienced practitioners suggest that they 
sometimes felt it was better to ‘aim low and overachieve’. This alternative view was 
influenced by the unanticipated costs frequently associated with mergers and by the 
increasing scrutiny of whether promised benefits were being delivered.17 
17 These discussions took place during a ‘Mergers Masterclass’ held at the University of Birmingham in Decem-
ber 2007, attended by the directors of several English associations and facilitated by two of the authors of this 
paper.
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Davies et al. also found that over half of the associations were failing to measure 
whether such savings targets were actually met, but recognised that ‘measurement 
is inherently difficult given the dynamic nature of the business’. Their analysis of 
published performance indicators for 2005 suggested that groups had achieved 
savings in operating costs compared to other associations, but that outcomes on 
most other indicators such as relet times, repairs performance and tenant satisfaction 
were worse.
These studies appeared to influence the mood of organisational leaders involved in 
a Delphi panel study undertaken by one of the authors (Mullins, 2006a). This study 
found that, paradoxically, most leaders expected a continued increase in merger 
and group structure activity, but few expected that such activity would result in cost 
savings for the associations involved. More recently, there has been a ramping up of 
regulatory expectations in relation to efficiency savings, close scrutiny of proposals 
(also referred to as ‘business cases’) submitted to support merger applications and 
more concerted attempts to monitor their achievement (signalled by a letter to all 
housing association chairs from the then Housing Corporation Chair, Peter Dixon in 
May 2005). It is possible that as a result of these changes clearer evidence will begin to 
emerge of such savings being delivered. For example, one of the authors is involved in 
a long-term evaluation of a major amalgamation of two large English groups to form 
an association of 50 000 homes. This organisation had set an initial savings target 
of £2 million for central services and a similar amount for a sub-group merger. It has 
adopted a balanced scorecard evaluation framework encompassing customer services, 
growth, influence and financial strength objectives. Later in this section we will explore 
new evidence emerging from the operating cost index concerning the impact of 
organisational scale on operating costs which suggests the emergence of a scale effect 
after 2005 (Indepen, 2008).
In the Netherlands, the Central Housing Fund (CFV, Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting) 
has researched the subject from a primarily financial perspective (Centraal Fonds 
Volkshuisvesting, 2005, 2006, 2007). The Housing Ministry (VROM) commissioned 
Cebeon (Centrum voor Beleidsondersteunend Onderzoek) to investigate the effect 
of mergers on social performance (Cebeon, 2006). Cebeon’s study focused on the 
qualitative effects of mergers, such as local performance agreements, regional and local 
commitment, effects on tenants, liveability, product differentiation, investment power, 
management costs and efficiency. The study concluded that mergers have a positive 
effect on the social performance of associations. An overview of those positive results 
has already been given in Table 4.2. Drawing mainly from Cebeon’s report (2006), we 
can also mention the following potential (interrelated) negative effects:
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 – losing touch with (or giving less attention to) local governments, housing markets and 
neighbourhoods, particularly when mergers expand the distribution of the housing 
stock over multiple municipalities;
 – becoming too strong in comparison to other associations and local 
stakeholders(monopolisation);
 – becoming less accessible to (local) stakeholders due to the larger size (particularly 
when combined with a centralised decision-making structure) and due to the internal 
orientation during the first years after the merger;
 – a lower level of service delivery due to decreased accessibility to individual clients;
 – less efficiency due to a larger overhead and increased internal bureaucracy.
Data derived from the annual reports of housing associations and from interviews with 
association representatives give a picture of their results. But comparable data on how 
tenants and other stakeholders perceive the performance of associations is still scarce 
and fragmented. No similar data is available on the English social housing sector. 
Customer and stakeholder satisfaction assessments by the Dutch Kwaliteitcentrum 
Woningcorporaties Huursector (KWH) indicate that mergers lead to a period of 
introspection, reflected in lower customer satisfaction scores immediately after a 
merger. The results fall in the first year but then rise sharply and even exceed the pre-
merger level. Larger associations take longer to recover [see Figure 4.4].
FIGURE 4.4 Average KWH-Huurlabel scores in the post merger period. ` 
Source: KWH 2007
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§  4.4.2 Scale and the production of rented homes
Apart from ratings by customers and stakeholders, the production of new homes is one 
of the main performance indicators for housing associations. In its sector survey for 
2007, the CFV reports that, after reaching a record low in 2001, associations doubled 
their production of new rented homes to 24 700 units in 2006 (Centraal Fonds 
Volkshuisvesting, 2007). However, the CFV also observes that, year on year, actual 
production is far below the associations’ own forecasts, which were twice as high. 
Housing associations forecast 60 000 new rented homes in 2008, while the CFV—
based on actual production in previous years—estimates that the annual production of 
rented homes will stabilise at around 30 000 units.
The extent to which associations contribute to new housing varies from association 
to association. For several years, the Housing Ministry (VROM) has published indexes 
showing the best-performing associations in terms of construction, sale and demolition.
If we look at the size of associations, it is the largest organisations that build, sell 
and demolish the greatest number of units. In 2006, the 56 associations with more 
than 10 000 units built 16 900 homes. The other associations built 7 700 units. In 
other words, the 12% largest associations built 69% of the new association-funded 
homes in the Netherlands. But the performance of large associations is less impressive 
when expressed as a percentage of units owned. With the exception of the 3 mega-
associations with more than 50 000 homes, providers of rented social housing with 
a stockholding between 30 000 and 50 000 homes built almost as many as the 
associations with less than 1 500 homes [see Figure 4.5].
As noted earlier, English government funding for constructing new social and afford- 
able housing has been focused on 74 large investment partners. Recently published 
data (Inside Housing, June 20, 2008) has confirmed that larger associations dominate 
the league table of new building. Of the top ten developers in 2008, none had fewer 
than 18 000 homes in management already; only two had fewer than 30 000 units and 
five already had more than 50 000 homes in management. Similarly it is mainly the 
larger associations that have the capacity to build housing for sale. So in the absence 
of a similar analysis we would predict that similar conclusions could be generated 
about the general performance of larger and smaller English housing associations—
that they do different things and have different strengths. Larger, more professional 
staffs improve compliance with corporate measures of performance, while greater 
financial capacity and asset strength contribute to higher new building activity and 
more construction for sale. However, on the down side merger processes can lead to 
dips in performance. Larger organisations can find it harder to achieve very high levels 
of customer satisfaction unless they are able to compensate for the loss of personalised 
relationships and trust that smaller landlords can engender.
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FIGURE 4.5 New housing production, sales and demolitions in 2006 in percentage of the housing stock of 
individual housing associations. 
Source: VROM, 2006, adaptation by authors
§  4.4.3 Scale and operation costs
In addition to the societal outcomes, efficiency is also an important indicator for 
measuring the effects of expansion. Based on operating costs, it is difficult to defend 
the argument that expansion leads to increased efficiency. The study of the operating 
costs of associations (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2005) shows that expenditure 
by large associations is considerably higher than that by small associations [Figure 4.6].
Mergers thus have less influence on cost levels. But this is not the full explanation. Why 
do large associations have higher operating costs? It would be easy, but perhaps not 
inaccurate, to attribute those costs to expensive head offices, high executive salaries 
and an excess of managers and corporate staff. Relatively speaking, large associations 
do indeed employ more people. In 2003, the associations with more than 4 000 units 
employed 10 FTEs for every 1 000 housing units, while associations with 600– 1 800 
units did their work with 25% fewer staff (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2005). Part 
of the extra staffing capacity is allocated to property- development activities.
TOC
 113 ‘Change for the Better?’ making sense of housing association mergers in the Netherlands and England
FIGURE 4.6 Operating cost per dwelling (in euros) 
Source: Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, survey of operating costs of housing associations, 2005 (adaptations by 
authors).  
Note: the sharp increase in operating costs per dwelling in 2002 was due to the fact that two large associations 
formed a provision for restructuring that year.
FIGURE 4.7 Process, Issues and Outcomes
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In its sector survey for 2006, the CFV reports that larger associations are better able to 
deliver their planned production of new dwellings. Nevertheless, a direct correlation 
between higher new production and higher net operating costs is not self-evident. 
Staffing costs relating to project development are usually absorbed in the all-in 
construction costs of the homes and therefore should not influence net operating costs. 
It appears that large associations carry out extra activities that cannot be absorbed 
in the all-in construction costs. We find indications of this in the follow-up study of 
operational costs published by the CFV in 2006. The study showed that associations 
with high operating costs have a higher ratio of staff to housing units. However, 
other operating costs have a greater influence, particularly the higher expenditure on 
accountants, external consultancy, marketing and communication, and liveability (e.g. 
investments in the public realm, social inclusion activities). The study concludes that 
the remuneration of top-level management does not contribute to the difference in 
operating costs. In its study, the CFV asked associations to break down their costs by 
activity. The responses showed that associations with high operating costs allocate 
a larger share of their wage costs to activities relating to social management and 
liveability.
In England as well, new evidence is emerging in relation to operating costs. This 
suggests that economies of scale are beginning to play a larger part in explaining 
variations in operating costs of English associations, particularly for traditional (i.e. 
non-stock transfer) associations. In England a slightly different approach has been 
taken to calculating the operating cost efficiency of housing associations with more 
that 1 000 homes18 in management and excluding ‘specialist’ associations (those 
with greater than 50% of housing for older people, supported and specialist housing). 
The Operating Cost Index (OCI) was introduced in 2004 and its methodology was 
amended in 2007 to enable ‘meaningful comparisons between the operating costs 
of RSLs’ (Housing Corporation, 2007). It is presented as a tool for self-improvement 
to help associations understand their cost base and drivers in comparison to other 
associations.
The index uses data provided by associations in annual and quarterly returns to 
‘investigate the significance of various cost drivers, and only includes cost drivers that 
are found to be statistically significant and which are found to explain the majority of 
operating costs of RSLs’ (these included the number of social and non-social housing 
units, house type mix, decent homes requirements and trends in costs versus inflation 
over time). Data has now been collected for three years and results for 2007 use a new 
method of calculation: actual cost as % of predicted cost. This is a far truer reflection of 
an index (a result of less than 100% suggests costs below that predicted, the converse 
being true for costs greater than 100%).
18  This threshold was introduced in 2007 and then applied to re-analysis of 2005 and 2006 data.
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The analysis (by Indepen Consultancy, 2008) has consistently distinguished between 
operating costs of stock transfer and traditional associations. It shows different 
patterns for calculations with and without major repairs expenditure.
The first publication of results coincided with work by Lupton and Davies (2005) on 
mergers and scale, asking ‘is bigger better’? They reported that ‘an analysis of the OCI 
based on size found no strong evidence of economies or diseconomies of scale. If we 
consider the mean average performance (including major repairs) broken down by size, 
it shows that associations with less than 5 000 units have a higher average ranking 
than larger ones, but that the ranking of those between 5 001 and 7 000 is noticeably 
lower than the largest associations. If major repairs are excluded there are no clear 
differences based on size’.
The analysis by Indepen (2008) (using a new methodology and confining the analysis 
to associations with 1 000 or more homes) draws a rather different conclusion. ‘There 
is evidence of economies of scale for English traditional associations on both measures 
of costs (including and excluding major repairs)’. For stock transfers there were scale 
economies if major repairs were excluded but not if they were included. ‘Economies of 
scale had not been observed previously’.
Within its complex overall methodology, the Indepen study takes a relatively simple 
first step, comparing the number of social housing units to net operating costs. Using 
this simple coefficient alone they find that for traditional associations ‘for every 10% 
increase in social housing units, net operating costs increase by 9.2%, indicating 
economies of scale’ (p. 22). For stock transfers the same coefficient indicates that ‘for 
every 10% increase in social housing units net operating costs increase by 9.8%, with 
no evidence of economies of scale’ (p. 26).
This suggests to the outside non-technical observer that either the changed definitions 
had induced these new results or there had been an increased emphasis on delivering 
efficiencies in larger associations. The latter is evidenced by harder merger business 
case savings submitted to the Housing Corporation and the trend to streamline 
group structures to strip out bureaucratic and governance costs. Further possible 
explanations of patterns in the data suggested by Indepen include accounting 
treatment, timing and scale of major repairs, quality of outputs, and cost drivers not 
covered by the model.
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§  4.5 Unsuccessful mergers
The literature on mergers indicates the importance of considering not just the motivations 
and external drivers but also the processes involved in brokering, negotiating and 
implementing mergers. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) argue that ‘the acquisition process itself 
is a potentially important determinant of acquisition activities and outcomes’ (p. 145). An 
important critique of much merger activity in the private sector, accounting for the rather 
limited success rate, is the emphasis on ‘strategic fit’ at the expense of ‘organisational 
or cultural fit’ (Porter, 1987; Datta, 1991). Strategic fit refers to the mutual goals and 
ambitions of the organisations prior to merger. The organisational and cultural fit are 
connected with the structure, systems, skills, management style, staff characteristics and 
shared values of the organisations that must be implemented after a merger to enable 
successful delivery of outcomes. This emphasis has also been found in the English housing 
association sector by Mullins (2000; see also Mullins & Craig, 2005), who identified the 
typical stages of a merger process and noted that most guidance and attention had been 
given to strategic fit and pre-merger planning (e.g. National Housing Federation, 1999).
Studies of critical success factors for mergers in both third sector (Cowin & Moore, 
1996) and profit-distributing sectors (Hubbard, 1999) indicate that the most 
important stage of the process is after the deal has been done. Failure to plan for post-
merger integration, inadequate consideration of organisational cultures and values 
of the partner organisations, and failure to keep the key stakeholders (staff, boards 
and customers) informed and involved in the change process are some of the most 
common causes of failed mergers.
Mullins and Craig (2005) explored the success rates of merger proposals. From expert 
interviews they estimated that 25–33% of proposed mergers fell by the wayside at various 
stages after their initiation. The main factors leading to abortive mergers were perceived 
differences in organisational cultures and failure to agree on who would be the Chair and 
Chief Executive of the new organisation. Following the business literature, which suggests 
that a high proportion of commercial mergers fail to deliver shareholder value, Mullins and 
Craig also explored some reasons why housing association mergers that proceed may not 
succeed. Again, culture was a major factor, together with post-merger integration issues 
such as planning, communication and staff buy-in.
Evidence of the reasons for mergers not proceeding is also available for the Nether- 
lands, where Van Veghel (1999) asked housing association actors to indicate why a 
merger had not taken place in cases where mergers had been negotiated. As Table 4.4 
shows, the most frequent reasons are related to differences in organisational cultures 
and company targets and the reluctance to give up the independence. It is interesting 
to note that customer factors such as tenant resistance and increased distance from 
clients were not mentioned by most respondents.
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MOTIVES N %
Board of supervisors and/or director did not agree 29 48%
The culture of the organisations was too different 28 47%
The association did not want to lose its independence 15 25%
The company objectives were too different 12 19%
Resistance among employees 8 14%
The organisation of the companies was too different 8 13%
The distance to the clients would become too big 3 5%
Resistance among tenants 2 3%
Other reasons 11 18%
Total 42
TABLE 4.4 Motives for not going through with a merge, mentioned by Dutch housing associations 
Source: Van Veghel (1998)
§  4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the motives and outcomes of mergers in the Dutch 
and English housing association sectors. In both countries, mergers take place with a 
wide range of motivations, among which the desire to be able to create more output 
in terms of lettings, housing development and the variety of services seem common 
factors in both countries. The main distinctions we draw from the review of merger 
drivers evidence is the greater importance attributed to external drivers in the English 
context, reflecting the strength of regulator pressure. This is associated with the 
greater importance attached to efficiency than to factors such as market position and 
professionalisation, which drive the merger process in the more market-based Dutch 
context. Evidence on merger outcomes suggests that larger housing associations 
produce relatively more new homes, seem to be more capable of cooperation with 
societal partner organisations and offer a wider variety of services. Smaller housing 
associations perform relatively well in terms of service delivery and tenant participation 
(as appreciated by tenants). The evidence presented in this paper also suggests that 
smaller associations have relatively low operating costs, although the evidence from 
England is less conclusive. Our paper has also drawn attention to the importance of 
post-merger integration planning to merger success, noting the belated recognition of 
this by good practice guidance for the English third sector housing sector. It has shown 
the importance of cultural factors as barriers to the merger process and success in both 
countries, supporting the case for a greater balance between cultural fit and strategic 
fit in merger planning. Finally it has highlighted the greater recent attention to post- 
merger evaluation in the English context primarily in relation to regulatory drivers. 
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In conclusion we would like to highlight some implications for policy and for strategic 
choices between a continuum of merger and alliance options. We also suggest some 
directions for future comparative research.
Policy implications
A key consideration in debating policy implications regards the different levers that are 
available to influence the policy directions we have observed.
In the Netherlands mergers have been seen as a response to freedom from state 
direction and the adoption of more business-like behaviour by associations. Approval 
by the Housing Ministry is still required for mergers to proceed. Yet this is often a rather 
technical matter and there is little direct or indirect pressure by either CFV or VROM 
to make mergers happen. Dutch local authorities have relatively limited leverage over 
merger activity. They do exert influence on planning matters, regeneration schemes, 
and rent increases for higher quality properties, all of which may drive merger activity in 
certain situations.
In England the Housing Corporation had long declared its reluctance to intervene in the 
shape and structure of the sector. However over a long period regulatory intervention 
has been an important merger driver for failing associations. The regulatory burden 
(particularly arising from the inspection regime introduced in 2002) has been 
reported as a motive for merger even amongst associations not facing immediate 
regulatory intervention (Mullins and Craig 2005). Furthermore, since 2004 there 
has been an increasing steering of merger objectives as a result of the requirement to 
submit business cases to secure regulatory approval for mergers. The requirement to 
demonstrate clear customer benefits and efficiency savings has led to more focused 
proposals and to more streamlined structures capable of generating significant cost 
reductions.
A final significant difference from the Dutch context is the ability to use public 
expenditure levers to influence organisational behaviour. Here, the most significant 
impact has come from the investment partnering regime. From 2004 on, it has 
limited the number of associations in direct receipt of a social housing grant, thereby 
encouraging other associations with development aspirations to merge or form 
alliances with the directly funded associations. An underlying policy issue that is easily 
ignored is that in neither country are mergers in the third sector subject to the prospect 
of hostile takeovers, as found in the share trading parts of the private sector. This factor 
is significant, since it limits the ability of predatory or expansionist associations to 
realise acquisition targets. Moreover, it enables associations that may not be exploiting 
their assets to their full potential to continue to do so without the threat of external 
takeover.
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Scale, function and the continuum of partnership options
Our main empirical conclusion is that the relationship between the size of housing 
associations and their performance is far from straightforward. This is principally 
because large and small associations are generally trying to do different things in 
different ways and have contrasting strengths and weaknesses. As we have seen in 
the Netherlands, smaller associations have more satisfied customers and tenant 
representatives, as well as lower operating costs. However, many small associations 
do not build new homes. The measurements for the ‘KWH-Maatschappijlabel’ show 
that large associations are more effective in terms of relations with stakeholders and 
translating social expectations into business processes. In England larger associations 
have greater capacity to manage regulator compliance, and the regulation system itself 
has been a major driver of the trend toward increasing scale.
These findings clearly complicate judgements on whether the process of increasing 
scale and industry concentration through merger is a change for the better. Different 
organisations are trying to do different things, and some commentators have 
suggested that the optimum size may vary between activities. In England, Lupton and 
Davies (2005) have suggested that ‘one size does not fit all’ since different sizes are 
appropriate to different functions [Table 4.5].
The statements about size range are tentative and must be considered in the English 
context, in which housing associations manage fewer homes on average than 
associations in the Netherlands. However, it is clear that there is a minimum ideal size 
for activities such as property development, back-office, finance and improvements. 
By contrast, general housing management (e.g. rental and maintenance) have a 
maximum ideal size, above which the organisation becomes too distant from its 
customers. This differentiation is reflected in the attempts being made by many 
associations to find the best organisational structure, in cooperation with others or 
within their own organisation. They suggest a shift of focus from economies of scale to 
economies of scope. This relates to the added value for customers and stakeholders, 
and to finding the most appropriate organisational form (e.g. strategic alliance, joint 
venture or partnership geared to a specific service, business process, project or district).
MOTIVES OPTIMAL SIZE RANGE
Housing management and maintenance 1 000 – 5 000 homes
Improvement and renovation More than 5 000 homes
Project development More than 7 000 homes
Full range of financial skills More than 5 000 homes
Full range of back-office services More than 10 000 homes 
TABLE 4.5 Optimal size range for the activities of UK housing associations 
Source: Lupton and David, Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) 2005
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In our earlier discussion of forms of merger and alliance [see Figure 4.1] we identified 
a continuum of options with different combinations of scale, independence and 
transaction costs (Mullins & Craig, 2005). One response to Lupton and Davies’ (2005) 
conclusions on economies of scope would be to draw greater attention to alliances of 
independent organisations rather than to groups or fully integrated mergers. However, 
this option could involve higher transaction costs and difficulties in maintaining 
relationships as circumstances change.
Future research directions
This paper has provided the opportunity to exchange information and ideas about 
the meaning and trajectory of merger behaviour in two contrasting settings. While 
the research reported upon has explored similar themes, there have inevitably been 
difficulties in ‘joining up’ and comparing studies undertaken with different methods 
and purposes. However, from these studies we believe there is scope for further 
comparative work on housing association mergers in England and the Netherlands and 
would make the following suggestions. Recent detailed analysis of sector restructuring 
in England (Pawson & Sosenko, 2008) was not matched by any of the sources we 
located in the Netherlands. It would be useful to develop a similarly detailed descriptive 
account of the two sectors.
Work by KWH in the Netherlands provides a far more comprehensive picture of merger 
outcomes and the comparative performance of large and small associations across 
a broad field of performance goals than is currently available at aggregate level for 
English associations. It would be useful to harness benchmarking data to replicate such 
analyses and add to the rather ambiguous evidence emerging from the operating cost 
index studies (Indepen, 2008).
Further work on the merger process seems critical given the findings of writers such 
as Jemison and Sitkin (1986) that early emphasis on strategic fit at the expense 
of cultural fit can plant the seeds of long-term adverse performance outcomes. 
Furthermore, it is important for this work to place emphasis on all stages of the 
process, including post-merger integration stages, where studies have again indicated 
that the seeds of failure are often harvested (Hubbard 1999). This approach is most 
likely to be achieved through case studies covering the life cycle of mergers and taking 
into account the impacts on a range of corporate aims and from the perspective of a 
variety of stakeholders. However, detailed case studies of the merger process and its 
outcomes are costly to undertake, are much less common and difficult to replicate. We 
believe, however, that studies taking into account multiple stakeholder and life cycle 
perspectives on organisational changes are most likely to generate knowledge that is of 
value in understanding and influencing these processes.
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Given the differences in policy context and sector position clarified in this paper it 
would not be practical to attempt a controlled experiment comparison between case 
study organisations in the two countries. However, there would seem to be scope for 
a looser alliance of housing organisations and researchers interested in horizontal 
learning and involved in discrete long-term evaluations to share ideas on questions 
such as:
 – managing the tensions between scale and local accountability;
 – developing new models to manage and measure social performance in large 
associations;
 – developing organisational structures that enable large associations to be ‘better 
neighbours’ to local communities.
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PART 2 CASE STUDIES
HOUSING HERO 2:
Make lives noble, homes happy, and family life good.
Octavia Hill (1838-1912), English social reformer.
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5 A network perspective on the 
organisation of social housing 
in the Netherlands: the case of 
urban renewal in The Hague
Gerard van Bortel & Marja Elsinga, (2007).  
Housing, Theory and Society, (24)1, 32-48. 
Abstract 
In the past 15 years Dutch housing associations have undergone a transformation 
from strictly regulated and heavily subsidized organisations to financially and 
administratively independent enterprises. This transformation has sparked a lively 
debate on regulation and the role of the government in social housing. There is a 
broad consensus that something needs to be done about the operations of housing 
associations in the Netherlands. Hence, their position and performance are a 
current topic of discussion in the Dutch Parliament. In this paper we examine public 
management from a network perspective. We envisage the policy environment as a 
network of players and explore three key concepts: ‘‘multiformity’’, ‘‘closedness’’ and 
‘‘interdependence’’. The government is not the dominant party in this scenario, but 
one of several players with their own specific goals and resources. To be sure of a good 
performance, instruments of governance need to be in tune with the characteristics of 
the network. This paper discusses the instruments applied in the Dutch social housing 
network and uses the results of a case study in The Hague to illustrate the efficacy of 
the network perspective in social housing analyses and to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current governance structure.
Key words
social rental housing, network approach, housing governance
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§  5.1 Introduction
The social housing sector in the Netherlands has undergone numerous changes since 
it first came into being around 1860 and since the introduction of the Housing Act in 
1901. Housing associations were private organisations that were subject to varying 
degrees of government influence during the 20th century. After World War II the social 
housing sector became a crucial weapon in the battle against housing shortages. From 
1945 until 1990, the Dutch government remained closely involved in the operations 
and funding of housing associations. As a result, they gradually turned into semi-public 
institutions that had strong hierarchical ties with the government. Since the 1990s, 
however, Dutch housing associations have become financially independent and are 
now powerful partners in local networks. That said, they are still (in 2005) registered on 
the basis of the Housing Act and therefore obliged to meet certain government criteria.
There are various instruments for safeguarding the performance of housing 
associations. The effectiveness of these instruments and, hence, the performance of 
housing associations are current topics of political debate. Politicians from across the 
spectrum are questioning the performance of housing associations in urban renewal 
and social housing, especially in view of the huge financial resources they have at their 
disposal. Discussions on the performance of the social rented sector have prompted 
various studies and advisory reports from, amongst others, the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR in Dutch) and the Social Economic Council (SER in Dutch) 
(WRR, 2004; SER, 2005; Conijn, 2005; Commissie de Boer, 2005).
This paper will add to the discussion by presenting the results of a local case study in 
which the performance of housing associations was analysed by applying the network 
approach. The case study was part of an ongoing research project that has been 
specifically set up to provide clearer insight into how the allocation of urban renewal 
responsibilities and the range of policy instruments work at local level. The following 
section explains the network approach as applied in the project. The paper then traces 
the background of the Dutch social rented sector. The results of the case study in The 
Hague are then presented.
Three questions were addressed: Who belongs in the network?; How does the 
network determine the desired performance in urban renewal?; and, How do different 
instruments influence the performance? The results are based on 25 interviews with 
key stakeholders in the local urban regeneration network. Finally, conclusions are 
presented and a number of issues raised for discussion and further research.
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§  5.2 A Network Perspective
This paper presents a network perspective on public management in the Dutch social 
housing sector. It describes the policy environment as a network of players where 
interactions and outcomes are influenced by the interdependence, multiformity and 
closedness of the parties. One crucial aspect of the network perspective is that the 
government is not dominant in many policy areas, but is one of the players with its 
own specific goals and resources. The players in the network cannot achieve their goals 
single-handedly. They need the resources and co-operation of the other players. To 
secure these, they must interact with other parties and influence their behaviour and 
decisions. Often, these interactions take place between a small group of players in 
patterns that are collectively shaped via formal and informal rules (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). Together these elements form the network structure. The concept of ‘‘steering’’ 
concerns the strategies and instruments used to influence the actions of other parties. 
As we shall discuss later in this article, steering strategies and instruments have to be 
adapted to the characteristics of the network. We take the view, together with several 
other authors, that the network perspective has considerable potential as a research 
framework for public-sector decision-making (Blackman, 2001; Chapman, 2002; 
Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Teisman, 1995). This 
paper focuses specifically on De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof’s framework for steering in 
complex networks (1991, 1995, 1997, 1999).
A complex network can consist of public, semi-public and/or private players. Each 
player has its own values, interests and objectives, and will try to achieve its objectives 
by using the resources and instruments at its disposal. It is not only the government 
that uses steering to influence the other players; indeed, other players also use it to 
influence the government. However, government and public agencies can still apply 
imperative (top-down) steering based on legislation. The other players are unable to 
do this and can only steer by persuasion. Their efforts may be ignored by the players 
for whom they are intended. We will see, however, that imperative steering offers 
only limited possibilities in networks. The government derives its legitimacy from its 
(presumed) commitment to the public interest and its electoral mandate.
TOC
 130 Networks and Fault Lines
§  5.3 Characteristics of Complex Networks
De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof identify three defining characteristics of complex 
networks (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1995, pp. 30–31): multiformity, closedness 
and interdependence. These characteristics can have a major influence on the 
effectiveness of steering initiatives in complex networks. We will show that they can 
place major obstacles in the way of imperative steering. This does not spell the end of 
all steering strategies, but rather that they should fit in with the network structure. In 
the government’s case this means a switch from imperative to more volitional steering. 
In practice the government will frequently apply a combination of imperative and 
volitional steering. For example, it may try to promote volitional steering instruments, 
such as multilateral performance agreements between housing associations and 
municipalities. Or it may threaten more stringent regulation if parties fail to reach an 
agreement. Without such ‘‘carrots and sticks’’ it is unlikely that many parties would be 
willing to commit themselves to any agreement at all.
§  5.3.1 Multiformity
Multiformity in a network can manifest itself between and within organisations. 
We shall illustrate this with examples from the Dutch social housing sector, where 
numerous parties actively participate, including municipalities, housing associations, 
tenants’ organisations and project developers. These parties have widely differing 
interests, values and organisational characteristics. Housing associations alone differ 
in size, financial position and strategy. Some work locally, while others work regionally 
or even nationally. Some have a very broad customer group, while others target specific 
groups such as the elderly or students.
Multiformity can exist within organisations. Many network players represent several 
departments or organisational units. Frequently, these departments also have different 
interests, values and cultures. A municipality is a classic example of intra- organisational 
multiformity: the council, the aldermen and the various departments all have their own 
values, objectives and remits. Multiformity can form an obstacle if a player wants to 
influence other network participants. Players can react very differently to steering signals. 
Sometimes they ignore them. However, multiformity can also offer steering opportunities. 
Differences in values and interests may make an organisation or part of an organisation 
susceptible to a specific steering signal. After all, not every housing association has a 
mission to relieve homelessness or realize housing for the elderly. When there are many 
housing associations in a network, there is a greater chance that some of them will react to 
a steering signal. Multiformity can therefore have an energizing effect on the network.
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§  5.3.2 Closedness
Unlike players in a hierarchical structure, the participants in a complex network do 
not automatically respond to external steering signals. This closedness stems from 
the frame of reference of the respective organisation (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 
1999, pp.38–40), which in turn is formed by the core values. Organisations are usually 
sensitive to steering signals that are in tune with their own frame of reference and tend 
to ignore signals that are not. These mismatches can manifest themselves in two ways. 
First, the steering signal is contrary to the frame of reference and will provoke active 
resistance. Second, the steering signal is not related to the frame of reference of the 
receiver and is ignored.
Closedness can be enhanced by the autonomy of the player (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 
1999, p.43). Since the mid-1990s many Dutch housing associations have developed 
into independent, self-aware and professional organisations, often with considerable 
financial resources. These characteristics make them powerful and desirable partners in 
local networks. For other players it is often crucial to have some kind of influence on the 
activities of housing associations, but the autonomy and strength of housing associations 
can make them less receptive to external steering signals.
De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof (1999, p.40) argue that organisations need to be ‘‘closed’’ 
to a certain degree, as receptiveness to all the external signals would disorientate 
them. Closedness enables organisations to incorporate only a limited amount of the 
complexity and upheaval into their activities.
Attempts to overcome the closedness of an organisation with hierarchical forms of 
steering are unlikely to be successful. It takes a lot of energy to break down the barriers 
and chances are that the players will grasp every opportunity to ignore steering signals. 
This is exactly what happened when a former Minister of Housing in the Netherlands 
expressed an ambition to sell a large percentage of the social housing stock. The 
steering signals were contrary to the frame of reference of the housing associations 
and were more or less ignored. In fact, the sale of rented homes declined during the 
minister’s period in office, despite the popularity of home ownership.
§  5.3.3 Interdependencies
A third characteristic of complex networks is interdependence between the different 
players. Interdependencies develop via the distribution of resources among a large 
number of players – resources that they need to achieve their goals. Interdependencies 
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in networks are often very complex, particularly if several different types exist at the 
same time, such as multilateral interdependencies (more than two parties are mutually 
dependent), asynchronous interdependencies (dependencies between players 
differ over time) or sequential dependencies (first A is dependent on B, and then B is 
dependent on A). Asynchronous and sequential dependencies can even lead to hit-
and-run strategies, whereby parties are exploited at their most dependent moments. 
In the long run these strategies can turn against the players who use them and they can 
undermine the performance of the network (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof (1999, p.42).
Interdependencies can significantly lower the transparency of a network. Steering 
signals aimed at only one player will not always be effective, because that player will, 
in turn, be dependent on other players. For example: to increase the production of 
new rented housing it will not suffice to address the housing associations, because 
most of them are dependent on the municipalities for building locations. It is usually 
impossible to incorporate all the dependencies into one’s activities because there 
are simply too many. Finally, networks with many interdependencies are often 
sluggish and ineffective. But interdependencies can also lead to important steering 
opportunities (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1999, p.43). Interdependence tempers 
the actions of the players and generates respect, because they will probably need each 
other in the future. Interdependencies in general, and complex interdependencies in 
particular, can open up avenues of negotiation. The chances of win-win situations are 
greater when the interdependencies are numerous and diverse.
§  5.4 Network Dynamics
Networks are constantly in transition. This is because of changes in the closedness, 
interdependencies and the multiformity of the players and their relations. Players 
come and go. Thus, opportunities to influence other players can change over time. 
Decision-making and steering is therefore often unpredictable. The absence of a 
hierarchical structure means that every stakeholder can try to influence the decision- 
making agenda – not an easy process in a complex network. Interdependencies can 
necessitate collaborations with many network players in decision-making processes. 
These players may see the proposed course of action as irrelevant or even detrimental 
to their interests. Decision-making in complex networks can therefore involve serious 
conflicts. There are no ‘‘done deals’’. New rounds of decision-making, new participants, 
or changes to the network characteristics can lead to a review of old decisions, possibly 
with different outcomes.
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§  5.4.1 Steering Strategies
Strategies in complex networks differ considerably from strategies in more hierarchical 
settings. De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) identify six:
1 from direct to indirect steering. In this strategy the government does not send direct 
steering signals, but tries to indirectly influence a specific player via other players in the 
network. Another form of indirect steering is to focus on the input instead of the output 
of a network player;
2 from generic steering to steering as fine-tuning. In a generic steering strategy the 
government does not make a distinction between the players it wants to influence; 
this is in contrast to fine-tuning where the government takes account of the specific 
characteristics of players;
3 steering as serendipity. In complex networks steering often follows a non-rational 
course and is frequently unpredictable. The government can use serendipity 
(coincidence, chance) to try to create a fertile environment in which opportunities for 
favourable events or developments are likely to occur;
4 from unilateral to multilateral steering. This strategy includes negotiating performance 
agreements in which the government and one or more other players try to agree on the 
desired behaviour and performances of the parties involved;
5 from the application of steering instruments to steering as network management. 
Besides using steering instruments the government can change the characteristics of 
the network by trying to modify the closedness, interdependencies and multiformity of 
players;
6 from steering by directives to steering as network constitution. The government can 
try to change the number of players in the network by encouraging new parties to join 
or by modifying the organisational or institutional characteristics of existing players 
(including the government).
§  5.4.2 Steering Instruments
De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) make a distinction between first- and second- 
generation steering instruments. The first-generation steering instruments include 
the more traditional directives and commands based on legislation. The second- 
generation instruments focus on more volitional methods of steering. De Bruijn and 
Ten Heuvelhof distinguish the following sets of instruments:
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 – Multilateral instruments. These instruments include performance agreements, 
covenants, gentlemen’s agreements and contracts. The essence of multilateral 
instruments is that different parties commit themselves mutually and voluntarily to 
specific goals and actions.
 – Person-specific instruments. This may be a person who is placed in an organisation to 
exert an influence on the actions of the players. For example, a government official 
may be appointed to the supervisory board of a housing association. This person then 
operates as a kind of steering instrument.
 – Incentives. Positive (subsidies) and negative (levies, fines) incentives motivate players 
to change their behaviour or focus on specific targets. This is still volitional steering, 
because players cannot be forced to change their behaviour.
 – Performance indicators. The government negotiates with network players to measure 
their performance on the basis of pre-agreed quantitative variables. The impact 
(rewards, sanctions) of the performance measurement must also be agreed in advance.
 – Communication. The government can try to influence the behaviour of players in the 
network by distributing specific information and best practices.
Though De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) had the government in mind when 
describing these steering strategies and instruments, they can still be used by other 
players – with one important difference: the government can use first generation 
instruments (or hold them in reserve) to reinforce the use of second-generation 
instruments.
§  5.5 The Social Rented Sector in the Netherlands
§  5.5.1 The Dutch Social Rented Sector in International Perspective
This study examines the performance of the financially independent housing 
associations in the Netherlands. Governments in many countries are cutting housing 
subsidies and phasing out state-funding in housing. Discussions are probably taking 
place on the position of social rented housing in these countries as well, but in some 
respects, the Dutch case is unique.
The Dutch social rented sector covers 35% of the total housing stock. This substantial 
market share is remarkable in an international perspective, with the UK in second 
place with 20% of the stock. In most European countries the social rented sector 
accounts for less than 10% of the housing stock (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2004). 
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The financial relationship between the government and the housing associations is 
another remarkable feature of the Dutch housing system. In most countries social 
housing associations can count on government subsidies for the construction of 
housing (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2004). This implies that the governments can then 
influence the behaviour of housing associations via subsidies and application criteria. 
The Netherlands is the only country that has recently abolished subsidies in the social 
rented sector. This has drastically curtailed the steering possibilities for the Dutch 
government.
§  5.5.2 The Transformation of Dutch Social Housing in the 1990s
A policy document on public housing in the 1990s, published by the State Secretary 
for Housing in 1989, ushered in a new era for the social rented sector and continued 
the trend to independence that had started in the 1960s (Van der Schaar, 1987). The 
document stressed the importance of private initiative in the social rented sector as 
this would enable people to decide for themselves on the nature of their commitment 
to the idea of social rented housing. It went on to state that housing associations 
had an important part to play in providing adequate housing for all, as laid down 
in the Dutch Constitution. It also laid down guidelines for increasing the financial 
independence of the housing associations, with the Central Housing Fund (CFV in 
Dutch) and the Guarantee Fund for Social Housing Construction (WSW in Dutch) as 
the main policy instruments. The Central Housing Fund is a government agency which 
takes remedial action if housing associations get into financial difficulties. Housing 
associations are responsible for funding the CFV. The WSW is a private body that 
guarantees housing association loans. A small portion of these guarantees are backed 
by a government warranty. These securities provide a robust safety net that gives 
housing associations a triple A rating on the credit market.
The policy document Public Housing in the 1990s ‘‘Heerma 1989’’ proved the 
stepping-stone towards financial independence for the housing associations. The 
final step would not be taken till 1995, and even then it was not premeditated. This 
“grossing and balancing operation’’ involved cancelling out all government loans 
against current subsidy obligations. It was at this stage that the bricks and mortar 
subsidies for housing associations were abolished.
Though fully independent financially, the housing associations still required 
authorisation under the terms of the Housing Act. Their responsibilities and 
operating conditions were laid down in the Social Rented Sector Management Order 
(BBSH in Dutch), a separate government order based on the Housing Act. The BBSH 
stipulated that approved housing associations are responsible for providing good, 
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affordable housing for people who are unable to pay market rents. Since the 1990s 
the public remit of the housing associations has been extended. In 1997 the quality of 
neighbourhoods was added to the list of performances in the BBSH. In the same year 
a new urban renewal strategy was presented in the Memorandum on Urban Renewal 
(MVROM, 1997) (see Priemus, 2004). Social housing was now considered part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution, as it was in the 1970–80s. If cities were to 
retain their vibrancy then higher income groups must be persuaded to stay in them. 
One way of achieving this is to replace social housing with more expensive rented 
and owner-occupied housing. The housing associations have become an important 
instrument in achieving the policy objectives of local as well as central government.
The ministry entrusts the performance of social housing associations to the self- 
regulating capacity of the sector and the development of performance agreements 
between local government and social housing associations as described in the BBSH. 
Some self-regulating instruments have been developed by Aedes, the national 
umbrella organisation for housing associations, others by (groups of) housing 
associations. Legally, the government is still the overseer.
A lively debate is being waged at the moment on the performance of housing 
associations in urban renewal. People are questioning whether self-regulation in 
the social rental sector, agreements at local level and the supervisory role of central 
government are enough to deliver satisfactory results.
§  5.6 Case Study: The Hague
To provide more insight into the operations of complex networks we conducted a case 
study on the performance of social housing associations in The Hague (Van Bortel & 
Elsinga 2005). With approximately 460,000 inhabitants, The Hague is the third largest 
city in the Netherlands (after Amsterdam and Rotterdam).
This study analyses the current constellation, paying particular attention to how it 
works at local level. The aim is to unravel the influence which the workings of the 
network and the steering instruments have on the outcomes, as perceived by the 
participants, for the performance in urban renewal.
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Three research questions were addressed:
 – Which parties are involved in the urban renewal network of The Hague? How can their 
relationships be described in terms of interdependence, closedness and multiformity?
 – What kind of steering instruments are used in The Hague and how effective are they?
 – How is the performance of housing associations in urban renewal measured and 
evaluated by players in the network?
§  5.6.1 Examining the Urban Renewal Network in The Hague
The first research question was addressed by examining the parties involved in the urban 
renewal network of The Hague and their interactions. The number of potential players in 
the urban renewal network is large. To get a picture of this network we conducted 25 semi-
structured interviews with local and central government officials and representatives from 
tenants’ organisations, housing association management and healthcare organisations. 
The interviews took place towards the end of 2004 and focused on the relations between 
the housing associations in The Hague and the other players in the network. We also 
studied the closedness, multiformity and interdependencies in the network and the way in 
which the players evaluated the performance of housing associations. Relevant documents 
were reviewed such as annual reports, policy memoranda and other publications.
§  5.6.2 Players and interactions. 
It soon became evident from the interviews with network participants that the urban 
renewal network in The Hague is dominated by relations between the social housing 
associations and the municipality. The interactions between these players appear to 
have a substantial influence on the pace and quality of urban regeneration processes. 
Co-operation with other players, such as healthcare organisations and commercial real 
estate developers, is less intense.
Tenant participation in the urban renewal process is limited. According to one respondent, 
The Hague has never had a very strong tradition in tenant participation. The position of 
tenants was further weakened by the perceived necessity in the mid-1990s to accelerate 
the urban renewal process. This sense of urgency was based on market surveys that 
predicted the potential redundancy of large numbers of apartment blocks. To speed up the 
process of urban renewal the most powerful players in the network – the municipality and 
the social housing associations – limited the number of participants and thus – perhaps 
unintentionally – reduced its complexity and multiformity.
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Co-operation between the municipality and the social housing associations is 
based on a number of performance agreements and contracts, which stipulate the 
responsibilities of the parties, their financial commitment and the targets that have 
to be met. At municipal level these agreements are more like letters of intent. At 
neighbourhood level they are more precisely formulated and contain provisions for 
monetary fines if targets are not met.
Collaboration between housing associations in The Hague is limited. They have 
committed themselves to mutual performance agreements, but usually work 
individually to achieve the agreed targets. The social housing associations in The Hague 
make very little use of one another’s capabilities. This is partly because they work in 
separate neighbourhoods.
§  5.6.3 Complex Network Characteristics
All three characteristics of complex networks that we discussed above, multiformity, 
closedness and interdependencies, could be found in the case study of The Hague.
Multiformity
Multiformity as identified by De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1999) was evident in 
The Hague. We found divergence in organisational forms, core values and goals as 
dimensions of multiformity. The social housing associations in The Hague all have large 
housing stocks and large workforces, which are split into several departments. This 
fragmentation of players into different organisational elements makes the network in 
The Hague more complex. The span-of-control of these organisations is stretched in 
such a way that multiformity in the values and behaviour of players is inevitable. The 
same can be said of the municipal organisation of The Hague.
The second form of multiformity identified by De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof concerns 
differences in values and policy rationalities. The research results revealed large 
differences between the core values and goals of the municipality and the housing 
associations. They are often unaware of these differences and apply their own frame of 
reference to judge the actions of the other parties. The players’ ‘‘line of reasoning’’ is 
different because their goals are different. This is one of the aspects of closedness that 
we will discuss later.
The Municipality of The Hague, for example, wants its population to expand to 
500,000. As building space is limited, the council wants to create more homes by 
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building high-rise apartments. This line of reasoning is based mainly on political 
ambitions and urban planning rationalities. The managing boards of the housing 
associations in The Hague tend to take a different view and are much more wary. They 
believe that the development of high-rise apartments involves a considerably higher 
risk than low-rise buildings. The social housing associations display a more financial, 
risk-averse and market-focused rationality.
Multiformity in organisational structure and core values can stand in the way of co-
operation, but it can also lead to opportunities. We found some evidence of this in 
the case study. For example, representatives from the municipal project development 
department were working closely with housing association officials in an urban renewal 
project. The representatives themselves described it as a case of ‘‘personal chemistry’’. 
Remarkably enough, the emergence of this personal chemistry was largely credited 
to an independent advisor who participated in the process and could bridge the 
differences between the players.
Closedness
Network players in The Hague are often unwilling or unable to pick up steering signals 
from other players in the network. For instance, social housing associations and the 
municipality co-operate intensively on the development of urban renewal plans. They 
seem to ignore external signals from tenants’ organisations or other players that the 
urban renewal process is exacerbating the shortage of affordable housing for low-
income households.
During the development process the municipality and housing association send 
out information about urban renewal projects but do not receive any. Residents are 
informed but not seriously consulted. This closedness was only assuaged after social 
housing associations and the municipality reached an agreement on key points in the 
urban renewal projects, such as urban planning, building programmes and finance. 
Tenants’ organisations feel that they can have very little influence on the plans at 
such a late stage in the process and are forced into a negatively critical role. They feel 
that more timely involvement would lead to more positive participation on the part of 
the tenants. Remarkably enough, the fact that participation by tenant organisations 
starts at such a late stage in the planning process has very little influence on their 
appreciation for the way they are informed about the restructuring plans. They were 
quite satisfied on this point. The problem is not information, but the lack of real 
participation.
The types of closedness found in the case study are highly reminiscent of the concept 
of ‘‘environmental enactment’’ described by Weick (1995,p.30). Weick argues that 
there is no such thing as ‘‘the’’ environment. The players and their environments 
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are inextricably intertwined. Weick: ‘‘People create their environment and their 
environment creates them’’. In this concept the environment is a construct based on 
stimuli generated by the actions of the players. This phenomenon is illustrated by 
an example from the case study. Representatives of the Municipality of The Hague 
found that housing associations were not transparent about their financial capability 
to execute urban renewal projects. This ‘‘closedness’’ could very well originate from 
the municipal eagerness to gain access to housing association resources, a tendency 
frequently mentioned by housing association officials.
Interdependence
When it comes to urban renewal, housing associations and the municipality are tied 
together in an intricate web of interdependencies. The housing associations own the 
majority of the housing stock in urban renewal neighbourhoods and have substantial 
investment power. The municipality can provide the democratic backing. Approval 
by the Municipal Council can lend legitimacy to urban renewal operations. Moreover, 
social housing associations are dependent on the municipality for numerous licences 
and authorizations, such as building permits, demolition permits, permission to 
subdivide and sell parts of their housing stock.
We found in The Hague that interdependence is a strong indicator of the position of the 
players in the network and the possibilities to successfully use steering instruments. 
The level of interdependence is illustrated in [Table 5.1].
The case study illustrates that interdependencies can serve as a ‘‘crowbar’’ to open up the 
arena and breach the closedness of the players. Working with interdependencies can lead 
to creative solutions. This is illustrated by the way in which performance agreements have 
come about in The Hague. The land on which most homes in The Hague are built does not 
belong to the social landlords but is distributed under long-term lease and thus remains 
the property of the Municipality of The Hague. The housing associations pay a land-lease 
fee. Any action that changes the land use or increases its value can push up the fee. This 
is what happens when housing associations sell their rented homes or replace low-rent 
houses with high-value apartments. Both situations exist in urban renewal areas in The 
Hague. The Municipality of The Hague insists on payment of the additional land-lease 
fee, much to the dismay of the housing associations, who find this unreasonable in view 
of their own unprofitable investments in the transformation of the housing stock. After 
protracted negotiations the municipality decided to divert the additional land-lease fee 
into urban renewal investments, provided the housing associations took responsibility, 
not only for the transformation of the housing stock, but also for the regeneration of public 
space in urban renewal areas (formerly the responsibility of the municipality). In this case 
the interdependencies between the municipality and the housing associations led to a 
new distribution of responsibilities and investment commitments.
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HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
Central governement *
External supervision by the Central Housing Fund ***
Tenants *1
Health and welfare organisations *
Housing associations  **
TABLE 5.1 Level of interdependence between actors in the urban renewal network of The Hague 
***=high, **=moderate, *=low 
1 The interdependence between housing associations and their tenants is out of balance. Due to the housing 
shortage, housing associations are not very dependent on their tenants, but most tenants are totally dependent 
on housing associations for low-cost housing.
The interdependence between social housing associations and their tenants is 
limited. In urban renewal projects tenants are in a relatively weak position. Significant 
housing shortages mean that there is no market pressure to make social housing 
associations take serious account of the demands of low-income tenants. New housing 
in restructuring areas is usually intended for middle- and high-income households, 
not for the current low-income tenants. The activities of housing associations and 
the municipality appear to focus mainly on winning the tenants’ co- operation in 
the urban renewal plans. There is hardly any real tenant participation in strategic 
decision-making. To ensure smooth collaboration, consideration is given to good and 
timely communication with the tenants about the restructuring plans and, in case of 
demolition, the careful relocation of tenants.
§  5.6.4 Steering Instruments and Self-regulation in The Hague
The third research question in the case study concerned the steering instruments 
used in The Hague and their effectiveness. In this section we provide a summary of the 
steering instruments and the self-regulation instruments in the Dutch social housing 
sector and determine how far they are used in The Hague. We also investigate the 
effects of these instruments on the performance of housing associations in The Hague 
[see Table 5.2 below]. 
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INSTRUMENT CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS
External supervision by the Ministry of Housing *
External supervision by the Central Housing Fund 1 ***
Internal supervision **
Performance agreements ***
Benchmarking (Aedex) *
Code of conduct (Aedes Code) *
External Review *
TABLE 5.2 Effectiveness of steering instruments on performance in the urban renewal of The Hague (as 
assessed by network players). 
***=high, **=moderate, *=low 
1 Network players rate the effectiveness of external financial supervisor (Central Housing Fund) as high, but the 
impact on performance as low.
External supervision
Two different organisations are responsible for the external supervision of housing 
associations: the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and 
the Central Housing Fund. The Dutch Housing Ministry is responsible for the overall 
supervision of housing associations, focusing especially on the legitimacy of the 
activities of social housing associations and the demarcation of the area in which they 
may operate (MVROM, 2004).
The second party involved in external supervision of housing associations is the Central 
Housing Fund (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting). The Central Housing Fund is an 
independent agency that executes supervisory tasks for the Ministry of Housing, mainly 
in relation to the management of financial resources by social housing associations. 
The Central Housing Fund uses a risk-based system to assess the financial position of 
housing associations. The higher the risk and the weaker the financial position of the 
association, the stricter the supervision. This can ultimately lead to intervention by the 
Central Housing Fund (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2005).
The external supervision in The Hague is similar to the situation at national level. 
External supervision of the performance of housing associations in urban renewal 
is almost non-existent. Financial supervision appears to function well, but it is not 
focused on performance in urban renewal.
TOC
 143 A network perspective on the organisation of social housing in the Netherlands: the case of urban renewal in The Hague
Internal supervision 
The Social Housing Sector Management Order (BBSH), first published in 1993, 
introduced the Board of Supervision, a new body in the social housing sector. The 
Board of Supervision can be compared with the non-executive Board of Directors 
in profit-making organisations. Its main tasks are to supervise the policy and the 
general handling of affairs in the housing associations and to advise the management 
on strategic issues. Members of the board are co-opted. Two members of the 
board (generally consisting of 5–7 members) must be elected via nomination by 
tenant organisations. Despite this, criticism of boards is increasing (Centraal Fonds 
Volkshuisvesting, 2003). Most board members seem to focus on financial issues and 
neglect the question of social housing. In general, supervision by the board is not very 
transparent and the operations are unsupervised. Board members are insufficiently 
critical of their own performance (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 2003). Recent 
publications on the Dutch social housing sector propose a stronger position for 
the supervisory board combined with strict supervision and more scope to impose 
sanctions on boards which are underperforming (Commissie De Boer, 2005; Conijn, 
2005; SER, 2005; WRR, 2004). The internal supervisory boards of the housing 
associations in The Hague focus mainly on financial and organisational matters. The 
performance of the housing association in urban renewal receives far less attention, 
though there has been some improvement. This lack of attention appears to be 
caused by a certain reluctance on the part of the supervisory board to interfere in the 
responsibilities of the management. As a result, the board members fail to closely 
monitor some key performance areas, including urban renewal.
Local performance agreements
A comparatively new instrument in Dutch housing governance is the ‘‘local housing 
covenant’’. These covenants consist of a number of agreements between the municipality 
and the housing associations on social housing issues, such as urban renewal, building 
production and the number of affordable homes (Van Grinsven & Kromhout, 2004). 
The social housing associations and the Municipality of The Hague have committed 
themselves to several multilateral and bilateral performance agreements at local and 
regional level. These agreements appear to be working, but the process was long and hard. 
Parties seemed pleased to have finally reached some form of mutual understanding.
Code of conduct for housing associations 
Aedes, the umbrella organisation for the social housing sector, has drafted a code 
of conduct for its members (the ‘‘Aedescode’’). Though all the housing associations 
in The Hague have ratified the Aedescode, they do not apply it much (Commission 
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Aedescode, 2003). At the moment this code contains only very general directives. On 
the basis of the research results we conclude that it has no substantial influence on the 
performance of social housing associations. Aedes is currently working on a new code 
with stricter and more specific guidelines.
Quality standards 
Dutch housing associations have been making greater use of quality standards in 
recent years. The Dutch social housing sector has developed a quality label (KWH) 
specifically for rented housing. This label sets standards for the service to tenants, but 
contains no performance targets. Up till now the KWH label is used by 171 housing 
associations (35%) and the number is still growing rapidly. Some housing associations 
use quality systems based on ISO-9001:2000 standards. Much more widely used is the 
‘‘INK Management Model’’, a Dutch variation on the Excellence Model of the European 
Federation for Quality Management (EFQM). The KWH label is used by some housing 
associations in The Hague. Some have also implemented other quality systems.
Benchmarking 
For some time now indicators have been collated of the performance of housing 
associations. These consist mainly of financial data, rental indicators and figures on 
the production of new homes and the transformation of the existing housing stock. 
Performance figures in the social housing sector are collected by Aedes, by the Ministry 
of Housing, by the Central Housing Fund and several accountants firms. Housing 
associations receive individual benchmark reports assessing their performance 
compared with similar organisations. None of these organisations publish the results 
for individual housing associations. Only aggregated results are published. All housing 
associations in The Hague use this data to assess their performance.
More recently, a number of housing associations developed the ‘‘Aedex’’, a real estate 
index comparable with the IPD indices used by commercial real estate investors. The 
Aedex measures the profitability of housing associations and the difference between 
this figure and the profitability that could be achieved by pursuing a commercial 
strategy. This difference, also called ‘‘dividend to society’’, is assumed to be the 
profitability that housing associations do not realise because of their non-profit 
character. The benchmark for the financial performance (Aedex) is used by one of the 
three housing associations in The Hague. But the Aedex benchmark does not assess 
performance in urban renewal.
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External review/peer review 
A few years ago Aedes introduced external reviews as a new instrument for the social 
housing sector. An external review checks out the quality of stakeholder relations and the 
policy development and deployment process. It is conducted by a small group of experts 
from the housing sector, consultancy firms and other relevant backgrounds. External 
reviews are voluntary. Until 2004 only 5% of Dutch housing associations had participated 
in one. No social housing association in The Hague has carried out an external review 
or has any intention of doing so in the near future. They see themselves as capable of 
evaluating their own policy process and stakeholder relations and organizing feedback.
§  5.6.5 Performance in the Regeneration of The Hague
From a network perspective, there is no dominant player that can unilaterally dictate 
the goals in urban regeneration. Possible yardsticks for assessing the performance 
of housing associations are the goals laid down in the multilateral performance 
agreements with the Municipality of The Hague.
In general, the stakeholders appear satisfied with the performance of social housing 
associations in The Hague. Run-down housing is replaced or upgraded and new houses 
are being built at a considerable speed. Social housing associations are also actively 
improving living conditions and security in neighbourhoods. Haaglanden region has 
managed to lower the share of low-income households in The Hague and to increase it 
in other municipalities in the region.
One shortcoming in the performance agreements is that other stakeholders, including 
tenants’ organisations, are not represented. Tenants’ organisations feel that the 
decrease in affordable rented homes is making it more difficult for low- income 
households to find decent housing.
§  5.7 Conclusions
The Dutch social housing sector has the largest (36%) market share in Europe. 
People are asking if the current housing system is delivering satisfactory results, 
given its independent position and substantial financial resources. This question is 
especially relevant in urban regeneration processes. This paper elaborates on the urban 
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renewal network at local level, it describes the players in the network and their inter-
relationships, the role of steering instruments and the evaluation of the outcome of the 
network.
Based on our research findings in The Hague, the complex network approach to the 
organisation of the social housing sector appears to be a valuable addition to the 
spectrum of research methods. The micro-level perspective of the network approach 
makes it a useful tool for investigating the interactions between players and the use 
and effectiveness of steering instruments.
The case study results confirm that relations between players in the urban renewal of 
The Hague can be characterized as a complex network. Key network characteristics, 
such as closedness, interdependencies and multiformity, are all present in urban 
regeneration network of The Hague. The housing associations and the municipality 
appear to be the most dominant players in the network. Tenants have a relatively 
marginal position.
Players with the most powerful positions (housing associations and the municipality) 
in the network are satisfied with their performance in urban renewal. Tenant 
organisations appear unable to convert their wishes into satisfying results either as a 
player in the network or as a stakeholder in the housing associations or as a voter of 
the municipal council. This raises the issue of whether the urban renewal network is 
complete, definitely a subject for further research.
The case study revealed that very few steering instruments used in The Hague can 
secure or improve the performance of social housing associations in urban renewal. 
The various self-regulating instruments developed by the Dutch social housing 
sector do not appear to have made any substantial contribution to the urban renewal 
performance of The Hague [see Table 5.2]. Self-regulation is still used very sparsely. 
The local housing associations seem reluctant to use these instruments. As a result, 
there is no real transparency in their decision-making process or their performance. 
Although the urban renewal network in The Hague has little checks and balances 
aimed at securing the performance of housing associations, the main driving force 
in urban renewal seems to originate from the close personal co-operation between 
representatives from different parties. Respondents say that ‘‘social commitment’’, 
‘‘personal chemistry’’ and ‘‘local social entrepreneurship’’ have a substantial influence 
on results in urban renewal. However, the presence of these elements in the urban 
renewal network of The Hague is more or less coincidental. They are not secured or 
managed in any way – thus suggesting another avenue of research in this project.
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6 Network governance in action: the 
case of Groningen complex decision-
making in urban regeneration
Gerard van Bortel,  
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 24(2), 167-183.
Abstract 
Theories on network governance constitute a promising approach to a better 
understanding of complex decision-making and problem-solving. Network theories are 
increasingly used in housing research. In this paper we present case-study findings on 
urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen, a medium-sized city in the North of 
the Netherlands. We used a network governance approach as an analytical framework. 
Social landlords and local government in Groningen have been collaborating in urban 
regeneration processes for many years. In 2006 negotiations between these actors 
on a renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant ran into difficulties and 
encountered seemingly insurmountable differences of opinion. These difficulties were 
largely caused by the increased complexity of the decision-making process, the large 
number of actors involved and a shift in focus from ‘bricks-and-mortar’ investments 
to a more balanced approach including social and economic aspects of urban 
regeneration. In this paper we analyse decision-making on urban regeneration policy 
in Groningen over the past 10 years. The outcomes of the case study demonstrate 
the usefulness of the network approach as a framework to analyse decision-making 
processes. The paper also identifies strategies used by actors in the field to successfully 
deal with complexities and uncertainties in networks.
Keywords 
Network governance, Urban regeneration, Housing associations, Groningen
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§  6.1 Introduction
Urban renewal policies are generally laid down in area action plans, master plans or 
covenants. The development of these plans involves many government, market, third-
sector and com- munity actors. Due to its complexity these decision-making processes 
often end up in deadlock or exclude weak actors like residents (Swyngedouw, 2005). 
Network governance theorists have developed frameworks that claim to increase our 
understanding of these processes and provide instruments to cope with the complexity 
of contemporary public-sector decision-making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In this 
article we put the network governance framework to the test by analysing resent urban 
regeneration decision-making processes in Groningen (The Netherlands) concerning 
the renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant.
Understanding and influencing complex regeneration decision-makin
In Section 6.2 we introduce the network governance approach and discuss important 
characteristics of networks such as pluriformity, closedness, interdependency and 
dynamics. We investigate the uncertainties connected with problem-solving and 
decision-making in complex networks and offer possible solutions for handling 
complexity and uncertainty. We continue in Section 6.3 with a summary of shifts in 
governance in urban renewal and affordable housing provision. Starting on a European 
level, we subsequently summarize the institutional context of the social housing 
sector in the Netherlands and continue by describing the urban renewal network in 
Groningen. In Section 6.4 the decision-making dynamics in Groningen are analysed 
using network governance concepts. We conclude this paper (section 6.5) by discussing 
the usefulness of the network approach as an analytical framework and as a toolbox to 
be used by practitioners in the field.
Research design
This article presents preliminary results from an on-going doctoral research project 
that explores the shifts in housing governance and will focus on the role and position of 
social landlords in urban decision-making processes in England and the Netherlands. 
Data for this article was gathered by conducting 25 interviews with key informants from 
housing associations and the Groningen local authority. The interviews were conducted 
by the author in collaboration with two City Council officials in preparation of a policy 
conference to renew the local area agreement, the Local Urban Renewal Covenant.
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The interviewees included three aldermen as well as the development, planning 
and finance managers from the housing associations that were involved in urban 
renewal and their counterparts within the Groningen City Council. The interviews were 
structured around three types of network uncertainty as identified by Koppenjan and 
Klijn (2004), i.e. substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties. We will discuss 
these uncertainties in greater detail in section 6.2.4. The following topics were raised 
during the interviews:
1 Strategies and ambitions of the own organisation;
2 Evaluation of past decision-making processes;
3 Possible efficiency gains in ‘bricks-and-mortar’ investments;
4 Social investments issues;
5 The coordination and management of urban regeneration interventions.
In addition to interview data, the findings presented in this paper are based on 
desk research involving policy documents and meeting notes and the participant 
observation of a high-level policy conference. The interviewees did not include any 
residents’ representatives because the latter did not participate in the policy conference 
that constitutes an important focal point in this article. In a later phase however, 
residents were involved in public consultation on the results of the negotiations 
between the City Council and the housing associations.
The author had exceptional access to urban renewal decision-making in Groningen. 
This was because of his 8 years of experience as a practitioner working for a housing 
association in Groningen from 1996 to 2004 and in 2006 as an external facilitator at 
a crucial stage in decision-making concerning the renewal of the Local Urban Renewal 
Covenant. The danger of researcher bias due to this intimate connection with actors 
in the Groningen urban renewal network is limited, however. This researcher has no 
formal connections with actors in Groningen and no stake in the outcomes of decision-
making processes. In addition we will use other independent external assessments of 
urban renewal decision-making in Groningen and the level of resident participation 
in the concluding section of this article (Van Hulst et al., 2008; Van de Wijdeven & De 
Graaf, 2008).
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§  6.2 Understanding governance networks
§  6.2.1 Network theory
In this paper we use a network governance approach to increase our understanding of 
complex decision-making in Groningen. Mullins and Rhodes (2007) identify several 
strands of network/systems theory in the field of housing research. They distinguished 
the following key strands of network concepts: (1) policy networks (2) network 
governance (3) supply networks/chains (4) organisational fields and (5) complex 
systems. Mullins and Rhodes synthesized these strands of network analysis into five 
overarching themes and interests:
1 a common emphasis on the way in which relationships between organisations affect 
the behaviour of individual organisations;
2 a recognition that the shape and structure of the network in which organisations 
operate can have significant implications for decision-making;
3 an interest in the way in which policy interventions are and should be structured in 
governance networks;
4 a shared interest in the way in which organisations adapt to changes in their 
environment and seek to influence these changes;
5 an interest in the boundaries of networks and the different levels of decision-making 
that influence what happens in networks.
We have chosen to use the network governance strand to increase our understanding 
of decision-making processes because this approach specifically targets the relations 
between interdependent actors and the interactions that result from decision-making 
processes in situations where there is no dominant actor (see De Bruijn et al., 2002; 
Kickert et al.,1997; Klijn et al., 1995; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007).
§  6.2.2 How governance networks work
The process of network formation is driven by interdependencies that induce actors 
to negotiate with others to attain the resources needed to achieve their goals. Their 
interactions lead to the formation of rules that are sustained by and changed through 
these interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). These interactions create relationship 
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patterns that over time acquire more robustness. Relationship patterns create 
formal and informal rules for future interactions. And it is these rules and patterns of 
interaction that constitute a ‘network’.
Koppenjan and Klijn describe series of interactions as ‘policy games’. The actors’ 
resources and their strategic behaviour determine their position in the network. 
Actors do not select strategies at random but are guided by their own objectives and 
perceptions, their own stakes in the outcome and the strategies of other participants. 
Policy games take place in activated parts of a network called ‘arenas’. A game may 
consist of multiple arenas and game rounds. Each round is concluded by a crucial 
decision or event, for example the signing of a covenant or -in a less positive sense- a 
major conflict. The developments and outcomes of decision-making are influenced by 
the strategies the actors use. These strategies can lead to breakthroughs but also to 
blockages and deadlocks in the decision-making process.
§  6.2.3 Characteristics of complex networks
De Bruijn et al. (2002) identify four characteristics of networks that have a major 
influence on the level of complexity and the nature of decision-making processes. We 
will give a short overview of these characteristics and illustrate them with examples 
from the Groningen case. The four characteristics are: (a) Pluriformity; (b) Closedness; 
(c) Interdependency; (d) Dynamics.
Pluriformity
The level of pluriformity is reflected in the number of actors involved in the governance 
network and their organisational characteristics. Furthermore, pluriformity is 
influenced by the variety of goals and perceptions of network actors. In Groningen 
the number of social landlords involved in urban renewal projects is limited. Due 
to mergers this number decreased from nine in the 1980s to only five in 2008. In 
addition, few local authority departments are involved in the bricks-and-mortar 
urban renewal, and Groningen has no devolved municipal structure. In comparison, 
Amsterdam has 14 housing associations and five borough authorities with devolved 
housing policy responsibilities. However, as we will discuss later in this paper, the 
number of actors involved in urban renewal decision- making in Groningen has 
increased considerably due to the inclusion of more social objectives in urban 
regeneration policy.
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Groningen has a long tradition (since the 1970s) in developing mutual urban 
renewal goals. These have been formalized in local area agreements between housing 
associations and the local authority, thereby limiting the level of pluriformity in 
goals and perceptions. In addition social landlords and the Groningen City Council 
are used to jointly commissioning housing market research. They have established 
an organisational structure to coordinate urban renewal decision-making and 
implementation, thereby further decreasing pluriformity.
Interdependency
Interdependencies in a network originate from the fragmentation of resources among 
actors. Actors need these resources to attain their own goals. Therefore they often 
need to collaborate with other actors. The resources range from financial grants, 
loans, building locations, building permits and public endorsement of plans to 
democratic anchorage by the city council. For example, housing associations in the 
Netherlands are often strongly dependent upon local authorities to provide building 
locations. Municipalities, on the other hand, need social landlords as delivery vehicles 
for new affordable homes and urban regeneration. This is especially the case for the 
development of new affordable housing, as each municipality has a limited number of 
housing associations active in its territory.
An additional form of interdependency was introduced in Groningen by the recent 
shift from bricks-and-mortar investments towards an approach balancing the social 
and physical investments. This resulted in an increased emphasis on initiatives aimed 
at social targets like crime prevention, supporting multi-problem families, creating 
opportunities for the long-term unemployed and tackling the school dropout problem.
Closedness
A third element of complex decision-making is closedness. Actors in a network are 
not automatically sensitive to external steering interventions by the state or other 
government agencies. National and local governments are no longer dominant actors 
that can coerce other actors to implement government policy. This is illustrated by the 
inability of the Dutch housing minister in the 1990s to increase the number of social 
rental homes being sold. The central government’s goal was ignored by most housing 
associations (Van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007).
De Bruijn et al. (2002) argue that organisations need a certain degree of closedness, 
because receptiveness to all external signals would send them adrift without a fixed 
aim or objective. Closedness enables organisations to retain their focus and incorporate 
only a limited amount of the complexity and environmental turbulence into their 
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activities. Closedness is often the result of the power and autonomy of the actor(s) 
involved. Autonomous actors do not usually need the resources offered by other actors 
and can subsequently simply ignore their initiatives.
Closedness can also be found in Groningen. It is known that actors (housing 
associations and local authorities) are used to working towards mutually supported 
urban renewal policies and that they jointly commission housing market research. 
However, the interviews with municipal representatives suggest that housing 
associations were not really inclined to listen to the local government’s plea to 
financially support social investments until they identified this as a source of leverage 
to advocate their wish for more efficient project development procedures.
The difficulty of accessing decision-making arenas is another form of closedness that 
was very prominent in Groningen. Local authorities and housing associations worked 
very closely together in the development of an urban regeneration strategy. Important 
decisions were discussed and agreed upon before they involved other actors. De Kam 
(2004) argues that the intensive relations between the local authority and housing 
associations resulted in formidable entry barriers for outsiders like commercial real 
estate developers or non-local housing associations. Entry of outsiders could be 
interpreted as a sign that local actors were not able to solve the problems on their own. 
However, this closedness was not limited to outsiders. The close collaboration between 
city administrators and social landlords also made it difficult for citizens to influence 
urban renewal policy (De Kam, 2004). In addition, Edelenbos (2004) concluded that 
there was little attention for the role and position of elected council members in the 
political debate on urban renewal policy. To summarize, the role of the professionals 
was very dominant.
Dynamics
Networks are constantly in transition due to changes in the closedness, 
interdependency and pluriformity of actors in the network and due to contextual 
developments. The network landscape changes, some actors leave, others join in, rules 
can change and so can the distribution of resources. This means that opportunities 
and barriers for successfully influencing decision-making can change over time. 
Decision-making in networks is therefore often unpredictable. Due to the absence 
of a hierarchical structure, every actor can try to influence the agenda-setting and 
decision-making process. In a complex network this is not an easy process. Fragmented 
interdependencies can make it necessary to interact with many different actors to 
influence outcomes. Furthermore in complex networks there are often no ‘done 
deals’. New actors in the network, new decision-making rounds or altered network 
characteristics can lead to the re-evaluation of decisions made in the past, with 
possibly different outcomes.
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The concept of network dynamics can be illustrated by the shift from the bricks-and-
mortar approach in Groningen towards a process balancing social and economic 
investments. Due to this shift many new actors from the social sector joined in the 
decision-making game. We can illustrate this by applying Koppenjan and Klijn’s 
(2004) network concepts to the Groningen case. Figure 6.1 shows two decision-
making games. The first policy game addresses the bricks-and-mortar pillar of urban 
regeneration. The second game depicted is concerned with social investments. Social 
investments are not new, but investments in health, education, crime prevention and 
unemployment programmes have only recently been seen as important elements in 
urban regeneration in the Netherlands (VROM, 2007). This new vision has resulted in 
the interconnecting of both decision-making games.
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, a new policy arena has emerged connecting the bricks-
and-mortar and the social investments games. Both games take place in different 
networks with dissimilar rules, values and vocabulary. These differences can (and 
did) cause problems and sometimes irritation. For example, informants from the 
bricks-and-mortar network mention the lack of neighbourhood orientation among the 
actors involved in social investments as a problem. Actors from the social investments 
network are blamed for rarely participating in urban regeneration meetings and 
activities on a neighbourhood level. Another point of criticism levelled at actors from 
the social investments network is their singular focus on long-term programmes and 
specific target groups, like immigrant women or school dropouts. Actors from the 
bricks-and-mortar network appear to prefer a more geographically demarcated and 
short-term approach.
§  6.2.4 Uncertainties in networks
After discussing the characteristics of complex networks described by De Bruijn et al. 
(2002), we shall delve deeper into the network approach as a useful tool for getting 
a better understanding of complex decision-making processes. An important factor 
influencing these processes is uncertainty. Decision-making in complex networks has 
to deal with several forms of uncertainty (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004):
 – Substantive uncertainty;
 – Strategic uncertainty;
 – Institutional uncertainty.
TOC
 157 Network governance in action: the case of Groningen complex decision-making in urban regeneration
FIGURE 6.1 Connection between the ‘bricks-and-mortar’ and ‘social investments’ games. 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004. Comments on bricks-and-mortar and social investments added by 
author
We will illustrate how these uncertainties played out in Groningen. As we discussed 
earlier in this paper, the aim of the Groningen City Council to seek additional funding 
for social investments connected very well with the wish of housing associations to 
organize the development of new homes in urban renewal areas more efficiently. By 
connecting both objectives, both actors wanted to ‘increase the size of the pie’ by 
reinvesting project development efficiency gains in the social projects. This initiative, 
however, created new substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties.
Substantive uncertainty
Substantive uncertainty is connected with the lack of shared knowledge about the nature 
of complex problems and viable solutions. Actors can have different problem perceptions 
and dissimilar frames of reference because they can interpret available information very 
differently. Adding more information is not always a solution because it can increase, instead 
of diminish, substantive uncertainty. New information brought forward by one actor is 
often debated or simply ignored by other actors. In Groningen actors have a long tradition in 
jointly commissioning research in housing market developments. This situation can limit 
substantive uncertainty because knowledge is based on a shared frame of reference.
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Strategic uncertainty
Actors involved in decision-making can have different objectives. They may base their 
actions on perceptions of reality that are not acknowledged or are unknown to other 
participants. This increases the strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, actors respond to 
and anticipate each other’s strategic moves. Altogether, this can lead to large variety of 
strategies and a high level of unpredictability in the decision-making process, thereby 
creating strategic uncertainties.
In Groningen strategic uncertainties arose from the mix of physical and social urban 
regeneration investments. This mix was new and created uncertainties about the 
different responsibilities of the actors involved. Strategic uncertainty was further 
increased by the intention of housing associations to not only financially contribute 
to social investments but also to control and monitor these investments. Many City 
Council officials regarded the social investments as their prerogative, even if these 
investments were partly funded by housing associations.
Institutional uncertainty
Complex decision-making often involves large numbers of actors. These actors 
frequently come from different institutional backgrounds, bringing with them their 
own culture and values. Complex problems often cut across existing organisational 
and institutional boundaries, administrative levels and networks. Interaction in policy 
games and the out- comes of these games are therefore influenced by different and 
sometimes conflicting rules, vocabulary/jargon and values. Actors often trust each 
other, but interactions can also be guided by high levels of distrust.
One of the reasons for institutional uncertainty in Groningen arose from the differing 
opinions about the way efficiency gains from urban renewal projects should be 
allocated to social investments. Should there be a central ‘till’ from which all social 
projects should be funded? And if so, who should control this till? Most City Council 
officials preferred this idea, whereby the local authority would be managing the till. 
Housing associations sup- ported an option whereby funds would flow directly from the 
social landlord into the social investment projects.
The three forms of uncertainty distinguished in the Groningen case are interconnected. 
The institutional uncertainty about the way efficiency gains should be allocated to 
social investments was strongly influenced by the strategic uncertainty about the 
responsibilities of housing association and the Groningen City Council.
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§  6.3 Developments in social housing governance
§  6.3.1 European developments
Throughout Europe, central governments are increasingly withdrawing from social 
housing provision. They are shifting tasks and responsibilities to lower levels of 
government or non-governmental organisations (UNECE, 2006; Whitehead & Scanlon, 
2007). There is an overall trend towards devolution, decentralization and privatization. 
This trend was partly triggered by beliefs prevailing in the eighties concerning the 
role of the state in housing provision. In most countries this resulted in a reduction 
in public housing expenditure. In general, housing became more market-oriented, 
competitive and open to economic pressures (Priemus et al., 1993; Priemus, 2004). 
Overall, the central government is still an important party in housing systems, but a 
shift in orientation can be seen from a ‘providing state’ to an ‘enabling state’ (Doherty 
2004, p. 256). These developments have changed the decision-making processes; 
the overall trend is towards an increasing number of actors and a fragmentation of 
power and resources. These developments are not natural phenomena. They are 
caused by the economic, social and political developments that triggered changes in 
public administration, like the rise of New Public Management approaches (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992).
In addition to this, in many European countries other developments can be 
identified. There is a trend for housing associations to bring their physical and spatial 
investments (the traditional bricks-and-mortar approach) more in balance with the 
economic and social aspects of urban renewal. This is illustrated by the iN Business 
for Neighbourhoods initiative by housing associations in England and the ‘Answer to 
Society’ by the Dutch housing associations in 2007 (Aedes, 2007). In both countries, 
housing associations commit themselves to invest in local communities.
Furthermore, an increased emphasis is put on resident empowerment, participative 
decision-making and public accountability. This is illustrated in England by the ‘Every 
tenant matters’ review (Cave, 2007) and the subsequent ‘tenant-based’ reform of 
the regulation of housing associations. In the Netherlands the ‘Confidence in the 
Neighbour- hood’ report published by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR, 2005) triggered a trend towards more resident involvement in urban 
renewal. The city of Groningen is one of four local authorities forming a front-runner 
group of municipalities that want to give residents a central position in urban renewal 
decision-making based on the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ philosophy.
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§  6.3.2 Developments in the Netherlands
The Dutch social housing sector in an international perspective
In many European countries governments are decreasing state funding and state 
involvement in the provision of social housing and giving a greater role to private 
and third-sector organisations. Developments in the Netherlands are no exception, 
although in some respects the Dutch case is unique. The Dutch social rented sector 
covers 35% of the total housing stock. This substantial market share is remarkable in 
an international perspective, as the UK takes second place with 20% of the stock. In 
most European countries the social rented sector accounts for less than 10% of the 
housing stock (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007).
The (almost non-existent) financial relationship between the government and 
social landlords is another remarkable feature of the Dutch housing system. In most 
countries social housing associations can still count on government subsidies for 
the construction of housing (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). The Netherlands is the 
only country that has almost totally abolished subsidies in the social rented sector. 
In an extensive ‘grossing and balancing operation’ during the 1990s, all outstanding 
government loans to housing associations were netted against supply-side housing 
subsidy obligations of the Dutch state.
From independence to semi-government organisations and back again
The social housing sector in the Netherlands has undergone numerous changes since 
it first came into being around 1860 and since the introduction of the Housing Act in 
1901. Housing associations were private organisations that were subject to varying 
degrees of government influence during the twentieth century. After World War II 
the social housing sector became a crucial instrument in the battle against housing 
shortages. From 1945 until 1990, the Dutch government remained closely involved in 
the operations and funding of housing associations. As a result housing associations 
gradually turned into semi-public institutions that had strong hierarchical ties with 
the government. The grossing and balancing operation fundamentally changed the 
relations between government and Dutch housing associations, giving the latter a 
virtually autonomous position.
Though fully independent financially and administratively since the 1990s, housing 
associations in the Netherlands still require authorization for high-impact decisions. 
Under the terms of the Housing Act their responsibilities and operating conditions are 
laid down in the Social Rented Sector Management Order (abbreviated BBSH in Dutch). 
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The BBSH stipulates that housing associations are responsible for providing good, 
affordable housing for people who are unable to pay market prices. The BBSH is not 
very specific about the results expected from housing associations, and it leaves this 
point to be negotiated between local authorities and housing associations (Van Bortel 
& Elsinga, 2007).
§  6.3.3 Developments in Groningen
To understand the interactions between parties in the urban renewal network of 
Groningen it is essential to get some grasp of the rather atypical nature of this city. 
Groningen is located in the extreme North of the Netherlands and in its immediate 
vicinity there are no other cities of consequence. The local authorities of Groningen 
adopted the slogan
‘Nothing goes above Groningen’ to accentuate its Northern location, the assets of 
the city and the high level of self-confidence shared by its residents. The location of 
Groningen has some drawbacks, however. The economic situation, although improving 
in recent years, is less prosperous compared with the Western part of the country; 
unemployment rates are higher and incomes lower. This situation is reflected in 
the housing market and housing stock. Compared with the West, buying a house in 
Groningen is relatively affordable. Waiting lists for social housing are relatively short 
(but for those in dire need of a home still too long).
The market position of the social housing stock in Groningen is vulnerable, as was 
illustrated by the high levels of housing voids at the end of the 1990s. This market 
situation stimulated actors in Groningen earlier than those in other Dutch cities to 
develop large scale-urban renewal programmes. Actors in Groningen have a long 
tradition of close collaboration in urban regeneration. Since the 1970s, the local 
authority, housing associations, residents, police, schools and other organisations 
have worked closely together to improve housing and living conditions in the city. 
The grossing and balancing operation in the 1990s was not the start of network 
governance of urban renewal in Groningen. It did however, give housing associations 
a more powerful and autonomous position vis-a-vis the local authority. Before this 
operation the local authority was not inclined to involve housing associations in the 
strategic decisions about urban renewal policy, like the selection of intervention areas 
(De Kam 2004).
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§  6.4 Decision-making dynamics in the Groningen 
urban regeneration network
In this section we shall describe the process of decision-making on urban regeneration 
policy in Groningen using the network approach discussed earlier. In Groningen we can 
broadly distinguish three periods or policy games: a) Period 1: 1995–1998; (b) Period 
2: 1998–2005; (c) Period 3: 2005–2007. These periods have been distinguished by 
the author. The demarcation is open to discussion and is not an objective empirical 
fact. However, each period is marked by an important event such as signing off on 
a covenant between actors. In the following we will discuss these periods in some 
detail, especially regarding the more recent developments in the period 2005–2007. 
At the end of each period, there was a significant increase or decrease in the level of 
uncertainty. This is in line with Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) notion of ‘game rounds’ 
that are most often concluded with breakthroughs or deadlocks.
§  6.4.1 Period 1: 1995–1998
The period starting in the mid-1990s and lasting until 1998 was characterized 
in Groningen by deteriorating market conditions, rising vacancies and increasing 
social problems in several neighbourhoods. Housing market surveys predicted 
mayor redundancies of apartment blocks. This resulted in a strong feeling among 
most housing associations and the local authority that urgent action was necessary. 
Groningen was one of the first cities in the Netherlands where in 1998 housing 
associations and the municipality agreed on large-scale urban regeneration 
investments, spanning a period of 12 years. The end of this period is demarcated by the 
signing of the first Local Urban Renewal Covenant in 1998.
§  6.4.2 Period 2: 1998–2005
In the period 1998–2005 implementation of the 1998 covenant was at the centre 
of attention. In this period it became clear that residents did not always share the 
ambitions of the Groningen housing associations and the local authorities. They did 
not agree with the large number of redevelopment plans. Residents were particularly 
opposed to the large proportion of demolish-and-rebuild in the redevelopment plans, 
because inadequate guarantees were given to residents that affordable houses would 
be available in their old neighbourhood. New dwellings were mainly intended for 
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middle- and high-income households, while many of the incumbent tenants were 
dependent on affordable housing. Market developments also proved less gloomy than 
depicted in housing market surveys conducted at the end of the 1990s. Tensions 
on the housing market remained and waiting lists were still long for those seeking a 
new home. It also turned out to be difficult to deliver as many housing demolitions 
and new-build homes as envisioned in the 1998 Local Urban Renewal Covenant. In 
2002 these developments led to a revised Local Urban Renewal Covenant [‘Het Lokaal 
Akkoord’] between housing associations and the municipality. In this new agreement 
demolition targets were adjusted downwards and the focus shifted from quantitative 
bricks-and-mortar targets towards more qualitative and integrative objectives. The 
latter focus placed more emphasis on the built environment and living conditions of 
residents and less on transformation of the housing stock alone (Van der Wal, 2004). 
This shift towards a more balanced approach to urban regeneration was illustrated by 
the selection of several new ‘Social Urban Regeneration Areas’ in Groningen. These 
areas would receive an extensive social programme targeting crime, vandalism and 
anti-social behaviour and only a small proportion of bricks-and-mortar investments.
The 1998–2005 period is demarcated by the ‘Nieuw Cement’ [New Mortar] exhibition 
presenting an overview of urban regeneration results in Groningen from 1998 until 
2004. Housing associations and the municipality jointly organized this event. The 
publication accompanying the exhibition contained several essays written by relative 
outsiders (De Kam, 2004; Edelenbos, 2004; Ouwehand, 2004) that contained—
sometimes critical—reflections on the process and outcomes of urban regeneration 
in Groningen. Critical comments were made about the lack of genuine involvement of 
residents and elected politicians.
§  6.4.3 Period 3: 2005–2007
In 2005 the municipality and housing associations started discussions on 
renewal of the 2002 Local Urban Regeneration Covenant. The emphasis on social 
investments made these discussions different from those on the earlier covenants. 
In 2005 a dormant discontent among professionals on the dominance of housing 
associations and the municipality was inflamed by the publication ‘Confidence in 
the Neighbourhood’ [‘Vertrouwen in de buurt’] by the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (abbreviated WWR in Dutch). This publication advocated stronger 
resident participation in improving the living conditions in neighbourhoods and 
powerful interventions by local governments and others if neighbourhoods lacked the 
social fibre to deal with problems themselves. Citizens’ empowerment was a central 
theme in the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ report. The report mentions housing 
associations as organisations with the organisational strength and financial resources 
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to take the lead in neighbourhood renewal operations, including coordinating activities 
targeting social problems.
In Groningen the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ (WRR, 2005) report inspired 
many of the professionals participating in urban regeneration projects to apply a more 
bottom-up approach. In the spring of 2006 a special conference was held in Groningen 
to discuss the implications of the report. Pieter Winsemius, lead author of the report 
and former Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning attended the conference together 
with more than 100 representatives of housing associations, local authorities, 
police, schools, residents and welfare organisations. The conference resulted in the 
formulation of ‘Ten golden rules of urban regeneration’ (Frenay, 2006) [Table 6.1]. 
These rules turned out to be very influential in subsequent discussions on renewal of 
the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant.
1 Develop tailor-made approaches for each neighbourhood
2 Create clear roles and responsibilities
3 Give residents breathing space, do not micro-manage
4 Keep it simple
5 Act more and talk less
6 Interact
7 Celebrate successes
8 Keep pace
9 Have confidence, give confidence
10 Nurture a ‘can do’ attitude
TABLE 6.1 The ten golden rules of urban regeneration in Groningen 
Source: Frenay, 2006
The wide dissemination of the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ philosophy could 
be interpreted as the success story of a well-written report sponsored by a charismatic 
political figure. Although not underpinned by research, the success of this report could 
also be interpreted from a ‘governing without government’ perspective. In that light, its 
success could also be the result of a brilliant government strategy aimed at changing 
the rules of decision-making in urban renewal processes through publishing a report by 
an independent (but state-funded) scientific council that fits the government agenda.
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§  6.4.4 Connecting games 
The emphasis on the empowerment of residents coincided with a growing notion within 
the local administration of Groningen that they were unable to fund the social activities 
needed to tackle problems in the no less than 14 regeneration neighbourhoods in 
Groningen. The Groningen City Council calculated the amount needed for these social 
services and concluded that the available municipal funds were insufficient. Instead 
of lowering their ambitions the local authority asked the local housing associations 
for assistance. This illustrates that dependencies are closely linked with the goals and 
ambitions of actors. The City Council could have chosen to lower its ambitions, resulting in 
a lower investment cost that matched the municipal budget.
In subsequent negotiations housing associations and the municipality developed 
solutions entwining the goals of both parties: making bricks-and-mortar urban 
regeneration more efficient by reducing the red tape and streamlining planning 
procedures and then rein- vesting these efficiency gains in social activities.
Actors developed a new model for project development: the Relay Race Model (in 
Dutch ‘het estafettemodel’). Actors were confident that the Relay Race Model could 
shorten the time needed to develop urban renewal projects by 40% (from 4 years to 
2.5 years) by organizing the process in a more effective way. Changes included the 
clear identification of steps in the process and defining clear responsibilities, timelines 
and output criteria for each step. The parties were confident that this would lead to 
substantial cost reductions, on average € 7 000 for each new-built dwelling. Housing 
associations were prepared to use these efficiency gains to fund social investments. But 
housing associations also wanted guarantees that these funds were used effectively. 
Some associations were only prepared to sponsor activities in neighbourhoods where 
their own housing stock was located. What made decision-making difficult was the 
combination of two different networks: the bricks-and-mortar network and the 
network dealing with social investments [see Figure 6.1 above].
§  6.4.5 Creating a way out of deadlock
In the autumn of 2006 negotiations on the New Local Performance Agreement 
reached a critical phase. At that moment decision-making was in a deadlock due 
to disagreement between the local authority and housing associations about the 
way funds from bricks-and- mortar projects would be made available for social 
investments. After 2 years of preparation and negotiations, the renewal of the Local 
Urban Regeneration Covenant seemed more dead than alive.
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From a network perspective, the complexity of the governance network on urban 
renewal issues had reached a critical level. There were too many actors and issues. As 
one Groningen City Council informant phrased it, ‘there were too many pieces on the 
chess- board.’ In addition, the frequent and informal contacts between actors hampered 
decision-making by creating a high level of ‘noise’, hearsay, confusion, mistrust and 
miscommunication. Quoting another informant from the Groningen City Council:
“Groningen is a small place, people bump into each other all the time; during a 
football game or in the shopping mall. It’s impossible to coordinate or manage these 
interactions in any way, especially because a lot of talk is going on about the people 
involved and not on the issues at hand.”
The CEOs of the two largest housing associations and the administrator of the 
municipal department of housing and spatial planning decided on a ‘pressure-cooker 
approach’. This entailed holding a two-day conference at a secluded location bringing 
together all relevant issues and actors from different hierarchical levels.
In interviews preceding the conference, high-level officials expressed trust in the 
other parties and emphasized that housing associations and the municipality needed 
each other. However, informants on lower hierarchical levels articulated less trust and 
confidence. One housing association’s informant stated that:
“The local authority needs money from housing associations to fund their social 
investments ambitions. The city council sees the promise to increase the efficiency of 
the building production as a possibility to get that money, but the city council is not 
really committed to implementing measures to increase efficiency and it will never be 
implemented.”
A Groningen city administration official felt that housing associations were making the 
discussion unnecessarily complicated:
“Housing associations are clever, they have more money than we think. They have made 
profits due to investments of the local authority. Their financial contribution to the 
social investment program is peanuts.”
Another finding from the interviews was a deeply felt reservation amongst 
representatives from both housing associations and several municipal departments 
about the limited organisational capacity of actors in the social investment network to 
deliver the necessary results.
Information from the interviews was processed in a discussion paper and a detailed 
programme for the conference. The setting of the policy conference was kept 
intentionally informal. It was held at a secluded location with many possibilities 
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for interaction in alternating plenary sessions, subgroups and social activities. An 
overnight stay was compulsory for all participants. To enhance the ‘pressure-cooker’ 
effect, the conference programme was structured in such a way that the results (or lack 
thereof) had to be presented at the end of conference at a session with the three local 
aldermen in attendance.
Parallel to the plenary and subgroup meetings a draft policy document was written 
describing the main points of agreement and disagreement. This draft was discussed 
with participants and adjusted to include their comments. At the end of the two-day 
conference a policy document was drafted and agreed upon by all participants. In 
the weeks following the conference this document was developed into a draft New 
Urban Regeneration Covenant. Early in 2007 the draft covenant was made public for 
consultation with residents.
Paramount in the New Urban Regeneration Covenant is the balance between 
investments in bricks-and-mortar and social activities. The joint responsibility of 
the local authority and housing associations to secure good living conditions in 
neighbourhoods is firmly anchored in the Covenant, specifying activities like crime 
prevention, sustainable housing management, social inclusion, welfare, health, 
education and improving neighbourhood facilities. Over the next 10 years housing 
associations will deliver 8 000 new dwellings in the city, of which 5 000 will be built in 
urban renewal areas. In the coming 4 years housing associations and the municipality 
will each invest ten million euros extra in social activities. The investment by housing 
associations is based on the assumption that the development time of real estate 
projects will be reduced by 40%. This is not an ex-ante condition for the investments; 
the actual efficiency gains will be assessed by ex-post measurements. Although 
considered in the development process, no sanctions are included in the covenant in 
case of non-compliance. This arrangement illustrates a certain level of mutual trust in 
the ability and willingness of actors to deliver results.
§  6.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the network governance approach and used it to take 
a closer look at urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen. We saw that policy 
development in this area can be a fairly complex venture, mainly because of the inter-
dependencies between actors and the dynamics in the network. The shift from a bricks-
and- mortar approach towards a more balanced approach to urban renewal focusing 
more on social investments constituted a major change in the urban regeneration 
network in Groningen.
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We also showed that this shift towards a more balanced form of urban regeneration 
turned an already complex—but still functioning—bricks-and-mortar network into 
an even more complex and—for some time—dysfunctional network due to the 
interconnection with the social investments network. The Relay Race Model was 
developed to deliver the efficiency gains in project development. This instrument alone 
proved insufficient to bring decision- making to a successful closure. A very top-down 
intervention by key officials was necessary. This intervention resulted in a two-day 
policy conference that included all relevant issues and actors, though excluding the 
residents. This created the opportunity to reach agreement on the text of the New 
Urban Regeneration Covenant and create a mechanism to channel financial resources 
from project development into social investments.
The research for this article did not include the opinions of residents because they 
were not directly involved in the renewal of the Urban Regeneration Covenant. Recent 
publications (Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf 2008; Van Hulst et al. 2008) however, 
have assessed the involvement of residents in, respectively, the implementation of 
the new Covenant and resident participation in the development of Neighbourhood 
Action Plans for two priority neighbourhoods in Groningen (named De Hoogte and 
Korrewegwijk).
The general strategy described in the New Urban Regeneration Covenant has to be 
delivered by local teams in the 14 priority neighbourhoods in Groningen. According 
to the Covenant, residents should ideally participate in these teams, but this is still an 
exception and largely remains a promise to be fulfilled (Van de Wijdeven & De Graaf, 
2008). In addition, the 14 local Neighbourhood Teams take very different approaches, 
thereby creating new forms of complexity and uncertainties that need to be overcome.
The pledge by professionals to base their actions on the ‘Confidence in the 
Neighbourhood’ principles [see Table 6.1 above] has created high expectations among 
residents about their influence on developments in the neighbourhood (Van de 
Wijdeven & De Graaf 2008, p. 26).
As Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf (2008) conclude in their assessment of the decision-
making process, while on a neighbourhood level professionals in Groningen operate 
as an intermediary between elected politicians and citizens, the link between the latter 
two parties is weak. This is supported by the conclusions of Van Hulst et al. (2008), 
who state that the development of Neighbourhood Action Plans for De Hoogte and 
Korrewegwijk was dominated by professionals and that the involvement of residents 
in the development of the Neighbourhood Action Plans and communication on 
the outcomes of decision- making had been limited. The connections between 
professionals from housing associations and the municipality appear to be so strong 
that they tend to exclude to some extent the local politicians and residents.
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Applying the network approach to urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen 
increased our understanding of the complexity and the uncertainties involved in these 
forms of decision-making. Using the network approach we identified instruments 
and strategies used by actors to cope with uncertainties and complexity. Actors in 
Groningen developed these tools without explicit knowledge of network concepts. It 
remains a topic for further debate and research if a more deliberate use of a network 
governance toolbox by practitioners would result in better quality and more efficient 
decision-making processes.
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7 Neighbourhood regeneration and 
place leadership: lessons from 
Groningen and Birmingham
David Mullins & Gerard van Bortel, (2009). 
Policy studies, 31(4), 413-428.
§  7.1 Introduction
The concept of place leadership is new and relatively untheorised in England (but see 
Gibney & Murie, 2008; Gibney, Copeland & Murie, 2009; Mabey & Freeman, 2010), 
and has not been explicitly formulated in the Netherlands. However, a related stream 
of practice and analysis around partnerships (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002) and network 
governance (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004) is already well-established in both countries and has framed our earlier work on 
neighbourhood regeneration and housing (Mullins & Rhodes, 2007; Van Bortel and 
Mullins, 2009; Van Bortel, Mullins & Rhodes, 2009).
This article explores connections between place leadership and network governance 
concepts to identify a set of themes that are then used to explore research evidence on 
neighbourhood regeneration and the role played by third- sector housing organisations 
in two cities: Groningen in the north of the Netherlands and Birmingham in the English 
Midlands. While our research has a particular focus on the housing sector and the role 
of housing associations (HAs), the regeneration task that our case study organisations 
set themselves has taken them well beyond ‘bricks-and-mortar’. This requires them to 
collaborate with municipal authorities and a wide range of partners who contribute to 
the wellbeing of places and people. We explore the role played by HAs in regeneration 
partnerships and the implications of place-shaping and network governance.
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§  7.2 Why place leadership and network governance? - Conceptual mapping
Over the past few years the idea of sustainable place-shaping has made its way to 
the heart of the debate on urban development and integrated policies for European 
regions, towns, cities and neighbourhoods. This has implications for the public and 
private sectors, third-sector organisations such as HAs and for local communities and 
governance arrangements.
§  7.2.1 Origins and purposes
With diverse roots in thinking about collaborative planning (Healey, 2006), competitive 
cities and regions (Florida, 1995), the impact of economic change and the knowledge-
based economy on different types of places (Gibney & Murie, 2008), ideas about 
place-shaping have been further stimulated by public policy agendas. In England, 
a strong policy impetus was provided by the Lyons report (2007) which argued the 
need to strengthen the focus on place and emphasised the role that local government 
could play in joining together a range of policy streams to create ‘effective’ places. This 
suggested that the attractiveness of neighbourhoods, cities and subregions should be 
seen as a key outcome of policy processes (Trickett et al., 2008).
This recognition of the need for an active approach to place-shaping has led to 
consideration of the leadership tasks required to bring together and coordinate 
multiple activities such as economic development, planning, housing, regeneration, 
sustainable communities and health to effect more satisfactory place-based outcomes 
(Gibney & Murie, 2008; Gibney et al., 2009).
There are very close parallels between the drivers for recent exploration of place 
leadership and longer-standing work on network governance. To orient our work in 
this article, Table 7.1 sets out our understanding of the contextual drivers, intellectual 
origins, disciplinary roots and problem focus of the two approaches.
Both place leadership and network governance respond to shifts from government 
to governance (Rhodes, 1997), from hierarchies to networks (Powell, 1990) and the 
normative search for new approaches to manage complexity and the ‘wicked issues’ 
at the interstices of sector-based policy silos (Klijn, 2008). The need for network 
management is most pronounced in situations where essential resources are dispersed 
between several actors and hierarchical steering is ineffective. A good example of this 
is provided by Dutch neighbourhood regeneration policies where HAs have a high 
degree of independence from local government and have the resources needed for such 
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interventions (van Bortel and Mullins, 2009). In contrast resources are less dispersed in 
the UK, with resulting stronger hierarchical steering of local ‘partnerships’ by the state 
(Davies, 2002).
A strong normative strand is shared by the ‘governance club’ originators of the network 
governance school (Rhodes, 1997) and recent place-shaping work at the University 
of Birmingham (Gibney & Murie, 2008). The former has been described by a key 
proponent as ‘the search for good, socially relevant outcomes’ (Klijn, 2008, p. 14). 
The latter began in collaboration with the Academy of Sustainable Communities to 
influence practice across many disciplines to create more sustainable places. Both 
approaches blend several academic disciplines. While the former draws mainly on 
public management, political science, and cognitive and behavioural research, the 
latter brings perspectives from planning and economic development and third-sector 
research as well as leadership and management studies.
NETWORK GOVERNANCE PLACE LEADERSHIP
Context Complexity 
From hierarchy to network governance (NG)  
fragmentation 
Resource dispersion between actors 
As NG + economic change, knowledge-based 
economy, competitive cities and regions, shifting 
policy paradigms, ‘place-shaping’ agenda (Lyons) 
Origins The Netherlands. Erasmus ‘governance club’ UK, Birmingham CURS/CLUB, building on 
place-shaping policy paradigm and collaborative 
planning tradition 
Disciplines Public management, politics, cognitive and 
behavioural dimensions
Planning, economic development, leadership and 
management, third- sector studies  
Problems addressed Normative - search for ‘good socially relevant out-
comes’, tackling ‘wicked issues’, complex policy 
coordination and steering without hierarchy
Normative - ‘successful places as outcomes’ 
and collaborative planning ‘from sectors and 
functions to places’
TABLE 7.1 Context, origins and problems addressed
§  7.2.2 Content and approaches
Gibney and Murie (2008) and Gibney et al. (2009) identify three specific elements of 
the place-shaping agenda requiring different leadership responses to those found in 
traditional hierarchies. These are cross-boundary working, community engagement 
and a focus on outcomes.
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Table 7.2 compares the content, core approaches and competences required for 
network governance and place leadership. In both cases these include cross-boundary 
working and community engagement. Slightly different repertoires of competences are 
suggested in relation to management and leadership.
NETWORK GOVERNANCE PLACE LEADERSHIP
Cross-boundary working Key focus on actors, games and arenas Multidisciplinary and multilevel actor 
networks with strong place focus  
Community engagement Activation of communities within 
networks  
Community leadership links to collabora-
tive planning
Leadership/ management Techniques for game management and 
actor selection to avoid ‘closedness’
Focus on leadership styles and tech-
niques, and dilemmas and challenges
TABLE 7.2 Content, approaches and key competences associated with network governance and place leadership.
The need for public managers to move out of service-specific silos to provide ‘joined-up 
local services’ has been a long-standing mantra of public management and is shared by 
network governance and place leadership. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) have identified 
the ‘reticulist’ skills that managers require for working across boundaries. Meanwhile 
Healey (2006) outlined the need for ‘collaborative planning’ and integrated approaches 
to improve quality of life in spatial planning. She advocated a shift from sectoral and 
functional approaches to service planning to a place-based approach with more fluid 
boundaries between public and private actors. Like Sullivan and Skelcher, Healey 
identified special skills such as joint visioning and consensus-building. The network 
governance literature elaborates the cognitive adjustments such as ‘covenanting’ 
required to share frames of reference between actors from different backgrounds (Klijn 
& Teisman, 1997).
Community engagement is the second main focus for place leadership identified 
by Gibney et al. (2009) and again there is long history of practice to draw upon. 
The continuum of options for levels of engagement of citizens and communities in 
decision-making and policy is well-known (Arnstein, 1969). Community leadership 
may intertwine with place leadership. Community engagement is important in network 
governance, but community actors may be less activated in networks that do not focus 
on place. Key decisions may be negotiated between powerful national or regional actors 
with limited reference to place-based community actors.
The greatest divergence between place leadership and network governance is probably 
in relation to management and leadership techniques and approaches. Network 
management is concerned with games, actors and arenas (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
and intervenes in network behaviour through process management and institutional 
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design. The repertoire of interventions considered by the place leadership school may 
in theory range from functionalist responses to the move from hierarchy to network, 
constructivist responses associated with dispersed boundary-spanning and critical 
discourses associated with the promotion of social justice (Mabey & Freeman, 2010). 
Case studies are required to understand how leadership is enacted in practice in 
different places.
Network governance research has developed beyond case studies to include 
comparisons of strategies and outcomes (Klijn, Steijn & Edelenbos, 2010). This has 
required common descriptors of network management strategies to enable survey-
based comparisons of actors’ experience and perceptions. Klijn et al. (2010) identify 
four types of management strategies: arranging, process, connecting and exploring to 
develop 16 survey questions relating strategies to outcomes. Similar developments 
could occur in the next generation of place leadership research.
§  7.2.3 Key challenges
Table 7.3 identifies some challenges faced by the two approaches, and it is these 
challenges that we intend to explore in our case studies of two neighbourhoods with a 
history of area-based interventions.
Earlier generations of interventions in these areas were informed by hierarchical 
planning and often failed to activate key local actors. Place leadership aims to avoid 
repeating these experiences by introducing more inclusive forms of policy-making and 
implementation in partnership with residents and communities. Network governance 
has also faced criticisms associated with selective activation of actors, within the field 
of neighbourhood regeneration there are numerous examples of weak engagement 
of residents at limited points of the process (van Bortel & Mullins, 2009). Other 
critiques of partnership take the opposite line that inclusive network negotiations and 
involvement in each stage in decision-making can be cumbersome and fail to add 
value, with dissatisfied actors failing to accept joint or shared outcomes. In between 
are critiques suggesting imbalance between discussion and action and recognising 
inequalities in influence of different actors. Our case studies address these issues by 
considering the history or interventions in each case study, the extent of explicit focus 
on place-shaping and the leadership styles and dilemmas encountered.
There is considerable discussion in the network governance literature on the 
relationship between networks and democracy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Again 
there are a variety of views, some seeing network management as reducing political 
issues to technocratic ones, others maintaining that all decisions are political and the 
TOC
 176 Networks and Fault Lines
shift of decisions away from democratically-mandated partners is the key critique 
(Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). The policy stance of place leadership in the UK is interesting 
in this regard, asserting the role of elected municipal authorities as key actors. Our 
case studies pay particular attention to questions of legitimacy and anchorage and the 
mandate place leaders and network managers have for their actions.
NETWORK GOVERNANCE PLACE LEADERSHIP
Key challenges Perils of partnership activation often too 
selective 
History of unsuccessful area-based inter-
ventions and top-down master-planning 
Democratic anchorage Problematic relationship between net-
works and democracy  
Links to political leadership of place
Process/outcomes Strong focus on process; emergent and 
joint outcomes; success judged through 
mutual satisfaction of actors
Successful places as outcomes and chal-
lenges output focus of silos
TABLE 7.3 Key challenges.
The third core dimension of the place leadership perspective is a focus on place-
based outcomes as the main test of effectiveness of interventions (Gibney & Murie, 
2008). For hierarchically-governed public services this is a major shift from outputs 
of individual players to joint impacts on places. More radically it suggests connections 
with community engagement in governance, and service delivery through co-
production. However, the process focus of network governance can make it hard to 
identify external outcomes. Place leadership’s insistence on ‘places as outcomes’ adds 
a distinctive dimension. Our case studies, therefore, pay particular attention to the role 
played by community engagement and area-based outcomes.
§  7.3 Why compare Birmingham and Groningen?
Place-shaping activity is necessarily responsive to context, and Collinge and Gibney 
(2010) have specified ‘regenerating places’ (such as those places going through a post-
industrial transition) as one category of place where the impact of place leadership can 
be explored. In their different ways Groningen and North West Birmingham provide 
good examples of such places that have needed to respond to structural changes that 
have affected their position in the economy and housing market. The research focuses 
on two specific neighbourhoods, both facing long-standing issues of deprivation: 
Lozells in Birmingham (England) and De Hoogte in Groningen (The Netherlands). 
Research data have been gathered by conducting in-depth interviews, observation of 
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meetings involving key actors engaged in regeneration interventions and desk research 
to track and corroborate these interventions over a period of several years. This data 
is part of a doctoral research project on shifts in governance and the changing roles of 
HAs in complex urban regeneration decision-making processes (Van Bortel, 2009). The 
research has a longitudinal focus tracking neighbourhood interventions spanning the 
eras referred to by Collinge and Gibney (2010).
The comparison between Birmingham and Groningen is valuable in highlighting the 
impact of differences in institutional structures, resources and incentives (HAs are 
more prominent and powerful in the Netherlands and central and local government has 
less hierarchical leverage on their activities than England). It captures different national 
approaches to partnership working, with a dominance of resource-led, hierarchically-
driven arrangements in England and a greater need for collaboration in the Dutch case, 
reflecting the wider dispersion of resources.
§  7.4 Place leadership and network governance 
in Birmingham and Groningen?
In this section we explore the experience of neighbourhood regeneration in the two 
case study areas based on seven themes developed from our review of place leadership 
and network governance concepts [see section § 7.2]:
1 History of area-based interventions;
2 Explicit focus on place-shaping;
3 Impact of national policy paradigms;
4 Leadership styles;
5 Leadership dilemmas and challenges;
6 Community engagement;
7 Impacts on democracy and anchorage.
§  7.4.1 History of area-based interventions
Both neighbourhoods have experienced long-term shifts in their structural position 
and economic function, resulting in changes in employment, housing demand, 
migration, crime and community safety. Consequently, both neighbourhoods have 
been subject to a succession of area-based interventions which have changed in 
content and approach over a 30-40-year period. We can contrast these initiatives in 
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the extent to which they were subject to vertical and horizontal influences, the mix of 
actors involved and the extent of community engagement.
In Groningen, a regeneration programme similar to the current initiative was 
undertaken in the 1980s to tackle deprivation in the area (especially worklessness 
and social exclusion of the immigrant population). This intervention was called the 
Problem Accumulation Area Policy. This involved the same leading partners (e.g. 
the local authority and HAs), but with a different allocation of tasks. Back then, 
the local authority was leading the project, and the HAs were mainly involved in 
the refurbishment and renewal of the housing stock and far less in improving the 
personal situation of residents. Local and central government provided the financial 
recourses. In 2007, a new initiative started to tackle deprivation in the same area. 
The local authority is still the leading actor, but is working in close partnership with 
HAs. The municipality and HAs provide financial resources on an equal basis for social 
investment.
Lozells in Birmingham has been subject to a similar series of area-based interventions, 
involving many of the same actors. In the 1970s as part of the shift from clearance 
to area-based housing improvement, the predecessors of the current lead HA actor, 
Midland Heart, were involved in the conversion of large houses formerly in private 
ownership into social rented flats accessible to new migrants and others seeking homes 
in the area. Now, 30 years later, Midland Heart is involved in a programme including 
de-conversion of some of the same properties into larger family homes for sale in an 
attempt to broaden the range of housing options that can be met within the area and to 
generate receipts to fund other regeneration activities in the neighbourhood.
§  7.4.2 Explicit place-shaping
In both neighbourhoods, recent regeneration initiatives contain clear ‘place-shaping’ 
elements. This is symbolised by the mottos given to the interventions in the area. In 
Birmingham, the title of the masterplan is ‘Making Lozells a place of choice’ and in 
Groningen the plan bears the title: ‘Ensuring that De Hoogte stays an attractive place to 
live’ (in Dutch: ‘Mooi blijven wonen in De Hoogte’). But the concept of place-shaping 
is found not only in slogans, but also in spatial concepts. Both intervention areas 
have explicit place-shaping dimensions in symbolic - but very diverse - locations. In 
Lozells place-shaping interventions are aimed at creating several high-profile gateways 
along busy routes through the area. These gateways will combine community and 
commercial facilities. In De Hoogte the place-shaping interventions have a more 
internal focus, namely the creations of a ‘vibrant heart for the neighbourhood ’. 
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This ‘vibrant heart’ will be a new ‘hub’ at the centre of the neighbourhood including 
community facilities such as a school and Child and Family Care Centre.
§  7.4.3 The impact of national policy paradigms
In both the Netherlands and England, local practice has been strongly affected by 
national policy paradigms, usually transmitted from policy reports, governmental 
programmes or voluntary and professional bodies. These influences have been filtered 
by key actors involved in the interventions in the two case study neighbourhoods.
In the Netherlands at least two important national policy paradigms can be identified. 
The first one is the targeted intervention of a limited number of neighbourhoods 
selected by the central government. The Problem Accumulation Area Programme in the 
1980s was followed by a series of similar programmes targeting a selection of deprived 
areas. The latest programme started in 2007 and contains 40 priority areas, including 
De Hoogte. The big difference from previous interventions is that HAs are now expected 
to pay for a large proportion of the intervention, but in turn are given a major say in 
policy development.
A key policy shift was triggered by the ‘Trust in the Neighbourhood’ report by the Dutch 
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2005). This report contended that 
in the past urban regeneration approaches have not been able to create sustainable 
improvements. While arguing that ‘place matters’ and that vibrant neighbourhoods 
can prevent school drop-outs and anti-social behaviour, the WRR also recognised 
that the meaning of place differs between citizens and advised that place leadership 
strategies should respond to these distinct groups with tailored strategies:
 – top-down ‘social reconquering’ strategies led by government and third sectors to 
address problems of deprivation and social cohesion; and
 – bottom-up ‘opportunity-driven’ approaches in more stable and cohesive 
neighbourhoods.
This approach inspired urban regeneration professionals in Groningen - in particular 
the need to include residents in regenerating their neighbourhoods, even where 
residents are already active, talented and motivated. Groningen is now one of four 
‘front-runner’ municipalities in the Netherlands actively implementing the ‘Trust in the 
Neighbourhood’ principles.
In England there were a number of neighbourhood-based initiatives in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (e.g. New Deal for Communities, guide neighbourhoods) and neighbourhood 
regeneration became a central role for some HAs such as Midland Heart (Mullins & 
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Murie, 2006). The Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders programme (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2009) had a direct impact on our case study, which 
is located in part of the Urban Living pathfinder area. In the early 2000s a campaign by 
the representative body for HAs, iN Business for Neighbourhoods was another influence. 
In the last year or so the transfer of functions from Housing Corporation and English 
partnerships to the new Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) has had important 
impacts in strengthening the place-shaping agenda, and expectations of closer working 
between local government and HAs in regeneration areas.
Midland Heart has adopted iN Business for Neighbourhoods, and promises to put 
neighbourhoods at the centre of their activities and strive to create places where people 
want to live. This is communicated in Midland Heart’s corporate motto passionate 
about communities’. Part of the motivation for Midland Heart to lead the partnership 
with Urban Living and Birmingham City Council to develop the regeneration plan for 
North Lozells, was the ambition to demonstrate that the merger that formed Midland 
Heart in 2006 enhanced the organisation’s resources, thereby meeting regulatory 
expectations that mergers should add value for tenants and communities.
The shift of responsibility for housing development from the Housing Corporation to 
the HCA led Midland Heart and Birmingham City Council to integrate regeneration 
plans for North Lozells and South Lozells, doubling the size of the plan area from 
2000 to 4000 properties. Thus the definition of place was amended in order to have a 
stronger position in future tenders for development funds with the HCA.
§  7.4.4 Leadership styles
Leadership in contemporary urban regeneration processes does not resemble the 
traditional 1970s and 1980s hierarchical leadership model, but instead adopts a more 
distributed approach, based on the development of common understandings and joint 
outcomes as envisaged by the network governance paradigm (Klijn & Teisman, 1997; 
Mabey & Freeman, 2010).
What we see in Groningen and Birmingham are collaborations between a range of 
agencies and municipal authorities, recognising the need for social and economic 
interventions that go beyond a bricks-and-mortar view of regeneration. The impacts of 
regeneration activities on specific places are increasingly taken into account.
In Groningen, urban regeneration leadership is devolved to Neighbourhood Teams that 
are the main driving force to deliver outcomes for communities. These teams consist 
of frontline staff from public and third-sector organisations and coordinate activities 
TOC
 181 Neighbourhood regeneration and place leadership: lessons from Groningen and Birmingham
to increase social cohesion and the quality of the public realm. The philosophy 
underpinning the Groningen Neighbourhood Teams is that housing professionals 
and local authority officers should shape local neighbourhood responses rather than 
following what ‘city hall’ or HA headquarters demand.
Top-level officials are expected to support the frontline. In order to get things done and 
deliver results for communities, top-level officials of both HAs and local authorities 
aim to empower the Neighbourhood Teams to cut through the red tape and to show 
stamina and strong leadership.
In Birmingham, the Lozells Neighbourhood Management Board has developed a 
Neighbourhood Management Plan that contains actions focused on issues such 
as health, young people, safety and the environment. Investments in the housing 
stock and plans to invest in the public realm and community facilities are specified 
in the North Lozells Masterplan. This plan was later developed through a series of 
engagements with stakeholders and community actors.
§  7.4.5 Leadership dilemmas and challenges
The position of the Neighbourhood Teams in Groningen is not uncontested. Some 
participants in Groningen find that the teams do not have a mandate to take decisions 
because they have no statutory position. They contend that the teams are arenas where 
actors meet, share information and coordinate actions, but not a place for shared 
decision-making. Decisions are made individually by the organisations participating 
in the Neighbourhood Teams: the respective municipal departments, HAs and other 
third-sector organisations. Opponents contend that the Neighbour- hood Teams in 
Groningen are part of the New Local Area Covenant that has been approved and thereby 
legitimised by the City Council. But there are no terms of reference guiding the working 
of the Neighbourhood Teams. 
In addition, critics point out that bold action assumes that everybody in the 
Neighbourhood Team has the same perspective on the actions to be taken, and that 
is often not the case. Actors involved in decision-making often do not have the same 
interests. They stress that it is often difficult and time-consuming to create consensus 
on interventions. Furthermore, this emphasis on delivering results favours a short- 
term over a long-term perspective. An informant from the Groningen municipality 
used the example of a playing area for kids: ‘it is rather simple to place a new toboggan, 
but who is going maintain this, what about creating a precedent? If you give one 
community a new toboggan, what if another neighbourhood asks the same thing?’ 
TOC
 182 Networks and Fault Lines
In Birmingham the Lozells Neighbourhood Management Board is the equivalent 
of the Neighbourhood Teams in Groningen. But there are some differences. The 
Neighbourhood Management Board in Lozells has a statutory position and is led by 
a neighbourhood manager employed by the Birmingham city council. The terms of 
reference setting out who can participate in the board and how decisions are made 
has been approved by the Perry Barr Constituency Committee. Perry Barr is one of 
the 10 electoral constituencies in Birmingham, and is part of the local structure of 
representative democracy. 
Another difference is that the Lozells Neighbourhood Management Board has almost 
no financial resources. The board is dependent on other organisations, municipal 
departments or HAs such as Midland Heart to supply resources. In contrast, the 
Neighbourhood Team in Groningen has considerable funds to allocate each year from 
the New Local Area Covenant.
§  7.4.6 Community engagement
In Groningen, two different kinds of interventions have been developed for De Hoogte. 
First a collective track has been developed that will focus on improving the public 
realm, community safety and facilities for young people. A second track addresses 
individual issues such as health, unemployment, education and financial exclusion. 
This individual approach to regeneration is relatively new in the Netherlands. It comes 
in response to criticism levelled at the traditional ‘bricks- and-mortar’ regeneration. 
Rather than solving problems, earlier regeneration had simply displaced them by 
moving households facing multiple forms of deprivation to other neighbourhoods.
For the collective track professionals take a facilitating role with a heavy emphasis 
on community engagement, but for the individual track a more assertive institution-
led ‘go for it’ approach is used and residents do not participate in decision-making 
on these issues. These different approaches reflect the neighbour- hood strategies 
described by the WRR, i.e. ‘social reconquering’ and ‘opportunity- driven’.
In Groningen, the Neighbourhood Action Plan is not very specific on actions that belong 
to the so-called collective track (e.g. safety environment, public realm and social 
cohesion). The plan only describes the intended outcomes and the budget available. 
Project proposals need to be developed and decided on by residents and selected 
during Neighbourhood Voting Days. These proposals have to contribute to the goals 
included in the Neighbourhood Action Plan. In De Hoogte the following goals have been 
selected: improve the quality of the public realm, create education and employment 
perspectives for young people and increase the feeling of security in the area.
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In 2008, the first Neighbourhood Voting Day was organised. A special instrument, 
called the Value Sieve, was developed to support large scale and sophisticated 
decision-making by residents. Using an electronic voting system, residents can assess 
project proposals based on their perceived contribution to the goals included in the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan. Community engagement processes in the two parts of 
Lozells developed in parallel, reflecting contrasting actor strategies. In North Lozells, 
urban regeneration options were first discussed in a series of workshops attended by 
officers from several Birmingham City Council departments and staff members from 
Midland Heart. Only after these actors had reached consensus about the outlines of the 
regeneration options was a public consultation organised for residents to have their say. 
Midland Heart intentionally did not involve resident’s groups in the first development 
stage because of the fragmented nature of communities and their representatives in 
the area and doubts about how representative these groups were for the larger resident 
population. Nevertheless, Midland Heart reports that resident involvement and public 
consultation are a key component in the regeneration of Lozells.
In South Lozells, a different approach was taken by the Birmingham City Council 
housing department and some resident groups were involved in the early develop- 
ment stages. Parallel to this a Lozells neighbourhood manager also conducted a 
consultation with residents to develop a Neighbourhood Management Plan.
All these community engagement initiatives appear to be duplicated by a new 
consultation process called the Community Dialogue Roadshow. This roadshow is 
organised by a Handsworth and Lozells CommUNITY Team, part of Birmingham City 
Council. The topics the CommUNITY team is exploring seem to overlap with the issues 
addressed in earlier consultations, namely environment, housing, transport, history 
and place, regeneration, health and community safety.
A process of ‘joining up’ has been required in the latest phase, not just to achieve cross-
boundary links between the different agencies involved, but also to join up the parallel 
initiatives north and south of Lozells Road. This process is being consolidated through 
a single Masterplan based on extensive opportunities for stakeholder and community 
engagement.
§  7.4.7 Impacts on democracy and anchorage
Both case studies indicate the importance of contests over authority, legitimacy and 
mandate in setting the boundaries within which place leadership can take place and 
the roles of neighbourhood managers and political leaders in negotiating the terms 
on which interventions can proceed. The network governance concept of democratic 
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anchorage (Sørensen and Torfing 2007) provides an explicit framework in which such 
questions of legitimacy can be discussed.
In Groningen, Neighbourhood Teams are central to the delivery of the targets in the 
Regeneration Covenant. The philosophy underpinning the Groningen Neighbourhood 
Teams is that frontline staff should be focused on tackling problems in the 
neighbourhood and not on local politicians or managers in the headquarters of the HA. 
Top-level officials should support frontline staff and give them sufficient mandate.
In Dutch urban regeneration circles frontline staff displaying this ‘can do’ attitude are 
sometimes admiringly referred to as ‘urban marines’ emphasising the risk-taking 
behaviour and bold action expected from them to solve problems and advance the 
neighbourhood agenda further. In Groningen, the Neighbourhood Teams are the 
embodiment of these ‘urban marines’.
Recent evaluation of the Neighbourhood Teams shows that strong leadership in 
neighbourhood is not as easy as it seems. Some members of Neighbourhood Teams 
emphasised that strong leadership and taking bold action in urban regeneration is 
problematic. They contend that municipal policies (e.g. policies on green areas, playing 
areas and architectural quality) are there for a reason, and the fact that their intentions 
are good does not mean that Neighbourhood Teams have the mandate to ignore 
policies and rules that have been approved by elected politicians of the city council.
Supporters of Neighbourhood Teams showing strong leadership contest that there is 
a strong democratic foundation because the brief of these teams is part of the urban 
regeneration covenant that has been approved by the city council. In addition, the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte has been approved by the council and the 
national housing minister.
In Birmingham, HA Midland Heart is leading the partnership with Urban Living and 
Birmingham City Council to develop the regeneration options for the North Lozells. 
Interviewees regard it as rather unusual that Midland Heart as a non-state actor 
is taking the leading role but this is generally regarded as a pragmatic and non- 
problematic solution.
In England, resident consultation is a big issue for the government and an important 
part of performance inspections by the Audit Commission. In addition, close 
collaboration between local authorities and HAs in place-making is an important 
subject for public bodies funding urban regeneration. This appears to be even higher 
on the agenda of the new HCA, than for previous agencies. This development could 
have the added value of putting democratic accountability back at the centre of place 
leadership and urban regeneration.
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§  7.5 Conclusions
Based on our findings from Birmingham and Groningen we draw three interim 
conclusions. The first and second concern the analytical value added by each of the 
two paradigms discussed, the third concerns the practical contribution that place 
leadership and network governance can have on neighbourhood outcomes.
What does the place leadership focus add to existing analysis 
within the network governance paradigm?
This article has considered the value added by the place leadership focus to existing 
knowledge on neighbourhood regeneration. Superficially, there would appear to be a 
quite limited added value for analyses that already recognise the importance of cross-
boundary working and the engagement of residents and communities in influencing 
decisions on the future of the places that are important to them. However, one critique 
of the network governance paradigm that may be overcome by the overlaying of place 
leadership concepts is the putative tendency of the former to reduce political problems 
and conflicts to management questions that can be addressed by tools such as those 
used in the Groningen case study. The connections and tensions between networks and 
democracy have been explored by Klijn and Skelcher (2007) and Sørensen and Torfing 
(2007) and are directly confronted by place leadership. Policy-driven applications 
of place-shaping in England have tended to re-assert the authority of municipal 
government in relation to third-sector agencies such as HAs (e.g. the HCA’s insistence 
on a ‘single conversation’ between local agencies involved in house-building, area 
regeneration and place-shaping and the earlier re-assertion by Lyons (2007) of the 
primary role played by local government in place-shaping).
However, in Birmingham urban regeneration plans are developed in partnerships 
that involve local authority departments, HAs and resident consultation, yet the 
position of local ward councillors in the decision-making process remains unclear. 
In Groningen, politicians have a more prominent and clearly defined role in urban 
regeneration decision-making. But there remain tensions between decisions made by 
Neighbourhood Teams and city council policies and priorities.
Emerging academic perspectives on place leadership (e.g. Mabey & Freeman, 2010) 
may strengthen attention to political factors such as authority, legitimacy and power. 
This could occur through problematisation of the notion of leadership, recognition of 
the role of distributed leadership and the links between leadership and power.
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What added value can network governance bring to place leadership?
Network governance can fill some of the conceptual gaps associated with the 
currently undertheorised stage of place leadership. In particular the consideration by 
network governance of cognitive processes and actor behaviour can begin to fill gaps 
concerning ‘what leaders do’ in their place-shaping and boundary-spanning roles. The 
introduction of new ideas and new actors (such as different types of local residents) 
may overcome ‘closedness’ in decision-making. The increasing recognition within 
Dutch neighbourhood regeneration practice of the different motivations and behaviour 
of different market segments within regeneration neighbourhoods is a good example.
The emphasis of network governance on process - for example, showing how actor 
behaviour evolves through a series of games played to a set of emergent rules - can 
add a dynamic perspective on the content of the activities of place leadership. In 
Birmingham new actors (such as the HCA) have entered the arena and changed the 
rules for subsequent games (the size of regeneration neighbourhoods and expected 
interactions between HAs and the local authority). In Groningen the paradigm of 
strong place leadership advocated by top-level local government and HA officials 
appears difficult to implement due to the large number of actors and fragmentation 
of resources. ‘Trust in the Neighbourhood’ requires a different approach to genuinely 
involve residents.
Another approach that place leadership might borrow from network governance is 
the development of research tools to enable comparisons between interventions and 
outcomes in different places. By developing typologies of place leadership tools similar 
to Klijn et al.’s (2010) typology of network management strategies, survey-based 
comparisons between places may be added to the intensive case studies of individual 
place leadership initiatives included in this special issue.
What evidence is there that place leadership and network governance 
achieve better outcomes for places such as Lozells and De Hoogte that have 
been on the sharp end of structural economic and social change?
Ultimately, the test of place leadership will be its ability to deliver better outcomes for 
the residents of neighbourhoods undergoing regeneration interventions. The history 
of areas such as Lozells and De Hoogte have been of a succession of interventions that 
have fitted the policy paradigms of the time but which have not fundamentally changed 
the position of the neighbourhood or the overall experience of the residents. The 
longitudinal perspective provided by our research has clarified the short-lived nature 
of some of the interventions, suggesting that outcomes are often transitory stages 
in a longer-term change process. The games metaphor used in network governance 
provides a helpful way of understanding the relationship between outcomes and 
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process. For example, the conversions of large houses into flats for social rent by HAs in 
Lozells in the 1970s were successful outcomes for policy then, but became part of the 
problem definition in later rounds of games in the 2000s when these flats were to be 
de-converted into housing for sale.
A key contribution of network governance is the recognition that successful 
neighbourhoods cannot be planned using traditional systems with a priori objectives. 
The need to engage with a wide range of actors and residents means that successful 
outcomes will usually be joint outcomes that are to some extent emergent rather than 
intended. In the early stages of the planning process an option to demolish some of 
‘the ‘groves’19 in North Lozells was considered. These areas were then perceived as 
badly-designed urban spaces causing problems with parking and litter. During the 
consultation process, the involvement of a new actor, English Heritage, reframed ‘the 
groves’ from a problem into a heritage asset. The demolition option was replaced by 
a strategy to improve the public realm and introduce intense management in close 
collaboration with residents.
Within network governance there is a tendency to define satisfactory outcomes as 
those which enjoy greatest joint support from actors involved in the process (Kickert 
et al., 1997). Consequently, there are dangers that more inclusive approaches that 
engage a wider range of actors including different market sectors of residents could 
appear to be less successful since the benchmark of satisfaction is raised to include a 
wider range of preferences and experience. Ultimately, in our view, more democratic 
and inclusive approaches to decision-making on neighbourhood regeneration are 
likely to result in better outcomes, but not necessarily in greater consensus. The focus 
of the place leadership paradigm on places as outcomes and local leadership and 
engagement needs to be matched by new evaluative approaches capable of providing a 
more nuanced picture of outcomes.
19  ‘Groves’ are clusters of housing located on dead-end streets resembling courtyards with only one entrance.
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PART 3 Conclusions and Reflections
HOUSING HERO 3:
[Neighbourhood regeneration] is a job that cannot 
begin too soon. But on the other hand it is also a job that 
is never over and done with, and never will be, in any 
given place.
Jane Jacobs (1916-2006), American-Canadian journalist, author, and urban activist.
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8 Will the Participation Society succeed? 
Lessons from neighbourhood 
regeneration programmes in 
England and the Netherlands 
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Abstract
Inspired by the Big Society agenda in the UK, the Dutch government has introduced 
an ambitious programme to devolve responsibility for welfare services to local 
authorities. This devolution is accompanied by substantial budget reductions, based 
on the assumption that local actors are able to deliver more efficient, tailor-made and 
effective services. Central to this new policy paradigm is the more active involvement 
of citizens in the co-production of solutions to complex societal problems through the 
development and sustaining of intermediary arrangements between individuals and 
public sector agencies such as housing associations.
This chapter aims to increase our current limited understanding of the conditions 
under which connections between public sector professionals and citizens are able to 
solve place-related and people-related problems. This chapter is based on Dutch and 
English neighbourhood regeneration case studies. A theoretical framework connecting 
governance network theory with Habermas’s concepts of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ guides 
this exploration. 
Keywords
Big Society, Governance Networks, Lifeworld and System, Housing Associations
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§  8.1 Introduction
§  8.1.1 Participation Society policy paradigm
It is undeniable that people in our current network and information society are more 
empowered and independent than before. Combined with the need to reduce the 
government’s deficit, the classic Welfare State is slowly transforming into a Participation 
Society. Anyone who can, should take responsibility for his or her own life and 
neighbourhood. (Dutch Government, King’s Speech 2013)
In 2013, the notion of a ‘Participation Society’ (‘Participatiesamenleving’), a new 
term in the Dutch vocabulary, was instantly elected as the word of the year (Onze Taal, 
2013). Remarkably, it was also nominated as the most disagreeable term in 2013 
and 2014 (Dutch Institute of Lexicology, 2014). It was not only a new term but also 
a key element of the government’s welfare-state reform policy. Notwithstanding the 
ambivalence surrounding the Participation Society agenda, the national government 
expeditiously began implementing important elements of it, such as the ‘three welfare 
decentralisations’, in January 2015. This entailed the devolution of social care, youth 
and work-related support services to local authorities, and included a considerable 
reduction of available budgets (Association of Dutch Municipalities, 2013). In addition, 
support services to address unemployment were elaborated in the Participation Act 
(Law Gazette, 2014).
Local authorities are now developing new institutional arrangements to accommodate 
their new responsibilities and cope with reduced budgets. One of the frequently used 
solutions is the creation of multi-disciplinary and multi-agency ‘Social Neighbourhood 
Teams’ (‘Sociale Wijkteams’) to improve coordination between professionals in order 
to deliver integrated and tailor-made services that make better use of the strengths 
and capabilities of citizens (Hilhorst & Van der Lans, 2015; Movisie, 2013). In 2015, 
it was expected that 89% of all Dutch local authorities would have one or more Social 
Neighbourhood Teams. In 2014, this number was 69% (Van Arum & Schoorl, 2015). 
The expectations surrounding such a Participation Society are high. Will it succeed 
or will it turn out to be a ‘fig leaf’ for government cutbacks and austerity? Without 
adequate support, vulnerable people and places may fall into the abyss created by 
government cutbacks. Institutions and programmes that can deliver this support are 
being affected by the austerity measures that are part of the current Participation 
Society agenda (Hilhorst and Van der Lans, 2015; Tonkens, 2014a). 
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The Dutch Participation Society agenda is strongly inspired by the English Big Society 
agenda that was presented by David Cameron in the run up to the 2010 election 
(Cameron, 2009; Van der Horst, 2013; Rutte, 2013). The welfare state reforms driven 
by the Big Society and Participation Society agendas both aim at more active citizenship 
by devolving responsibilities to the local level (e.g. individuals, local authorities and civil 
society). There are, however, considerable differences in the way the Dutch and English 
governments have framed and implemented their reforms. Based on an analysis of 
policy documents and political speeches, Verhoeven and Tonkens (2014) found that 
English politicians use ‘empowerment talk’, calculated to trigger positive feelings about 
being active citizens, while Dutch politicians employ ‘responsibility talk’, conveying 
negative feelings about the failure to participate more actively in society. Based on 
the policy discourse used in England, the government is to blame because it became 
too big – participation is conceived of as a civic ‘right’. In the Netherlands, the citizens 
are the culprits because they have become too complacent and too dependent on the 
government – participation is thus understood as a civic ‘duty’.
§  8.1.2 Learning from co-production in neighbourhood regeneration 
Government cutbacks to services supporting vulnerable places and people are not new. 
In 2011, the Dutch national government terminated its involvement in the Empowered 
Neighbourhoods Programme, which was introduced in 2007 to support 40 vulnerable 
neighbourhoods across the country (WWI, 2007). This was one of the first domains 
in which the Participation Society – avant la lettre – came to the fore. The government 
announced the premature termination of the programme in a letter to Parliament, in 
which the arguments used to justify the termination were remarkably similar to the 
text of the 2013 King’s Speech:
The Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme demonstrates that many residents are 
highly capable of independently achieving improvement in their local community. That 
is what they prefer. Therefore, residents have a key role. (Donner, 2011)
As part of the 2007 Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme, several Dutch cities 
created Neighbourhood Teams. While these teams had a stronger focus on place-
related and collective problems (e.g. safety, social cohesion and quality of life), the 
more recently established Social Neighbourhood Teams have a stronger focus on 
people-related issues (e.g. social inclusion, health, social care, work and parenting). 
The focus may differ, but the challenges facing these new Neighbourhood Teams 
remain largely the same: strengthening multi-disciplinary work and creating stronger 
connections between the activities of professionals and people and communities based 
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on the latter’s needs and capabilities. The experiences of actors directly involved in 
these teams could support the implementation of the Participation Society agenda. 
In England, while Big Society supporters might claim to be focused on empowering 
residents, the programme is mainly known for being accompanied by severe austerity 
measures, government reductions in welfare provisions and the termination of 
government programmes. The concept is strongly criticised for exactly this reason. 
Philip Blond, one of the co-creators of the concept, has since argued that ‘Austerity 
strangled Big Society at birth’20 (also see Blond, 2010). Many see the notion of Big 
Society as entailing a philosophy of self-help, with few, if any, additional resources 
(Bailey and Phil, 2011). Jacobs and Manzi (2014, p. 40) have suggested that the 
‘localism’ framework of community planning that emerged from the Big Society 
paradigm is very likely to disempower local communities and will lead to decision-
making being controlled and managed by small numbers of unrepresentative elites 
masquerading as local and community-focused groups. As we will discuss later 
in this chapter, the austerity measures introduced in the 2010 Comprehensive 
Spending Review terminated funding for many initiatives that supported forms of co-
production in neighbourhood regeneration. There was also a scaling back of funding for 
infrastructure bodies that are vital in supporting the development of skills and capacity 
among community-led bodies (Caron and MacMillan, 2014).
§  8.1.3 Goal, scope and structure
We still have a limited understanding of the differences between the world of 
professionals and the world of citizens and local communities (Van den Brink, Van 
Hulst, De Graaf, & Van der Pennen, 2012; Van Hulst, De Graaf, & Van den Brink, 2011, 
2012; Van der Pennen & Van Bortel, 2015). Moreover, limited use has been made of 
the experiences of neighbourhood teams and the lessons learned that might promote 
the successful implementation of Participation Society policies.
This chapter aims to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the factors 
influencing collaborative connections between public sector agencies and citizens that 
aim to resolve place-related and people-related problems. This chapter will pay special 
attention to the role of third sector housing associations and the perceptions of the 
actors directly involved. Many of the people who should benefit from the Participation 
Society agenda come from low-income households, live in deprived neighbourhoods 
and are tenants of housing associations. Social housing landlords have played a 
20  Interview with Philip Blond on Altijd Wat on 24 November 2014.
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prominent role in neighbourhood regeneration in both the Netherlands and England 
(Mullins & Murie, 2006; Mullins, 2010; Van Gent, 2009; Van Gent, Musterd, & 
Ostendorf, 2009). Therefore, case study data from neighbourhood regeneration 
programmes from both countries will be used. 
The theoretical and methodological framework of this chapter will be briefly introduced 
in § 8.2 below. This framework is then applied in § 8.3 and § 8.4 to case study data 
from two neighbourhood regeneration programmes, one in the Netherlands and the 
other in England. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the key factors 
influencing the success or failure of collaborative connections between agencies and 
citizens. 
§  8.2 Theoretical perspective and methodology 
§  8.2.1 Participation Society and the international debate on co-production 
Welfare reform and the Big Society and Participation Society agendas are related to the 
debate on the role of citizens in the provision of public services and the development 
of joint solutions to social problems: also referred to as ‘co-production’ or ‘co-
creation’ (Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2014; Boyle & Harris, 2009; NEF, 2007). 
International research on co-production processes and outcomes is still limited and 
inconclusive. Some research results suggest that the involvement of citizens can 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery and also increase the 
affective connection between citizens and government (Clark, Brudney, & Jang 2013; 
Dunston et al., 2009; Osborne, 2010a, 2010b; Thomas, 2012). Some findings suggest 
that third sector organisations are better able to develop higher and more sustainable 
levels of citizen participation in the provision of public services compared to public and 
for-profit providers, insofar as they have a strong focus on local communities (Pestoff, 
2006, 2008, 2009). In contrast, based on an extensive literature review, Voorberg, 
Bekkers and Tummers (2014) concluded that little is known about the benefits and the 
effects of co-production with citizens. Not only is little known about the outcomes, in 
addition, most of the research undertaken has been focused on the role of government 
and organisations in co-production processes and has barely looked at the role 
of citizens.
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§  8.2.2 Participation Society and the limitations of the 
governance network perspective 
The Participation Society21 paradigm and the concept of co-production imply more 
intensive collaboration between professionals and citizens. These different groups of 
actors bring diverse and sometimes conflicting sets of values and rules into decision-
making arenas. This requires a theoretical framework that helps us understand 
interactions between very diverse actors. Governance network theory is a promising 
approach to explore, explain and support these complex multi-actor decision-making 
processes (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Rhodes, 1997). 
An important element of governance network theory concerns the notion that in 
the context of uncertainty interdependent actors solve problems by participating in 
decision-making ‘games’. The often compounded and interrelated nature of problems 
in deprived neighbourhoods compels actors to combine their resources with the 
capabilities of local communities (Hilhorst & Van der Lans, 2015). In order to solve 
problems, actors need to be brought together. In governance network theory this is 
often referred to as establishing ‘couplings’ between actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Weick 1969, 1979; Crozier & Friedberg, 1980). These couplings can be arranged in 
various ways: ranging from light and informal arrangements to settings that are more 
formal and anchored in written agreements and contracts. Insofar as interactions are 
guided by the ‘rules of the game’, if decision-making games are to be successful, actors 
need to agree on these rules (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 193).
Governance network approaches are mainly focused on inter-organisational 
interactions. Perspectives concerned with understanding interactions between 
professionals and citizens are less developed within this academic domain. Koppenjan 
and Klijn (2004, p. 198) state that as an element of sound network management, 
actors should be ‘matched’ according to hierarchical level, skills, competences and 
professional language. In governance network theory, citizens are often regarded as 
‘outsiders’ to the problem-solving and decision-making arenas. Their involvement 
is seen as an aspect of the democratic anchorage and legitimacy of the governance 
network itself (Bogason & Zølner, 2011). The Participation Society paradigm sees 
citizens as co-producers of solutions. Consequently, they can neither be regarded as 
outsiders nor as just ‘regular’ institutional actors. The coupling of professionals and 
residents in decision-making arenas is therefore difficult to reconcile with the network 
management requirements of matching languages, values, hierarchies and skills. 
21 For the remainder of this chapter we will use ‘Participation Society’ when referring to the policy agendas of both 
the Dutch and English governments. We acknowledge that the concepts are closely related but not identical.
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§  8.2.3 Connecting governance network theory with 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action
Several scholars, commentators and others have pointed to the differences and 
interrelationships between the world of organisations and the world of residents with 
respect to neighbourhood regeneration (Van der Lans, 2012; Van den Brink et al., 2012; 
VROM-Raad, 2007; Van der Pennen & Van Bortel, 2015; Tonkens 2014a; Tonkens & 
De Wilde, 2014; Stienen, 2015). In developing his theory of ‘communicative action’ 
(1987), Habermas theorises about the differences between ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’, 
distinguishing two forms of rationality at work in modern society: first, an ‘end-means 
rationality’ dominant in what Habermas calls the ‘system’, and second, ‘communicative 
rationality’, which is the cohesive mechanism in the ‘lifeworld’. The system includes all 
that people have developed in the form of organisations, rules, laws, procedures and 
hierarchies in societal domains such as economics, politics, education, housing, science, 
government, healthcare, welfare and justice. In contrast, the lifeworld is the domain 
of personal relationships between family members, friends, neighbours and members 
of local, faith or other groups. It is a world of informal communication, storytelling, 
personal values, experiences and emotions, but also a domain of social inequality and 
conflict (Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 56). 
Bureaucracies are the most undiluted form of the ‘system’ (Weber, 1922/1992, 
quoted by Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 55). Bureaucracies have largely contributed to 
the growth of productivity and the creation of our modern welfare state. Due to their 
success and efficiency they have spread to many government institutions, and also 
to large profit and non-profit companies. However, that success has come at a price: 
bureaucracies function best when the human element is eliminated and decisions 
are based on strictly formal, rational and hierarchical rules. Such system agencies are 
increasingly met with scepticism and distrust (Kunneman, 1998; Sieckelinck et al., 
2013; WRR, 2005). Habermas contends that system agencies have become estranged 
from their roots and have begun to ‘colonise’ the lifeworld. According to Habermas, the 
untapped potential of the lifeworld should be mobilised to reverse this development 
(also see WRR 2012; Van der Lans, 2012). This invites the question of whether the 
Participation Society agenda is part of a ‘decolonisation’ or a ‘colonisation’ process.
The reservations surrounding the ability of system agencies to develop and sustain 
connections with people and communities are not new. In 1992, the Dutch Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (Dutch acronym: WRR) questioned the ability of public 
sector organisations to develop ‘civic’ values and behave like good fellow citizens 
(WRR, 1992, p. 89). A more recent report by the same council concluded that only 
enlightened, talented and independently minded frontline workers (professionals) are 
able to make and sustain connections between the system and the lifeworld (WRR, 
2012, p. 14). 
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Van den Brink et al. (2012, p. 59), using Habermas and Weber, summarised the 
incongruities between the logic of the system and that of the lifeworld [see Table 8.1 
below]. These incongruities are primarily ideal types in the Weberian sense, and will 
rarely be seen in undiluted form in empirical reality. Both worlds have their own logic 
and rules, but do not exclude each other completely. Most citizens are well versed in 
navigating both the system and the lifeworld. They switch back and forth almost daily 
and are perfectly capable of distinguishing the rules that apply in work and in private. 
In vulnerable neighbourhoods, however, the tension between both worlds can take 
extreme forms (Van den Brink et al., 2012). Residents in these areas often have very 
intense contact with system agencies. This may be because they are on a waiting list 
for social housing, receive unemployment benefits, have chronic health issues, have 
children that have dropped out of school, broken the law or are victims of those that 
have. Many withdraw behind their front door, in order to have as little as possible to do 
with system agencies (social care avoiders), others are overwhelmed by professionals 
from various system agencies that deliver social support to one family or individual 
but insufficiently coordinate their activities. In both instances, problems often remain 
unresolved.
SYSTEM (WEBER’S BUREAUCRACIES) LIFEWORLD (HABERMAS)
1. Salaried staff Voluntary service
2. Division of labour and specialisation Communicative action
3. Formal rules and procedures Informal rules and personal outcomes
4. Functional hierarchies Social inequalities
5. Functional relations Personal relations
6. Rational power resources Values and emotions
TABLE 8.1 Theoretical incongruities between the logic of the system and the lifeworld  
Source: Van den Brink et al. (2012, p. 58), translation by authors
There are different views about the relationship between the system and the lifeworld: 
is the system separated from the lifeworld or is it not so much detached from the 
lifeworld but ‘colonising’ that lifeworld’s logic and values? While the first premise 
suggests that professionals are no longer able to communicate with vulnerable people 
because they come from different ‘worlds’, the second premise assumes that residents 
are able to talk and think like professionals. Both are unsatisfactory, and they require 
different solutions (Mensink, 2015). The conclusions of Van der Pennen and Van Bortel 
(2015) support this, suggesting that in order to overcome these incongruities a careful 
match should be made between professionals and the environment in which they 
work. Some exemplary urban practitioners are successful in their work in the rough-
and-tumble of the world outside bureaucratic institutions. Others are more successful 
working inside these institutions (Van der Pennen & Van Bortel, 2015, p. 19). 
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§  8.2.4 Research methodology
This chapter is one of the outputs of a qualitative cross-national longitudinal exploration 
of the role played by housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration governance 
in the Netherlands and England (Van Bortel, 2015). The fieldwork for this study was 
conducted between 2007 and 2014. The important components of this research project 
are two longitudinal case studies on the role played by housing associations in two 
deprived neighbourhoods. In total, the study included around 70 in-depth interviews 
with actors involved in the local neighbourhood regeneration networks in Groningen 
and Birmingham, such as officers from the housing association and local authority and 
community representatives. This chapter is informed by approximately 20 of these 
interviews. Many actors were interviewed multiple times over the years to capture 
contextual changes and developments. For the purpose of this chapter, the empirical data 
from this study (interview transcripts and policy documents) was analysed in the light of 
incongruities between system and lifeworld as discussed by Van den Brink et al. (2012).
§  8.3 The case studies: agencies, areas and arenas
This section introduces the system agencies, the case study areas and the decision-
making arenas that played an important role in the analysis.
§  8.3.1 Agencies
In recent decades, non-profit housing organisations in the Netherlands and the UK 
have taken a prominent role in neighbourhood regeneration initiatives (Mullins & 
Van Bortel, 2010; Van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007; Van Bortel et al., 2009; Van Bortel & 
Mullins, 2009; Van Bortel, 2009). The focal actors in the current case studies are two 
such housing associations: the Groningen-based housing association De Huismeesters 
(6,500 properties) and housing association Midland Heart, 
 which owns and manages 32,000 properties across the West Midlands. These 
organisations were selected because they have both expressed the ambition to give 
residents an important role in the regeneration of their neighbourhoods. They are 
not necessarily representative for the entire social housing sector in their respective 
countries. The Groningen and Birmingham local authorities also played a prominent 
role in the decision-making arenas.
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§  8.3.2 Areas
This chapter focuses on regeneration activities in two neighbourhoods: Lozells in 
Birmingham (England) and De Hoogte in Groningen (the Netherlands). Both areas 
face compounded issues concerning social, economic and physical deprivation, with 
the housing associations playing an important role in initiatives to improve the quality 
of life in these areas, and both areas were also part of nationwide neighbourhood 
regeneration programmes. Lozells was part of the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) 
programme and was included in ‘Urban Living’, the HMR Pathfinder for Birmingham 
and nearby Sandwell (Audit Commission, 2011; Webb, 2010; Wilson, 2013; Leather 
et al., 2012) that started in 2003 and was prematurely terminated in 2011. De 
Hoogte was selected as one of the 40 priority areas in the Netherlands that were part 
of the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme initiated in 2007 and prematurely 
terminated in 2011 (WWI, 2007). Both areas have a long history of regeneration 
initiatives going back to the 1970s, combining social and economic initiatives to 
increase community cohesion and support vulnerable individuals. Investments have 
been made to improve the quality of the public space, neighbourhood facilities and the 
quality and variety of the housing stock. 
§  8.3.3 Arenas
In partnership with the Birmingham City Council and the Urban Living HMR Pathfinder, 
housing association Midland Heart developed a master plan in 2009. The plan stated 
that the agencies ‘wanted to harness the talent of the area’s community to create 
mixed and well-functioning neighbourhoods’ (Birmingham City Council, Midland Heart 
and Urban Living Partnership, 2009, p. 25). In a similar vein, the 2007 Neighbourhood 
Action Plan for De Hoogte, developed by local housing associations and the Groningen 
local authority, stated that ‘We want to transfer the control over the future of the 
area to residents and neighbourhood professionals’ (Groningen Local Authority and 
Housing Associations, 2007, pp. 3-4). There were clear parallels between the ways 
the agencies in both countries wanted to involve local communities in neighbourhood 
regeneration. As part of these regeneration programmes, decision-making arenas were 
created to couple system agencies (e.g. professionals working for housing associations 
and local authorities) and local communities (e.g. residents and community 
volunteers). These arenas are visualised in Figure 8.1. Table 8.2 contains examples of 
the various types of arenas. This chapter focuses on ‘Type 3’ arenas, which are briefly 
introduced in Table 8.3.
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FIGURE 8.1 Arenas in informal (lifeworld) and formal (system) networks  
Note: Each circle in the figure above represents an actor. The direction of arrows indicates the level of shared 
understanding and mutual goals between the actors involved. The figure presents generic examples of arenas 
which are not directly connected to the case studies.
ARENAS PREDOMINANT LOGIC EXAMPLES
1. Lifeworld Informal resident meeting
2. Lifeworld Informal meeting of residents with a 
community support officer from a hous-
ing association
3. Mixed system and lifeworld logics 
(co-production arena)
Neighbourhood team with community 
members and neighbourhood profes-
sionals
4. System Neighbourhood Regeneration Steering 
group with representatives from housing 
associations and local authority
5. System Board of housing association or neigh-
bourhood regeneration agency (e.g. 
Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder) with 
members from local communities 
TABLE 8.2 Examples of lifeworld, co-production and system arenas
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ARENAS AREA AGENCIES
1.  Neighbourhood Team and Neighbour-
hood Voting Days
De Hoogte, Groningen HA De Huismeesters
Groningen City Council
Third sector social care providers
2.  Neighbourhood Management Board 
and Neighbourhood Manager
Lozells, Birmingham Birmingham City Council
Local ward councillors
3.  Resident Involvement Platforms 
Housing Associations 
De Hoogte, Groningen
Lozells, Birmingham
HA De Huismeesters
HA Midland Heart
TABLE 8.3 Co-production arenas in De Hoogte and Lozells explored in this study
1 Neighbourhood Team and Neighbourhood Voting Days (De Hoogte Groningen)
Neighbourhood Teams were introduced in Groningen in 2007. The creation of these 
teams was part of a concerted programme run by the Groningen local authority 
and housing associations to improve the quality of life in deprived neighbourhoods 
(Groningen Local Authority & Housing Associations, 2007). 
The Neighbourhood Team for De Hoogte consisted of professionals from the Groningen 
local authority, housing associations, third sector social care providers, and several 
residents. Each neighbourhood received a budget pooled from resources provided 
by the Groningen City Council and housing associations. The Neighbourhood Team 
for De Hoogte received special status and additional national government resources 
after the area was selected as one of the 40 priority areas in the National Empowered 
Neighbourhoods Programme later in 2007 (Ministry of Housing, Neighbourhoods and 
Integration, 2007). 
Residents could decide on the allocation of the neighbourhood budget to specific 
project proposals during ‘Neighbourhood Voting Days’ (‘Wijkstemdagen’). These 
events were organised in De Hoogte once or twice a year in the period 2008–2010. 
 Project proposals were to be resident-led. Up to €500,000 in funding was available for 
each voting day (Groningen Local Authority and Housing Associations, 2008). Projects 
receiving the largest number of votes from residents were allocated the requested 
funding until the budget was depleted: a ‘Value Sieve’ methodology was used to assess 
proposals based on their perceived added value to the neighbourhood (Corbett, 2000; 
Deuten & De Kam, 2006). Some examples of the proposals selected included the 
‘Colourful Dinner’, aimed at bringing members of different community groups together 
to enjoy a multicultural meal, and the placement in the area of a mobile container with 
playground equipment. 
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2 Lozells Neighbourhood Management Board and 
Neighbourhood Manager (Lozells, Birmingham)
In early 2007, the Birmingham City Council started a neighbourhood management 
pilot in five areas, including Lozells. A Neighbourhood Manager was appointed and 
a Neighbourhood Management Board established. This board was chaired by a local 
councillor and was a platform to discuss and align the activities of public sector 
agencies with the needs of the local community. The role of the Neighbourhood 
Manager was to act as a bridge between agencies and to work closely with residents. 
The programme was funded through ‘Working Neighbourhoods Fund’ grants, which 
ended in March 2011 as a result of the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review 
(Birmingham City Council, 2011). 
3 Resident involvement by housing associations
The resident participation structure of the housing association De Huismeesters 
included a central Tenant Board (‘Huurdersraad De Huismeesters’) 
 that served as a platform to discuss issues that affected all residents, for example, the 
annual rent increase. The Tenant Board was the umbrella body for resident committees 
that operated on a neighbourhood or estate level. The Residents’ Interests Association 
for De Hoogte (‘Bewoners Belangen Vereniging De Hoogte/Selwerderwijken’) was the 
formally accredited resident platform in De Hoogte. In addition to this more general 
participation structure, De Huismeesters also created a temporary ‘Residents Planning 
Group’ as an advisory body for the refurbishment of approximately 400 properties in 
the period 2008–2011, and organised several public consultation meetings to discuss 
regeneration plans with residents (De Huismeesters, 2008–2013).
The participation structure of housing association Midland Heart consists of five 
geographically organised ‘Customer Panels’, including a panel for Birmingham. The 
panels provide feedback to an umbrella ‘Customer and Communities Committee’. 
Residents can also participate in ‘Customer Groups’ for a specific neighbourhood, 
street or estate. 
 During the fieldwork period, Midland Heart did not have an active Customer Group in 
Lozells, but did organise street-level meetings around specific issues such as litter and 
safety. Midland Heart also organised consultation events to discuss regeneration plans 
for the area. 
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§  8.4 Actor perspectives on system/lifeworld incongruities 
This section connects neighbourhood regeneration case study data from Birmingham 
and Groningen to the six system/lifeworld incongruities as formulated by Van den 
Brink et al. (2012) in Table 8.1. Each incongruity in this section starts with a brief 
introduction (in italics) and continues by deductively applying examples from the case 
studies. 
§  8.4.1 Incongruity 1: Salaried staff versus voluntary service 
System agencies work with salaried and qualified staff members. Residents are most 
frequently found in the lifeworld. Most of the time, no money is involved, and there are 
no hierarchical relationships between active residents and the local community (Van 
den Brink et al., 2012, p. 57).
The research found indications that professional behaviour is increasingly expected 
from community volunteers. Not long after the start of the Neighbourhood Teams in 
2007, issues arose around the participation of residents in these teams. In a letter to 
the Groningen City Council (Gemeenteraad), the Groningen Cabinet consisting of the 
Mayor and aldermen (B&W) stated:
Residents must be able to adequately represent their neighbourhood as well as be 
able to make trade-offs for the entire neighbourhood on the allocation of resources. 
Residents need to work within a group of professionals who work on the basis of their 
own background and knowledge. This actually requires ‘professional’ community 
representatives. (Groningen Local Authority, 2008)
This letter gives the impression that professionals are permitted to work on the basis of 
their own ‘background and knowledge’, with no adaptation in their routine apparently 
required. In contrast, residents are expected to ‘work in a group of professionals’, 
‘represent their neighbourhood’ and ‘make trade-offs for the entire neighbourhood on 
the allocation of resources’. Moreover, a hierarchical relationship is assumed between 
residents in the Neighbourhood Team and the rest of the community.
A second observation concerns the dominant role of professionals in community 
initiatives that were intended to encourage the active participation of residents. The 
Neighbourhood Voting Days, introduced above, were regarded by many as a successful 
instrument in stimulating community involvement (Groningen Audit Commission, 
2011). The Voting Days were indeed successful in Korrewegwijk, a neighbourhood 
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adjacent to De Hoogte. However, in De Hoogte there was meagre participation from 
residents. A community worker commented: ‘Residents submitted very few proposals. 
Almost of the all ideas were conceived by professionals. I don’t mind this, as long 
as residents are involved in some way or form, but that was not the case’. Several 
professionals interviewed indicated that they had attempted to mobilise residents 
to develop proposals, but the results were disappointing. A housing association 
officer remarked in 2010 that residents used the Neighbourhood Voting Days as an 
opportunity to submit ideas that would then be implemented by agencies: ‘Residents 
need to think about the implementation of their plans. We are happy to provide 
support, but it is not a “you ask and we run” exercise. We do expect some level of 
reciprocity, but many residents quit when we asked for something in return’. 
The positive evaluation of the Neighbourhood Voting Days also overlooked the 
considerable resources invested in this instrument. A community worker stated that a 
considerable share of the funding allocated was not used to pay for the direct costs of 
regeneration activities, but to pay the professionals who were involved in the projects. 
In Lozells, a considerable share of the funding was also used to pay the professionals. 
As a ward councillor stated in 2011: ‘the [Birmingham] city council have taken a large 
proportion of regeneration money for their officers. Those officers do things to the 
community rather than with the community’.
§  8.4.2 Incongruity 2: Division of labour and specialisation 
versus communicative action
Residents experience the lifeworld as an organic whole in which various associated 
activities come together. The lifeworld does not have a division of labour. In the lifeworld 
it is important that actors develop a common story (Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 57).
This research found two patterns that can be linked to the specialisation versus 
communicative action incongruity. The first pattern involved the limited participation 
of residents in large capital investment decisions, such as demolition, refurbishment 
and new housing construction. Large capital investment decisions were usually 
made in arenas that were not open to residents. Resident participation was far more 
developed in projects that required limited resources; for example, activities to improve 
the public realm, street layout, playground facilities and dealing with environmental 
issues such as littering [Low investments in Figure 8.2]. 
Large investment plans were first developed, and agreed on, by system agencies. While 
residents were consulted on draft plans, very few were involved in their inception 
[High investments in Figure 8.2]. In an interview in 2008, a manager working for De 
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Huismeesters commented on this agency-led approach: ‘It’s important that we involve 
residents, but we have an investment horizon of 30, 40 or even 50 years. Therefore, it 
is crucial that a lot of our ideas are included in plans to regenerate the neighbourhood’. 
That large regeneration investments are mainly institution-led is not necessarily bad. 
The Lozells Neighbourhood Manager stated in 2009 that ‘the options in the master 
plan were received very positively by the residents consulted. Residents in Lozells will 
support every investment in the neighbourhood’.
FIGURE 8.2 Dominant consultation approach concerning low versus high capital investment projects
The second pattern entails the creation of many disconnected, specialised agency-
led projects because of abundant regeneration funding. A community support officer 
taking up a position at De Hoogte in 2010 was ‘flabbergasted’ by the number of 
projects going on in the area and the number of professionals involved. Two years 
after the start of the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme, many professionals 
involved in these projects still did not know each other: ‘I was shocked, we had all kinds 
of professionals engaged in resident activation programmes, all of which were aimed 
at similar target groups. There was no coordination and a shocking lack of resident 
involvement’. These professionals were often new to the area and its residents. This led 
to a growing resentment among residents and incumbent professionals who preferred 
a limited number of actors that were ‘familiar faces’ to the local community (also see 
Incongruity 6). 
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Both patterns reinforced the specialised and fragmented nature of neighbourhood 
regeneration activities and did not support the creation of a ‘common story’ that was 
shared by professionals and local communities.
§  8.4.3 Incongruity 3: Formal rules and procedures versus 
informal rules and personal outcomes
In the lifeworld, fixed rules and procedures play a marginal role. It is not the correct 
application of rules when undertaking an initiative which is the most important thing 
but whether that initiative produces outcomes relevant to those directly involved. In the 
lifeworld of residents, rules are implicit and unwritten, such as rituals, cultural norms 
and social codes (Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 57).
Delivering outcomes that are relevant to local communities sometimes requires liaison 
in order to mediate between and translate the rules and policies of agencies and rules 
and needs of local communities. In this regard, the Neighbourhood Team in De Hoogte 
was given a brief to act as an intermediary institution to prioritise neighbourhood 
needs above city-level policies. In practice, this task proved more complicated than 
anticipated. A Groningen local authority officer closely involved in the activities of the 
Neighbourhood Team made a distinction between two kinds of rules. First, there were 
rules that related to political decisions on the allocation of scarce resources. Second, 
there were rules that related to public safety principles or the proven effectiveness and 
efficiency of policy interventions. While it is possible to deviate from the first when 
wanting to invest additional resources in deprived areas, it is easy to diverge from 
the latter when interventions are evidently not safe or not effective. A community 
involvement officer working for De Huismeesters voiced his exasperation in several 
interviews with respect to the ‘lack of courage and decisiveness’ of the Neighbourhood 
Team in taking firm action to champion neighbourhood needs. 
Residents in De Hoogte tended to offload the work involved in implementing proposals 
to the professionals (also see Incongruity 1). This is illustrated by a telling example 
involving a proposal to place a work of art on a roundabout in the area. Residents 
supported this proposal during one of the Neighbourhood Voting Days. It was clear 
from the start that the plan needed city-level traffic and spatial planning approval. 
Some local authority officers who were part of the Neighbourhood Team took over 
the residents’ responsibility to obtain the necessary permits. An officer working for 
De Huismeesters regarded this as an example of pampering residents. In his view, 
professionals should deliver support but not take over the responsibilities of residents. 
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In comparison to statements about the Neighbourhood Team in De Hoogte, the 
Lozells actors interviewed report more positive experiences with the Neighbourhood 
Manager. In Lozells, the neighbourhood manager was applauded for her intermediary 
role. A ward councillor stated in 2011: ‘Neighbourhood management was probably 
one of the best things that has happened to this area for a long time. Neighbourhood 
management did simple things: bringing people together, stopping duplication of 
work and enhancing partnership working’. Referring to the neighbourhood manager, a 
community volunteer commented in 2011: ‘she saw the need to build bridges between 
organisations and resident groups … In terms of having an influence, it was the best 
structure, but now they’ve abandoned that’.
§  8.4.4 Incongruity 4: Functional hierarchies versus social inequalities 
The lifeworld of residents has no formal hierarchical relationships, but it is certainly 
not an egalitarian community. There are social inequalities and the influence of some is 
greater than others (Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 57).
Residents in the Neighbourhood Team in De Hoogte were expected to ‘represent 
their neighbourhood’ and ‘to make trade-offs for the entire neighbourhood’. From 
a lifeworld perspective, this is a rather awkward position. The residents were self-
nominated: there was no formal or informal mandate from the local community 
underlying their position in the Neighbourhood Team. Unlike the Netherlands, 
England has a form of neighbourhood-level representative democracy: councillors are 
elected for small areas called ‘wards’. Local ward councillors were part of the Lozells 
Neighbourhood Management Board and were actively engaged in matters that affected 
their constituency. 
Compared to community volunteers in the Netherlands, the councillors in Lozells had 
a much stronger mandate to speak on behalf of the local community. This mandate 
sometimes conflicted with participative forms of democracy [also see Chapter 3]. A 
community involvement officer working for Midland Heart expressed his reluctance 
to work with permanent resident groups in the area. He feared ‘political tilt’ by 
local politicians and referred to several events where local politicians ‘highjacked’ 
community group meetings for their own political purposes. Consequently, Midland 
Heart preferred to involve residents in informal and temporary settings. In De Hoogte, 
the opposite occurred. Residents participating in the Refurbishment Planning Group 
were asked by the housing association to represent the views of the wider community 
and to be accountable to that community. However, these residents wanted to 
participate on a strictly personal basis and remain anonymous, in fear of possible 
negative responses from other community members. This apprehensiveness of 
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community volunteers is not without reason. In 2011 a community volunteer noted 
that voicing your opinion or presenting ideas in De Hoogte is not without risk: ‘The 
moment you do that, you stick out and you will be criticised by other residents. I have 
received loads of critique, but I can handle it. Two days later, I will be drinking a beer 
with that same person. That’s also typical for De Hoogte’.
Social inequalities in De Hoogte could explain the reluctance of its residents – in 
comparison to Korrewegwijk – to develop project proposals for the Neighbourhood 
Voting Days. Actors mentioned the more open social structure and the larger number 
of owner-occupiers in Korrewegwijk as important factors leading to the more active 
participation of residents. A community support worker commented on how the rather 
closed social networks in De Hoogte influenced the outcomes of the voting process: 
‘Good proposals will not be accepted if you do not have good connections in the 
neighbourhood’. This was echoed in a statement by a community volunteer: ‘De Hoogte 
is a close-knit community. People have to get to know you, otherwise you will not be 
accepted in the community’. 
§  8.4.5 Incongruity 5: Functional relations versus personal relations 
In the lifeworld, human qualities take central stage. Factors such as social background, 
age, gender and religious beliefs are all relevant in the lifeworld. The impersonal formal 
system-world responsibilities of salaried staff members are of secondary importance 
(Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 58). 
Agencies such as housing associations tend to underestimate the importance of 
personal relationships between practitioners and the local community. Small acts can 
have huge impacts. A Lozells community activist described an incident in 2009, when 
a Midland Heart officer apologised at the last minute for not attending a community 
meeting and sent a trainee as a replacement. This felt like ‘a kick in the teeth’ and led 
the activist to conclude that ‘they don’t have regard for us, they think we’re stupid’. 
In a similar vein, several residents in De Hoogte terminated their participation in the 
Refurbishment Planning Group after De Huismeesters failed to inform them about a 
change in the venue of the meeting. This incident was the ‘straw that broke the camel’s 
back’, after previous incidents gave community volunteers the impression that their 
views were not taken seriously.
On a more positive note, other developments indicate the evolution of stronger 
personal relationships between practitioners and community members around 2010. 
In interviews, actors in both case study areas started referring to new neighbourhood 
professionals taking up posts. More specifically, they spoke of a community 
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involvement officer working for Midland Heart and a community support officer 
working for a third sector organisation in De Hoogte. Interviewees reported a new 
dynamic generated by these new professionals. Previously, the actors had usually 
referred to projects, not to the personal commitment of professionals. The difference 
was that these new practitioners were no longer focused on delivering specific 
agency-led projects but on giving support to community-led activities. A community 
involvement officer working in Lozells stated: ‘This new way of working generates a lot 
of energy. Now real relationships are built with residents’. 
Gender, age and religion played a prominent role in the design of resident participation 
in Lozells. It is very likely that this approach was influenced by the high proportion of 
ethnic minority residents (around 90%) in the area. As part of the public consultation 
on the Lozells Masterplan in 2008/2009, Midland Heart and the Birmingham City 
Council organised various meetings aimed at specific groups. For example, they had a 
women’s-only breakfast meeting for mothers with a Bangladeshi background at their 
children’s school, a meeting for local shopkeepers, events for young people and for 
older residents. There were also meetings in a Catholic church, a Methodist church, 
a Somali community centre and events after prayers in two different mosques, one 
Pakistani-led the other Bangladeshi. 
In contrast, this research did not find meetings in De Hoogte that were designed to 
address specific cultural needs. When presented with examples from Lozells, several 
Dutch interviewees did not regard them as feasible in the Dutch context. Compared to 
Lozells, the proportion of residents with an ethnic minority background in De Hoogte 
remains relatively low (20% in 2011), and the need to include cultural and religious 
concerns in designing resident participation may not be that urgent. 
§  8.4.6 Incongruity 6: Rational power resources versus values and emotions
The lifeworld is less focused on rational business considerations. More important are 
personal ambitions and values. In addition, rational arguments, stories, feelings, ideals, 
experiences and passions are also relevant (Van den Brink et al., 2012, p. 58).
The termination of national regeneration programmes [see § 8.3.2] appears to 
have caused a paradigm shift among community volunteers and neighbourhood 
practitioners. Although one would expect local actors to lament the loss of resources, 
this was hardly the case. A former Lozells neighbourhood manager stated: ‘It is really, 
really so interesting how quickly things have changed after the money disappeared 
and how that dramatically alters your perspective’. A Lozells community activist 
found the disappearance of funding ‘liberating’. It forced people to become creative 
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with resources. It forced agencies to set priorities and increase their focus on what 
communities wanted. A Midland Heart community officer described the post-austerity 
era in 2011 as a ‘new dawn’, ‘staff was no longer given a project, but briefed to see what 
was happening on the ground and find the places to plug in and give support’.
This response to the funding cuts must be interpreted in the context of scepticism 
among residents and practitioners about the capacity of agency-led initiatives to 
transform resources into results relevant to local communities. A Midland Heart 
community involvement officer commented in 2011: ‘There has been lots of 
regeneration money, but none of it has been grass roots. These organisations had 
money swilling … but unfortunately the capacity of the people involved didn’t tally 
with the amount of money that ran through their accounts’. In a similar vein, a ward 
councillor stated that same year: ‘Urban Living and all the other regeneration agencies 
have invested millions into this area. Where’s all that money gone, what legacy has it 
left behind?’ A community activist did see a legacy of the regeneration investments: 
‘A lot of that actually did help to build a sense of identity’. This is also reflected in a 
comment made by another community volunteer in 2011: ‘One of the biggest legacies 
is “friendships”. I know it sounds very woolly, it’s relationships, it’s the connections, it’s 
the network … now we sort of know how to get problems sorted’.
A community officer described how Midland Heart had to find a new ground of 
legitimacy for their involvement in neighbourhood activities: ‘In a way we had to prove 
our worth from scratch, but implementing ideas that benefit the neighbourhood does 
not necessarily involve large amounts of money. Projects are not driven by money … 
they are powered by passion’.
Between 2007 and 2011, in both case study areas, housing associations and local 
authority professionals were largely preoccupied with the allocation of funding, the 
coordination of regeneration projects and attempts (especially in Lozells) to acquire 
additional regeneration resources. Rational arguments and the need to coordinate 
and manage activities prevailed during that period. The focus of the professionals 
was not particularly on the needs of the local people, but on projects, procedures and 
collaboration with other professionals. The reduction in resources resulted in fewer 
actors and projects, and simplified structures.
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§  8.5 Conclusion
What is required for the Participation Society to succeed? This chapter contributed 
to answering that question by exploring co-production arenas that include agencies 
and residents who aim to solve neighbourhood problems. This research included a 
secondary analysis of qualitative case study data on decision-making interactions 
in two vulnerable neighbourhoods: De Hoogte in Groningen (the Netherlands) and 
Lozells in Birmingham (the UK). This data was analysed using a governance network 
framework (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004), supplemented by elements of Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action, notably his system and lifeworld concepts (Habermas, 
1987; Van den Brink et al., 2012). This exploration was experimental in nature, and 
the findings lend themselves to tentative and cautious conclusions. These conclusions 
are divided along two lines. The first concerns the theoretical and methodological 
implications of this research, the second focuses on practical implications.
Theoretical and methodological implications
By connecting governance network concepts with Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action we wanted to construct a framework that increased the explanatory power of 
co-production interactions between professionals and citizens and to understand 
interactions not only from the perspective of organisations but also from the viewpoint 
of residents. 
The research confirmed the incongruities between system and lifeworld, as formulated 
by Van den Brink et al. (2012). The application of the network governance concept 
highlighted that the logics of system and lifeworld are found in very different decision-
making arenas (such as neighbourhood teams, public consultation events and board 
meetings), which possibly require different solutions to reconcile the divergent logics. 
The connections between the ‘incongruities’ defined by Van den Brink et al. (2012) and 
the case study data are not seamless. There are some overlaps, and sometimes the case 
study examples did not fully match the incongruity labels. Further development and 
study of these incongruities is required to give them more depth and make them less 
ambiguous. 
The notion of co-production between citizens and professionals amplifies the need for 
the further theoretical and methodological development of research frameworks that 
combine network governance concepts with the communicative action perspective. 
This research deductively applied key statements on incongruities by Van den Brink et 
al. (2012), looking for supporting evidence from interview transcripts. An alternative 
approach would be to inductively develop a framework and investigate co-production 
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interactions to explore the rules and logics used by professionals and residents. This 
could result in conclusions that are different to or do not confirm the findings in 
this chapter. This would require research methodologies that empirically examine 
interactions ‘up close and personal’ from the perspectives of the actors involved, such 
as anthropological approaches.
Practical implications
This research found strong indications to support the premise that a system logic 
‘colonises’ the lifeworld (see Mensink, 2015). While the term ‘colonises’ has a 
malicious connotation, this research found that even with the best intentions 
neighbourhood professionals tended to apply system logic in their attempt to support 
residents in taking a stronger role in neighbourhood regeneration. Often with the best 
intentions, professionals took over the responsibilities of residents. This research was 
not designed to explain why neighbourhood professionals did this, but the results 
do allow for the formulation of some tentative hypotheses. First, professionals are 
trained and disciplined to work according to system logic. Therefore, it may not be part 
of their mind-set to use any other logic. Second, practitioners often work with tight 
time frames and professional standards, set by themselves or other system agencies. 
Professionals may take the initiative in the assumption that they can produce results 
faster and in compliance with their professional standards. Third, professionals want 
to protect residents from bureaucratic complexity and the red tape that is involved in 
neighbourhood regeneration initiatives.
Tonkens (2014b) highlighted several misconceptions about the Participation Society 
agenda, notably that it adequately replaces the welfare state and that it is easy 
for professionals and residents to adapt to their new roles. This chapter supports 
Tonkens’s contention that this is not the case. The success of the Participation Society 
to a large extent depends on the ability of organisations, professionals and residents 
to communicate and collaborate. Developing these capabilities can be regarded as a 
form of ‘craftsmanship’, as described by Richard Sennett (2009). Citizenship is a craft, 
and reliable and responsive institutions and professionals are needed to support and 
nurture its development with patience and persistence, while accepting the unruly 
nature of the subject. 
Given the results presented in this chapter, the optimism surrounding the 
implementation of the Participation Society agenda is rather unsettling. The 
examination of the case study data highlighted the widespread lack of knowledge 
about the divergent logics at play and, consequently, the lack of awareness of the 
craftsmanship needed to overcome the incongruities between system and lifeworld. 
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There is an urgent need to start developing this craftsmanship in order to resolve 
these incongruities and prevent the Participation Society from failing, and to 
prevent vulnerable people and neighbourhoods from falling into the abyss 
created by government cutbacks and austerity. In relation to co-production in 
neighbourhood regeneration in particular, this requires a form of ‘place leadership’ 
by residents and professionals which can build networks that champion vulnerable 
places [see Chapter 7].
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9 Conclusions
§  9.1 Introduction
This thesis explored the role of non-profit housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration governance in the Netherlands and England. This concluding chapter 
starts by synthesising the answers to the research questions presented in Chapter 1 
and explored throughout this thesis [§ 9.2 to § 9.6]. This synthesis is guided by the 
conceptual research framework [see Figure 9.1], which consists of five components 
(context, network, actors, process and outcome), each elaborated in a research 
question. Section 9.7 reflects on the added value and challenges of the governance 
network theory perspective, the system/lifeworld concepts and the research 
methodology. The chapter concludes [§ 9.8] with a reflection on the future role of 
housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration governance and a final cautionary 
tale for housing associations. 
To address the research questions, this chapter contains some new empirical data 
not presented in previous chapters, most of which was included in conference papers 
(Rhodes and Van Bortel, 2007; Van Bortel, 2011; Van Bortel, 2014) that have not yet 
been developed into full journal articles.
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FIGURE 9.1 Conceptual framework 
§  9.2 Context
Research Question 1 
How have contextual factors such as economic, social and political developments 
affected the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration decision-
making processes? 
§  9.2.1 Context: main conclusion
Contextual developments had a significant impact on the role of housing associations 
in neighbourhood regeneration decision-making and delivery, and these varied across 
the two cases. The housing association in the Dutch case proved more resilient to 
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contextual developments than its English counterpart. National government funding 
was less important for the Dutch housing association: they already had access to 
considerable neighbourhood regeneration resources. The research took place during 
a period (2007-2014) of unexpectedly dynamic economic, social and political 
developments that significantly affected neighbourhood regeneration decision-making 
in the case study areas. The housing market downturn and the rapid and sudden 
government cutbacks to neighbourhood regeneration schemes profoundly affected the 
role played by housing associations in the case study areas, albeit in different ways. This 
confirms the value of the longitudinal approach of this thesis.
Other contextual factors, such as the characteristics of the two countries’ national 
housing systems and their political economy, indirectly affected the role played by 
housing associations, and directly affected regulation and finance.
These factors influenced the characteristics of the governance networks and 
subsequent policy games within these networks. They will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 8.3 (Network).
§  9.2.2 Context: De Hoogte, Groningen
In De Hoogte, housing association De Huismeesters demonstrated high levels of 
robustness in delivering its housing refurbishment and construction investment 
programme within a context characterised by a housing market downturn and 
government austerity measures. The government resources channelled into the 
area through the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme (Ministry of Housing, 
Neighbourhoods and Integration, 2007) were highly useful, but not essential to the 
realisation of housing association regeneration activities. 
After De Hoogte gained the status of a priority area in 2007, De Huismeesters 
received unanticipated financial compensation for its €45 million investment in the 
refurbishment of part of its housing stock in the area. However, the organisation had 
already planned to deliver these investments before the area gained its priority status, 
and had already secured the necessary funding through government guaranteed loans. 
The organisation used this compensation to increase its contribution to social and 
economic community investment in the area. The housing market downturn did not 
significantly affect the plans of De Huismeesters. Revenues from housing sales in the 
area were needed to support the regeneration investments but the moderately priced 
refurbished owner-occupancy properties sold rather quickly even in the downbeat 
housing market of the time. 
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Despite the economic crisis, the housing market downturn and the withdrawal of the 
national government from neighbourhood regeneration programmes, De Huismeesters 
was able to realise its ambition to refurbish 500 properties, build a considerable 
number of new homes, contribute to community investments and improve a local 
community centre. The termination of the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme 
did not seriously impede these ambitions because the organisation already had the 
investment resources.
§  9.2.3 Context: Lozells, Birmingham
Very different findings emerged from the Birmingham case. Housing association 
Midland Heart was able to realise only a small part of its regeneration ambition to 
produce a more varied and better quality housing stock in Lozells. Financial resources 
from the Urban Living Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder sponsored by the national 
government were essential to the funding of Midland Heart’s local regeneration 
activities [also see § 9.2.4 Outcomes].
An important element of Midland Heart’s regeneration plans for Lozells was the 
refurbishment and ‘deconversion’ of Victorian era properties into large owner-
occupancy homes for more affluent families. In the 1970s, these semi-detached 
terraces were converted into apartments that primarily attracted young, single and 
transient tenants. To make the initial refurbishments and deconversions financially 
feasible, subsidies from the Housing Market Renewal programme were needed. 
Revenues from the sale of the properties were also needed as leverage to acquire and 
deconvert additional properties. Partly as a result of the housing market downturn, the 
properties in Lozells could not be sold and were transformed into rental housing. This 
was very probably also caused by the miscalculation of the level of demand from large 
ethnic minority households to buy these properties in Lozells [also see § 9.5 Process]. 
The refurbishment programme in De Hoogte was also dependent on revenues from 
housing sales, but the properties for sale were targeted at a lower market segment and 
sold quite easily.
The termination of the Housing Market Renewal programme and the reduction in 
affordable housing grants as a result of the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, 
delivered an additional substantial blow to Midland Heart’s deconversion programme 
in Lozells. While regeneration activities in Lozells were directly affected by the budget 
cuts, there was an additional indirect impact. The Comprehensive Spending Review 
also included large budget reductions for local authorities. The Birmingham City 
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Council was hit particularly hard by the budget cuts22 and had to reduce staff in large 
numbers, including staff involved in neighbourhood regeneration. Neighbourhood 
Management resources were terminated and all of the neighbourhood managers 
in Birmingham lost their positions. In Lozells, these neighbourhood managers 
had contributed greatly to improving collaboration between housing association 
professionals, Birmingham City Council officers and representatives of the Lozells 
Community. 
§  9.2.4 Context: similarities and differences
At the start of the fieldwork period in 2007, the national governments in both countries 
were actively engaged in neighbourhood regeneration programmes. Both governments 
prematurely ended these programmes in 201123 in response to the global financial crisis 
and various national policy drivers. However, the end of government funding did not 
bring about the end of the housing associations’ involvement in the regeneration of De 
Hoogte and Lozells. Rather, these external setbacks revealed a high level of commitment, 
flexibility and tenacity on the part of housing associations in both case study areas, and a 
higher level of resilience to contextual developments in the Dutch case. 
Dutch housing associations do not depend on government subsidies for investments 
in new housing construction or neighbourhood regeneration. In Groningen, the 
government’s austerity measures did reduce the resources available for regeneration 
activities, but did not affect the organisations in the network in terms of staff numbers. 
In England, budget cuts were more severe, and organisations in the network were 
more dependent on these resources. This not only reduced the regeneration resources 
available, but also affected the organisations included in the regeneration network 
through significant frontline staff reductions (i.e. neighbourhood managers), and in some 
cases, entire organisations (i.e. the Urban Living Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder 
organisation). The housing market downturn also affected the development departments 
of many Dutch housing associations, as projects were put on hold or terminated. The 
impact on De Huismeesters was limited. Their project development portfolio and 
development staff numbers were already limited and not severely affected by the crisis.
22 Other developments also contributed to the need for Birmingham City Council, the largest local authority in 
England, to implement drastic budget reductions and reduce staff. In 2010-2011, Birmingham had to deal with 
a huge legal settlement over equal pay, estimated at £1.1 bn. http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/
apr/11/equal-pay-women-birmingham-city-council (Accessed 14 August 2014)
23 The Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder programme in England and the Empowered Neighbourhoods Pro-
gramme in the Netherlands.
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In contrast, the combination of the housing market downturn and the termination 
of regeneration funding proved ‘lethal’ for the refurbishment and deconversion 
programme in Lozells. This was very probably also caused by overly optimistic 
expectations of local community demand for, and the ability to afford, the deconverted 
properties [also see § 9.5 Process]. The asking price for these rather sizeable properties 
was largely unaffordable to the prospective target group (i.e. extended family with 
an ethnic minority background). In contrast, the feasibility of the refurbishment 
programme in De Hoogte was not highly dependent on government subsidies. The 
programme did depend in part on revenues from housing sales, but the properties were 
targeted at a lower market segment and sold quite easily.
The termination of the regeneration programmes in 2011 in both countries was 
accompanied by a national government discourse that signified a profoundly 
altered perspective on the role of the state in neighbourhood regeneration (Donner, 
2011). Within this discourse, top-down government interventions were framed as a 
phenomenon of a bygone era. While neighbourhood renewal was now primarily seen 
as a responsibility of local government, emphasis was also placed on the need to make 
greater use of the talents and resources of residents (Heijkers, Van der Velde and 
Wassenberg, 2012; KEI and Nicis Institute, 2012; Mullins, 2012) and to enable local 
communities to take a more active role. 
The UK conservative government introduced its Big Society concept in 2010 
(Cabinet Office, 2010) and implemented this – in part – through the Localism Act 
(see Mullins, 2012; Jacobs and Manzi, 2013; and Travers, 2012 for a discussion of 
the impact of the Localism Act on social housing and vulnerable neighbourhoods). 
The Dutch government used a similar ‘Participation Society’ discourse to justify the 
termination of its Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme (Donner, 2011), but 
has been slow in matching this with an adequate policy framework. In 2013, the 
Dutch government officially coined the term ‘Participatiesamenleving’ (‘Participation 
Society’), first used in September in the traditional King’s Speech (the ‘Troonrede’),24 
highlighting the government’s new vision of the more active involvement of citizens 
in supporting vulnerable people and places. However, no government policies have as 
yet been introduced in the Netherlands (and very few in England, but see for example 
Community Based Budgets, Be Birmingham, 2011) to support residents in taking a 
more active role in improving their neighbourhoods. 
24 http://nos.nl/artikel/552167-de-volledige-troonrede.html (Dutch language, accessed 14 August 2014).
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§  9.3 Network
Research Question 2
What are the characteristics of the neighbourhood regeneration networks in which 
housing associations participate? 
§  9.3.1 Network: main conclusion
This study demonstrated that neighbourhood renewal decision-making takes place 
through interactions in a complex network setting. Pluriformity, interdependencies and the 
closed nature of certain network dynamics generated high levels of substantive, strategic 
and institutional uncertainties [see for example Chapter 6]. However, the research also 
found substantial cross-national differences and indications that network characteristics 
can change and fluctuate over time. These differences are discussed in more detail below.
§  9.3.2 Network: De Hoogte, Groningen
De Hoogte has a strong, well-developed and resilient collaborative regeneration 
network, with housing associations and various local authority departments the 
most prominent actors. This neighbourhood-level network was strongly connected to 
the city-wide regeneration network that included all five Groningen-based housing 
associations. This network has gradually evolved since housing associations and the 
local authority started collaborating on a more equal footing in the mid 1990s, when 
housing associations gained more financial and operational autonomy. Previously, 
the Groningen local authority had a more dominant position in the network. 
Mutually agreed upon interaction rules and regeneration goals are included in formal 
agreements that are updated every four years. 
In Groningen, it was found that all neighbourhood regeneration policymaking and 
implementation activities were coordinated through an elaborate collaborative network. 
This structure included city-level and neighbourhood-level arenas. It encompassed a city-
level executive board, neighbourhood-level teams and a steering group that functioned as 
a linking pin between these levels. A small team funded jointly by the housing associations 
and the Groningen local authority coordinated the activities of the network.
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Many community investment resources in Groningen were pooled, with the 
regeneration network coordinating their allocation. The collaboration between housing 
associations and the local authority was publicised explicitly under one unified 
catchphrase ‘Mensen maken Stad!’ (‘People make the city’), with a joint website 
and communication strategy and design.25 However, not all decisions regarding 
neighbourhood regeneration were taken within the network. De Huismeesters 
maintained control over its refurbishment and new housing construction investments, 
while Groningen City Council regulated the funding of many third sector agencies that 
offered support to individuals and communities.
Chapter 7 described how the ‘place-shaping’ agenda led to increased inter-disciplinary 
cross-boundary work between agencies in Groningen. This resulted in a shift from 
regeneration as a predominantly ‘bricks-and-mortar’ operation to a more balanced 
approach that included social and economic aspects. However, merging the physical 
with the social and economic community investment domain led to increased network 
complexity and more profound substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties. 
This complexity was further intensified in 2007, when the national government 
selected De Hoogte as one of the 40 priority areas for its Empowered Neighbourhoods 
Programme. Existing governance arrangements, notably a collaboration to the deliver 
goals included in the ‘New Local Area Agreement’ (‘Nieuw Lokaal Akkoord’), were 
adapted to align with the national policy framework. New actors, goals and projects 
were introduced, causing considerable destabilisation of the existing local network. It 
took network actors considerable time to deal with this complexity. 
§  9.3.3 Network: Lozells, Birmingham
Lozells did not have a well-developed regeneration network, but did have a loosely 
connected ‘partnership’ between housing association Midland Heart, Birmingham City 
Council and Urban Living, the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder. This partnership 
consisted of a steering group and several working groups which aimed to develop 
a master plan for Lozells. It was a temporary collaborative structure focused on 
developing a plan that could be used in a bid for regeneration grant funding from 
the national Homes and Community Agency (HCA). The strong focus of the local 
network on attracting funding was illustrated by the fact that for a period of time, two 
different regeneration plans were being developed for Lozells: a plan for North Lozells 
led by Midland Heart and a plan for South Lozells led by Birmingham City Council. 
The residents interviewed regarded this division as rather superficial and inadequate 
25  www.mensenmakenstad.nl (Dutch language, accessed 15 August 2014).
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as the local community did not use the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ to refer to their 
neighbourhood. The plans were integrated only after the HCA indicated that the initial 
‘North’ and ‘South’ Lozells regeneration plans would be unlikely to receive funding 
if submitted separately. This highlights the ‘externally mandated’ character of the 
network and the still strong influence of national government agencies (Muir and 
Mullins, 2015). 
In Lozells, the physical and social elements of neighbourhood regeneration were 
elaborated within different plans. ‘Bricks-and-mortar’ investments were set out 
in the Lozells Masterplan and the social/economic actions were to be found in the 
Neighbourhood Management Plan. While the two plans referred to each other, they 
were not combined financially, nor were they integrated into a single regeneration 
delivery ‘vehicle’. No resources were pooled and all decision-making powers remained 
within the individual organisations.
In addition to the Lozells Masterplan Partnership, there were various established 
arenas of communication in Lozells wherein housing associations discussed housing 
management issues with other social housing landlords and local authority officers. 
More strategic housing and neighbourhood issues were discussed by CEOs of housing 
associations and high-level Birmingham City Council officials and Cabinet members. 
However, these arenas did not form an integrated network, but rather a fragmented 
and disjointed myriad of policy spheres. 
The circumstances revealed in the Birmingham case do not appear to be favourable 
for developing collaborative networks. The autonomy of actors is limited by their 
dependence on national government resources. The sheer scale of Birmingham also 
impeded network development. With 1.2 million residents, Birmingham is the largest 
local authority in England. More than 40 housing associations are active in the city. 
These factors constituted significant challenges to the development of strong city-
wide regeneration networks. Due to the lack of strong collaborative structures and 
mutual goals and rules, the partnerships established can be regarded as rather weak 
and shallow forms of networks. The weakness of these network connections could be 
related to the influence of the central government on local networks. In this respect, the 
case study relates to other studies that suggest that externally controlled/mandated 
partnerships may be unlikely to develop into mature collaborative networks because 
they are driven by the agendas of external funders (in this case government) and they 
lack strong internal cohesive drivers such as trust and reciprocity (Muir and Mullins, 
2015; Rees, Mullins and Bovaird, 2012, p. 24). 
The research findings also support remarks made by Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) about 
the potential for hybrid coordination mechanisms to destabilise governance networks 
because of the continuing proliferation of New Public Management arrangements 
aimed at efficiency and transparency. These values are not necessarily compatible with 
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network governance-like provisions enhancing interaction and commitment (Klijn 
and Koppenjan, 2012, p. 600). The competitive bidding procedures embedded in New 
Public Management approaches make actors more focused on the expectations of the 
funding bodies (e.g. Urban Living, Homes and Communities Agency or the Department 
of Communities and Local Government) rather than on building a mutual vision and 
creating goals that are shared by all of the actors involved. 
§  9.3.4 Network: similarities and differences
Because the case studies were located in divergent national contexts, this research 
expected to find cross-national differences in governance networks. Housing 
associations in England work within a predominantly Liberal Market Economy while 
Dutch housing associations operate in a Collaborative Market Economy. To structure 
a network comparison in the case study areas, this research used Keast and Brown’s 
(2009) distinction between cooperative, coordinative and collaborative networks 
[see Chapter 1 for a more in-depth discussion of context and network typologies]. 
As a consequence of the Dutch Collaborative Market Economy, this study expected 
to find more collaborative network characteristics in Groningen and to encounter 
more competitive or self-serving relationships between actors in the Birmingham 
regeneration network, consistent with Keast and Brown’s cooperative/coordinative 
network typologies. While the fieldwork results support this hypothesis, this study 
also found that network characteristics can change and fluctuate due to external and 
internal influences.
 
The research findings indicate that the main explanation for the different network 
typologies found in the case studies is related to differences in the availability of 
financial and other resources. In De Hoogte, most neighbourhood regeneration 
resources were already part of the local network; in other words, they were already 
embodied in the investment capacity of the housing association. The resources from 
the national government’s Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme were welcome 
but not essential. This relative independence from external resources contributed 
to strong and stable network relationships in a collaborative network with dense 
interdependent relationships and goals. While the focus in the De Hoogte regeneration 
network was predominantly on allocating resources, in contrast, the Lozells network – 
or rather, the more loosely organised partnership – aimed at acquiring funding through 
national government schemes such as the Housing Market Renewal Programme or the 
HCA’s Affordable Homes Programme. 
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Network relationships between housing associations and local authorities were 
strengthened during the development of the Lozells Masterplan into a more 
coordinative network (focused on joint projects and joint funding and semi-dependent 
goals), but receded to become a more cooperative network (with limited joint actions 
and goals) after the termination of the Housing Market Renewal Programme [see 
Figure 9.2].
FIGURE 9.2 Evolution of network typologies in Groningen and Birmingham during the fieldwork period (2007-
2014) (concept based on Keast & Brown, 2009)
Despite the strong network relationships in Groningen, the 2007 introduction of the 
Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme constituted a disruption to well-established 
local network collaborations. The Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme introduced 
new network actors and new projects. This temporarily changed the typology of 
the Groningen network from collaborative to coordinative, with lower levels of trust 
between actors, especially between the ‘incoming’ and the ‘incumbent’ network 
actors (Rees, Mullins and Bovaird, 2012, p. 24). The focus shifted away from stable 
collaboration based on regularly updated Local Area Agreements linked to long-term 
regeneration goals, and towards the implementation and coordination of a myriad of 
short to medium-term projects included in the hastily drafted 2007 Neighbourhood 
Action Plan for De Hoogte. As concluded in Chapter 8, the resources made available 
through the national Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme also triggered actors 
to put forward plans and projects that primarily served the objectives of the individual 
organisations.
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§  9.4 Actors
Research Question 3
What are the perceptions and objectives of the housing associations and other key 
actors concerning neighbourhood renewal investments and activities?
§  9.4.1 Actors: main conclusion
The housing associations in both case study areas took a prominent role in 
regeneration activities and closely collaborated with local authority departments 
in drafting regeneration plans for their areas. The housing associations regarded 
improving the quality and variety of the local housing stock as an important element 
in creating a more mixed community and attracting or retaining more affluent 
households. The local authorities supported this predominantly long-term ambition. 
Residents were more concerned with short-term liveability issues, such as anti-social 
behaviour, crime and litter.
During the fieldwork period for this research the role of the housing associations 
changed in both case study areas, from a leading role in the regeneration process (in 
conjunction with the local authority) to more of a facilitating and supporting role. 
This appears to have been brought about by two related factors: a serious decline in 
available resources, and an increased emphasis in policymaking on the responsibilities 
of individual residents and local communities. 
§  9.4.2 Actors: De Hoogte, Groningen
De Huismeesters took an important role in the development of the 2007 
Neighbourhood Action Plan and frequently represented the Groningen regeneration 
network in communications with the national government within the nationwide 
Empowered Neighbourhood Programme. In the regeneration of De Hoogte, De 
Huismeesters and the local authority operated externally as one unified actor.
This study showed that De Huismeesters had a clear stake in the quality of life in De 
Hoogte. More than 20% of its housing stock (around 1,600 properties) was located in 
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the area (De Huismeesters, 2009). Previous regeneration activities in the late 1970s 
and early 1990s had improved part of the housing stock but had not significantly 
improved the local housing market or the socioeconomic position of its residents. 
The turnover rate in the area was high. Anti-social behaviour and drug-related crime 
also constituted a heavy burden on housing management activities in the area. The 
organisation regarded it as paramount to closely monitor developments in the area 
and, through intensive housing management, prevent further decline. To achieve 
this, the organisation wanted to excel in property management and to increase their 
proficiency in identifying and solving, above all, social problems, through greater 
involvement in community investment and social support programmes.
To prevent further decline, De Huismeesters wanted to refurbish the 500 oldest 
properties in the area, and to merge and sell some of the duplex properties to create 
larger homes for owner occupancy. This would create a more mixed housing stock 
and hopefully attract or retain more affluent households. It was never the objective 
of De Huismeesters to start a high-profile neighbourhood regeneration operation in 
the area. When the national government selected De Hoogte as one of the 40 priority 
areas for its Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme in 2007, De Huismeesters rather 
reluctantly agreed, but in the expectation that additional resources could contribute to 
increased social, economic and bricks-and-mortar investments in the local community 
and its residents (Van Bortel, 2011). The organisation did not anticipate the complexity 
that would arise from this priority status, as described in the section on Network above 
and Process below.
After the conclusion of the refurbishment project in De Hoogte and the termination 
of the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme in 2011, De Huismeesters returned 
to its initial role in De Hoogte: adopting a strong focus on adequate property 
management, and identifying and solving social problems in collaboration with other 
actors. De Huismeesters embraced this more facilitating and supportive role regarding 
neighbourhood regeneration. This is strongly reflected in a 2011 interview with the 
CEO of De Huismeesters. He stated, ‘housing associations should emphasise that 
residents need to take their own responsibility for the quality of life in neighbourhoods. 
Ultimately, they have to do it themselves’ (Hidding, 2011, p. 5). 
§  9.4.3 Actors: Lozells, Birmingham
During the study period, housing association Midland Heart profiled itself as an 
organisation that was ‘passionate about communities’. The organisation regarded 
regeneration as an instrument to transform neighbourhoods into sustainable 
communities. One of the reasons mentioned by Midland Heart for leading the master 
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planning of Lozells between 2007 and 2009 was to showcase its regeneration capacity 
and its ability to generate and reinvest the efficiency gains arising from the merger of 
the two housing associations that led to its formation in 2006. The leading position of 
Midland Heart in the regeneration and master planning of Lozells became increasingly 
difficult to maintain after the national Housing Corporation was replaced with the 
Homes and Communities Agency (HCA). This new agency reasserted the primary role 
of the local authority in developing regeneration policy through its ‘single conversation’ 
mechanism (Homes and Communities Agency, 2009). 
With 800 local properties, Midland Heart is the largest landlord in Lozells, owning 
one third of the housing stock. In a 2007 interview, a high level Midland Heart 
officer emphasised the commitment of its organisation to the Lozells area: ‘It’s our 
neighbourhood. If we don’t do it, it’s our stock that’s going to get worse and our 
company’s name going through the mud isn’t it?’. However, Lozells constitutes only a 
small part of Midland Heart’s asset base. Midland Heart owns and manages 32,000 
properties in 54 local authorities across the West Midlands, which means that Lozells 
constitutes less than 3% of its stock. In comparison to the proportion of the housing 
portfolio of De Huismeesters in De Hoogte (20%), the impact of a deteriorating 
housing stock in Lozells appears to be less profound for Midland Heart. 
The 2011 budget cuts in England led to the termination of almost all regeneration 
investments in Lozells. Midland Heart was one of the few regeneration organisations 
that remained active in the area, albeit with limited resources. Facing the profoundly 
altered regeneration landscape, the organisation shifted its focus from the delivery of 
investment-heavy ‘bricks-and-mortar’ regeneration projects to facilitating community 
activities and supporting vulnerable individuals. This entailed, for example, addressing 
environmental issues such as illegal dumping and littering and creating employment 
opportunities for young people living in the area through Midland Heart’s ‘Back on 
Track’ apprenticeship programme, which aimed to provide a select group of vulnerable 
young people with alternatives to the gangs active in Lozells and surrounding 
areas (Home Office, 2014). Ironically, interviews with local actors indicate that this 
tactical shift resulted in a higher ‘visibility’ for Midland Heart in the area and better 
appreciation of it by local community members.
§  9.4.4 Actors: similarities and differences
Working within different societal contexts and with a dissimilar resource base, both housing 
associations demonstrated high levels of tenacity and commitment to contributing to the 
quality of life in the case study areas. This commitment was reinforced by concerns for the 
future of the large number of properties that both organisations owned in these areas. 
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This study demonstrated that the housing associations had a strong commitment to 
the neighbourhoods. The wish to increase the quality of, and the demand for, their 
properties, was as a strong driver for the housing associations. The organisations also 
appeared to be driven by a more altruistic – ‘noblesse oblige’ – motive. They found 
they had to act because they could. Their organisations had the capacity to use the size 
of their stockholdings as well as the capacity to make a real difference in vulnerable 
neighbourhoods. A more critical perspective might argue that the organisations were 
motivated by concerns about their public image: standing by and doing nothing could 
have damaged their reputation. 
This illustrates that housing associations in both countries can be driven by 
intrinsic motives, but also by external pressures. These drivers may be self-serving 
and sometimes even dangerous, as was demonstrated by the findings of the 
Dutch Parliamentary Enquiry Commission on Housing Associations (House of 
Representatives of the Netherlands, 2014a; 2014b). This commission investigated 
fraud and mismanagement cases and concluded that the often intrinsic motivation 
and moral compass of housing associations and their CEOs was insufficiently focused 
on supporting low-income households and prudently managing the organisation. 
Governance and regulatory frameworks provided insufficient checks and balances 
to restrain the leadership of these organisations. The inadequacy of supervision and 
governance also featured prominently in Chapter 5 of this thesis, which explored 
the organisation of the Dutch social housing system. Providing adequate checks and 
balances was also an issue in England, where the HCA strengthened its regulatory 
framework after the housing association, Cosmopolitan Housing Group, ran into 
financial difficulties in 2012 as a result of inadequate risk awareness (Altair, 2014). 
A combination of external pressure and intrinsic motivation also led to housing 
associations in England and the Netherlands taking an active role in the place-shaping 
and place-leadership agendas. This greater focus on ‘successful places’, as an objective 
of policy interventions, was a prominent government policy priority around the start of 
the fieldwork in 2007 (see Chapter 7). The place-shaping agenda aimed to strengthen 
cross-boundary work between agencies by combining different policy domains, such as 
housing, work, education and welfare. This would enable the provision of coordinated 
services tailored to the needs of local communities and provide opportunities to gauge 
the impact of these services on the quality of life in specific areas. For both housing 
associations, this led to a stronger focus on the social and economic needs of residents 
and local communities as part of their regeneration activities. This was reflected in an 
increased focus on activities supporting individual households, which supplemented 
regular landlord activities. Midland Heart established an apprenticeship programme 
to support young people. On a smaller scale, De Huismeesters also provided training 
programmes in conjunction with regeneration activities, but these programmes were 
not specifically designed to attract residents from De Hoogte.
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Chapter 4 discussed the trend towards mergers and an increased organisational scale 
in the Dutch and English social housing sectors. This trend was driven, at least in part, 
by the belief on the part of many housing organisations that scale would increase 
their housing development and neighbourhood regeneration capacities. In line with 
this trend, through a series of mergers Midland Heart grew into an organisation with 
32,000 units. Midland Heart presented the organisational scale and the efficiency 
gains expected from the 2006 merger between the two housing associations, 
Keynote and Prime Focus, as an important factor contributing to their neighbourhood 
regeneration capabilities. Their leading role in the regeneration of Lozells was, at least 
in part, motivated by the ambition to demonstrate their capabilities in this domain. 
However, at the same time, the increased scale of general operations diluted the focus 
and importance of any individual area to the organisation.
De Huismeesters had no ambition to expand its territory or increase its organisational 
size. Scale was seen as the natural outcome of asset management decisions such 
as housing sales, demolitions, (de)conversions and new housing construction. The 
organisation explicitly profiled itself as a neighbourhood-driven organisation: a focus 
on the needs of neighbourhoods and residents, rather than organisational scale, was 
regarded as a key to success. The differences between the two organisations show that 
within the context of a general trend towards increased organisational scale, housing 
associations may make very different choices about their own organisational size.
§  9.5 Process
Research Question 4
How do decision-making interactions involving housing associations develop in 
neighbourhood regeneration networks? Which interaction strategies do housing 
associations use and how do other actors view and respond to these strategies?
This section focuses on two distinct periods in the decision-making process regarding 
the regeneration of Lozells and De Hoogte. The first period deals with the development 
of the regeneration plans. The second period focuses on select events that took place 
after the regeneration plans were approved. The development of the Lozells Masterplan 
spanned several years, from 2007 to 2009. In De Hoogte, the development of the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan in 2007 only took several months. 
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§  9.5.1 Process: main conclusion
Housing associations in both case study areas had a prominent and often leading role 
in the policy arenas in which regeneration policies were developed. In these arenas, 
intensive decision-making interactions between housing associations and local 
authority departments took place. Both national governments had a strong impact 
on how the decision-making processes evolved, leveraged by the alluring resources 
offered by national regeneration programmes and the requirements attached to these 
funding resources. Local actors who wanted to acquire funding from these national 
programmes tailored the local decision-making process to fit these requirements.
Decision-making took place in arenas that almost exclusively consisted of 
professionals. Residents were given a consumer role in the process: their views on 
neighbourhood needs were implicitly taken into account but they were not involved in 
the development or delivery of the plans. The neighbourhood plans were presented to 
residents only after the housing association and the local authority (and the national 
government) had reached consensus. Not all decision-making arenas were closed to 
residents. The housing associations in both case study areas involved residents as co-
decision-makers in more ‘hands-on’ neighbourhood issues such as improvements to 
the public realm.
Very few conflicts and deadlocks occurred during the development of the regeneration 
plans. There was a strong impetus for the housing associations and the local authority 
to reach an agreement: no consensus would mean no national government funding. 
This may explain why the actors involved in the development of the regeneration plans 
used rather traditional instruments to facilitate decision-making, such as limiting the 
number of actors involved and enforcing strict time constraints. 
§  9.5.2 Process: De Hoogte, Groningen
The national Empowered Neighbourhood Programme triggered the development of the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte in 2007. Without this national programme 
De Hoogte would have remained one of the 15 priority neighbourhoods in Groningen 
that were part of the city-wide ‘New Local Agreement’ (‘Nieuw Lokaal Akkoord’) 
neighbourhood approach. Because neighbourhood regeneration plans for De Hoogte 
were already at an advanced stage of development, De Huismeesters rather reluctantly 
decided to support the Groningen local authority’s ambition to include De Hoogte in 
the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme. The expectation that this would channel 
additional resources to the area was an important driver for this decision.
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The inclusion of De Hoogte in the new national neighbourhood programme meant that 
a Neighbourhood Action Plan had to be developed in a matter of months. Because of the 
time limits set by the national government, there was very limited opportunity to develop a 
joint vision on the future of the area and to coordinate the goals of the various stakeholders. 
Consequently, the ensuing decision-making process clearly resembled ‘garbage can 
decision-making’ (Cohen et al., 1972). The objectives included in the Neighbourhood 
Action Plan were only loosely connected to the actual problems in the area. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Cohen et al. (1972) used the ‘garbage can’ as a rather 
value-free metaphor to describe how the decision-making process evolves in 
complex situations they called ‘organised anarchies’, where ‘choices were looking 
for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision-situations in which they 
might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and 
decision makers looking for work’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 1). It could be argued that 
‘garbage can’ decision-making is simply a fact of life and that one should celebrate 
the accomplishments of actors who are able to create policy windows and agree on 
actions in a very complex context. However, this implies that action – any action – is 
an improvement. The possibility that certain actions could worsen the situation in 
neighbourhoods or could simply be a waste of money is not taken into consideration. 
The case study found little evidence that actors tried to manage the ‘garbage can 
nature’ of decision-making. The ‘pressure cooker’ meetings were used to accelerate 
decision-making and left little room to assess and compare the impacts of different 
scenarios. The main yardstick for the inclusion of any given proposal in the plan was 
the level of ‘energy’ it generated among the professionals who participated in the 
meetings. The organisations involved in the development of the plan primarily wanted 
to include their own goals, but did not necessarily support the goals and actions that 
other organisations proposed for inclusion in the Neighbourhood Action Plan. 
The Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte was developed without direct resident 
involvement. Before the plan was drafted, officers from the housing association and 
the local authority went door to door on several occasions to ask residents about their 
needs and wishes for the area. Although this was a sympathetic gesture, and for some 
officers a large step because they had thus far had very limited contact with residents, 
the impact of these door-to-door sessions on actual decision-making remains unclear. 
It is clear, however, that residents were not involved in drafting the Neighbourhood 
Action Plan. Instead, they were presented with the end results of the decision-making 
process by the housing association, the relevant Groningen local authority departments 
and several government-funded organisations delivering care and support services. 
The drafting of the Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte did not result in 
major conflicts or deadlocks. The decision-making process was primarily focused 
on producing a document that would satisfy the needs of the national government. 
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Conflicts did arise after the relevant parties had signed-off on the plan; for example, 
the controversy surrounding the creation of a neighbourhood centre (see Chapter 
6 for a more elaborate discussion). One of the most prominent elements in the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte was the development of the Sparkling 
Heart (Bruisend Hart), a new community ‘hub’ in the centre of the neighbourhood 
that would include an Extended School (Brede School), a Family Care Centre and 
other neighbourhood facilities. However, it was not clearly communicated that 48 
apartments would have to be demolished in order to develop this community hub. 
The residents affected were not involved in, and initially even not informed about, 
the demolition decision. They thus organised a programme of fierce opposition 
that received considerable local media coverage. This opposition coincided with 
disagreement between the housing association and the local authority about the 
ownership of the new school, leading to a new round of decision-making that 
culminated in the termination of the Sparkling Heart initiative. As a result, the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte became a rather inconsequential policy 
document that did not even factor in the evaluation of the Empowered Neighbourhood 
Programme in Groningen in 2012 (Groningen Audit Committee, 2011).
§  9.5.3 Process: Lozells, Birmingham
In comparison to the planning processes in De Hoogte, the development of the Lozells 
Masterplan faced less time pressure, enabling different scenarios and options to be 
discussed by representatives from the housing association and the local authority. 
As in De Hoogte, residents had no formal role in the development of the master plan. 
Some community members were consulted informally to determine whether there was 
support for specific solutions before their inclusion in the master plan. However, these 
consultations had no formal status and the proceedings of these meetings were not 
communicated to the wider community.
In Lozells, this study found strong indications that the regeneration partnership led 
by housing association Midland Heart intentionally tried to maximise support for 
and minimise opposition to the Lozells Masterplan. This is illustrated by the way the 
regeneration options were presented to the public. During the workshops for housing 
association and local authority professionals, plans were discussed in detail, but 
during the May 2008 public consultation, these plans were intentionally presented 
in more abstract form in order to prevent residents from ascertaining the impact on 
their personal situations. For example, plans that included the demolition of specific 
properties were ‘blurred’ so residents would not be able to determine whether it was 
their home that would be demolished. 
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Another strategy used to increase support for the Lozells Masterplan is apparent in the 
way neighbourhood generation initiatives were visualised, with highly biased ‘before’ and 
photo-shopped ‘after’ pictures. The ‘before’ pictures usually had overcast skies, bare trees 
and no people in them. The ‘after’ pictures had blue skies, blossoming trees or trees with 
fresh greenery, happy families, fathers playing with their children and women in colourful 
saris (see North and South Lozells, 2009 Final Report, pp. 36, 39, 44, 90). It is not 
surprising that public consultations with residents resulted in very high levels of support 
for the initiatives in the master plan (between 96% and 99% of the residents consulted) 
(North Lozells Masterplan, 2008, pp. 69-74; also see Skelcher, Sullivan and Jeffares, 
2013, for a discussion on how Midland Heart organised public consultation).
Not all spheres of neighbourhood regeneration decision-making were closed to residents. 
One example is the women-only workshop that was externally commissioned by Midland 
Heart in 2007 to discuss specifications for the properties to be ‘deconverted’ into 
homes for large extended families (CUDOS, 2007). However, it remains unclear how the 
outcomes of this workshop influenced the actual design of the deconverted homes. There 
are indications that some crucial outcomes from the workshop were not included in the 
design. Workshop participants warned that there was a clear limit to what local families 
could afford to pay for the deconverted properties. Despite this caveat, the deconverted 
homes were refurbished to a very high standard. Due to the resulting substantial asking 
prices for these properties, it proved very difficult to find buyers, and most homes were 
converted into rental properties. Participants in the all-women’s workshop also indicated 
that interest in multi-generational extended family homes was eroding within many of 
the ethnic communities in the area. Young families from these communities increasingly 
opted for individual homes close to family members, but not for large extended family 
dwellings. 
While the influence of the local community on decision-making outcomes remains 
opaque at best, the impact of the national government was clearly visible; for 
example, in the adaptations of the geographical scope of the Lozells Masterplan. The 
initial master plan, delivered in 2008, only incorporated plans for North Lozells and 
was tailored to the expectations of the national Housing Corporation: the agency 
that funded and regulated housing associations. However, in 2008, the Housing 
Corporation was replaced by a new entity: the Homes and Community Agency (HCA). 
Communications between the HCA and the Lozells regeneration partnership made it 
clear that a master plan for North Lozells alone would not meet the expectations of the 
HCA, and would be on too small a scale to be successful in a bid for funding. Midland 
Heart and Birmingham City Council thus decided to create an integrated plan that also 
included South Lozells. This new plan was finalised in 2009. By that time it was already 
apparent that the Housing Market Renewal programme would be terminated. The 
austerity measures presented in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review made it 
even more certain that no government funding would be forthcoming to support the 
plan’s proposals. 
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§  9.5.4 Process: similarities and differences
In both countries, the housing associations and local authority departments tried to 
reach consensus on neighbourhood regeneration policies in policy arenas that were 
closed to other actors, such as residents. Only after consensus was reached did housing 
associations and local authorities present the outcomes to the local communities.
In both countries, the national government had a significant influence on how the 
local decision-making processes evolved. The time constraints imposed by the Dutch 
government had a negative impact on the quality of the decision-making process that 
produced the De Hoogte Neighbourhood Action Plan. In Lozells, the actors took their 
time to develop the master plan, assess different options and align the plan with the 
expectations of the national government. The level of joint image-building and the 
entwinement of goals was thus higher in Lozells than in De Hoogte. This is further 
evidenced by the fact that most options included in the Lozells Masterplan were also 
included in the long-term Aston, Lozells and Newtown Area Action Plan (Birmingham 
City Council, 2012). This document forms the long-term planning framework for the 
area. The Neighbourhood Action Plan for De Hoogte was not aligned with the spatial 
planning framework. 
In both case study areas, the plans seem to have been developed in a world that 
was far removed from the daily reality and needs of residents. Decision-making on 
neighbourhood regeneration was almost exclusively the domain of professionals from 
housing associations and local authority departments. The role of residents, as well as 
elected politicians, was very limited. 
One factor that may have contributed to the decision-making arenas being kept 
off-limits to residents was the fact that the plans concerned long-term investment 
decisions on housing and neighbourhood facilities. In interviews, some housing 
association representatives voiced doubts about the ability of residents to provide 
any fruitful contribution to such discussions. Another possible contributing factor, 
encountered in De Hoogte, relates to the fact that some programmes included in the 
Neighbourhood Action Plan were aimed at supporting vulnerable families. Interviewees 
from housing associations and the local authority believed that developing and 
delivering these individual support programmes was the domain of professionals. In 
their view, residents lacked the expertise to offer a contribution to decision-making in 
this domain.
This lack of inclusion of residents and other actors in the decision-making process 
may also be related to the goal of reducing decision-making complexity by limiting 
the number of actors participating in such arenas. Because both neighbourhood plans 
were primarily the product of local authority and housing association professionals, 
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they remained poorly visible to local residents and were not adequately embedded in 
the local community. Consequently, the plans played a very limited role in subsequent 
decision-making arenas and they – almost literally – descended into oblivion after the 
termination of the regeneration programmes from which these plans originated.
§  9.6 Outcomes
Research Question 5: 
How has the network, and the role of the housing associations in particular, 
contributed to neighbourhood regeneration decision-making outcomes? 
§  9.6.1 Outcomes: main conclusion
The test of governance networks and the role of housing associations in these networks 
will ultimately be measured by their ability to deliver relevant results. The housing 
associations in the case study areas contributed significantly to neighbourhood 
regeneration activities, not only because they channelled considerable investments 
into the areas, but also due to their strong involvement with government agencies, 
local communities and –sometimes – market actors to facilitate decision-making and 
problem-solving. 
The actions of network actors have improved the quality of some parts of the housing 
stock in the case study areas. Joint projects have been delivered to improve the 
public realm and contribute to neighbourhood safety. The socioeconomic position 
of residents in both case study areas also improved in an absolute sense, although 
it only remained stable when compared to city-wide development. The fact that any 
improvement was made in places such as Lozells and De Hoogte, which have been on 
the sharp end of economic and social change, can be regarded as an achievement given 
the economic crisis, the austerity measures, the housing market downturn and the 
termination of most neighbourhood regeneration funding. 
An epistemological perspective which considers that policy outcomes can only be fully 
understood when the perceptions of all of the actors involved are taken into account 
underpinned this research. The research found that actors used diverging process, 
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input, output or outcome yardsticks to measure success, ranging from the number 
of projects and activities that started, to the amount of money spent, the increase in 
resident satisfaction, the number of conflicts overcome and the improvement seen in 
quality of life indicators.
The longitudinal perspective provided by this research has highlighted the short-lived 
nature of some of the neighbourhood interventions, suggesting that outcomes are 
often transitory stages in a longer term process of change. The assessment of outcomes 
is fluid. The games metaphor used in network governance theory provided a helpful 
way of understanding the relationship between outcomes and decision-making 
processes. New rounds of decision-making, new participants or changes to the network 
characteristics led to a review of old decisions, sometimes with a different assessment 
of the outcomes achieved. In this research, games are used as a metaphor. A formal 
in-depth theoretical analysis of specific policy games was not part of the scope of this 
research—but see Hertting (2007) and Klijn and Koppenjan (2004, especially chapter 
3-5) for examples of game analysis. 
§  9.6.2 Outcomes: De Hoogte, Groningen
Neighbourhood regeneration in De Hoogte was delivered through strong collaboration 
between the Groningen local authority, housing associations and other third sector 
actors. It is therefore not always possible to attribute results to the actions of a single 
actor. It is, however, clear that housing association De Huismeesters was the most 
important actor in delivering the refurbishment and new housing construction in De 
Hoogte (De Huismeesters, 2012). In addition, the housing association contributed 
financially and in-kind to many community investment activities aimed at improving 
the public realm, neighbourhood facilities and supporting vulnerable residents. 
All these activities were included in the 2007 Neighbourhood Action Plan that was 
collaboratively developed by the Groningen local authority and housing associations, in 
consultation with residents. 
These activities contributed to the overall satisfaction of residents with developments 
in their neighbourhood and more optimism about the future of their area. Residents 
in De Hoogte expressed a level of satisfaction with recent and expected developments 
in their neighbourhood that surpassed the city average (Groningen Local Authority, 
2013b). However, many residents questioned the efficiency of the programme: 78% 
were satisfied with the additional resources invested in their community, but only 
40% found that these resources were well spent (Groningen Audit Commission, 
2011, p. 60).
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The link between regeneration activities and neighbourhood outcomes 
remains tentative. A 2011 assessment by the Groningen Audit Commission 
(Rekenkamercommissie), an independent scrutinising body of Groningen City 
Council, found that neighbourhood regeneration projects often lacked explicitly 
formulated objectives. Their effectiveness was rarely monitored and they lacked 
a mechanism which indicated how the projects were expected to contribute to 
overarching regeneration objectives (Groningen Audit Commission, 2011; also see 
Visitatiecommissie Wijkenaanpak, 2011). 
The network actors were satisfied with the neighbourhood regeneration results. 
This satisfaction appears to be mostly based on the assessment of the decision-
making process and less on the outcomes delivered. After a difficult start-up period, 
collaboration in neighbourhood regeneration initiatives improved and gained 
momentum. The start of regeneration activities in 2007-2009 was regarded as slow, 
chaotic and insufficiently coordinated. Actors emphasised the importance of having 
only a limited number of practitioners active in the area: ‘Knowing and being known’ 
was deemed a very important characteristic of a successful regeneration network. 
Actors voiced great pride in the Groningen neighbourhood renewal tradition that 
combined a strong focus on community involvement and solid collaboration between 
housing associations and the local authority. The collaboration between housing 
associations and the Groningen municipality was singled out as exemplary, intense and 
a critical success factor (Groningen Local Authority, 2012).
The yardsticks used to assess the outcomes of decision-making games can be 
transitory. Two examples from De Hoogte illustrate this. In the late 1970s, the 
refurbishment and replacement of outdated housing was aimed at maintaining the 
large amount of low-income housing in the area. At the time, most actors welcomed 
this outcome, but in the new millennium this homogenous low-rent housing stock 
was regarded as undesirable. The second example involves the decision-making 
games that resulted in the 2007 Neighbourhood Action Plan, which included the 
intention to develop a neighbourhood hub with a school and other facilities. This was 
regarded as of utmost importance for the area, even warranting the demolition of 48 
apartments. However, the implementation of the plan triggered controversy, leading to 
new decision-making arenas and ultimately resulting in the conclusion that there was 
really no need for a new neighbourhood hub. New decision-making arenas led to new 
outcomes.
Residents valued the regeneration activities. This is reflected in their considerably 
improved assessment of the quality of the public realm and neighbourhood facilities. 
However, with regard to neighbourhood safety, community cohesion and general 
neighbourhood quality, very limited progress was made between 2006 and 2012 
(Groningen Local Authority, 2013b, also see the Leefbaarometer: the national 
liveability monitor). 
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 Diminishing the gap between the priority areas and the city average was an important 
goal of the Empowered Neighbourhoods Programme (Ministerie van VROM, 2007), 
but the overall position of De Hoogte compared to the city average has not improved. 
Profound socioeconomic improvement remains wanting: it is not yet reflected in 
significant improvements to deprivation indicators, and for many residents it is not yet 
observable in daily life. The longer term objective to improve the social and economic 
position of residents has not yet been achieved. (Groningen Audit Commission, 
2011, p. 60).
§  9.6.3 Outcomes: Lozells, Birmingham
Regeneration activities in Lozells were delivered by a partnership that included 
Birmingham City Council, the housing market renewal pathfinder, Urban Living, and 
housing association Midland Heart. Midland Heart had an important role in delivering 
these activities and led the process that resulted in the Lozells Masterplan. Master 
planning is an activity usually conducted by the local authority because such plans 
are used to inform future statutory planning guidelines. This illustrates the close 
cooperation between partners in the network. Most of the regeneration activities in 
Lozells were funded by Urban Living, with limited financial investments in Lozells by 
Midland Heart: its capital investments were mainly focused on projects in neighbouring 
areas, for example the Crocodile Works project in Newtown.
The regeneration activities, with the support of funding from Urban Living, addressed 
the long-standing concerns of residents, such as on-street drug dealing, prostitution 
and anti-social behaviour, through the installation of CCTV cameras, as well as alley 
gating and target hardening of properties. In addition to these security upgrades, the 
programme included environmental improvements such as garden clearance and 
maintenance works at a number of crime hotspots. Monthly ‘walkabouts’ by officers 
from Midland Heart and various local government departments were introduced to 
identify and resolve issues such as illegal dumping and graffiti (Audit Commission, 
2011, pp. 21-22). 
The largest capital investment in the area involved restoring Victorian era houses which 
had been converted into small apartments in the 1960s and 1970s, returning them 
to their original status of large owner-occupied family homes. Around 10 deconverted 
homes were delivered in Lozells. Due to the housing market downturn, Midland Heart 
was unable to sell these properties and had to transform them back into social rental 
housing. Some of the homes acquired with Urban Living money remained empty in the 
absence of regeneration funding and market demand.
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This process of housing deconversions illustrates the transitory nature of regeneration 
outcomes. In the 1970s, the conversion of these large properties into social rental 
flats by housing associations was regarded as a successful policy outcome, but it then 
became part of the problem in ‘game rounds’ of the 2000s when these flats were to be 
deconverted into family housing for sale. Another example illustrating the transitory 
nature of regeneration outcomes involves the clearance of ‘groves’ 
 in Lozells. In the early stages of the Lozells master planning process, an option to 
demolish some of the ‘groves’ in North Lozells was considered. These areas were 
perceived as badly designed urban spaces causing problems with parking and litter. The 
involvement of English Heritage, a new actor participating in the consultation process, 
led to a reframing of the ‘groves’ from a nuisance into a heritage asset. The demolition 
option was replaced by a strategy to improve the public realm and introduce intense 
management in close collaboration with residents. Some of the groves in South Lozells 
were not so lucky: they had been cleared some years earlier but proved unsuitable for 
redevelopment because of the complicated layout of the sites and severe soil pollution.
Neighbourhood regeneration outcomes in Lozells have been subject to two evaluations: 
one by Urban Living (2011) and one by the Audit Commission, the government’s 
watchdog (2011). Various criteria were used to assess the regeneration outcomes. 
There was a strong focus on both output – the number of acquired, demolished, 
refurbished and newly constructed housing – and inputs – national government 
investments offset against the amount of additional public and private investments 
leveraged for the area. 
In retrospect, Urban Living concluded that it had achieved or exceeded all of the 
agreed targets, claiming that the area was now in a better position to attract further 
investment (Urban Living, 2011). In contrast, the Audit Commission saw it as a matter 
of concern that in an area of high housing demand private sector developers and 
housing associations had not taken the opportunity to develop land that was ready for 
re-use following clearance (Audit Commission, 2011). 
Outcome indicators of the quality of life in the area played an important role in the 
assessment of regeneration outcomes. This involved indexes on property satisfaction 
(focused on the individual home) and neighbourhood satisfaction (focused on the 
local community). Despite external improvements to almost 1,000 homes, property 
satisfaction declined in Lozells. Poor housing conditions remain, with overcrowding a 
significant problem (Audit Commission, 2011). Very few affordable homes were built 
in the areas. Neighbourhood satisfaction increased in North Lozells between in 2004 
and 2010, where Midland Heart concentrated most of its interventions. However, 
neighbourhood satisfaction in South Lozells fell in the same period. Both areas 
remained below the average for the Urban Living pathfinder. 
TOC
 245 Conclusions
The regeneration activities strengthened the ability of the local communities to 
influence the way their neighbourhoods were served and shaped. This is also reflected 
in the statements by local community representatives interviewed for this research [see 
Chapter 8]. Residents had more influence on decision-making, an increased capacity 
to undertake regeneration initiatives and better connections with housing associations 
and local authorities. The residents interviewed noted, however, that the investments 
by Urban Living were not very visible in the area: ‘they did not leave a legacy’.
Notwithstanding the actions undertaken by actors in the regeneration network, Lozells 
is still among those areas with the highest levels of deprivation in England and Wales. 
Census data from 2001 and 2011 shows a slight improvement in the socioeconomic 
position of residents in Lozells and the levels of deprivation in the area, but the gap 
between Lozells and the city average has not diminished [also see Appendix H]. Lozells 
remains among the most deprived neighbourhoods in the pathfinder area. Household 
turnover also remains high, reducing the stability of the community. There is a high risk 
that social cohesion problems may return, threatening long-term sustainability and 
mitigating the impact of positive interventions to date. There is still dissatisfaction with 
crime and the poor quality of the environment. The development of a more balanced 
housing market remains constrained by low-income households with limited access to 
finance (Audit Commission, 2011, p. 8). These outcomes demonstrate that the impact 
of network actors on neighbourhood regeneration outcomes was limited: overall 
market and socioeconomic factors were more powerful than their interventions.
§  9.6.4 Outcomes: similarities and differences
Lozells and De Hoogte have seen a succession of neighbourhood regeneration 
interventions in line with the policy paradigms of the time. These interventions have 
not fundamentally changed the position of either neighbourhood or the overall 
experience of the residents. During the most recent interventions, tangible results 
were delivered by the local governance networks, which involved a strong contribution 
by housing associations. The satisfaction of residents with neighbourhood quality has 
increased and they are more positive about the future of their area. Nevertheless, while 
the socioeconomic position of residents has improved nominally in both areas, the 
overall position of both neighbourhoods in comparison to their respective city averages 
has not changed. Low-cost housing remains predominant in both areas, attracting low-
income households. 
These results indicate that bringing change to vulnerable neighbourhoods such 
as Lozells and De Hoogte is a long-term process. The yardsticks used to assess the 
outcomes of regeneration are transitory. Previous outcomes can be regarded as 
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undesirable in new decision-making game rounds. This study demonstrated that 
this may not only occur with respect to outcomes attained decades ago but also with 
respect to very recent results, which may ‘fall from grace’ as a result of new actors 
entering decision-making arenas and changing policy agendas.
The evaluations in De Hoogte and Lozells included improvements in resident 
satisfaction with their homes and their neighbourhoods. However, the evaluations did 
not provide much insight into the drivers underpinning change and the connection 
between neighbourhood interventions and the outcomes produced. 
The assessment of developments in Lozells and De Hoogte was part of evaluations 
that involved larger geographical areas. Lozells was part of an evaluation of the entire 
Urban Living pathfinder area. The evaluation of De Hoogte was combined with the 
larger neighbourhood of Korrewegwijk. The policy evaluations in both case studies 
contain critical remarks on the developments, but in a kind of ‘halo effect’ the positive 
developments in other neighbourhoods tended to dominate the overall assessment of 
the regeneration programme, masking the less favourable results.
§  9.7 Scientific and societal relevance
§  9.7.1 Introduction
This section discusses the scientific and societal relevance of this thesis. The discussion 
of scientific relevance is divided into two elements. First, the theoretical relevance 
of this research, in terms of a better understanding of the complexity of the role of 
housing associations in decision-making processes, will be addressed. The section 
continues by discussing some of the challenges to the further development of 
governance network theory and the way this research has contributed to solving these 
challenges through theory development.
The second part of the discussion of scientific relevance reflects on the methodologies 
used to explore neighbourhood regeneration decision-making and the need for further 
development in this domain. This discussion also includes a reflection on the role of 
the researcher and research process.
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The section ends with a reflection on the societal relevance of this research. This 
includes some implications and recommendations that may strengthen the 
contribution of housing associations to neighbourhood regeneration decision-making.
§  9.7.2 Theoretical relevance 
Understanding and nuancing the complexity of decision-making 
This subsection discusses the merits of and the challenges facing the network 
governance perspective used in this research. It will reflect on the experiences 
accumulated in this research using a state-of-the-art overview of governance network 
theory by Klijn and Koppenjan (2012). 
The governance network perspective has supported the exploration of the role played 
by housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration decision-making. This 
approach has increased our understanding of the complexity and the uncertainties 
involved in networked forms of decision-making by highlighting concepts such 
as the interdependence of actors, the importance of trust, the impact of different 
actor perspectives, the creation of decision-making arenas, and the development 
of rules that determine access to these arenas and guide interactions within them. 
The approach helped us to identify instruments and strategies used by housing 
associations and local authorities to cope with the complexity and uncertainties 
of decision-making. These strategies combined network steering (aiming to reach 
consensus, build commitment and develop trust) and hierarchical steering in the 
design of the decision-making process (e.g. fixed decision-making timelines and 
restricted access for certain actors to decision-making arenas). 
This research nuances some of the complex characteristics attributed to governance 
networks, such as high levels of multiformity, interdependencies and closedness 
[see Chapters 5 and 6]. Initially, there were only a limited number of actors in the 
networks investigated: local government agencies, housing associations and other 
third sector organisations. Most actors had been collaborating for many years and 
could be expected to have been familiar with each other’s goals, logic and values, thus 
diminishing the uncertainties often associated with decision-making in networks. 
The network actors themselves increased the complexity of policy games. Sometimes 
this was induced by the national government, when local network actors responded to 
steering instruments such as subsidies applied by the state. This led to more network 
complexity and dynamics in the form of new goals, actors and arenas. Decision-
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making in the local network was put under additional time pressure in order to meet 
the requirements of national regeneration programmes. Consequently, the national 
government obtained an influential position and many interactions in the local network 
were aimed at acquiring or allocating national government funding and meeting 
national government expectations. 
Network governance theory supported the reflection on the composition and 
management of the regeneration networks. This research found that residents and 
private sector actors were not, or rarely, involved in decision-making processes. With 
a little hindsight, one could formulate the contention that these actors were not 
fully represented in the governance network because incumbent network actors (i.e. 
housing associations and local authorities) ‘chose the devil they knew’. They opted 
for state involvement, rather than facing the uncertainties that would have resulted 
from expanding the network to include residents and private sector actors. This 
conclusion nuances the findings presented in Chapter 3, which suggested a degree 
of complementarity between network governance and representative democracy, but 
also concluded that it is important to find a pragmatic balance between efficiency and 
the democratic anchorage of decision-making in governance networks. Our case study 
findings revealed how existing network actors made decisions on the composition 
of governance networks and the design of decision-making processes that were 
at odds with criteria for democratic anchorage. Apparently, efficiency in decision-
making is sometimes preferred over democratic anchorage. This supports one of Klijn 
and Skelcher’s (2007) alternative conjectures, presented in Chapter 3, namely the 
‘instrumental conjecture’ that sees networks as instruments used by dominant actors 
to reinforce and realise their interests, rather than as a process of negotiation with 
other actors.
Challenges for governance network theory
In a 2012 article, Klijn and Koppenjan focused on the past, present and future 
of governance network theory and highlighted some challenges that need to be 
addressed (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012). One of the challenges formulated concerned 
the emergence of hybrid governance practices, combining network governance with 
hierarchical public administration models and market-based approaches. They also 
emphasised the need for growing awareness of the limitations of governance network 
theory. The following will highlight how this research contributed to addressing these 
challenges and will formulate some additional theoretical issues emanating from this 
research. 
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1 The emergence of hybrid governance practices, combining network governance with 
traditional (hierarchical) public administration models and market-based approaches.
From the outset of this research, governance network theory was used interpretively 
as a ‘lens’ through which to explore and understand how decision-making processes 
evolved. Informed by network theory critics such as Davis (2011) and Swyngedouw 
(2005), this research anticipated that networks would not exclusively consist of 
‘horizontal’ relationships between actors. Therefore, more hybrid decision-making 
mechanisms that combined hierarchical government steering with market competition 
and network coordination were expected. 
Several governance network scholars emphasise the stability and robustness that 
networks acquire over time (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 9; Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004, p. 9). While the Groningen regeneration network was rather stable and robust, 
this research demonstrated how contextual developments profoundly affected the 
network, especially changes in national government policies. Klijn and Koppenjan 
(2012) point out that hybrid coordination mechanisms can lead to instability in 
decision-making. They regard this as one of the major challenges for governance 
network research, but also present it as a kind of anomaly: a deviation from the norm 
that says complex decision-making processes in modern networked societies should 
take place in arenas that are infused with trust, social capital and reciprocity. 
The findings of this research suggest that hybrid coordination mechanisms dominate 
decision-making in the public domain and support the contention that genuine 
‘horizontal’ governance networks will rarely be found in practice. This supports the 
argument that there is a need to shift governance network research away from an 
exclusive focus on horizontal network arrangements and towards a study of hybrid 
governance practices in which hierarchical, market and network arrangements are 
combined. However, hybrid forms of decision-making remain controversial in a context 
dominated by neoliberal discourse, where market mechanisms seem to be equated 
with efficiency and government steering is equated with democratic legitimation.
This research supports the need for theories that are able to unravel a hybrid 
coordination mechanism. A sizable part of the interactions in the local networks 
explored were focused on dealing with the impact of contextual developments, 
especially the need on the part of network actors to align their plans with rather 
unstable national government policies and expectations. The emergence of hybrid 
governance practices features very prominently in this thesis. We found that the 
national government had a major influence on the decision-making processes in 
both the Birmingham and Groningen cases. Hybrid arrangements combining diverse 
coordination mechanisms compels governance network theory to develop further so it 
can address the potentials and risks of hybrid governance. This research highlighted the 
TOC
 250 Networks and Fault Lines
vulnerability of the Birmingham governance network, which had many characteristics 
of an externally mandated partnership with strong national government influence.
The impacts of government decisions were not only felt through policy shifts that 
provoked sudden fluctuations in the scope and funding of the neighbourhood 
regeneration programmes. The respective national governments, each in their 
own way, also changed the rules governing the roles of actors in neighbourhood 
regeneration networks. The participation society agendas introduced by the English 
and Dutch governments call for a bottom-up approach to neighbourhood regeneration, 
emphasising the responsibilities of individuals and local communities. It is quickly 
forgotten that only a few years ago the same national governments, albeit with a 
different political orientation, championed top-down approaches to neighbourhood 
interventions, such as the Empowered Neighbourhood Programme in the Netherlands 
and the Housing Market Renewal Programme in England. 
2 Awareness of the limitations of governance network theory
This study highlighted some additional challenges that need to be addressed through 
the further development of governance network theory or by seeking connections 
with other theories. This research found two specific challenges: first, the theoretical 
implications of the role of residents as co-producers of neighbourhood regeneration; 
and, second, the need for a more robust assessment of governance network outcomes.
The theoretical implications of the role of residents as co-
producers of neighbourhood regeneration 
One of the challenges identified by Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) is the accommodation 
of growing specialisation and differentiation within governance network theory. 
Neighbourhood regeneration governance can be regarded as one the domains 
requiring a specialised approach, due to the role of residents in decision-making. This 
is one of the issues that arose very prominently from the Birmingham, Groningen and 
The Hague case studies. Resident participation was problematic in all three cases. 
While most officers were committed to involving residents in neighbourhood 
regeneration decision-making, delivering on this commitment proved more 
complicated than anticipated. The actors stated that they were reluctant to formally 
involve residents in decision-making processes because local communities, in their 
experience, were fragmented and often hopelessly divided. These officers recounted 
cases where conflicts and feuds between individuals, families and community groups 
had seriously hampered decision-making. For them this was an important reason not 
to involve residents in decision-making arenas.
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Governance networks have the potential to contribute to new forms of democracy 
and community involvement that are adapted to the complexity of decision-making 
on neighbourhood regeneration and that deal with societal fractures and actor 
fragmentation by involving more groups at different stages of the decision-making 
process [see Chapters 3 and 8]. Governance networks may contribute to the quality 
and legitimacy of decision-making outcomes, but the efficiency of decision-making will 
most probably not benefit from this more inclusive approach. The trade-off between 
efficiency and legitimacy that arises from increased resident involvement in the co-
production of neighbourhood regeneration is a challenge that calls for the further 
development of governance network theory. 
This research suggests several avenues that could be followed. First, a more in-depth 
study of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, as explored in Chapter 8, might 
be undertaken. Second, more use could be made of the body of knowledge and theories 
developed in England during the New Labour government (1997-2010), which was 
often explicitly concerned with networks that linked governments with citizens and local 
communities. For example, work by Sullivan and Skelcher on citizen participation in public 
services (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002), theory-driven approaches to analysing collaboration 
(Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008) and methodologies for assessing the relationship between 
network governance and citizens (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007) may all be of relevance. 
The assessment of governance network outcomes
Ultimately, more democratic and inclusive approaches to decision-making on 
neighbourhood regeneration are likely to result in better outcomes, but not necessarily 
in greater consensus among the actors involved. Within network governance 
approaches there is a tendency to define satisfactory outcomes as those that enjoy the 
greatest joint support of the actors involved in the process. Teisman calls this ‘ex-post 
satisficing’ (Teisman, 1992, quoted by Kickert et al., 1997, p. 173). More inclusive 
approaches that engage a wider range of actors, including different market sectors and 
residents, might appear to be less successful as the benchmark of satisfaction is raised 
to include a wider range of preferences and experiences. Therefore, we need a more 
nuanced assessment of outcomes produced by highly diverse networks. 
The longitudinal perspective provided by this research has highlighted the short-
lived nature of some of the neighbourhood interventions, suggesting that outcomes 
are often transitory stages in a longer term process of change. The assessment of 
outcomes is fluid. The game metaphor used in network governance proved a helpful 
way of understanding the relationship between outcomes and decision-making 
processes. New rounds of decision-making, new participants, or changes to network 
characteristics led to a review of old decisions, sometimes with a different assessment 
of the outcomes achieved. 
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Governance network theory should therefore develop methods – or develop 
connections with other theories and methodologies – that enable the evaluation of 
the success of governance networks by combining substantive regeneration outcomes, 
network actor and stakeholder satisfaction, and network learning in assessment 
processes. Ideally, any evaluation should include a combined triple bottom line 
approach [see Figure 9.3] to prevent actors from ‘cherry picking’ among the various 
yardsticks available in order to construct a ‘bottom line’ that favourably influences the 
outcome of the evaluation. 
FIGURE 9.3 Combining evaluation criteria
Preventing ‘cherry picking’ is essential, given the disinclination found among actors 
to closely scrutinise the outcomes of decisions that resulted from ‘garbage can’ forms 
of decision-making. Further development of network governance approaches will 
increase our understanding of how actors construct the yardsticks used to evaluate 
success and provide tools to facilitate a more comprehensive assessment of network 
outcomes [also see ‘Recommendation 5’ in § 9.7.4 on developing methods to increase 
accountability and transparency in decision-making processes and their outcomes]. 
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§  9.7.3 Methodological relevance 
Exploring neighbourhood regeneration decision-making 
This research used a qualitative, longitudinal, international comparative methodology. 
This approach demonstrated the considerable impact of contextual developments – 
over time and place – on the characteristics and outcomes of governance networks. The 
research methodology combined a focus on processes with attention to outcomes such 
as stakeholder satisfaction and societal impacts.
The longitudinal approach of this research [see Figure 9.4] highlighted the 
developments in the network: the coming and going of actors, and also the change in 
the goals and perspectives of actors. This perspective revealed the short-lived nature 
of government-sponsored neighbourhood regeneration interventions, suggesting that 
regeneration outcomes are often transitory stages in longer term processes of change, 
which may include, for example, shifts in welfare regimes that alter the responsibilities 
and tasks of the state, the market, civil society and individual residents. Changing 
perspectives led to the considerable transformation of actors’ goals. The longitudinal 
approach helped us to capture these developments. 
FIGURE 9.4 Figure 18: Conceptual elements to analyse policy games
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Reflections on the role of the researcher and the research process
The combination of a focus on processes and multiple forms of outcomes (substantive, 
societal, network) provided a form of triangulation. Approximately 70 interviews were 
conducted for this research. Many individuals were interviewed several times during 
the fieldwork period [see Appendix C]. The interviewees predominantly focused on 
the decision-making process, with their narratives focusing specifically on what they 
did. Often they were not yet able to elaborate on the outcomes that were produced 
by their actions. This ‘fog of decision-making’ sometimes made it impossible for 
the interviewee, and for me as a researcher, to gain a clear overview of all the arenas 
and actors. In both case studies there were several staff changes which resulted in 
new officers taking up a position. These individuals thus had limited knowledge 
about previous decision-making arenas and had to rely on such information from 
their colleagues. Sometimes interviewees were unable to recall events, thoughts and 
interactions, or provided statements that were not consistent with previous interviews. 
During the fieldwork period, I sometimes had more detailed knowledge about the 
previous decision-making events than the individuals interviewed.
The research also encountered some limitations to the research approach, and some 
limitations regarding the researcher. Interviewees are not always willing to speak about 
all the problems, conflicts, deadlocks and stalemates they encounter. To address this 
problem, at least in part, some interviews were conducted with external specialists 
or people who had been involved in decision-making events but had since moved to 
another organisation and were more inclined to reflect critically on events.
Sometimes practical problems made it impossible to fully capture events or interview 
narratives. Constraints of time and place limited the number of individuals that could 
be interviewed or events that could be attended. Informal ‘corridor’ or ‘sidewalk’ talks 
could not be recorded, but only captured in retrospect. In some cases interviewees 
requested that their statements remain off the record. Some issues were more prosaic, 
for example interviews that could not be fully transcribed because the music in the 
local Costa or Starbucks was too loud, or the batteries of the recording device ran out. 
In-depth interviews constituted an important element of this research. A topic list 
was used to guide these interviews [see Appendix F], but this list was never used in a 
strictly sequential manner. In practice, interviews had a narrative flow and the topic list 
was used to formulate questions to gently steer the conversation through the topics 
relevant to the study. Moreover, many interviewees could only reflect on developments 
and interactions in decision-making arenas they themselves had participated in, or 
arenas about which they indirectly acquired information from other sources, such as 
colleagues, managers and network actors. Some questions proved difficult to answer 
for interviewees; for example, questions related to the development and characteristics 
of the governance network that transcended on-going policy games. Answering these 
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questions required a ‘bird’s-eye’ overview of developments: most interviewees did 
not have such a perspective, but rather presented a narrative that reflected on the 
developments and actions in which they were directly involved. The longitudinal 
approach of this research proved very helpful, allowing the combining of the accounts 
of the various individuals to reconstruct decision-making events and the development 
of the governance network.
Reflection on research quality and the portability of research findings
Chapter 1 introduced three general criteria adopted in this research to secure its 
scientific quality: veracity, objectivity, and perspicacity. These criteria are derived from 
quantitative, ethnographic, research approaches (see Stewart, 1998). Appendix E 
contains an in-depth reflection on the measures taken to safeguard research quality. 
Given the fact that this research endeavoured to increase our understanding of the role 
of housing associations in regeneration governance, the ‘representativeness’ of the 
two sets of organisations and local contexts is relevant: to what extent are the research 
findings of this ‘small-n’ study generalizable? The perspicacity concept adopted in this 
research helps us to answer this question.
Perspicacity deals with the identification of theories, processes, structures, 
relationships and contingencies that are specified sufficiently to provide insights that 
are applicable in other contexts. The concept of ‘portability’ through thinly rationalistic 
social mechanisms, as developed by Bengtsson & Hertting (2014), further specifies 
and operationalizes perspicacity. Portability through social mechanisms recognises 
that actors do things for a reason. It constitutes a generalizing bridge to other contexts 
with similar actor constellations to formulate plausible expectations that actors 
involved in comparable decision-making situations in other contexts would act and 
interact in much the same way. 
Chapter 2 presented two core characteristics of housing associations: 1) they have the 
social aim to provide housing for target groups that cannot afford full market rents, 2) 
they are self-governing within a government regulatory framework. In addition to these 
core characteristics, this research indicated that the following portability conditions are 
relevant for housing associations to take on a meaningful role in neighbourhoods:
1 The housing association has a commitment to improve the quality of life in vulnerable 
neighbourhoods.
2 The housing association has the ability to sustain that commitment, independently 
from the priorities of politicians, funders, regulators or others.
3 The housing association has the ability to maintain a gradual—but not necessarily 
large—flow of resources (e.g. staff and money) to support vulnerable neighbourhoods. 
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4 The housing association regards residents and local community organisations as key 
stakeholders, and understands that collaboration with local communities is a craft that 
needs constant care.
5 The housing association understands that governance networks matter.
6 The housing association recognizes that it should protect governance networks from 
its own (and other’s) organisational dynamics such as changes in staff, systems and 
strategies.
These conditions are mainly of a social nature and largely independent from 
organisational characteristics such as the size and structure of housing associations. 
Therefore, the portability conditions could also apply to other (social) housing providers, 
such as housing cooperatives, municipal housing companies or private social enterprises.  
§  9.7.4 Societal relevance
Strengthening the contribution of housing associations to 
neighbourhood regeneration decision-making
This research demonstrated that housing associations play an important role in 
neighbourhood regeneration networks. They can be a stabilising and cohesive factor in 
governance networks. Their interests are invested in the housing stock and this secures at 
least some level of commitment to vulnerable neighbourhoods. Their hybrid characteristics 
enable them to collaborate with community, market and state actors. Moreover, their 
access to resources allows them to focus on neighbourhood needs in cases where 
communities lack the capacity or cohesiveness to champion their own; when private actors 
shun these communities because profits are too low or perceived risks are too high; and 
when governments fail to prioritise resources to support vulnerable people and places. 
It is likely that there will always be neighbourhoods such as De Hoogte and Lozells: 
areas that predominantly attract vulnerable low-income households. In these 
areas, the Big Society and Participation Society policy paradigms are likely to fail if 
implemented abruptly. Residents in these areas have long been dependent on support 
from system agencies such as housing associations and local authorities. They need 
sustained support to develop the capabilities to improve their own socioeconomic 
position and the quality of life in their community. This will very probably remain an 
activity that takes place beyond the limelight of mainstream politics and markets: it 
is not an activity that benefits politicians when it comes to winning elections, or helps 
CEOs increase the value of their company. 
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In the current political climate it is highly unlikely that national and local governments 
will be able or committed to making a positive impact in these areas. In past decades 
some neighbourhood regeneration programmes received long-term government 
support, such as the New Deal for Communities in England (1998-2011), the Big City 
Policy (1995-2009) and the ‘Investment Budget for Urban Renewal’ (2000-2014) 
in the Netherlands. The premature termination of the Empowered Neighbourhoods 
Programme in the Netherlands and the Housing Market Renewal Programme in 
England appear to mark a break from these long-term programmes. The current policy 
discourse in both countries demonstrates an unshakeable confidence in ‘the market’ 
and the strength of individuals, local communities and civil society. 
Civil society resources are constrained in vulnerable neighbourhoods because the 
ability of residents to pay for services and contribute to civil society activities remains 
limited. This is the domain where housing associations can make a real difference – if 
they want to. Their position as private not-for-profit organisations lying between state, 
market and society provides them with some discretionary freedom to manoeuvre 
between state hierarchies and market competition to support local communities where 
needed. Housing associations need not be auxiliaries of the state, the local community 
or the market. If necessary, housing associations are able to act contrary to state, 
market or community expectations and logic, by placing issues on the policy agenda or 
determining priorities that are not defined by national or local politicians. 
There are clear indications that governments tend to act too late in providing support to 
deprived neighbourhoods, and that their actions are only triggered when public order 
is in danger. The Dutch Empowered Neighbourhood approach introduced by Minister 
Vogelaar in 2007 (MVROM, 2007) was preceded by reports from her predecessor, 
Minister Winsemius, which claimed that certain neighbourhoods were in danger of 
becoming ‘no-go zones’. 
The fact that Lozells was labelled one of the priority areas in the Urban Living Housing 
Market Renewal Pathfinder is very likely connected to violent disturbances in the area 
in 2005 (Black Radley, 2007). The connection between the fear of public disturbance 
and the priority given to deprived neighbourhoods is clearly reflected in a remark by a 
high-level Midland Heart officer made in late 2010 not long after it became clear that 
regeneration funding for Lozells would be terminated. He was deeply concerned that 
this constituted a move away from any serious regeneration funding for the next 10 to 
15 years, and that only two things could change the government’s mind, one was an 
increase in homelessness and the other was street riots. 
This is not a hypothetical assumption: neighbourhood regeneration might not be 
as high on the political agenda as before, but the widening gap between rich and 
poor is leading to segregation in a growing number of European cities. The rich and 
the poor are living at an increasing distance from each other. A comparative study 
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on socioeconomic segregation in European capital cities concluded that this may 
be disastrous for the social stability and competitive power of cities (Tammaru, 
Marcińczak, Van Ham and Musterd, 2016). The authors of this study claimed that 
spatial segregation may become a breeding ground for misunderstanding and social 
unrest. Investment in neighbourhoods and communities are needed to reverse 
this trend. 
Politicians, almost by definition, depend on short-term electoral support. Private sector 
actors will only invest in deprived communities when profits and risks are acceptable 
and more attractive investment opportunities are unavailable. Social housing 
landlords, in contrast, have a long-term focus related to their real estate investments. 
Housing associations can therefore become a stabilising factor in local neighbourhood 
regeneration networks.
Achieving a mutual vision and goals that are shared by all actors involved is the 
most desirable outcome of neighbourhood regeneration decision-making. Given 
the fragmentation of actors, goals and perspectives this is likely to be unattainable. 
Housing associations have to make their own assessment. This implies that they must 
sometimes muster the audacity to act contrary to market logic, political agendas or the 
expectations of individual residents and local communities if this serves the quality 
of life in the neighbourhood in the long term. This is by no means a metaphorical 
‘blank cheque’ for the activities of housing associations. The Parliamentary Enquiry 
on Housing Associations in the Netherlands clearly demonstrated what can happen 
if housing associations overstep their mandate [see § 9.8.2]. Using the leeway that 
housing associations have – as a hybrid organisation located between state, market 
and community – is an extremely delicate exercise which should aim to seek a balance 
between the very different expectations of the outside world. This is only feasible when 
housing associations can combine proficiency in network management with increased 
accountability. Housing associations can undertake several actions in taking on this 
role: 
1 Increase their knowledge of the neighbourhood challenges and assess the capabilities 
of residents and the local community to address these problems
2 Choose an appropriate role in relation to each neighbourhood
3 Strive to include all relevant actors in the governance network
4 Provide stable ‘gradual’ neighbourhood regeneration resources to support network 
development
5 Improve accountability on decision-making processes and outcomes
These actions will be discussed in more detail below.
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1 Increase their knowledge of the neighbourhood challenges and assess the 
capabilities of residents and the local community to address these problems
There can be no ‘one-size-fits-all-approach’ to neighbourhood regeneration. In some 
neighbourhoods, the quality of life is already excellent, with no need for additional 
investments by the housing association beyond the regular housing management 
activities. These areas face few problems and those that do arise are adequately dealt 
with by agencies, local community networks or individual residents. At the other end 
of the spectrum are areas such as Lozells and De Hoogte, where residents encounter 
difficulties in solving problems without external support. Sometimes local community 
networks only need a little support. Housing associations must develop monitoring 
systems and connections between frontline staff and local communities to acquire 
knowledge about the challenges in each neighbourhood and the ability of the local 
community to address these challenges.
2 Choose an appropriate role in relation to each neighbourhood 
Based on the assessment described above, housing associations should carefully 
choose which role they can and should take. This role should preferably stimulate 
and facilitate resident initiatives and co-produce regeneration activities with local 
communities, but might also entail the delivery of interventions with limited resident 
involvement. The latter, rather interventionist, approach should only be taken as a 
last resort and would compel the housing associations to provide very convincing 
arguments to support their actions. Housing associations can use their position to 
act as a liaison between other organisations – for example the local authority – and 
signpost the needs of the area.
3. Strive to include all relevant actors in the governance network 
Given the current post-crisis context, government austerity and participation 
society agendas, it is very likely that future neighbourhood regeneration will only be 
delivered in networks that include private sector and community actors. This research 
demonstrated that housing associations have the potential to help craft and maintain 
the networks needed to contribute to the quality of life in vulnerable neighbourhoods. 
To counterbalance the power of local authorities and housing associations, 
interventions are needed to put residents in the position and provide them with 
resources to genuinely contribute to neighbourhood regeneration decision-making 
and delivery.
Most housing associations already have a strong relationship with market actors 
in the field of housing financing, maintenance, refurbishment and construction. 
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However, these relationships are limited to specific projects and transactions, with 
market actors rarely part of the network. Thus, the challenge for housing associations 
is to bring private sector actors into the governance network and increase their 
involvement in the regeneration of vulnerable neighbourhoods. This will call for dense 
interdependent relationships, risk sharing, mutual goals, robust communication and 
information sharing between actors, and a long-term focus on the neighbourhood and 
collaboration between the housing association and market actors (also see Keast and 
Brown, 2009). 
4. Provide stable ‘gradual’ neighbourhood regeneration 
resources to support network development
Financial resources are an important driver in developing and sustaining governance 
networks. This research found that both the absence and the abundance of resources 
can be detrimental to network performance. Financial resources can be so abundant 
that network actors are not able to transform them into meaningful neighbourhood 
regeneration outcomes. Well-known urban planning scholar Jane Jacobs framed 
the latter as ‘cataclysmic money’ in her seminal book The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities (Jacobs, 1961/1989). ‘Cataclysmic money’ refers to large, one-off 
investments that pour into an area in a concentrated form, producing, or intending to 
produce, drastic changes, but often behaving like a torrential and erosive flood (Jacobs, 
1961/1989, p. 293). The eroding character of the Housing Market Renewal initiative in 
general was clearly voiced in remarks made by the UK housing minister, Grant Shapps, 
in 2012: he compared the housing market renewal programme to bombing raids by the 
German Luftwaffe with respect to its impact on homes and communities.
This study also demonstrated that the availability of ‘cataclysmic money’ for 
neighbourhood regeneration can be very short-lived. Rare and brief periods of 
resource opulence alternate with long periods of resource ‘drought’. What is needed 
is a ‘gradual’ flow of resources that can capitalise, build upon and supplement what is 
already available in the neighbourhood: resources that behave like an irrigation system 
that feeds steady, continual growth (Jacobs, 1961/1989, p. 293). 
Housing associations can become an important source of such gradual flows of 
money by reinvesting the surpluses generated by their regular landlord activities into 
vulnerable neighbourhoods. The experiences of Midland Heart in Lozells after the 2011 
budget cuts demonstrate that the activities of dedicated staff members, supported 
by small amounts of money, can generate valuable results (see Van der Pennen & 
Van Bortel, 2015) when they remain focused on what is really relevant to the local 
community and they aim at mobilising the capabilities and talents of residents. The 
Neighbourhood Voting Days in Groningen also proved capable of stimulating many 
residents to develop and deliver neighbourhood regeneration activities. Money can go a 
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long way if it is not used to pay the salaries of unproductive staff members or expensive 
consultants but rather to leverage other resources, such as funds from other parties, 
time, commitment and local knowledge. 
Housing associations in England and the Netherlands have become very proficient in 
leveraging government support and using their own resources to attract private sector 
investments. It would be very much in line with the Big Society/Participation Society 
paradigm [see Chapter 8] for housing associations to use their leverage capabilities to 
not only attract investments from the private sector, but also time, talent and other 
resources from residents and local communities to supplement the ‘gradual money’ 
they invest in the neighbourhood themselves. These resources can be used by housing 
associations to create a gradual stream of opportunities and incentives for tenants and 
local communities, and as a stimulus for governments and market actors to provide 
additional resources and investments.
5. Improve accountability on decision-making processes and outcomes
This research found strong indications of a reluctance among professionals and 
policymakers to learn lessons from various activities in neighbourhood regeneration 
networks. Rather than reflection on their effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, the 
actors preferred to move on to new policy games. They seemed to be rather easily 
satisfied when decision-making in policy arenas led to action of any kind, without 
closely scrutinising the impact of these actions. This phenomenon closely resembles 
what Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p. 126) call ‘ex post rationalisation’.
Stakeholder satisfaction, including the satisfaction of residents, was frequently used 
as a measure in the policy evaluations in the case study areas. Teisman calls this the 
criterion of ‘ex post satisficing’ (1992). If actions do not lead to positive developments 
at an objective level, evaluation based on stakeholder satisfaction alone is not 
sufficient, as it cannot identify why actions did, or did not, deliver results. 
The attribution of certain outcomes to actions is complicated, and this research found 
that network actors tended to rather selectively attribute outcomes to activities in 
order to signpost the success of their own actions. In Chapter 6, we discussed three 
criteria proposed by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p. 127) for an integrated assessment 
of outcomes generated in a network setting: substantive learning, strategic learning 
and instructional learning. This research found that actors are reluctant to use such a 
holistic and comprehensive evaluation framework. 
There are several compelling reasons why housing associations should champion more 
integrated evaluation methods. First, housing associations – and their tenants – are 
on the sharp end of neighbourhood failure. Therefore, they need to know what works 
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and what does not work in neighbourhood regeneration. Housing associations have 
strong, long-term invested interests in the effectiveness of any action taken to improve 
the quality of life in a neighbourhood and the quality of the governance network that 
develops and delivers these actions. 
The challenge is not the availability of evaluation methods, but the discipline and the 
commitment of network actors using them. To illustrate this, the following textbox 
presents a framework that could be used for a more integrated evaluation.
Example: Towards a more holistic evaluation of governance 
network outcomes in neighbourhood regeneration.
This research found that decision-making dynamics in governance networks can lead 
to outcome assessments that are dominated by the satisfaction of the most powerful 
actors involved. This mode of outcome assessment often provides very little insight 
into how specific interventions contributed – or failed to contribute – to solving 
neighbourhood problems and meeting local community needs. This research also 
found a reluctance to undertake evaluations and a tendency to ‘cherry pick’ yardsticks 
that would place outcomes in the most positive light. This calls for instruments that 
facilitate a more comprehensive assessment of network outcomes.
One could state that this is ‘a fact of life’ in network decision-making and that network 
actors cannot be coerced into using these instruments. However, this research 
highlighted that housing associations in particular have many reasons to champion 
methods that support more holistic evaluations of governance network outcomes – not 
in the least because they are at the forefront of failed neighbourhood initiatives. 
Housing associations are faced with diverging – and sometimes conflicting – 
expectations and demands on their limited resources. They need tools to be 
accountable to stakeholders and their demands: to explain their actions and the 
outcomes these actions delivered. They also need methods to capture lessons on how 
the governance network was able to cope with cognitive, strategic and institutional 
uncertainties – especially in the context of increasing network complexity. 
The evaluation framework presented in this textbox is based on the findings of 
this research. It is an adapted version of the classic ‘input, throughput, output and 
outcome’ framework used in management and public administration research and 
policy evaluation (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004; Deuten & De Kam, 2005; Deuten, 
2007). It does not contain any new or revolutionary concepts. 
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This particular framework [see Table 9.1] is inspired by the ‘Logic Model’, which aims 
to evaluate the effectiveness and success of programmes. The Logic Model includes a 
visual representation of the connections between inputs and outputs and is therefore 
very suitable for use in multiple actor programme evaluations. The framework relies on 
the principles of clear accountability with respect to stakeholder input and plausible 
assumptions about how and why a programme will solve a particular problem, generate 
new possibilities and make the most of valuable assets (Innovation Network, n.d.; 
Millar, Simeone, & Carnevale, 2001; W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004a, 2004b).
This approach to accountability and evaluation can be enhanced through the 
comparison of ex-ante plans and expectations (planned activities and expected 
outcomes) with ex-post results (activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts delivered). 
Similar methods have been used as part of an action-learning project (2008-2010) 
on neighbourhood-focused housing associations to visualise inputs, activities and 
outcomes using the ‘Outcome Arena’ model (Van Bortel and Van Overmeeren, 2011; 
Mullins, Van Bortel, & Pethia, 2010). The development of the Outcome Arena was 
commissioned by former Experimental Social Housing body the SEV, now part of 
Platform31, as an instrument to support dialogue with stakeholders on neighbourhood 
interventions.
TABLE 9.1 Six accountability steps to increase housing association accountability
TOC
 264 Networks and Fault Lines
§  9.8 Epilogue: the future role of housing associations 
in neighbourhood regeneration networks
The rise and fall of the ‘Dutch Model’
Following cases of fraud and mismanagement, the governance, mandate and 
legitimacy of Dutch housing associations became the subject of public debate and 
scrutiny. Some of the incidents were related to the activities of housing associations 
in neighbourhood regeneration; for example, the transformation of a former cruise 
ship, the SS Rotterdam, into a vocational training centre and neighbourhood hub in 
Rotterdam (House of Representatives of the Netherlands, 2014b). This culminated 
in the establishment of a Parliamentary Enquiry on Housing Associations in 2012. 
A Parliamentary Enquiry is the highest level investigatory instrument that the Dutch 
Parliament has at its disposal. In this case, dozens of leading figures from the social 
housing sector and government agencies were scrutinised and held accountable during 
public hearings in 2014 that investigated the flaws in the governance structure of 
the Dutch social housing sector. In October 2014, the committee presented its final 
report ‘Ver van huis’ (‘Lost its bearings’) (House of Representatives of the Netherlands, 
2014a). The report concluded that trust in the Dutch social housing sector was 
damaged due to several factors: there was an over-dependence on the moral compass 
of housing associations themselves; housing associations lacked a clear mandate and 
behaved in overly ambitious and risky ways; and the sector suffered from inadequate 
governance and insufficient countervailing powers. 
Parallel to – and closely aligned with – the Parliamentary Enquiry, the national 
government was already working on a Revised Housing Act. After a long legislative 
process, the Revised Housing Act was unanimously adopted by Parliament in early 
2015 and came into force on 1 July 2015. The Revised Housing Act will have profound 
implications for the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration (see 
textbox below). 
Measures included in the 2015 Revised Housing Act related to the role of Dutch 
housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration
 – More influence of local authorities and tenants on the activities of housing associations
 – Restrictions on community investments (e.g. investments in neighbourhood facilities)
 – Activities to improve quality of life in neighbourhoods should be closely aligned with 
local authority policies
 – Liveability expenditure will very probably be maximised to €125 per dwelling, per year
 – Stricter rules for investments by housing associations in the private rental sector and 
owner-occupied housing
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A new role for housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration networks
The combination of a restricted mandate and scarcer resources will very probably 
lead to a different role for Dutch housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration 
networks. Housing associations will become less powerful actors in governance 
networks. Diminished power does not necessarily mean diminished importance. 
This research provides several reasons for why housing associations should remain 
active in vulnerable neighbourhoods.However, the 2015 Housing Act offers very little 
support for such a role and restricts the mandate of housing associations in relation 
to neighbourhood regeneration, even including very detailed restrictions, such as the 
maximum amount of money housing associations can spend on liveability activities 
(see textbox above). 
The argument for a significant role for housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration networks is at odds with the agenda of the current national government, 
the content of the new Housing Act and recent actions of many housing associations, 
who feel compelled to focus exclusively on their core business. A focus on people and 
places has been replaced by a focus on property management. In many areas, this may 
be perfectly adequate, but this is probably not the case in the most deprived areas. 
More focus is excellent, but housing associations should beware that they do not put 
on blinkers. 
Housing associations are among the most prominent frontline agencies supporting 
vulnerable people and places. Through their housing stock they are literally ‘anchored’ 
in the most deprived communities. Housing associations underestimate the 
importance of their role in regeneration networks in these vulnerable neighbourhoods. 
They should not see themselves as a ‘jack of all trades’ in the neighbourhood, but as 
an actor that helps to develop and maintain well-functioning and stable regeneration 
networks that vulnerable neighbourhoods need. The reasons for the active involvement 
of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration networks can be summarised 
in five key points:
1 Housing associations can provide a stable stream of neighbourhood investment
2 Housing associations can be the long-haul champion that neighbourhoods and local 
residents need
3 Housing associations can support well-functioning governance networks in 
neighbourhoods
4 Housing associations can help mainstream the Participation Society
5 Housing associations can be the capable frontline system agency that vulnerable 
neighbourhoods need
TOC
 266 Networks and Fault Lines
1 Housing associations can provide a stable stream of neighbourhood investment
Housing associations in the Netherlands own one-third of the total housing stock. 
In deprived neighbourhoods, often more than 70% of the properties are owned by 
housing associations. The value of these assets amounts to billions of euros. Annually, 
hundreds of millions of euros are invested in housing maintenance, refurbishment 
and new housing construction. This asset base, and the level of money channelled 
into neighbourhoods, makes housing associations an influential force in relation 
to improving the quality of life in neighbourhoods. Ideally, the allocation of these 
resources should not be decided by the housing associations alone, but in close 
collaboration with other network actors to achieve maximum impact. Housing 
associations can help maintain a steady flow of resources and work opportunities 
in these neighbourhoods, and act as a safety valve to prevent resource cataclysm or 
resource drought.
2 Housing associations can be the long-haul champion that 
neighbourhoods and local residents need 
This research demonstrated that housing associations can sustain their commitment 
to neighbourhoods in good and in bad times. Lozells and De Hoogte became better 
places as a result of the neighbourhood regeneration activities, but both areas and 
many residents are still vulnerable and likely to remain so in the future. This highlights 
the continuous nature of neighbourhood regeneration. The decision-making arenas 
examined in the case studies were contingent on policy arenas that had been 
established earlier, and will very probably be transformed into new arenas in the 
future. It is clearly a long-term process, not a quick-win project. To quote Jane Jacobs: 
‘Neighbourhood regeneration is a job that cannot begin too soon. But on the other 
hand it is also a job that is never over and done with, and never will be, in any given 
place’ (Jacobs, 1961, p. 294). 
In this respect, it would be prudent of housing associations not to forget the civil 
society roots of their sector. They are autonomous not-for-profit organisations that 
can make independent judgements. Yes, housing associations have strong bonds with 
the government, and may in future become more dependent on market dynamics. 
However, in the end, these connections do not define the essence of what constitutes a 
housing association. Ultimately, these connections are a means to an end. The end is to 
support vulnerable people who often live in deprived communities. 
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3 Housing associations can support well-functioning 
governance networks in neighbourhoods
Neighbourhoods need vibrant networks to solve problems, and actors who can help 
build and sustain these networks. In this research, decision-making interactions 
mainly played out between the government, housing associations and other third 
sector organisations. In retrospect, the number and variety of actors in the networks 
was rather limited: residents and market actors were not full members of the network.
The resources are no longer available to sustain top-down approaches to 
neighbourhood regeneration. This does not mean that vulnerable areas and vulnerable 
people no longer exist. They still do. Housing associations not only play an important 
role in championing these areas (as discussed in the previous point), they can also help 
strengthen governance networks to include the actors and the resources needed to 
improve the quality of life in vulnerable areas. 
Housing associations have become more dependent on private sector actors for 
neighbourhood regeneration investments. As a result of the Participation Society 
agenda, residents will become more important as co-producers of neighbourhood 
regeneration. Housing associations can help secure a more robust position for 
residents and market actors in the network. Traditionally, housing associations have 
invested in deprived communities. They know this part of the housing market and have 
developed mechanisms to deal with the risks and challenges involved. This expertise 
could open up investment opportunities for private sector actors who would otherwise 
have overlooked this specific segment of the housing market. This will require long-
term partnerships between housing associations and private sector actors, not one-off 
transactions. 
4 Housing associations can help mainstream the Participation Society
Participation Society discourse highlights the need for active and empowered citizens. 
However, it could very well be that governments, national and local, expect more self-
sufficiency from residents than they can muster. In other words, it is very likely that 
there will be a large group of people for whom participation is less obvious. A large 
proportion of these people are tenants of housing associations. Housing associations 
can thus function as an early warning system, to prevent a lack of engagement by local 
citizens and make independent judgements to champion vulnerable areas and their 
residents.
The neighbourhood is a promising level for mainstreaming the Participation Society. 
The 2015 Housing Act contains provisions that support community-based schemes 
such as housing cooperatives, and strengthens the position of residents in the 
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governance of housing associations. Using this framework, housing associations could 
reach out more effectively to residents and policymakers to support tenant initiatives. 
Housing associations can work with other actors in the network to support residents 
and help local communities to make the most of their latent energy, talents and local 
knowledge. 
5 Housing associations can be the capable frontline system 
agency that vulnerable neighbourhoods need
Housing associations are one of the primary system agencies capable of recognising 
that people or places are caught in a downward spiral. Each year, housing association 
staff, or organisations commissioned by them, make millions of house calls. They have 
more eyes and ears in the neighbourhoods than most system agencies. Additional early 
warning signals can be generated from their business processes, such as increasing 
rent arrears, anti-social behaviour, rising resident turnover, increasing vacancies and 
difficulties in housing lettings, rising housing and estate management costs. Housing 
associations are now more dependent on others. This might entice them to think more 
in coalitions and networks. They do not need to undertake action on signals that clearly 
fall outside their remit, but they could function as a liaison, mediating between system 
organisations in the network and providing support – without usurping power – to 
community initiatives in self-management and self-development. 
While in the past housing associations focused on the professionalisation of their 
housing development and finance activities, today the improvement of frontline 
services is of paramount importance. An active focus on the needs of neighbourhoods 
can help housing associations to better embed themselves in the life of the community, 
creating connections with a range of local groups and widening the association’s reach 
to its customers, especially those groups and individuals with whom it is more difficult 
to engage. Working with local residents will increase the range of staff skills, especially 
in bridging the incongruities between system and lifeworld, as discussed in Chapter 8.
A cautionary tale
This research ends at a crucial moment for both Dutch and English housing 
associations. While Dutch housing associations are looking for a new identity and 
renewed sources of legitimacy within a more restricted mandate, the English National 
Housing Federation’s (NHF) strategic vision on the position of English housing 
associations appears imbued with confidence:
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We [housing associations] are independent social enterprises – the best, longest 
established, social enterprises in the country. We create profit for a purpose and re-
invest that for social good. We don’t need permission to do that. We can just do it. (NHF, 
2014, p. 2)
Dutch housing associations have long operated on the basis of ‘We don’t need 
permission, we can just do it’ and are now recovering from the worst existential crisis in 
their history. The future of English housing associations could now look very different 
from the elated NHF vision presented in 2014, after the Conservative Government 
announced the extension of the Right to Buy scheme to include housing association 
tenants (Cabinet Office, 2015), and the first Conservative budget, presented in July 
2015, included four years of rent reductions for housing associations (HM Treasury, 
2015). Both measures restrict the contribution that housing associations can make 
to affordable housing and neighbourhood renewal. This demonstrates that the role of 
housing associations is part of a never-ending series of policy games. 
The housing associations in the case study areas demonstrated a long-term 
commitment to the quality of life in these neighbourhoods. They maintained this 
commitment while keeping a keen eye on their business interests in order to safeguard 
the value and market position of their housing stock, and with a concern for the public 
image of their organisations. 
It remains to be seen whether housing associations are able and willing to maintain 
such a commitment to vulnerable neighbourhoods. In both countries, social housing 
landlords are increasingly dependent on private sector finance. Housing associations 
need to comply with private sector requirements, while simultaneously complying with 
government expectations and regulations. There is a clear and present danger that 
housing associations will conform to market and political pressure and retreat from 
the support of vulnerable people and places to a focus on a narrow and very basic set of 
landlord activities.
I hope that housing associations will be able to maintain their commitment to 
vulnerable neighbourhoods, even when this is out of vogue, and will further develop 
their connections with local communities and individual residents. The research 
therefore ends with a cautionary tale. The moral of the following century-old fable 
is that the behaviour of some creatures, some people and some organisations is 
irrepressible, no matter what the consequences. It is my firm belief that the future of 
housing associations is irrevocably connected to the future of vulnerable people and 
communities. Peril faced by one would bring peril to the other, but unlike the scorpion, 
housing associations have a choice. 
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THE FABLE OF THE SCORPION AND THE TURTLE
FIGURE 9.5 Source: An 1847 illustration of ‘The Scorpion and the Turtle’ from the 
Persian Kalilah and Dimn
A scorpion asks a turtle to carry him across a river. The turtle is afraid of being stung during the trip, 
but the scorpion argues that if it stung the turtle, the turtle would sink and the scorpion would drown. 
The turtle agrees and begins carrying the scorpion, but midway across the river the scorpion does 
indeed sting the turtle, dooming them both. When asked why, the scorpion explains that this is simply 
its nature.
This fable appears in different variants in several African and European folk tales, with the earliest 
versions dating from the fifth century BC in Babylonia. See for example: The Phantom Publisher (2010), 
The Lady Frog and the Scorpion. Wellington, Phantom House Books. 
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PART 4 Appendixes
HOUSING HERO 4:
There is only one country: earth
There is only one people: humanity
There is only one religion: love
Floor Wibaut (1859-1939), socialist alderman for housing, Municipality of 
Amsterdam26
.
26 The Amsterdam Municipality used Floor Wibaut’s quote in its obituary commemorating the crash of Malaysia 
Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 over Ukraine that killed all 298 people on board.
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Appendix C Overview of actors and interviewees
FIGURE 9.6 Overview of main actors in the Birmingham case study
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Lozells, Birmingham, England
NAME FUNCTION ORGANISATION INTERVIEW(S)
Government (local and national)
1 Deborah Burke Regeneration 
manager
Birmingham City 
Council
2010 and 2011
2 Mark English Housing service 
manager
Birmingham City 
Council
2010 and 2011
3 Kate Foley2 Neighbourhood 
Manager for Lozells
Birmingham City 
Council
2009 and 2010
4 Kate Foley2 Regeneration officer Urban Living 2011
5 Gillian Loyd Neighbourhood 
Manager for Lozells
Birmingham City 
Council
2010
6 Baggi Mattu2 Regeneration officer Homes and Com-
munity Agency
(HCA)
2010
7 Mark Thompson Officer / Trainee Homes and 
Community Agency 
(HCA)
2008
8 Yvonne Wagner1 Ward support 
officer
Birmingham City 
Council
2007
Residents
9 Saaed Saidul Haque Co-chair Forum
Community Activist
Social Entrepreneur 
Lozells Neighbour-
hood Forum
2009 and 2010
10 Mahmood Hussain1 Ward councillor for 
East Handsworth 
and Lozells
Councillor for 
Birmingham City 
Council
2007
11 Sister Helen Ryan Co-chair Forum Lozells Neighbour-
hood Forum
2011
12 Waseem Zaffar Ward councillor for 
East Handsworth 
and Lozells
Councillor for 
Birmingham City 
Council
2011
Housing Associations
13 Jo Burrill Community In-
volvement Officer
Midland Heart 2011
14 Mary Jane Gunn Community In-
volvement Officer 
Midland Heart 2009 and 2011
15 Martin Hall Community In-
volvement Officer 
Midland Heart 2010 and 2011
16 Baggi Mattu2 Regeneration officer Midland Heart 2007, 2008 and 
2009
>>>
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NAME FUNCTION ORGANISATION INTERVIEW(S)
17 Tom Murtha Chief Operational 
Officer (2007) / 
Chief Executive 
officer (2010)
Midland Heart 2007 and 2010
18 Ashok Patel Community Invest-
ment Officer
Midland Heart 2013
19 Olu Olanrewaju Manager Urban 
Heart
Midland Heart 2007
20 Gail Walters Head of Community 
Involvement
Midland Heart 2010, 2011 and 
2013 
Others
21 Nick Booth Social media con-
sultancy
Podnosh 2009
22 Steve Botham Chair Chamberlain Forum 2009
23 Chris Wadhams Independent Hous-
ing & Regeneration 
Expert
2008
1 Interviews conducted by Michael Farrelly. Transcripts used for this research with kind permission. 
2 Kate Foley worked as a Neighbourhood manager for Lozells and moved to Urban Living in 2011. Baggi Mattu 
worked as a regeneration officer for Midland Heart and moved to the Homes and Communities Agency in 2010.
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De Hoogte, Groningen, The Netherlands
 
FIGURE 9.7 Overview of main actors in the Groningen case study 
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De Hoogte, Groningen, The Netherlands
NAME FUNCTION ORGANISATION INTERVIEW(S)
Groningen Local Authority
1 Chris Niemeijer Neighbourhood 
coordinator for De 
Hoogte and Korre-
wegwijk
OCSW department, 
Groningen City 
Council
2009, 2010 and 
2011
2 Rene de Jong Former District 
Coordinator in 
1980s
City district coordi-
nation department, 
Groningen City 
Council (‘Stadsdeel-
coordinatie’)
2008 (combined 
interview with Rene 
de Jong)
3 Gerard Tollner Policy officer in 
1980s
City district coordi-
nation department, 
Groningen City 
Council (‘Stadsdeel-
coordinatie’)
2008 (combined 
interview with Rene 
de Jong)
4 Liesbeth van de 
Wetering
District Coordinator 
(‘Old Neighbour-
hoods’) 
City district coordi-
nation department, 
Groningen City 
Council (‘Stadsdeel-
coordinatie’)
2009 and 2011
5 Wouter van Bolhuis District Coordinator 
(‘Old Neighbour-
hoods’) 
City district coordi-
nation department, 
Groningen City 
Council (‘Stadsdeel-
coordinatie’)
2009
6 Ron Jeukens Process manager for 
the development of 
the Neighbourhood 
Action Plans in 
2007
Commissioned 
by Groningen City 
Council
2008
7 Henk Boldewijn Process manager for 
the implementation 
of the Neighour-
hood Action Plan in 
2008
Commissioned 
by Groningen City 
Council
2011
8 Kees van der Helm Programma manag-
er Nieuw Lokaal 
Akkoord
City district coordi-
nation department, 
Groningen City 
Council (‘Stadsdeel-
coordinatie’)
2008, 2011 and 
2014
9 Frank de Vries Alderman respon-
sible for housing 
(2006-2012)
Groningen City 
Council
2011
10 Teresa Kloosterhuis Policy officer Nieuw 
Lokaal Akkoord
Groningen City 
Council
2011
>>>
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NAME FUNCTION ORGANISATION INTERVIEW(S)
11 Inge Jongman Councillor for Chris-
ten Unie political 
party
Groningen City 
Council, chair of 
‘Heel de Buurt’ 
overleg
2011
Residents
12 Alex Spanjer Resident / Commu-
nity representative
Member of Plan 
group for the 
Tuindorp De Hoogte 
refurbishment. 
and ‘Heel de Buurt 
overleg’, member 
of Neighbourhood 
Team De Hoogte
2009 and 2010
13 Evert Bosscher Resident / Commu-
nity representative
Member of Plan 
group for Tuindorp 
De Hoogte refur-
bishment, and ‘Heel 
de Buurt overleg’ 
Neighbourhood 
Team De Hoogte
June 2011
14 Peter van Pelt Resident / Commu-
nity representative
Member of the ac-
tion group opposing 
the demolishment 
of the 48 apart-
ments
2009
15 Linden Douma Resident / Commu-
nity representative 
Member Neigh-
bourhood Council 
(Wijkraad) De 
Hoogte.
2013
Housing Associations
16 Peter Hillenga Chief Executive 
Officer  
Housing association 
De Huismeesters
2009, 2010, 2014
(2014 combined 
interview with Henk 
Zaagman)
17 Henk Zaagman Head of Housing 
Services
Housing association 
De Huismeesters
2008, 2010, 2011 
and 2014
(2014 combined 
interview with Peter 
Hilenga)
18 Stein van Berkel Neighbourhood 
officer
Housing association 
De Huismeesters
2009, 2010
and 2011
19 Miranda de Locht Neighbourhood 
manager
Housing association 
Lefier (uptil 2010 
‘In’)
2010
20 Mathilde 
Groeneveld
Housing officer Housing association 
De Huismeesters
2011
21 Mireille van der 
Velde
Housing officer Housing association 
De Huismeesters
2011
Community Support
>>>
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NAME FUNCTION ORGANISATION INTERVIEW(S)
22 Anja Bos Community Sup-
port officer for De 
Hoogte 
Stiel Foundation 2009
23 Carina de Witte Community Sup-
port officer for De 
Hoogte
Stiel Foundation 2011
24 Hennie van Beek Community Sup-
port officer 
Commissioned by 
housing association 
De Huismeesters to 
support the ‘Plan-
groep’ refurbish-
ment Tuindorp De 
Hoogte
2011
TABLE 9.2 Overview of interviewees 
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Appendix D Overview of attended events
Lozells, Birmingham, United Kingdom
NR. MEETING DATE
1. 2nd Midland Heart Client Workshop for the devel-
opment of the Lozells Masterplan 
December 2007
2. 3rd Midland Heart Client Workshop for the devel-
opment of the Lozells Masterplan 
January 2008
3. Public consultation meeting Lozells Masterplan May 2008
4. Meeting Mary Jane Gunn (ML, neighbourhood 
management), Kate Foley (BCC, neighbourhood 
manager) and a representative of the BCC, hous-
ing department 
January 2009 (in a pub)
5. Lozells Neighbourhood Management Board 
meeting
April 2009 (in a school)
6. Workshop with Midland Heart officers on the 
role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
renewal
November 2010
De Hoogte, Groningen, The Netherlands
NR. MEETING DATE
1. Start of the refurbishment project in De Hoogte May 2009
2. Community meeting on the replacement of com-
munity center De Borg. 
June 2011
3. Neighbourhood Voting Day Korrewegwijk October 2011
4. Neighbourhood Voting Day De Hoogte November 2011
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Appendix E Actions taken to ensure 
research quality
Chapter 1 introduced the following criteria to ensure adequate academic research 
quality: veracity, objectivity and perspicacity [see Table App.E.1 below]. This appendix 
identifies possible pitfalls of the adopted research approach, and describes the 
measures used to overcome these difficulties. Following Stewart (1998), coping 
strategies for each of these research quality criteria have been developed. 
QUALITY CRITERIA USED IN THIS RESEARCH
Veracity Level of plausibility and accountability of what we 
have observed.
Objectivity Level of mitigation of research and researcher bias, 
and the accountability of research circumstances.
Perspicacity Level to which research results have been produced 
that can be applied outside the case study context.
TABLE APP.E.1 Research quality criteria
A Veracity 
There are some insurmountable limits to fully understanding decision-making 
processes. It is simply impossible to observe and track all decision-making events. In 
addition, not all policy documents, events and actors are accessible to the researcher. 
Informants are not ‘open books’ for easy inspection, nor do they necessarily have to 
speak the truth or reveal all information. Limitations of the researcher due to personal 
and role constraints constitute additional research challenges: researchers can forget, 
ignore, mishear and misinterpret. 
Research coping strategies to pursue veracity:
 – Prolonged fieldwork
 – Search for disconfirming observations
 – Good participative role relationships
 – Attentiveness to speech and interactional contexts
 – Multiple modes of data collection
 – Repeat and follow up interactions with actors 
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B Objectivity
Positivist and quantitative orientated researchers bundle objectivity and consistency 
in the goal to attain reliability (Stewart, 1998, p. 29). This makes sense if one has 
the ambition to capture research results that are independent from the researcher, 
time, social context and research circumstances. However, this does not make much 
sense for most research projects. It would be too simple to ignore the concept of 
reliability altogether. Stewart does this by first unbundling objectivity from consistency. 
Objectivity is a concept that can be useful in research in an ethnographic tradition. 
Stewart identifies three sub constructs that influence objectivity: 1) bias, 2) replication 
of research and 3) specification of research circumstances. 
The positivist concept of reliability is problematic in qualitative research. Qualitative 
research is embedded in, and influenced by, a complex social context (see Geertz, 
1976, 1988).  Describing the context in full will not mitigate this bias, because 
contexts are not universal or ‘given’ but actively constructed by actors. There are, 
however, strategies to minimise bias and support specification, but there are no tactics 
to enable replication. While replicability is not a precondition for scientific findings, 
inter-subjective testability is (Hunt, 1991).
Research coping strategies to pursue objectivity:
 – Trail of the researchers’ path: describing the process through which they have learned
 – Respondent validation of research findings
 – Invite feedback from outsider informants
C Perspicacity
Qualitative research aspires to produce applicable insights that can be used in more 
contexts than that of the case in which the fieldwork took place. Specifying the 
underlying generic forms of interactions, processes, structures and meanings can 
attain this objective. Using methods that create insights and help in understanding the 
non-obvious, supports perspicacity. A challenge to achieve perspicacity is the limited 
knowledge on the transferability of insights, given that observations are connected to 
the social and systemic contexts that influence their meaning.
Research coping strategies to pursue perspicacity:
 – Intense consideration of empirical case study data
 – Extensive exploration of the context of the case study area and search for contingencies
Chapter 1 presented some strategies to safeguard research quality. The table below 
contains a critical reflection on how these strategies have been applied in this research. 
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QUALITY CRITERIA RESEARCH COPING STRATEGY ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THIS 
RESEARCH
Veracity Prolonged fieldwork The fieldwork period spanned a 
8-year period (from 2007 until 
2014). The total time spent in 
each case study area was approxi-
mately one month.
Search for disconfirming obser-
vations
The selection of informants and 
documents include actors and 
accounts from various sources: 
network actors working with local 
authority, housing associations, 
community representatives, 
informed outsiders and actors that 
had left the network during the 
field work period.
Good participative role relation-
ships
Contacts with informants were 
used to generate possibilities for 
additional interviews and possibili-
ties to participate in events.
While attending meetings the 
researcher mainly adopted the role 
of Peripheral Member Researcher 
or Active Member Researcher (Adler 
and Adler (1987) when the passive 
observation was considered 
rather unnatural or unusual (Van 
Maanen, 1991, p. 31).
Attentiveness to speech and inter-
actional contexts.
Around 50 of the 70 interviews 
were transcribed in full. The 
remaining interviews were sum-
marized or captured in memos. 
Where relevant, transcripts 
included comments on the tone 
of voice used by the informant, 
short descriptions of the physical 
and social context of the interviews 
conducted and meetings attended 
were given.
Multiple modes of data collection This research combined individual 
interviews, with some group inter-
views, participant observation of 
events and desk research. Analysis 
included social media accounts. 
This data source that expanded 
during the fieldwork period. 
>>>
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QUALITY CRITERIA RESEARCH COPING STRATEGY ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THIS 
RESEARCH
Objectivity Trail of the researchers path de-
scribing the process through which 
they have learned
The methodology section in 
chapter 9 contains a summary of 
the learning experiences of the re-
searcher. The appendixes provide 
an overview of the informants, the 
number of interviews conducted 
and information on attended 
events.
Respondent validation of research 
findings
No explicit validation of research 
findings took place but draft 
texts have been presented for 
comments to key local informants. 
Their feedback was used to revise 
texts. 
Invite feedback from outsiders The study included interviews 
with outsider informants, i.e. 
informants that where involved in 
past decision-making events in the 
case-study areas in the 1980s and 
1990s. Several actors were inter-
viewed that had left the network 
during the fieldwork period due to 
a change in job-position. 
>>>
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QUALITY CRITERIA RESEARCH COPING STRATEGY ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THIS 
RESEARCH
Perspicacity Intense consideration of empirical 
case study data
Interview transcripts were coded 
and analysed using Atlas TI soft-
ware and a coding list (appendix 
F) derived from the theoretical 
framework. This enabled the 
analysis of phenomena that were 
mentioned by informants or were 
found in documents. The coding 
also facilitated the comparison of 
data from both case study areas.
The added value of the coding was 
limited. In practise, full text search 
of interview transcripts and doc-
uments using keywords from the 
coding list provided more flexibility 
to analyse the data.
Emerging ideas about data 
analysis and interpretation were 
captured by writing memos and 
commentaries.
Interview transcripts were consult-
ed a second time for the secondary 
analysis of case study data using 
Habermas’s system and lifeworld 
concept [see chapter 8].
Extensive exploration of the 
context of the case study area and 
search for contingencies
The context of the case study areas 
plays and important role in the ex-
ploration as described in Chapter 
2 and elaborated in various other 
chapters.
TABLE APP.E.2 Research quality strategies
References
Adler, P.A.,  & Adler, P. (1987). Membership roles in field research. Newbury Park: CA: Sage.
Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales of the field: On writing ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Appendix F Topics list for interviews
This topics list was used for the Birmingham case study. A similar, Dutch language 
version, was used for interviews in Groningen. The list was also used to code interview 
transcripts using the qualitative research tool Atlas TI. 
1 Network (Research question # 2) 
1.1  General information on network composition
1.1.1 In what way are you involved in the regeneration of the Lozells 
and the North-Lozells master planning in particular?
1.1.2 With which actors [people or organisations] do you interact 
regularly concerning the regeneration in the Lozells?
1.1.3 How often do you meet, and how are these interactions organised? 
(formal/informal, regular/irregular, bilateral/multilateral) 
1.1.4 What actors are important for the regeneration of the Lozells but are not involved?
1.2 Interdependencies  
1.2.1 On what issues/decisions do you need the resources/support of other 
actors. Who were these actors and what did you need?. (Resources 
can take very different forms and shapes, like grants, loans, permits, 
knowledge, land, real estate, active support or passive consent). 
1.2.2 On what issues/decisions do other actors need your resources/
support? Who were these actors and what did they need? 
1.2.3 How did this influence decision-making? 
1.2.4 How did you respond?
1.3 Network dynamics / context  [Research question #1)
1.3.1 Did any actor exit or enter the decision-making events? 
1.3.2 Were there any statutory changes (e.g. mergers, participation 
in groups structures, changes is statutory powers)?
1.3.3 Were there any deadlines, timetables that influenced 
decision-making? If so, in what way?
1.3.4 Did any external developments in your opinion influence the regeneration in the 
Lozells. If so, how? If necessary ask the following more specific questions?:
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A Political developments;
B Policy developments;
C Regulatory developments;
D Social developments;
E Economic / (housing) market developments.
2 Actors (Research question #3)
2.1 In what way are you and your organisation involved in the regeneration of the Lozells?  
2.2 Why is the regeneration of the Lozells important for your organisation? 
2.3 In what way are you involved in the development and/
or implementation of the North-Lozells Masterplan? 
2.4 Could you tell me more about your background and that of your organisation?  
(only ask this question if Q 2.1 – Q2.3. did not produce enough info) 
3 Process / decision-making interactions (Research question #4)
3.1 Issues 
3.1.1 What are in your view the main challenges/problems facing the Lozells? 
3.2 Goals
3.2.1 What are the objectives of your organisation concerning the regeneration of 
the Lozells? (only ask this question if Q 2.4 did not produce enough info) 
3.2.2 What actions should be taken to achieve these goals? 
3.2.3 In what way do the actions in the North-Lozells Masterplan address these issues? 
3.3 Actions
3.3.1 Could you tell me more about recent or ongoing actions/events (e.g.  workshops, public 
consultation events, meetings, other) you are involved in concerning the generation of 
the Lozells in general and the North-Lozells Masterplan in specific? Could you tell me 
more about these actions/events?. 
The answer should address the following items. Ask additional 
questions if necessary and use the name used for the action or event 
(e.g. Radnor Road deconversion or North-Lozells masterplan)
A what was your role?
B who else participated?
C who was facilitating / leading (if any) the action/event?
D what was done or discussed in the action/event?
E what did you want to achieve with this action/event? 
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F could you tell what you did during the action/event?
G what did other actors do? (pay special attention to Midland Heart)
H did any of the actors behave in a way that was for you unexpected or dysfunctional? 
How did this influence decision-making? 
I what were the outcomes of the action/event?
J what is your opinion on the outcomes of these action/event?
K (positive/negative, breakthroughs/deadlocks) 
L was there any communication about the action/events with non-participants.  If so, 
what? 
3.3.2 Could you tell me more about the way people from different organisations collaborated 
in these actions/events? 
Implicit of explicit rules concerning the following items:
A were there any actors that started or stopped their participation when the action/event  
was already ongoing? Why? 
B were there any differences in the influences of participants (dominant vs. weak actors)
C how are decisions made? (based consensus, consent, decision by a dominant actor)
D were there any conflicts and if so how where they handled
E if decisions had to be made, where their any alternative courses of actions criteria to 
select solutions
F how do you assess the level of trust or distrust between actors? 
3.3.3 Issues concerning the closedness of decision-making:
A were there any people / organisations deliberately included or excluded from the 
action/event? Why?
B were there any actions/events where you wanted to participate but were excluded. If so 
by anyone in particular? 
C were there moments during actions/events where you felt that your input was ignored? 
D If so could you tell bit more about this? Who ignored your input. How did this influence 
decision-making? How did you respond? 
3.3.4 Issues concerning pluriformity 
A During decision-making on the regeneration of the Lozells, did you encounter 
situations where representatives or department from the same organisation (BCC, 
Midland Heart, others?) expressed contradictory opinions/goals. 
B How did this influence decision-making? How did you respond?
3.4 Outcomes (Research question #5)
3.4.1 What tangible results did the regeneration of the Lozells deliver (e.g. 
new or refurbished housing, social services, economic results)?
3.4.2 What are the effects / outcomes of these results? 
3.4.3 How do these results and outcomes relate to your perceptions of the 
important issues in the Lozells and the objectives of your organisation?
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4 Learning outcomes (Research question #5) 
4.1 Cognitive learning
4.1.1 In what way (if any) did your views on the problems and 
the possible solutions change over time? 
4.1.2 To what extend is there a joint view on problems and most viable solutions concerning 
the regeneration of the  Lozells.  Where do the views of actors overlap or differ?
4.1.3 Did your goals concerning the regeneration of the Lozells change over time? Why?
4.1.4 To what extend do your goals concerning the regeneration of the Lozells overlap 
with those of other actors? Where do the goals of actors overlap or differ?
4.1.5 To what extend are you satisfied with the overall outcomes 
of regenereation of  the Lozells? Why or why not?
4.2 Strategic learning
4.2.1 To what extend are you satisfied with the overall decision-making processes 
on  regeneration of the Lozells? What went well what went not so well? 
4.2.2 To what extend have you increased your understanding of objectives 
of other actors and the interdependencies between actors.
4.2.3 In what way did decision-making change your ability and the ability 
of other actors to effectively deal with conflicts of interest? 
4.2.4 How do you assess the transparency, openness and involvement of residents and 
politicians concerning decision-making on the regeneration of the Lozells?
4.3 Institutional learning
4.3.1 Did any new relations, partnerships, organisations or other collaborative 
or deliberative structures emerge from decision-making to support 
future interactions and make them more predictable?
4.3.2 Did any formal or informal new rules or joint language emerge from decision-making?
4.3.3 In what way did the decision-making process change the level of trust between actors?
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Appendix G Figures to update information 
in Chapter 4 on Dutch housing 
associations size and performance
FIGURE APP.G.1 Number and average size of Dutch housing associations  1997-2012 
Source: Zijlstra and Van Bortel (2014). Will scale finally deliver? Overcoming the crisis: are Dutch housing 
associations able to deliver better value for money? Paper presented at the 2014 ENHR Conference Edinburgh, 
1-4 July 2014.
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FIGURE APP.G.2 Number of housing associations per size categorie in 2006 and 2012.
FIGURE APP.G.3 Variation of net operational expenses per housing housing unit in 2012 in euros (y) by 
organisational scale of the housing association (x). Source: CFV Sectorbeeld 2013, p. 33.
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FIGURE APP.G.4 Average net operational expenses per housing unit
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Appendix H Social, Economic and Liveability 
developments in De Hoogte and Lozells
Lozells, Birmingham
FIGURE APP.H.1 Persons in households with a ‘Household Reference Person’ that never worked or is long-term 
unemployed 
Source: Office of National Statistics. Census 2011 table code: QS119EW / Census 2001 table code: UV067
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FIGURE APP.H.2 Households and deprivation dimensions (Based on 2001 and 2011 census data)
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De Hoogte, Groningen
FIGURE APP.H.3 Liveability Assessment for De Hoogte, Korrewegwijk and Groningen  
Source: Outcomemonitor Wijkenaanpak 2015, p. 112 (translation by author).
 DE HOOGTE GRONINGEN ALL 40 PRIORITY 
 NEIGHBOURHOODS
THE NETHERLANDS
Work and income 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007
Income from labour1 3 59% 58% 66% 65% 60% 59% 72% 71%
Households on long term bene-
fits >3 years3
9% 11% 3% 4% 6% 7% 2% 2%
Non-working jobseekers3 9% 15% 5% 7% 7% 11% 4% 5%
Low income households2 78% 76% 59% 59% 60% 61% 40% 40%
1=2007 and 2011 | 2 =2007 and 2010, lowest 4 income deciles | 3= in % of total employable population 
CBS, Outcome monitor (Aandachtswijken), 2008-2012, Statline  http://statline.cbs.nl
TABLE APP.H.1 Social economic indicators from Outcome Monitor Empowered Neighbourhoods Program
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Summary
Networks and Fault Lines 
Understanding the role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration:  
a network governance perspective
1 The changing role of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration
This study aims to increase our understanding of the role of social housing 
organisations in neighbourhood regeneration governance networks, in order to 
enhance the performance and outcomes of these networks. Our understanding of how 
governance networks work is still limited, especially concerning the role of non-state 
actors like housing associations. Hierarchical government steering is increasingly 
mixed with market mechanisms and networked forms of decision-making. These shifts 
in governance often result in more complex decision-making that can easily lead to 
deadlocks, low-quality outcomes and ambiguous anchorage of democratic principles. 
Neighbourhood regeneration takes place in rather exceptional governance networks. 
The organisations involved, and the problems at hand, are place-based.  Actors, like 
housing associations, local authorities and community organisations, are more or less 
‘locked’ into the regeneration network and need to collaborate in order to solve the 
problems. The complexity of neighbourhood renewal processes is often very high, due 
to the large number of actors involved, and the combination of insufficient housing 
quality, lack of affordability and supply, along with social and economic problems that 
need to be addressed. 
Housing associations focus on the delivery of affordable decent quality housing; but, 
in many countries—like the Netherlands and England—these organisations also have 
an important role in neighbourhood regeneration. Housing associations are non-profit 
organisations that provide housing for low and moderate-income households. They 
operate largely autonomously from the government, although they are often strongly 
regulated and dependent on government subsidies. Housing associations in England 
and the Netherlands share many organisational characteristics and hybrid third-sector 
values emerging from the need to balance social and economic objectives. They have 
largely similar tasks and responsibilities, but work in very divergent contexts.
TOC
 310 Networks and Fault Lines
This study devotes careful attention to the contingencies of time and place of decision-
making in order to regenerate insights that are also relevant outside the case-study 
areas. Therefore, this study places Dutch and English housing associations in their 
respective political economies, welfare regimes and rental housing systems. The study 
also highlights the ambiguous position—between state, market, and society—of 
housing associations
Neighbourhood regeneration evolved from slum clearance and complete area 
redevelopment in the 1950s and 1960s, towards more integral place-based 
approaches—in the 1970s and 1980s—with a stronger emphasis on improving the 
existing housing stock and involving local communities. The nature of the involvement 
of housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration has changed over time 
in response to government policies, public opinion, their own strategies, and the 
strategies of their umbrella organisations. In both England and the Netherlands, their 
increasingly prominent role —especially after the start of the new millennium—was 
driven by pressures on housing associations to take a leading role in neighbourhood 
regeneration. 
2 A governance network perspective on neighbourhood regeneration
The emergence of the ‘network society’ has led to a fragmentation of power and 
resources. This fragmentation has led to increased interdependence of actors; public, 
private and community actors need to collaborate to solve problems. This study uses 
a governance network approach to explore the complexity and uncertainties involved 
in neighbourhood regeneration decision-making. The study explores five interrelated 
questions [see Chapter 1, §1.2], each related to a component of a theoretical 
framework on decision-making in a network setting. These questions involve context, 
networks, actors, processes and outcomes. 
In order to answer the research questions, a qualitative, comparative, longitudinal 
exploration based on a case study methodology, was conducted. To ensure that 
comparable cases were explored, similar ‘focal actors’ were chosen (i.e. housing 
associations), as well as similar ‘policy outputs’ as starting points for the study 
(i.e. the drafting of neighbourhood regeneration plans). Based on these criteria, 
housing association Midland Heart, and the neighbourhood Lozells in North/West 
Birmingham, was selected as the English case study. In the Netherlands, housing 
association De Huismeesters, and De Hoogte, a neighbourhood in Groningen, were 
selected. Personal accounts have been an important data source for this study; 70 
interviews with 45 different individuals were conducted between 2007 and 2014 in 
Groningen, and Birmingham. In addition, for the case study in The Hague (Chapter 5), 
around 25 interviews were conducted in 2004. That chapter was a first introduction to 
the explanatory capabilities of the network governance perspective.
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3 Research results
The introductory chapter explores contextual factors—such as economic, social and 
political developments—that affect the role of housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration. Chapters 3 through 7 contain sections which describe the context 
relevant to that specific chapter. Chapter 8 is more reflective in nature and discusses 
the impact of post-crisis ‘Big Society’ (UK), and Participation Society (NL) government 
policies, as contingency factors for the role of housing associations in relation to 
local communities. Finally, Chapter 9 brings all the components of the theoretical 
framework together and especially reflects on the significant impact of contextual 
developments on the role played by housing associations in neighbourhood 
regeneration decision-making, and delivery. This research also highlighted the strong 
network relationships between housing associations and local authorities, but also 
revealed the often troublesome interactions between housing associations and 
residents. The title of this thesis: “Networks and Fault lines” is intended to reflect this.  
This research took place in a period of unexpectedly dynamic economic, social 
and political developments, i.e. the global financial crisis, the housing-market 
downturn, government austerity, and a more restricted interpretation of the state’s 
role in delivering welfare services. The impacts of these developments varied across 
the two cases. The Dutch housing association proved more resilient to contextual 
developments than its English counterpart; especially its ability to continue the 
neighbourhood investment programme. National government funding was less 
important to the Dutch housing association: the organisation already had access to 
neighbourhood regeneration investment resources. Other contextual factors, such as 
the characteristics of the national political economies, welfare and housing systems, 
indirectly affected the role played by housing associations. These factors mainly 
influenced the characteristics of the governance networks and the decision-making 
processes within these networks. 
Explored through the networks component are the characteristics of the governance 
networks that housing associations participate in: interdependencies, strength of 
network relations, and the nature of the coordination mechanisms that underline 
decision-making. The key concepts to exploring networks are introduced in Chapter 
2, and further developed in Chapters 3, 5 and 7. We found high levels of uncertainty, 
generated by the variety of, and the interdependencies between, actors, the 
closed-mindedness of actors to the arguments of other parties, and the changes in 
composition of the governance network. For example, the research found substantial 
cross-national differences, and indications that network characteristics change and 
fluctuate over time. In contrast to the situation in Groningen, the dependency of 
the Birmingham network on external government funding negatively affected the 
stability and the performance of that network. In Groningen, top-down government 
intervention also negatively affected the stability of the network, but for other reasons. 
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The, short-lived, abundance of resources for regeneration led to such a high number of 
new actors, issues, goals and decision-making arenas that the governance network was 
unable to function properly for some time. The network actors increased the complexity 
of policy games of their own volition. Sometimes, this was induced by the national 
government, when local network actors responded to steering instruments such as 
government subsidies. This led to more network complexity and dynamics in the form 
of new goals, network actors and decision-making arenas. 
The third research component—the actors— explored the perceptions and objectives 
of housing associations, and other key network actors concerning neighbourhood 
regeneration investments and activities. Housing associations in both case-study 
areas took a prominent role in neighbourhood regeneration activities, and collaborated 
closely with local authority departments in drafting regeneration plans. The housing 
associations regarded improving the quality and variety of the local housing stock as an 
important element in creating a more mixed community, and retaining and attracting 
more affluent households. The local authorities supported this predominantly long-
term ambition. Residents were more concerned with tackling short-term liveability 
issues, such as anti-social behaviour, crime and litter.
The role of housing associations changed during the 2007-2014 fieldwork period. 
From occupying a leading role in the regeneration process—in partnership with the 
local authority—at the start of the exploration in 2007, this role transformed into a 
more facilitating and supporting role. This appears to have been brought about by two 
related factors: a serious decline in available regeneration resources, and an increased 
emphasis on the responsibilities of individual residents and local communities under 
the influence of the Participation Society agenda, in the Netherlands, and the Localism 
agenda in England.
Residents and private-sector organisations were rarely directly involved in regeneration 
decision-making. With a little hindsight, one could formulate the contention that these 
actors were not fully represented in the governance network because the incumbent 
network actors (i.e. the housing associations and local authorities) chose the devil 
they knew. They opted for state involvement to acquire investment resources, rather 
than facing the uncertainties that would have resulted from expanding the network to 
include residents and private-sector organisations as full and mature network actors.
Decision-making processes constitute the fourth component of this study. It explored 
the decision-making interactions inside the neighbourhood regeneration networks, 
with a special focus on the interaction strategies used by housing associations. This 
study found that housing associations in the Groningen and Birmingham cases had a 
prominent and often leading role in the policy arenas where regeneration policies were 
developed. National governments in both countries had a strong impact on how these 
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processes evolved, leveraged by the alluring investment resources offered by national 
regeneration programmes, and the preconditions accompanying these resources. 
Decision-making took place in arenas that almost exclusively consisted of housing 
association and local authority professionals. Residents were largely given a 
consumerist role in the process: their views on neighbourhood needs were collected 
through various instruments to involve residents, such as surveys and street interviews. 
Their views were, implicitly, taken into account in the decision-making. Residents 
were most often not part of these processes and not involved in the development 
of regeneration investments plans. Not all decision-making arenas were closed to 
residents. The housing associations in both case-study areas did involve residents as 
co-decision-makers in more ‘hands-on’ neighbourhood issues such as improving play-
areas, tackling garbage and litter problems.
Decision-making conflicts and deadlocks were rather limited in the investigated 
governance networks. There was a strong impetus for the housing associations and the 
local authorities to reach agreements: no consensus would very likely mean no national 
government funding. Housing associations and local authorities used rather traditional 
instruments to facilitate decision-making, such as limiting the number of actors 
involved, and enforcing strict time constraints on decision-making processes.
Outcomes are the fifth and last component of this study. In this component we 
explored how the network—and housing associations in particular—contributed 
to decision-making and neighbourhood regeneration outcomes. It is evident 
that the housing associations in the case-study areas contributed significantly to 
neighbourhood regeneration activities, not only because they channelled considerable 
investments into the areas, but also due to their strong network relations and frequent 
interactions with government agencies and local communities. The actions of network 
actors have improved the quality of some parts of the housing stock. Joint projects have 
been delivered to improve the public realm and contribute to neighbourhood safety. 
The research found that actors used very divergent process, input, output and outcome 
yardsticks to measure success, ranging from the number of projects and activities 
started, to the amount of money spent, the increase in resident satisfaction, the 
number of decision-making conflicts overcome, and the improvement achieved in 
quality-of-life indicators. These yardsticks changed over time and varied from actor to 
actor. This demonstrated how fluid the assessment of regeneration outcomes can be. 
New rounds of decision-making, as well as new network actors, led to a review of old 
decisions, sometimes with a different assessment of the outcomes achieved. 
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4 Challenges for governance network approaches
The governance network perspective has supported the exploration of the role played 
by housing associations in neighbourhood regeneration decision-making. It has 
increased our understanding of the complexity and the uncertainties involved in 
networked forms of decision-making. Governance network theory helped us identify 
instruments and strategies used by housing associations and local authorities to 
support regeneration decision-making. The governance network perspective is a rather 
new academic discipline that can be further developed. This study contributed to this 
development by addressing some issues and challenges; firstly, the role of residents 
in decision-making arenas, and secondly, the assessment of governance network 
outcomes.
The theoretical and methodological implications of residents 
as neighbourhood regeneration co-producers 
Policy-makers expect a more active role of residents and local communities in the 
co-production of neighbourhood regeneration. This more inclusive approach may 
contribute to the quality and legitimacy of decisions made in governance networks, but 
the efficiency of decision-making will most probably not benefit. The trade-off between 
efficiency and legitimacy that arises from increased resident involvement is a challenge 
that calls for the further development of the governance network theory. This research 
suggests several avenues that could be followed to address this challenge. Firstly, 
a more extensive use of Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, as explored 
in Chapter 8, might be undertaken to supplement the governance network theory. 
Secondly, more use could be made of the body of knowledge and theories developed in 
England during the New Labour government (1997-2010), which was often explicitly 
concerned with networks that linked governments with citizens and local communities 
[see Chapter 9]. 
The assessment of governance network outcomes
Co-production of neighbourhood regeneration can lead to more democratic and 
inclusive approaches to decision-making. This is likely to result in better outcomes, 
but not necessarily in greater consensus among the actors involved. Within network 
governance approaches, there is a tendency to define satisfactory outcomes as those 
that enjoy the greatest joint support of the actors involved in the process. More 
inclusive approaches, which engage a wider range of actors, might appear to be 
less successful as the benchmark of satisfaction is raised to include a wider range 
of preferences and experiences. Therefore, we need a more refined assessment of 
outcomes produced by increasingly heterogeneous networks. 
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Governance network approaches could develop methods – or develop connections 
with other theories and methodologies – that help evaluate the success of governance 
networks by combining substantive regeneration outcomes, actor and stakeholder 
satisfaction, and network learning. Preventing ‘cherry picking’ in the use of assessment 
yardsticks is essential, given the disinclination of actors to closely scrutinise the 
outcomes produced by governance networks (as found in this research). Further 
development of network governance approaches may increase our understanding of 
how actors construct the yardsticks to evaluate success, and provide tools to facilitate a 
more comprehensive assessment of network outcomes [See chapter 9]. 
5 Housing associations as champions of networks in vulnerable neighbourhoods
This research demonstrated that housing associations can play an important stabilising 
and cohesion-enhancing role in neighbourhood regeneration networks. Their interests 
are vested in the value of the local housing stock, and this financial incentive secures 
some level of commitment to vulnerable neighbourhoods. Their hybrid characteristics 
enable housing associations to collaborate with community, market and government 
organisations. Moreover, their professional capabilities and their relatively-easy 
access to resources allow them to champion neighbourhood needs, in cases where 
communities lack the capacity or cohesiveness to champion their own. 
Using the leeway that housing associations have, as a hybrid organisation, is an 
extremely delicate exercise. They should seek a balance between the very different and 
variable expectations of the outside world. This balancing act is only attainable when 
housing associations can combine proficiency in network management, with increased 
accountability. Each neighbourhood is different, and housing associations should take 
a role that is appropriate to each neighbourhood. To do this, they should increase their 
knowledge of the neighbourhood challenges and assess the capabilities of residents 
and the local community to address these problems. Housing associations can support 
the development of governance networks to address these problems by helping craft 
networks in such a way that they include all relevant parties, and by providing small 
but stable funding to support network development and by improving accountability in 
decision-making processes.
There are strong arguments for housing associations to take a central role in 
neighbourhood regeneration. Housing associations are among the most prominent 
frontline agencies supporting vulnerable people and places. Through their housing 
stock, they are literally ‘anchored’ in the most deprived communities. Housing 
associations should not become the ‘jack-of-all-trades’ in neighbourhood 
regeneration, but can help develop, nurture and maintain well-functioning and stable 
regeneration networks which vulnerable neighbourhoods need. Housing associations 
can be the long-haul champion that neighbourhoods and local communities need.
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Samenvatting
Netwerken en Breuklijnen 
De rol van woningcorporaties in de wijkaanpak:  
een netwerkperspectief op besluitvormingsprocessen
1 Probleemstelling en onderzoeksdoel 
Maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen en veranderend overheidsbeleid hebben grote 
invloed gehad op de manier waarop de nationale overheid  betrokken is bij betaalbaar 
wonen en leefbare wijken. Hiërarchische overheidssturing in deze domeinen is in 
de afgelopen decennia steeds meer vermengd met marktwerking en besluitvorming 
in netwerken van onderling afhankelijke actoren. Dit heeft invloed gehad op 
besluitvormingsprocessen.  De verscheidenheid aan actoren heeft besluitvorming er 
niet gemakkelijker op gemaakt. Ons begrip van dergelijke besluitvormingsprocessen is 
nog volop in ontwikkeling. Dit onderzoek richt zich op de rol van woningcorporaties in 
de verbetering van kwetsbare wijken; gebieden die veelal worden gekenmerkt door een 
concentratie van huishoudens met een laag inkomen, een opeenstapeling van sociale 
en economische problemen en ontoereikende kwaliteit en variëteit van woningen, 
openbare ruimte en wijkvoorzieningen. 
Wonen en de wijkaanpak vormen een vruchtbaar terrein voor onderzoek naar complexe 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Wonen wordt door velen beschouwd als de ‘wankele pijler 
van de welvaartsstaat’ (Torgersen, 1987, p.116), vanwege de ingewikkelde relatie 
tussen wonen als consumptiegoed, waar marktwerking zoveel mogelijk zijn gang 
moet gaan, en wonen als een zaak van publiek belang, waar de overheid een rol heeft. 
Wonen is ook een typisch voorbeeld van de manier waarop de levering van publieke 
diensten wordt georganiseerd in een postmoderne welvaartsstaat: namelijk met een 
sterke rol voor organisaties die geen onderdeel zijn van de overheid, zoals marktpartijen 
en organisaties in het maatschappelijk middenveld. Woningcorporaties zijn er 
een sprekend voorbeeld van. Het zijn relatief autonome not-for-profit organisaties 
die publieke diensten leveren. Zij dragen zorg  voor betaalbare woningen en het 
bijdragen aan leefbare buurten. De spanning tussen markt en overheid zorgt in de 
wijkaanpak voor complexe dillema’s als het gaat om de rol van woningcorporaties. 
Mogen corporaties bijvoorbeeld koopwoningen en duurdere huurwoningen in 
aandachtswijken bouwen? Hebben corporaties een rol in het zorgdragen van publieke 
TOC
 318 Networks and Fault Lines
voorzieningen zoals scholen en buurthuizen? Wat is de rol van corporatie in de 
Participatiesamenleving? Het antwoord op die vragen is in 2015, het jaar dat dit 
promotieonderzoek werd afgerond, veelal anders dan in 2005, het jaar waarop het 
veldwerk voor dit onderzoek startte. 
Sociale verhuurders hebben de afgelopen 20 jaar een belangrijke rol in de 
wijkvernieuwing gehad; veelal in de vorm van een mix van sociale, economische 
en fysieke interventies om de leefomstandigheden en de woningmarktpositie van 
achtergestelde wijken te verbeteren. Wat besluitvormingsprocessen in de wijkaanpak 
extra bijzonder maakt, is het gebrek aan vrijblijvendheid: woningcorporaties en 
bewoners kunnen zich niet onttrekken aan de problemen in kwetsbare wijken. 
Onderzoeksdoel
Dit onderzoek wil de kennis vergroten over de rol van woningcorporaties in 
besluitvormingsprocessen over de wijkaanpak en wil verkennen hoe die rol wordt 
beïnvloed door de beleidscontext waarin woningcorporaties opereren in Nederland en 
Engeland. Een beter begrip van de rol van woningcorporaties in de wijkvernieuwing kan 
bijdragen aan beter presterende beleidsnetwerken.
2 Theoretisch kader 
Om het bovengenoemde onderzoeksdoel te realiseren is een theoretisch raamwerk 
ontwikkeld dat inzicht biedt in de maatschappelijke positie van woningcorporaties 
en in de historische ontwikkeling van hun rol in de stedelijke vernieuwing. 
Bovendien bevat dit raamwerk de elementen die nodig zijn om complexe 
besluitvormingsprocessen in het publieke domein beter te begrijpen. Deze elementen 
zijn hieronder samengevat.
De maatschappelijke positie van woningcorporaties in Engeland 
en Nederland: verschillen en overeenkomsten 
Dit onderzoek richt zich op Engelse ‘housing associations’ en Nederlandse 
woningcorporaties. Deze organisaties werken in uiteenlopende maatschappelijke 
contexten. Engeland wordt traditioneel omschreven als een liberale markteconomie met 
een beperkte welvaartsstaat. De Nederlandse economie wordt gezien als meer gericht op 
onderlinge afstemming tussen partijen en minder op volledig vrije marktwerking (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001). Ook de huurmarkt in beide landen is verschillend (Kemeny, 1995). 
Housing associations in Engeland hebben lange tijd gefunctioneerd in een duaal stelsel 
waarin de aanbieders van sociale huurwoningen zwaar werden gereguleerd en sociale 
huurwoningen stevig gesubsidieerd, dit in tegenstelling tot de vrijwel niet gereguleerde 
private huursector. De huurmarkt in Nederland had traditioneel een meer unitair 
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karakter en werd gekenmerkt door een sociale huursector die toegankelijk was voor een 
brede doelgroep, sociale verhuurders die beschikten over een grote mate van autonomie 
en open concurrentie tussen de sociale en commerciële huursector. 
Die situatie is gedurende het veldwerk voor dit onderzoek ingrijpend veranderd. 
Engelse housing associations zijn zich steeds meer gaan richten op woningen voor 
huishoudens met een wat hoger inkomen; de overheid heeft dat mogelijk gemaakt 
door aanpassing van wet- en regelgeving en de introductie van subsidieprogramma’s 
voor ‘affordable housing’. In Nederland is sprake van een  tegenovergestelde 
ontwikkeling. De sociale huursector is sinds 2010 door regelgeving steeds meer 
afgezonderd van de rest van de huurmarkt. De autonomie van woningcorporaties 
is aanzienlijk beperkt door een sterkere sturing van lokale overheid en huurders en 
door afroming van het vermogen door middel van een verhuurdersheffing. Er zijn veel 
aanwijzingen dat de maatschappelijke context van sociale verhuurders in beide landen 
naar elkaar is toegegroeid en dat Engelse woningcorporaties op dit moment zelfs meer 
bewegingsvrijheid hebben dan hun Nederlandse collega’s. 
De rol van woningcorporaties in de wijkaanpak is in de loop van de tijd veranderd onder 
invloed van overheidsbeleid, de publieke opinie, de eigen strategieën en die van hun 
koepelorganisaties. De aard van wijkvernieuwing evolueerde van krotopruiming en 
het herontwikkelen van complete gebieden, naar een integrale aanpak van wijken. In 
beide landen was er sterke druk op woningcorporaties om een meer prominente rol 
in de verbetering van wijken op zich te nemen. Naast investeringen in de verbetering 
en de bouw van woningen, nemen Engelse housing associations ook veel sociale 
activiteiten voor hun rekening, zoals het leveren van diensten op het gebied van 
welzijn, zorg en training voor huurders. Vaak doen ze dat niet met eigen geld, maar 
met overheidssubsidies of steun van charitatieve organisaties zoals de National 
Lottery. Nederlandse corporaties werken vrijwel uitsluitend met eigen middelen 
en blijven dichter bij hun kernactiviteit, zoals het ‘schoon, heel en veilig’ houden 
van de woonomgeving. Waar Engelse collega’s vaak een belangrijke rol hebben 
bij het leveren van activiteiten op het gebied van zorg, welzijn en werk, beperken 
Nederlandse corporaties zich vaak tot de rol van investeerder in maatschappelijk 
vastgoed (zoals buurtcentra en scholen) en sponsor van leefbaarheidsactiviteiten. Op 
een enkele uitzondering na, leveren Nederlandse corporaties meestal niet de zorg- 
en welzijnsdiensten.  De nieuwe Woningwet, ingevoerd in juli 2015, legt overigens 
ernstige beperkingen op aan de mogelijkheden van corporaties om buiten hun 
kerntaken nog iets te doen voor wijken.  
Begrijpen en beïnvloeden van complexe besluitvormingsprocessen
Woningcorporaties functioneren tussen overheid, markt en samenleving. Hun 
positie is ambigue en hybride doordat zij doorlopend een balans moeten zoeken 
tussen uiteenlopende en veranderende verwachtingen en belangen. De hybriditeit 
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waarmee woningcorporaties te maken hebben is de afgelopen jaren wel van karakter 
veranderd. Waar corporaties in het verleden zich vrij gemakkelijk konden bewegen in 
het maatschappelijk middenveld tussen markt, staat en samenleving, is het speelveld 
voor corporaties nu meer afgebakend. In plaats van activiteiten verrichten die tot het 
domein van de overheid of de markt behoren, moeten corporaties zich vaker afvragen 
of, en hoe, zij een rol kunnen spelen in de wijkaanpak. Vaak zal het antwoord zijn dat 
het niet meer tot de kerntaak van corporaties behoort. Zij zijn meer dan in het verleden 
afhankelijk van anderen.  Dat vergt veel van de mogelijkheden om samen te werken 
met anderen. Samenwerken in netwerken is onmisbaar om de benodigde middelen en 
legitimiteit te verkrijgen en om het gedrag van anderen te beïnvloeden. 
De externe hybriditeit van netwerken in de wijkaanpak neemt toe; meer, en meer 
verschillende, actoren zijn nodig om problemen op te lossen. Zij hebben niet langer de 
bewegingsvrijheid om sociale en commerciële activiteiten te combineren. De interne 
hybriditeit van corporaties neemt af en verplaatst zich naar buiten. Corporaties moeten 
sociale (DAEB) en commerciële activiteiten strikt van elkaar scheiden, in ieder geval 
administratief en soms zelfs juridisch. In plaats van een hybride bedrijfsvoering wordt 
het eerder een gecompartimenteerd bedrijf. 
Het oplossen van complexe vraagstukken, zeker de problemen in kwetsbare 
buurten, vraagt om de inbreng van veel verschillende actoren (Bengtsson, 2009; 
Priemus, 2004). Dit is niet een fenomeen dat alleen woningcorporaties raakt, 
maar is onderdeel van onze moderne netwerksamenleving waarbij onderlinge 
afhankelijkheden steeds groter worden (Castells, 1996; Frissen, 2002) en overheden 
steeds meer naar de achtergrond verdwijnen, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs minder 
invloed hebben. Er bestaat onder onderzoekers geen overeenstemming over de 
machtsverhoudingen tussen de actoren in die netwerksamenleving en dus ook 
niet over de coördinatiemechanismen die de drijvende kracht vormen achter 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Is er werkelijk sprake van horizontale netwerken met weinig 
verschil in macht of invloed (Koppenjan en Klijn, 2004), of is de overheid nog steeds de 
machtigste partij maar weet zij die invloed slimmer te verpakken (Davies, 2011)? 
De (machts)verhoudingen en afhankelijkheidsrelaties tussen actoren in 
beleidsnetwerken kunnen zeer verschillend zijn. Dat geldt ook voor het doel en de 
structuur van netwerken (Brown en Keast, 2003; Keast, Mandel en Brown, 2007). 
Netwerken kunnen variëren van losse, kortdurende en vrijblijvende verbindingen 
tussen actoren tot met sterke, langdurige en structureel verankerde verbindingen 
tussen actoren. 
Dit onderzoek werkt vanuit de aanname dat coördinatiemechanismen, zoals 
overheidshiërarchieën, marktwerking en netwerksturing, hooguit conceptueel van 
elkaar te onderscheiden zijn, maar in de praktijk met elkaar zijn verstrengeld en 
voorkomen in verschillende combinaties (Swyngedouw, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Bradach 
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& Eccles, 1989).  Dit onderzoek gebruikt theorieën over beleidsnetwerken (‘goverance 
networks’) om de rol van woningcorporaties in complexe besluitvormingsprocessen 
beter te begrijpen. De kracht van deze benadering ligt in het besef dat 
besluitvormingsprocessen vier specifieke kenmerken hebben. Ze zijn doordesemd met 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1955), ze verlopen veelal rommelig (Lindblom, 1959), 
zijn complex (De Bruijn en Ten Heuvelhof, 1991) en onzeker (Koppenjan en Klijn, 
2004).
Gelijktijdig met het terugtrekken van de overheid wordt van burgers een steeds 
actievere rol verwacht in het bijdragen aan leefbare buurten en het verbeteren van hun 
eigen sociaal/economische positie. Van consumenten moeten burgers veranderen 
in coproducenten van de welvaartsstaat. Dit is zeker het geval na de introductie van 
‘Big Society’ in Engeland in 2009 en de ‘Participatiesamenleving’ in Nederland in 
2013. Veel professionals, zeker in de corporatiesector, zijn ronduit sceptisch over deze 
hervormingen, omdat zij uit ervaring weten dat veel van hun huurders afhankelijk 
zijn van overheidssteun en de transitie naar meer zelfredzaamheid niet gemakkelijk 
kunnen maken.
De co-productie tussen bewoners en professionals (Pestoff, 2014) vraagt om 
concepten die inzicht bieden in communicatie tussen zeer uiteenlopende individuen. 
Dit onderzoek maakt daarvoor, naast theorieën over beleidsnetwerken, gebruik van 
Habermas’ theorieën over ‘communicatief handelen’ (Habermas, 1987). Zijn theorieën 
analyseren onder andere de verschillen in regels en denkwijzen zoals organisaties die 
gebruiken (het systeem) en de regels en denkwijzen van bewoners (de leefwereld). 
3 Onderzoeksopzet
Onderzoeksvragen
Op basis van het bovengeschetste kader over de positie van woningcorporaties en 
de complexiteit van besluitvormingsprocessen in de wijkaanpak is een conceptueel 
model samengesteld om ons onderzoeksdoel, het beter begrijpen van de rol van 
woningcorporaties in beleidsnetwerken in de wijkaanpak, te behalen. Dit model 
bestaat uit 5 componenten, elke component is uitgewerkt in een onderzoeksvraag: 
 – Context: hoe hebben contextuele factoren, zoals economische, sociale en politieke 
ontwikkelingen, de rol van woningcorporaties in besluitvormingsprocessen in de 
wijkaanpak beïnvloed?
 – Netwerk: wat zijn de kenmerken van beleidsnetwerken (actoren, afhankelijkheden, 
verbindingen, coördinatiemechanismen) in de wijkaanpak waarin woningcorporaties 
participeren?
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 – Actoren: wat zijn de percepties en doelen van woningcorporaties en andere 
sleutelactoren in de wijkaanpak?
 – Proces: hoe verlopen besluitvormingsinteracties in beleidsnetwerken in de wijkaanpak. 
Wat is de rol van woningcorporaties, welke interactiestrategieën gebruiken zij en hoe 
reageren andere actoren daarop?
 – Resultaat: welke bijdrage hebben beleidsnetwerken geleverd aan 
besluitvormingsprocessen en resultaten in de wijkaanpak?
Onderzoeksmethodologie
Om de bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden, werd gebruik gemaakt 
van een kwalitatieve, longitudinale en internationaal vergelijkende  casestudy 
methodologie. Twee casestudy’s lopen als een rode draad door dit proefschrift, 
namelijk de wijkaanpak in Lozells (Birmingham, UK) en in De Hoogte (Groningen, 
Nederland). Later meer over deze gebieden. Voor deze casestudy’s zijn in de 
periode 2007-2014 circa 70 semi-gestructureerde interviews uitgevoerd met 45 
verschillende personen1. Met sommige personen is in de loop van de jaren meerdere 
keren gesproken. De geïnterviewden werkten veelal voor de woningcorporaties en 
gemeenten. Tevens zijn actieve bewoners, lokale politici en andere betrokkenen 
geïnterviewd. Interviews zijn aangevuld met documentanalyses en observaties van 
bijeenkomsten. 
Woningcorporaties zijn de hoofdrolspeler in dit onderzoek. De wijkaanpak is 
geselecteerd als terrein van onderzoek vanwege zijn complexiteit, het grote aantal 
betrokken actoren en de veelal hardnekkige sociale, economische en fysieke 
problemen die spelen in achterstandswijken. De casestudy over Den Haag was een 
eerste verkenning van de meerwaarde die de netwerkbenadering heeft om de bijdrage 
van woningcorporaties aan de wijkaanpak en de beïnvloedingsmogelijkheden van 
landelijke en lokale overheid beter te begrijpen.
De casestudy’s in Groningen en Birmingham zijn meer gericht op één centrale actor: 
een specifieke woningcorporatie, en één specifiek ‘beleidsspel’ waarmee het onderzoek 
startte, namelijk de ontwikkeling van toekomstplannen die richting moest geven aan 
de verbetering van de wijken; een masterplan voor Lozells en een Wijkactieplan voor 
De Hoogte. De wijken zijn geselecteerd als casestudy’s voor dit onderzoek omdat de 
besluitvorming over deze plannen in beide gevallen in een vroeg stadium was, en er 
voldoende toegang was tot documenten, bijeenkomsten en informanten. De centrale 
actor in De Hoogte is woningcorporatie De Huismeesters. In Lozells is dat housing 
association Midland Heart. 
1 Dit is exclusief de 25 interviews die zijn uitgevoerd voor de case studie in Den Haag (hoofdstuk 5).
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DE HOOGTE, GRONINGEN
De Hoogte is een wijk met ongeveer 2.000 huishoudens in studentenstad Groningen, op ongeveer 15 
minuten fietsen van het centrum. Het oudste deel van de wijk is Tuindorp de Hoogte, gebouwd vlak na 
de Eerste Wereldoorlog door de voorlopers van woningcorporatie De Huismeesters.  Andere delen van 
de wijk, Selwerderwijk Noord en Zuid, zijn na de Tweede Wereldoorlog gebouwd en bestaan vooral uit 
portieketagewoningen. Het is een wijk met oorspronkelijk vrijwel uitsluitend sociale woningbouw. De 
afgelopen decennia zijn woningen vervangen, gerenoveerd en bijgebouwd. De wijk blijft een gebied 
met vele lage inkomens. Voor Groningse begrippen is het aandeel bewoners met een niet-Nederlandse 
achtergrond vrij hoog (ongeveer 20%). Een eenzijdige bevolkingssamenstelling en woningvoorraad, 
in combinatie met sociale en leefbaarheidsproblemen, waren aanleiding voor de wijkaanpak in De 
Hoogte.
LOZELLS, BIRMINGHAM
Lozells ligt niet ver van het centrum van Birmingham. De wijk telt ongeveer 4.000 huishoudens. De 
bevolkingssamenstelling is een van de meest diverse van de stad; 95% van de inwoners heeft een niet-
Engelse achtergrond. Veel bewoners hebben wortels in Bangladesh, Pakistan of de voormalige Engelse 
koloniën in de Cariben. Het is een wijk die al heel lang opvangplek is geweest voor nieuwkomers 
in Engeland. De laatste jaren is het de startplek voor migranten uit onder andere Somalië en 
diverse Oost-Europese landen zoals Polen. De sociale en economische problemen zijn hoog, veel 
werkloosheid, veel criminaliteit en problemen met zwerfvuil. De wijk bestaat vooral uit rijtjeshuizen, 
variërend van grote Victoriaanse villa’s, die veelal zijn gesplitst in appartementen, tot kleine 
rijtjeshuizen. Overbezetting van woningen is er een groot probleem. Ongeveer 25% van de woningen is 
eigendom van sociale verhuurders.
4 Resultaten
Kritische perspectieven op beleidsnetwerken in de wijkaanpak, 
bewonersparticipatie en sociale integratie (hoofdstuk 3)
Beleidsnetwerken worden vaak genoemd als instrument om bewonersparticipatie in 
de wijkaanpak te bevorderen. Deze claim is gebaseerd op de aanname dat verticale 
sturing door de overheid plaatsmaakt voor een meer evenwichtige verdeling van macht 
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en invloed van actoren. Gecombineerd met een sterkere nadruk op wederkerigheid 
en vertrouwen zou dit zich vertalen in pluriforme beleidsnetwerken voor collectieve 
besluitvorming. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat na of deze claim ook wordt waargemaakt. Zij doet dit 
in de vorm van een aantal kritische reflecties op beleidsnetwerken in de wijkaanpak, op 
bewonersparticipatie en op sociale integratie van etnische minderheden in Nederland, 
Zweden en Engeland. Daarbij werd ook kritisch gekeken naar de democratische 
verankering van beleidsnetwerken. 
Die reflecties leidden tot de voorzichtige conclusie dat beleidsnetwerken een 
waardevolle aanvulling kunnen zijn op traditionele vormen van representatieve 
democratie. Vervolgonderzoek moet uitwijzen of het daadwerkelijk gaat om horizontale 
beleidsnetwerken of dat er vooral sprake is van sturing in de ‘schaduw’ van hiërarchisch 
overheidsingrijpen. Daarnaast zijn de opvattingen van de betrokken actoren van 
essentieel belang. Vinden zij zelf dat netwerksturing aanvullend of incompatibel is 
met representatieve democratie? Zijn hun opvattingen daarover in de loop van de tijd 
veranderd? Tenslotte is het  belangrijk om te onderzoeken hoe beleidsnetwerken in de 
praktijk gekoppeld zijn aan systemen van representatieve democratie. 
‘Een verandering ten goede?’ Doorgronden van de fusiebeweging in de 
sociale huisvestingssector in Nederland en Engeland (Hoofdstuk 4) 
Één van de meest opvallende ontwikkelingen in de sociale huisvesting in Nederland 
en Engeland is de schaalvergroting door fusies. De gemiddelde Nederlandse 
woningcorporatie is bijvoorbeeld in de afgelopen 20 jaar verdubbeld in omvang. Het 
artikel brengt de motieven en drijvende krachten in beeld en kijkt naar de resultaten 
van de fusiebeweging. Is schaalvergroting een verandering ten goede, en blijkt dat ook 
uit de impact op klanttevredenheid, woningproductie en bedrijfslasten?
Het hoofdstuk bestudeert fusies in hun nationale context. In Engeland waren fusies 
veelal het gevolg van externe factoren, onder andere de druk van de toenmalige 
toezichthouder (de Housing Corporation) op het behalen van efficiencywinsten. In 
Nederland werden fusies vooral gedreven door interne factoren, zoals de wens tot 
professionalisering van de werkorganisatie en het versterken van de marktpositie en 
externe invloed van de organisatie.  De rol van woningcorporaties in de aanpak van 
wijken werd zelden genoemd als doorslaggevende factor voor schaalvergroting. 
De relatie tussen schaal en prestaties blijkt ambivalent. De vergelijking tussen grote en 
kleine woningcorporaties is lastig omdat ze  veelal andere ambities, opgaven, taken, 
werkwijzen en sterkten en zwakten hebben. Het onderzoek toont aan dat in Nederland 
de grotere woningcorporaties relatief meer nieuwe woningen bouwen en een breder 
pakket aan diensten aanbieden. De huurders van kleinere corporaties zijn echter 
meer tevreden over de kwaliteit van de dienstverlening en bewonersparticipatie. Deze 
organisaties hebben ook lagere bedrijfslasten. De onderzoeksresultaten over Engeland 
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zijn op dit punt minder eenduidig. Het onderzoek benadrukt het belang van integratie 
van structuren, systemen en culturen van de samengevoegde organisaties na de fusie. 
Het realiseren van beoogde fusiebaten eindigt niet bij het juridisch samenvoegen van 
organisaties, maar begint daar juist. 
Een netwerkperspectief op de organisatie van betaalbaar wonen 
in Nederland: de wijkaanpak in Den Haag (Hoofdstuk 5)
Voordat met de casestudy’s in Birmingham en Groningen is gestart, werd eerst met 
behulp van de netwerkbenadering onderzoek gedaan naar het gebruik en de effecten 
van sturingsinstrumenten in de wijkaanpak in Den Haag. Het onderzoek bevestigde 
het bestaan van complexe beleidsnetwerken met veel wederzijdse afhankelijkheden. 
De overheid was duidelijk niet langer de dominante actor in de wijkaanpak. Het aantal 
instrumenten waarover de overheid beschikte om invloed uit te oefenen op het gedrag 
en de prestaties van woningcorporaties bleek beperkt. Ook de stuurkracht van die 
instrumenten was niet groot.
Nederlandse woningcorporaties beschikten over diverse vormen van zelfregulering, 
zoals visitaties, benchmarking en de governancecode. Deze instrumenten bleken 
weinig invloed te hebben op de prestaties in de wijkaanpak. Het volkshuisvestelijk 
toezicht door de nationale overheid had ook weinig effect. Effectiever bleek 
het financieel toezicht door het aan de rijksoverheid gelieerde Centraal Fonds 
Volkshuisvesting en het gebruik van prestatieafspraken tussen de gemeente en de 
corporaties in Den Haag. In combinatie vormden de gebruikte sturingsinstrumenten 
echter geen sluitend stelsel van ‘checks and balances’ om prestaties te waarborgen. 
Actoren in het Haagse wijkvernieuwingsnetwerk vonden de formele 
sturingsinstrumenten overigens minder belangrijk dan het door gemeente en 
woningcorporaties gedeelde commitment aan de kwaliteit van wijken, de persoonlijk 
chemie tussen personen en het maatschappelijk ondernemerschap van corporaties. 
Dit waren volgens hen de belangrijkste drijvende krachten achter prestaties in de 
wijkaanpak. Het blijft echter enigszins toevallig of dat commitment, die persoonlijke 
chemie en dat maatschappelijk ondernemerschap ontstaan; het was in Den Haag op 
geen enkele wijze gewaarborgd. 
Wellicht niet toevallig waren de woningcorporaties en de gemeente, de actoren met de 
meest invloedrijke positie in het netwerk, overwegend tevreden over hun prestaties in 
de wijkaanpak. Bewonersorganisaties waren een stuk minder tevreden en bleken ook 
minder in staat om hun wensen te vertalen in praktische resultaten. De invloed van 
bewoners was beperkt, dat gold zowel voor hun rol als actor in het beleidsnetwerk, hun 
positie als huurder van de woningcorporatie en als burger die via verkiezingen invloed 
probeert uit te oefenen op het gemeentelijk beleid en daarmee op de koers van de 
wijkaanpak.
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Beleidsnetwerken in actie: complexe besluitvormingsprocessen 
in de Groninger wijkaanpak (Hoofdstuk  6)
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert besluitvormingsprocessen in de Groninger wijkvernieuwing. Het 
hoofdstuk beschrijft de groeiende samenwerking tussen de gemeente Groningen en 
woningcorporaties in de wijkaanpak sinds het midden van de jaren negentig. Vanuit een 
netwerkperspectief beschrijft het de moeizame onderhandelingen tussen corporaties en 
gemeente over een nieuw convenant met afspraken over wonen en wijkvernieuwing in 
2006. De besluitvormingscomplexiteit en het aantal betrokken actoren nam toe omdat 
men de sociale, economische en fysieke aspecten van de wijkaanpak wilde intregeren. 
Dit had wel tot gevolg dat zelfs partijen die al jaren samenwerkten er bijna niet meer 
‘uitkwamen’ en vastliepen in conflicten en misverstanden.
Het identificeert de strategieën die door actoren werden gebruikt om de toegenomen 
complexiteit en onzekerheden het hoofd te bieden, zoals het formuleren van een 
gezamenlijke visie en het slim koppelen van besluitvormingsarena’s (zie Koppenjan en Klijn, 
2004). Als weg uit de impasse werden ‘gouden regels’ voor de wijkaanpak afgesproken, 
pas daarna werd onderhandeld over concrete doelen en de inzet van financiële middelen. 
Besluitvormingsarenas werden bijzonder zorgvuldig voorbereid, gefaciliteerd en opgevolgd. 
Impliciet maakten de actoren intensief gebruik van netwerk managementinstrumenten.
Wijkaanpak en Leiderschap: lessen uit Groningen en Birmingham (Hoofdstuk 7)
Vooral in Engeland was er na het Lyons rapport (2007) een sterke nadruk op het belang van 
de sociale, fysieke en economische leefbaarheid van wijken. Een aantal jaren eerder had het 
rapport ‘Vertrouwen in de Buurt’ van de Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 
(WRR, 2005) een vergelijkbare uitwerking. In Engeland werd de rol van de overheid 
benadrukt om wijken weer aantrekkelijk te maken door verschillende beleidsdomeinen 
met elkaar te verbinden. Dit werd samengevat in het begrip ‘place shaping’ (Trickett et 
al., 2008). Hiermee onlosmakelijk verbonden is het begrip ‘place leadership’; iemand 
moet tenslotte een bijdrage leveren aan ‘place shaping’ processen. In beide landen is een 
belangrijke rol weggelegd voor lokale overheden. In Nederland adviseerde de WRR om 
woningcorporaties een rol als regisseurs van de wijkaanpak te geven. 
Tegen deze achtergrond, verkent hoofdstuk 7 het concept ‘place leadership’ en 
vergelijkt dit met de netwerkbenadering. In Engeland was ‘place leadership’ een 
relatief nieuw en weinig onderzocht fenomeen.  In Nederland wordt het woord 
‘leiderschap’ zelden in combinatie met de aanpak van wijken gebruikt, hoewel van 
woningcorporaties vaak wel een belangrijke rol werd verwacht zoals bleek uit het 
eerdergenoemde rapport van de WRR (2005). De relaties tussen beleidsnetwerken 
en leiderschap werden onderzocht aan de hand van een aantal thema’s, zoals de 
ontwikkeling van wijkgerichte interventies, de invloed van nationale beleidsagenda’s, 
bewonersparticipatie, democratische verankering van de besluitvorming en de 
verschillende stijlen, dillema’s en uitdagingen verbonden aan ‘place leadership’. 
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We vonden dat zowel het perspectief van ‘place leaderschip’ als van beleidsnetwerken 
een toegevoegde waarde hebben om besluitvorming in de wijkaanpak te doorgronden. 
In Nederland wordt zelden expliciet over leiderschap gesproken, maar in de praktijk 
zijn er wel degelijk partijen die de kar trekken. Veelal zijn dat de professionals in dienst 
van gemeente en woningcorporaties. Doordat leiderschap zo impliciet blijft, blijven de 
spanningen verbonden met leiderschap veelal onbesproken. De verhouding tussen de 
professionals aan de ene kant, en  bewoners en gemeenteraadsleden aan de andere, 
blijven onderbelicht. Het perspectief van ‘place leadership’ besteedt aandacht aan 
macht, invloed, legitimiteit en gezaghebbendheid. In de netwerkbenadering worden 
deze zaken veelal gereduceerd tot een managementvraagstuk en ontdaan van hun 
politieke lading. 
Een belangrijke bijdrage van de netwerkbenadering is de erkenning dat het werken 
aan succesvolle buurten vrijwel niet gepland kan worden via traditionele rationele 
planningsmethoden. Doelen ontstaan veelal als gevolg van interacties tussen actoren. 
De netwerkbenadering maakt ook duidelijk dat veranderende beleidsagenda’s, en 
de introductie van nieuwe actoren, de uitkomsten van besluitvormingsprocessen 
kunnen beïnvloeden, en ook uitwerking hebben op de waardering van uitkomsten 
van beleidsspelen uit het verleden. Dit hoofdstuk sluit af met de conclusie dat een 
wijkaanpak vraagt om methoden die in staat zijn om de uitkomsten van complexe 
besluitvormingsprocessen op een meer genuanceerde en holistische wijze in beeld te 
brengen. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt deze conclusie vertaald in enkele aanbevelingen.
Maakt de participatiesamenleving kans van slagen? Lessen uit 
de wijkaanpak in Engeland en Nederland (Hoofdstuk 8)
Zowel in Nederland als in Engeland werden wijkvernieuwingsprogrammas met een 
sterk top-down karakter (het Krachtwijkenprogramma in Nederland en het Housing 
Market Renewal Programma in Engeland) in 2011 vroegtijdig beëindigd. Hiervoor in 
de plaats kwam een beleidsagenda die meer verantwoordelijkheid legde bij burgers 
en lokale overheden, maar tegelijkertijd ook minder overheidsmiddelen beschikbaar 
stelde. In Engeland vond dit plaats onder de vlag van de in 2009 geïntroduceerde 
‘Big Society’ en ‘Localism’ agenda. In Nederland werd in 2013 de sterk op het Britse 
voorbeeld gebaseerde ‘participatiesamenleving’ geïntroduceerd, maar al eerder werd 
het argument van de sterkere rol van burgers gebruikt om het Krachtwijken programma 
te beëindigen. 
Centraal in dit nieuwe beleidsparadigma is een meer actieve betrokkenheid van burgers bij 
de coproductie van oplossingen voor complexe maatschappelijke problemen. Hoofdstuk 
8 onderzoekt, op basis van de casestudy resultaten uit Birmingham en Groningen, 
welke lessen er geleerd kunnen worden voor het succesvol implementeren van de 
participatiemaatschappij. Met behulp van Habermas’ (1987) concept van leefwereld en 
systeemwereld wordt aannemelijk gemaakt dat het ontwikkelen van verbindingen tussen 
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professionals en bewoners erg lastig is vanwege de verschillende denkwijzen en regels. Die 
verschillen worden door professionals amper onderkend, waardoor coproductieprocessen 
met burgers vaak uitermate moeizaam verlopen. De lessen uit de wijkaanpak zijn 
waardevol voor het versterken van de participatiemaatschappij. Professionals zullen tijd 
en aandacht moeten besteden om bewoners in kwetsbare buurten te ondersteunen in het 
oppakken van hun rol als coproducent. Burgerschap vergt ambachtschap, en organisaties 
zoals woningcorporaties zijn uitstekend gepositioneerd om bewoners te ondersteunen in 
het ontwikkelen van de noodzakelijke vaardigheden.
5 Conclusies
In deze sectie worden de antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen over respectievelijk 
context, netwerk, actoren, proces en resultaat samengevat.
Context
Dit onderzoek vond plaats in een periode (2005-2014) van onverwacht ingrijpende 
economische, sociale en politieke ontwikkelingen. De crisis op de woningmarkt en de 
snelle terugtrekking van de overheid uit wijkvernieuwingsprogramma’s hebben de 
besluitvorming over de wijkaanpak en de rol van de woningcorporaties in de  casestudy-
gebieden significant beïnvloed, zij het op verschillende manieren. 
De Nederlandse woningcorporatie bleek aanzienlijk robuuster in het omgaan met 
deze contextuele ontwikkelingen dan de Engelse housing association. Financiële 
ondersteuning door de overheid was van veel minder kritisch belang voor de 
Nederlandse woningcorporatie; ze beschikten al over voldoende middelen om te 
investeren in de wijkaanpak. 
De introductie van Big Society en Localism in Engeland, en de participatiesamenleving 
in Nederland hebben de rol van woningcorporaties beïnvloed en effect gehad op de 
kenmerken van de beleidsnetwerken in de wijkaanpak. Dit toont ook de waarde aan van de 
internationaal vergelijkende, longitudinale aanpak van dit onderzoek. Deze aanpak maakte 
het mogelijk om de perspectieven en reacties van actoren te volgen en vast te leggen op het 
moment dat die contextuele ontwikkelingen zich voordeden. Dat gaf een zuiverder beeld 
dan actoren achteraf te vragen die ontwikkelingen en hun reactie daarop te reconstrueren. 
Netwerk
Dit onderzoek toonde aan dat besluitvorming in de wijkaanpak plaatsvindt in complexe 
netwerken. Kenmerken die horen bij dergelijke vormen van besluitvorming werden 
ruimschoots aangetroffen, zoals onderlinge afhankelijkheden, pluriforme actoren, 
een zekere mate van geslotenheid van actoren en van het netwerk, en een aanzienlijke 
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dynamiek van wisselende actoren en beleidsagenda’s. Deze factoren zorgen voor grote 
inhoudelijke, strategische en institutionele onzekerheden. 
Uit het onderzoek bleken ook aanzienlijke verschillen tussen Nederland en Engeland.  
Deze verschillen kwamen niet onverwacht. Omdat Nederland veel kenmerken 
van een gecoördineerde markteconomie heeft (zie Hall en Soskice, 2001), werd 
in Groningen ook een sterker ontwikkeld netwerk verwacht en in Birmingham, 
vanwege de sterkere liberale marktverhoudingen, meer competitie tussen actoren 
en samenwerkingsverbanden die vooral gericht waren op de eigen doelen van de 
betrokken organisaties. Die verwachtingen werden ook grotendeels bevestigd door het 
onderzoek. 
De voornaamste verklaring voor de verschillen in netwerktypologieën lijkt samen 
te hangen met de uiteenlopende beschikbaarheid van financiële middelen. In 
Groningen waren de meeste middelen al beschikbaar, namelijk in de vorm van de 
investeringscapaciteit van de betrokken woningcorporatie. Bijkomende middelen 
uit het Krachtwijkenprogramma van de nationale overheid waren welkom, maar niet 
noodzakelijk. Deze relatieve onafhankelijkheid van externe middelen droegen bij aan 
een sterk ontwikkeld en stabiel beleidsnetwerk. De focus in het Groninger netwerk 
lag voornamelijk op de allocatie van middelen over activiteiten en projecten. Het 
beleidsnetwerk in Lozells beschikte daarentegen over minder eigen middelen en was 
vooral gericht op het verkrijgen van financiering van de nationale overheid. 
De kenmerken van de beleidsnetwerken waren niet  constant, maar veranderden onder 
invloed van interne en externe factoren. Netwerkrelaties tussen Midland Heart en de 
Birmingham City Council waren intensiever tijdens de ontwikkeling van het Masterplan 
voor Lozells, maar verslapten nadat de kansen op subsidie waren verminderd door 
beëindiging van het Housing Market Renewal programme en versobering van het 
Affordable Homes Programme in 2011.
Actoren
In beide casestudy gebieden vervulden de woningcorporaties een prominente rol in 
wijkvernieuwingsactiviteiten. Dat deden zij in nauwe samenwerking met gemeentelijke 
overheden, onder andere door het gezamenlijk opstellen van toekomstplannen voor de 
wijken. De betrokken woningcorporaties beschouwden het verbeteren van de kwaliteit 
van de woningen als een belangrijk doel, evenals het vergroten van de verscheidenheid 
in het woningaanbod, vooral door aanvullend woningaanbod te creëren voor 
huishoudens met een modaal of hoger inkomen. Deze ambitie werd ook ondersteund 
door de gemeenten. De nadruk van bewoners lag vooral op het verbeteren van de 
woningkwaliteit en het zorgen voor voldoende betaalbare woningen. Ook vonden 
bewoners de verbetering van de leefbaarheid erg belangrijk, zoals het bestrijden van 
overlast, vervuiling, vernieling en (drugs)criminaliteit.
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Tijdens het veldwerk voor dit onderzoek veranderde de rol van woningcorporaties in 
beide casestudy gebieden. Van een leidende positie in het wijkvernieuwingsproces (in 
samenwerking met de lokale overheid) veranderde dat in een meer faciliterende en 
ondersteunende rol. Dit lijkt te zijn veroorzaakt door twee factoren: een sterke daling 
van de beschikbare middelen en een grotere nadruk op de eigen verantwoordelijkheid 
van individuele bewoners en lokale gemeenschappen.
Proces
Woningcorporaties in beide casestudy gebieden hadden een prominente en 
vaak leidende rol in het wijkvernieuwingsnetwerk. In deze netwerken vonden 
vooral interacties plaats tussen woningcorporaties en lokale overheden, maar ook 
centrale overheden hadden een sterke invloed op het verloop en de uitkomsten van 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Die invloed kwam vooral voort uit de financiële middelen 
die door de nationale overheid in het vooruitzicht werden gesteld en de eisen die 
daaraan verbonden waren. Lokale actoren hebben in belangrijke mate het lokale 
besluitvormingsproces afgestemd op de wensen van de nationale overheid. Er waren 
weinig conflicten en impasses tijdens de ontwikkeling van plannen voor de wijk. Er was 
betrokkenen ook veel aan gelegen om tot overeenstemming te komen; geen consensus 
zou immers ook geen overheidssteun betekenen. Zeker in Birmingham was die 
financiering van essentieel belang. 
Besluitvorming vond voornamelijk plaats in arena’s die vrijwel uitsluitend bestonden uit 
professionals. Bewoners kregen vooral de rol van ‘consument’. Hun visie op de toekomst 
van de wijk werd wel gevraagd en meegewogen in de besluitvorming, maar daar waren 
zij zelf meestal niet bij. Vooral de professionals van de woningcorporatie en de gemeente 
maakten de plannen. Plannen die  zij vervolgens voor commentaar aan de bewoners 
presenteerden. Niet alle besluitvormingsarena’s waren gesloten voor bewoners. 
Woningcorporaties in beide gebieden betrokken bewoners als coproducenten in de meer 
uitvoerende projecten, zoals de verbetering van de openbare ruimte.
Resultaten
Woningcorporaties in beide casestudy gebieden hebben aanzienlijk bijgedragen aan 
de wijkvernieuwingsactiviteiten. Niet alleen omdat ze investeerden in de wijken—
overigens vooral in Groningen—maar ook vanwege hun intensieve interacties met 
andere actoren in het netwerk.
Dit onderzoek heeft vooral vanuit de perspectieven van betrokken actoren gekeken naar 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Dat perspectief is ook gebruikt om de resultaten van de 
wijkaanpak te evalueren. Actoren gebruikten een opvallende verscheidenheid aan criteria 
om resultaten te beoordelen, variërend van input indicatoren zoals de hoeveelheid 
geïnvesteerd geld, output indicatoren zoals het aantal uitgevoerde projecten, outcome 
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indicatoren zoals de stijging van de bewonerstevredenheid, en meer objectieve 
indicatoren over de leefbaarheid in de buurt en de sociaal/economische positie van 
bewoners. Soms werden ook procesindicatoren gebruikt voor de evaluatie, zoals de 
goede samenwerking of het samen vinden van oplossingen voor meningsverschillen. De 
beoordeling van uitkomsten was hierdoor enigszins fluïde en willekeurig. Actoren hadden 
de neiging om indicatoren te kiezen die hun inspanningen in een positief licht plaatsten. 
6 Implicaties voor theorie en praktijk
Dit onderzoek toont aan dat woningcorporaties ertoe doen in beleidsnetwerken in de 
wijkaanpak. Zij kunnen een stabiliserende en verbindende factor zijn. Bedrijfsbelangen 
en sociale betrokkenheid bevorderen hun commitment aan kwetsbare wijken. De 
hybride kenmerken van hun organisatie stellen hen in staat om samen te werken met 
bewoners, overheden en marktpartijen. De relatief gemakkelijke toegang tot financiële 
middelen maken het woningcorporaties mogelijk om zich langdurig te concentreren op 
het ondersteunen van kwetsbare wijken, als bewoners zelf onvoldoende mogelijkheden 
hebben om dat te doen.
Wijken zoals De Hoogte en Lozells zullen er waarschijnlijk altijd blijven; gebieden waar 
veel kwetsbare huishoudens met een laag inkomen wonen. Op basis van de bevindingen 
van dit onderzoek, is het onwaarschijnlijk dat nationale overheden –of marktpartijen- in 
staat, of bereid, zijn om zich langdurig in te zetten voor deze gebieden. Daarvoor zijn 
de kansen op financieel of politiek gewin te beperkt. De politieke aandacht voor wijken 
als De Hoogte en Lozells werd in het verleden sterk beïnvloed door dreigende onrust of 
daadwerkelijke rellen en andere vormen van criminaliteit. Niets doen, zou leiden tot 
politiek verlies. Het is gevaarlijk om de aandacht voor kwetsbare wijken te laten afhangen 
van de getijden van politiek en markt. Dit onderzoek heeft onderstreept dat we complexe 
problemen alleen kunnen oplossen in netwerken met meerdere partijen. Het ontwikkelen 
en onderhouden van relaties tussen actoren in die netwerken kosten tijd en inzet. Er is 
een organisatie nodig die netwerken in kwetsbare wijken langdurig kan ondersteunen, 
ongeacht de stand van het getij. Corporaties zijn daarvoor een uitgelezen partij.
De positie van woningcorporaties—als private not-for-profit organisaties, tussen 
overheid, markt en maatschappij—biedt hun enige discretionaire vrijheid om te 
manoeuvreren tussen overheidshiërarchieën en de tucht van de markt als dat nodig 
is om lokale gemeenschappen te ondersteunen. Sociale verhuurders zijn daardoor 
in zekere mate in staat om contra-cyclisch te handelen,  door het agenderen van 
onderwerpen die niet hoog op de politieke agenda staan, door te investeren in 
projecten en gebieden waar reguliere marktpartijen geen interesse in hebben, of 
door activiteiten uit te voeren die niet aansluiten bij de heersende opvattingen van 
bewoners en lokale gemeenschappen. Dit vraagt lef en daadkracht van corporaties. 
Het is geenszins een pleidooi om woningcorporaties een ‘blanco cheque’ te geven. 
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De Parlementaire Enquête Woningcorporaties heeft duidelijk gemaakt wat er kan 
gebeuren als woningcorporaties hun mandaat overschrijden. Het gebruiken van de 
speelruimte die woningcorporaties hebben -als hybride organisatie tussen overheid, 
markt en samenleving- is een uiterst delicate oefening. Het is een evenwichtsoefening 
tussen de verschillende verwachtingen van de buitenwereld en de eigen afwegingen om 
bij te dragen aan de kwaliteit van de buurt op lange termijn. Die evenwichtsoefening 
slaagt alleen als woningcorporaties in staat zijn om vaardigheid op het gebied van 
netwerkmanagement en het bouwen van coalities met andere actoren te combineren 
met transparantie en verantwoording over hun keuzen, afwegingen en resultaten; 
het gaat daarbij om het vinden van een zorgvuldige -en kwetsbare- balans tussen 
legitimiteit, efficiency en effectiviteit van handelen. 
Samenvattend, ziet dit onderzoek vijf redenen voor een prominente rol  van 
woningcorporaties voor het ondersteunen van kwetsbare wijken:
1 woningcorporaties kunnen zorgen voor een stabiele stroom investeringen in wijken;
2 woningcorporaties kunnen als organisatie met een lange-termijn focus opkomen voor 
de belangen van kwetsbare wijken en hun bewoners; 
3 woningcorporaties kunnen als hybride organisaties bijdragen aan een goedwerkend 
beleidsnetwerk;
4 woningcorporaties kunnen bijdragen aan het verder uitbouwen van de 
Participatiesamenleving door het ondersteunen van bewonersinitiatieven in wijken; 
5 woningcorporaties hebben, meer dan menig andere organisatie, ogen en oren in 
kwetsbare wijken en kunnen signaleren, agenderen en waar nodig handelen. 
Aansluitend hierop, formuleert dit onderzoek een vijftal aanbevelingen voor de rol van 
woningcorporaties in de wijkaanpak:
1 vergroot de kennis van de uitdagingen waar buurten mee kampen, en onderzoek 
nauwkeurig wat de weerbaarheid en zelfredzaamheid van wijken is: over welke 
mogelijkheden, talenten en vaardigheden beschikken bewoners en buurten om zelf 
problemen op te lossen?;
2 kies op basis van de weerbaarheid en zelfredzaamheid van bewoners en buurten voor 
een rol die past om bij te dragen aan het oplossen van problemen. Die rol zal per buurt 
verschillend zijn;
3 streef ernaar om alle relevante actoren actief als coproducenten (en zo min mogelijk als 
consumenten) te laten participeren in het oplossen van problemen. Bekwaam je in het 
gebruik van netwerk management instrumenten om dit te bewerkstelligen;
4 zorg voor een bescheiden maar stabiele stroom aan middelen (geld, mensen, aandacht, 
kennis en tijd) om de participatie van actoren in het beleidsnetwerk te ondersteunen;
5 versterk de transparantie en verantwoording over het functioneren en de resultaten van 
het beleidsnetwerk.
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Uitdagingen voor beleidsnetwerken als onderzoeksperspectief
Om de rol van woningcorporaties in complexe besluitvormingsprocessen in de 
wijkaanpak beter te begrijpen heeft dit onderzoek zeer vruchtbaar gebruik gemaakt 
van theorieën over beleidsnetwerken. Op basis van de onderzoekservaringen is een 
aantal uitdagingen voor de verdere ontwikkeling van theorieën op het gebied van 
beleidsnetwerken geformuleerd:
1 vergroten van inzichten in de impact van contextuele ontwikkelingen, marktwerking en 
overheidssturing op beleidsnetwerken;
2 ontwikkelen van methoden en verantwoordingsmechanismen om de resultaten van 
beleidsnetwerken te beoordelen in een situatie waarin het aantal betrokken actoren, 
perspectieven en doelen toeneemt;
3 ontwikkelen van theoretische concepten die meer inzicht bieden in de rol van burgers 
als coproducenten in besluitvormingsprocessen.  
7 Epiloog
Dit proefschrift eindigt met het uitspreken van de hoop dat sociale verhuurders hun 
focus op kwetsbare wijken niet verliezen. Uiteindelijk zijn zij één van de weinige 
partijen die daar het verschil kunnen maken. Als woningcorporaties zich niet 
committeren aan wijken en kwetsbare bewoners verliezen zij hun unieke positie en 
daarmee eigenlijk hun bestaansrecht, want het aanbieden van betaalbare woningen 
alleen is geen unieke taak meer van woningcorporaties. Wat wel uniek is, en wat geen 
enkele andere organisatie goed kan, is het gebruiken van betaalbare woningen als 
hefboom en instrument om kwetsbare wijken en mensen te ondersteunen, in goede en 
in slechte tijden, niet alleen nu of morgen, maar zo lang het nodig is. 
 
Maar niet met steen  
en hout alleen 
is ‘t grote werk gedaan 
‘t Zal om onszelve gaan. 
 
Valerius’ Neder-landtsche gedenkclanck (1626) 
Gezang 320, Liedboek voor de kerken (1973)
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Gerard van Bortel was born on November 8 1963 in Breda. He followed a rather long 
but ‘scenic’ educational route. After finishing his general secondary education (MAVO) 
in Breda, he followed a vocational technical study Architecture in the same city. During 
that study, he became inspired by affordable housing and urban regeneration, and 
followed the specialized Social Housing track at the Tilburg Polytechnic Architecture 
department (HTS). He attained his title as Architectural Engineer (Ing.) in 1989 with a 
study on the regeneration of a deprived housing estate in the city of Groningen. 
After completing his alternative military service, he started working for housing 
associations in Zwolle (SAVO, later DeltaWonen) and Groningen (De Huismeesters) in 
various functions: housing officer, ICT-officer, quality manager, manager of a Research 
and Development department and, finally, senior strategy consultant. Parallel to 
his career in housing, Gerard continued studying in part-time. After attaining his 
propedeuse in Economics at the University of Amsterdam, he studied Organisational 
Sciences (‘Bedrijfswetenschappen’) at the Open University. In 2003 he attained his 
Masters title with a thesis exploring the link between the organisational strategies and 
performance of Dutch housing associations. 
In 2004, Gerard quit his job at housing association De Huismeesters in Groningen, and 
moved with his wife (Neeltje Reijnders) and two young children to Belgium were Neeltje 
became a Minister in Brussels for the United Protestant Church of Belgium. It proved 
to be a pivotal year. Without employment, Gerard started to look for new opportunities 
in the domain of social housing. This exploration led to a career shift with to a stronger 
focus on consultancy, research, training and education. He became a social housing 
strategy consultant working for the Amsterdam-based firm RIGO Research en Advies. 
Parallel to his work for RIGO, Gerard conducted a study on governance networks in 
neighbourhood regeneration in The Hague working as an independent researcher for 
the OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment, part of the Delft University of 
Technology. 
Working for OTB Gerard’s ideas to do a PhD matured. He started his PhD in 2005 under 
supervision of Prof. Dr. Ir. Marja Elsinga, Prof. Dr. Peter Boelhouwer (both TU Delft) 
and Prof. David Mulins. In 2007 Gerard left RIGO and started working at OTB, were he 
specialised in studies on social housing governance and institutions. In 2013 Gerard 
moved to the TU Delft Real Estate and Housing department, part of the Architecture 
faculty, to strengthen the balance between governance & management and research & 
education in his work. 
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Parallel to his work for the TU Delft, Gerard is chair of a supervisory board of housing 
association Parteon and chair of the Audit Board (‘Visitatieraad’) that assesses the 
performance of Flemish housing associations. Gerard is a proud father of a teenage 
son (Gideon, 17) and daughter (Emma, 15) and lives with his family just north of 
Amsterdam, in Krommenie, after their return from Belgium in 2009. 
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